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The rise of East Asia has generated debate about how International Relations (IR) 
Theory should respond to ongoing structural change. Most significantly, a vibrant 
body of literature now exists that advances – or critiques – the imperative and 
feasibility for East Asian IR Theory (EAIRT). This thesis addresses an understudied 
but unique dimension of the EAIRT debate: how claims about EAIRT have altered the 
way academics approach their research, education and other professional activities. 
This question has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT 
directly (whatever their perspective on that debate) and by those who study the 
relationship between academia and practices more generally.  
Driven by the question ‘how have academic practices changed in response to the call 
for EAIRT’, this study investigates the connection between the various claims about 
EAIRT and the actual practices of academics in bringing their claims to life. In 
addressing this issue, this research answers three sub-questions: why knowledge 
claims occur the way they do; how theorists validate and implement these claims in 
their daily life; and what actually drives those claims and shifting practices (if any). 
Addressing these questions provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, 
significance and depth of the contemporary EAIRT debate and enables a better 
appreciation of the theory-practice relationship. 
To answer these questions, this thesis constructs a ‘sociology of science’ framework 
and then applies it to assess the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities in 
an EAIRT context. This study finds that whilst there have been some changes adopted 
by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, the degree and form of changes vary across 
cases. In China, the biggest developments are the formulation of a vibrant theory-led 
debate and a resource mobilization process to pave the way for the construction of a 
‘Chinese style’ IR Theory. In Japan, the EAIRT discourse initially presented itself in 
the form of re-examining the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ in the past. However, it has 
increasingly shifted toward a ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. Meanwhile shifting EAIRT 
practices in the US are most clearly found among a small number of American-based 
East Asia specialists who have attempted to bring the Eastern agency into IR Theory. 
Yet ‘mainstream American IR’, given its hegemonic status in the field and the 




This thesis argues that these different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the 
uneven impact of social factors on the practices of knowledge claims. These social 
factors can be classified into two main categories: structural consideration (power 
shift, socio-political concerns, and academic institutions) and agential choice 
(personal background, vision of science, and moral choice). These structural and 
agential factors often intersect and exert impact to varying extents on different 
national IR academies and individual academics, and therefore shape their respective 
responses to the call for EAIRT. That explains why claims for EAIRT take various 
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 A note on name and translation 
This thesis follows the Chinese and Japanese convention of placing the surname 
before the given name in refereeing to the names of mainland Chinese and ordinary 
Japanese scholars. As an exception, this convention is reversed when identifying those 
Chinese diaspora scholars and Japanese authors who have published extensively in 
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Theoretical shifts and trends are seldom independent of real-world 
developments, such as changes to the distribution of power, the emergence of 
new patterns of conflict or cooperation, and the advent of new areas that pose 
urgent and serious challenges to states and societies… Assuming that a key 
underlying basis of Western-centrism in IRT had to do with the material and 
ideational dominance of the West, will the material rise of Asia have 
consequential ideational repercussions for IR, reshaping IRT not just in Asia, 
but also beyond? (Acharya 2014c, 120-1). 
After centuries of Western dominance in world politics, we are now witnessing the 
shifting of economic and political power to the East. Serving as the key engine of the 
‘Asian century’ (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 2011; Commonwealth 2012), East Asia has 
become the limelight of attention given its growing geopolitical importance in the 
world political economy.1 East Asia is the world’s most dynamic and rapidly growing 
region with a total population of nearly 2.2 billion, accounting for approximately one-
third of the world’s total (United Nations 2015, 13-7), and is home to economic and 
political powerhouses like China and Japan as well as emerging economies like South 
Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN. This region’s growing strength has been accompanied 
by a call by both East Asian policy-makers and by its scholarly community for the 
thinking about international relations to be weighed more centrally by those involved 
in that pursuit. This groundswell was perhaps first evident in the early to mid-1990s 
when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his Singaporean counterpart 
Lee Kuan Yew spearheaded the ‘Asian values’ movement as an alternative to Western 
formulas for modernization and political development (Zakaria 1994; Mohamad 1996; 
Teik 1999). More recently, this approach has been updated by Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ of building a stronger and more prosperous China coupled 
with Beijing’s ‘New Security Concept’ that envisions a new type of Asian-centric 
international relations devoid of traditional power balancing that so characterizes 
Western geopolitics. Other regional offshoots arguably embody a greater ‘Asianness’ 
1 The term ‘East Asia’ in this research is not understood in its broader sense as ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Asia’; 
nor is it confined in the older and narrower sense as ‘Northeast Asia.’ ‘East Asia’ in this research refers 
to the region that covers the Northeast and Southeast Asian sub-regions.  
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 include Abenomics in Japan and the ‘ASEAN Way’ prevailing throughout much of 
Southeast Asia.2  
The reality of East Asia’s rise and the purported simultaneous decline of the West 
posit the key issue of how International Relations Theory (IRT) should respond to this 
structural development. The ongoing power shift to the East has created some 
discernible responses in the international relations (i.r.) of the West. These include 
most notably the announcement of US pivot to Asia in 2011 and Australia’s issuance 
of a White Paper on its place and strategy in the ‘Asian century’ in 2012 
(Commonwealth 2012; White 2011). The geopolitical rise of the East, however, has 
not significantly changed the way our knowledge about i.r. is being produced: 
International Relations (IR) remains a Western-centric discipline.3 Increasingly, 
however, there have been various attempts by local as well as some Western-based 
scholars to construct some sort of indigenous theories based on the rich history, 
experience, and traditions of East Asia. This academic movement coincided with a 
critical self-refection within Western scholarship on the current state and future 
development of IR theory. Together, these discussions have shaped one of the most 
heated debates in the existing IR literature regarding the so-called non-Western IRT in 
East Asia or East Asian International Relations Theory (EAIRT).  
Among other things, the debate over EAIRT has raised an interesting and indeed 
important puzzle which this thesis aims to decode, and that is to what extent this 
theoretical debate can shape the practices of involved scholars. There have been many 
claims and counter-claims being put forward in the EAIRT debate but we may wonder 
how these claims have altered the way academics approach their work, research, 
education and other professional activities. In short, what have academics done to 
actualize their claims in daily life? It is this relationship between the theoretical debate 
about EAIRT on the one hand and the social practices of scholars across the range of 
their day-to-day operations on the other that is the focal point of this research. 
2 ASEAN is the abbreviation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This organization 
comprises of ten Southeast Asian countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. 
3 Throughout this research, ‘international relations’ (i.r.) is used to describe the practice of international 
politics while ‘International Relations’ (IR) refers to the academic discipline of IR. 
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 Driven by the question ‘how have academic practices changed in response to the call 
for EAIRT’, this study investigates the connection between the various claims that 
surround EAIRT and the actual practices of scholars in bringing their claims into life. 
In addressing this issue, this research answers three sub-questions: why knowledge 
claims occur the way they do; how theorists validate and implement these claims in 
their daily life; and what actually drives those claims and shifting practices (if any). 
This question has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT 
directly, whatever their perspective on that debate, and by those who study the 
relationship between academia and practices more generally. Addressing this question 
thus provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, significance and depth 
of the contemporary EAIRT debate and enables a better appreciation of the linkages 
between theory and practice. 
To address the research questions, this researcher constructs a sociology of science 
framework and then applies it to assess the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR 
communities in an EAIRT context. As a consequence of these innovations, this study 
finds that whilst there have been some changes adopted by scholars involved in the 
EAIRT debate, the degree and form of changes vary across cases. An argument is 
advanced here that these different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the 
uneven impact of social factors on the practices of theoretical claims. These social 
factors can be classified into two main categories: structural consideration (power 
shift, socio-political concerns, and academic institutions) and agential choice 
(personal background, vision of science, and moral choice). These structural and 
agential factors often intersect and exert impact to varying extents on different 
national IR academies and individual academics, and therefore shape their respective 
responses to the call for EAIRT. That explains why claims for EAIRT take various 
forms in theoretical debates and are implemented in different ways in scholars’ daily 
practices. 
With that in mind, this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with a 
discussion about the current state of IR Theory and the emerging debate about EAIRT. 
The researcher will then identify the gap in the existing literature and the relevance of 
this thesis, followed by a briefing about the thesis’s methodology, findings, and 
argumentation. The chapter concludes with a summary of the overall structure and the 
scholarly contribution of this thesis. 
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 ‘The end of IR Theory’ and the emerging debate over non-Western/East Asian 
IR Theory 
In the summer of 1989, just before the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama 
pressed the policy and the scholarly communities with his ‘end of history’ thesis. 
Among other things, Fukuyama argued that the demise of the Cold War would end the 
global ideological conflicts and eventually lead to an end of mankind’s ‘history’ of 
ideological contention with the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy and Western 
values (Fukuyama 1989).4 Shortly afterwards, a counter-thesis to Fukuyama’s theory 
in the form of the ‘clash of civilizations’ coined by a no-less renowned scholar Samuel 
Huntington emerged. Contrary to Fukuyama, Huntington foresaw a decline of liberal 
democracy and Western values and possible civilizational conflicts ‘between the West 
and the rest’ (Huntington 1993a; Huntington 1996b). Such a world, in Huntington’s 
view, was not a unitary one because ‘civilizations unite and divide humankind’ 
(Huntington 1993b, 194). Western culture, in such a diverse environment, is ‘unique’ 
but ‘not universal’ because ‘what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the 
rest’ (Huntington 1996a).   
The aforementioned Asian values thesis was advanced almost simultaneously with 
Huntington’s clash of civilization theory. Asian values embodied the assertion that 
distinctly regional cultures and norms flowing from them contributed to the postwar 
economic success of many East Asian countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. It consequently shaped their worldview in different forms 
from those prominent in Western circles e.g. conception of democracy and human 
rights (Kausikan 1993; Jayasuriya 1996; Wu 1996; Inoguchi and Newman 1997). This 
assertion challenged the conventional wisdom about the West’s superiority of 
‘civilized democracy/liberalism/individualism/science’ as opposed to the East’s 
4 There have been debates over the definition and distinction of the West/non-West terms as will be 
further elaborated in the Literature review chapter. Nonetheless, for the purpose of convenience, these 
two terms are referred to in this research with their most general understandings. Kishore Mahbubani 
defines ‘the West’ geographically as the United States, Canada, and Europe, joined by the ‘Anglo-
Saxon states’ of Australia and New Zealand (Mahbubani 2008). Despite this relatively ‘homogenous’ 
concept of ‘the West’, there is a wide variation among the so-called ‘Western IR theories’ such as those 
differences between positivist and reflectivist positions or between the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European approaches. The term ‘non-West’, meanwhile, is a more controversial concept and is 
currently vaguely defined as the region ‘beyond the West’. For the purpose of this research, the term 
‘non-West’ is used interchangeably with those terms of ‘Third World’, the ‘Global South’, ‘Developing 
Countries’ or the ‘Subaltern.’ The term ‘non-Western IRT’ is also used interchangeably with ‘post-
Western’, ‘past-Western’ or ‘postcolonial’ IRT although their discern distinction will be at times 
noticed in specific context. 
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 inferiority of ‘barbaric Oriental despotism’, centering on 
‘authoritarianism/collectivism/mysticism’ (Hobson 2014, 123). The ‘Asian values’ 
assertion was harshly criticized among Western scholarship; yet interestingly, 
Huntington was among the few Western scholars who identified with it. The success 
of East Asian societies, he acknowledged, was ‘not because they became like the 
West, but because they have remained different from the West’ (Huntington 1996a). 
Huntington, therefore, agreed with the assertion by the leading ‘Asian value’ 
proponent – Kishore Mahbubani – that ‘the rapidly increasing economic power of East 
Asian states will… lead to increasing military power, political influence and cultural 
assertiveness’ (Huntington 1993b, 193). The ‘Asian Values’ proposition, however, ran 
out of steam when most of Asian economies were undercut by the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis. 
A decade after this civilizational debate, a similar debate materialized in the domain of 
IR Theory. In 2007, Christine Sylvester talked about ‘the end of IR’ implying the 
increasing silence of ‘theoretical debates’ in the field. IR, argues Sylvester (2007, 566) 
has been dominated by its ‘camp structure’ which ‘indicates that all major conflicts 
within IR have not been resolved and are not being resolved.’ Although borrowing the 
term ‘end of IR’ from Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, Sylvester (2007, 567) 
posited that the ‘end of IR’ is not a part of the ‘end of history.’ In fact, contrary to the 
end of history which hails the triumph of Western values, the end of IR ushers in a 
period of more ‘fragments’ or ‘camps’ and, by definition, ‘less overdetermining 
gatekeeping in the field’ (Sylvester 2007, 567). 
The mitigation of ‘great debates’ and ‘conflicts’ in IR has increasingly become a clear 
trend in the field. In 2013 the European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) 
devoted a special issue to the theme ‘The end of International Relations Theory?’ 
Borrowing on their long-time observation of the IR field, EJIR’s editors (Tim Dunne, 
Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight) realized that since the third great debate between the 
rationalists and reflectivists in the late 1980s to early 1990s,5 there have been no new 
‘great debates’ or ‘grand theorizing’ in IR scholarship. Instead of theoretical conflicts, 
what occurred was a ‘theoretical peace’ or ‘theoretical truce’ among contending 
theoretical paradigms and that scholars gravitated toward ‘theory testing’ rather than 
5 This debate is at times referred to in the literature as the fourth great debate in IR. For consistency, it 
is referred to in this thesis as the third great debate in IR. 
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 ‘theory development’ (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 406). The absence of ‘great 
debates’ or ‘paradigm wars’ in the field was also characterized by the surge of middle-
range theorizing and mid-level theory at the expense of ‘grand theorizing’ or ‘meta-
theory.’ Although IR scholars remained deeply divided as to whether the current 
situation constitutes the ‘end of IR theory’, they seemed to agree that the state of IRT 
was one of pluralism and/or fragmentation of theoretical approaches.  
In an effort to repair this unfortunate situation, some leading scholars have since urged 
for the restoration of ‘big thinking’ and ‘grand debates’ in IR (Mearsheimer and Walt 
2013). During the past two decades, some minor theoretical innovation has taken 
place, such as the introduction of critical realism, ‘practice theory’ (as part of 
constructivism), and empirically driven middle-range theories. However, no new ‘big 
theory’ has been developed and no new great debate currently appears to be in sight 
(Wæver 2007). In this context, analytical eclecticism developed by Peter Katzenstein 
and Rudra Sil (2008) emerges as ‘the only real alternative to the status quo’ (Lake 
2011, 472). Eclectic scholars advocate ‘problem-driven rather than paradigm-driven 
research, and seek to foster dialogue across approaches so as to help solve substantive 
problems in international politics’ (Schmidt 2014). In light of this theoretical turn 
toward middle-range theories and eclectic theorizing, David Lake posits that ‘we 
should recognize there are multiple valid and perhaps even complementary paths to 
understanding’ (Lake 2011, 465). Diversity is needed, and we should depart from 
‘great debates’ of isms toward more practical, issue-oriented knowledge (Lake 2011).  
Occurring almost simultaneously with this critical self-reflection of the state of IR 
theory within Western IR scholarship is the call for constructing a more inclusive 
‘global’ IR discipline by incorporating the voices of the non-West. While the drive 
toward building the so-called ‘non-Western IR Theory’ has been witnessed in various 
non-Western regions such as Latin America, South Asia, Russia, and Africa, the 
spotlight of attention and debate focuses on East Asia. This is because East Asia is a 
region of growing geopolitical importance where claims for cultural and philosophical 
‘distinctiveness’ are also strongest. Yet, East Asian IR communities have long been 
regarded as a mere consumer rather than producer of knowledge. In particular, there is 
a heavy dependency on American IR theoretical findings and orientations in a 




 The leading American scholars are good at what they do, and East Asians 
recognize that. Thus, the implication is that IR social science in East Asia 
assumes the role of a follower and supporter of American IR standards, 
methodologies and ideas, rather than a leader and independent creator of 
ideas/norms. When combined with the strengths inherent in the US academy 
we can understand why the IR community in East Asia has been slow to 
develop (Inoguchi and Newman 2002, 19). 
Nonetheless, the contemporary material and cultural rise of East Asia relative to the 
purported decline of Western power and intellectual hegemony has sparked off 
renewed interest among local scholars as well as some Western-based East Asia 
specialists in making an ‘East Asian’ contribution to the global heritage of IR 
knowledge. Starting from the 1980s when Chinese scholars first openly expressed 
their interest in studying ways to build ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ (Song 
2010) and especially since the controversial debate over ‘Asian values’ during the 
1990s, there have been more and more IR scholars viewing East Asia more than 
simply a playground for theory testing. In 2003, the distinguished East Asia specialist 
David Kang first pointed out the need for new analytical frameworks as the 
application of Western IRT to predict the future of Asian security, he concluded, often 
resulted in ‘getting Asia wrong’ (Kang 2003a). In 2007, the Japan-based International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific Journal (IRAP) devoted a special issue to the single 
theme ‘Why is there no Non-Western IR Theory in Asia?’ The issue, which was later 
turned into a book, was edited by the two renowned theorists – Amitav Acharya and 
Barry Buzan – and contributed by other leading East Asia experts. It was the first time 
the question of the hindrances to the emergence of an ‘Asian’ IRT was discussed in a 
comprehensive and constructive manner. Following this pioneering work, there have 
been vigorous discussions among East Asia specialists regarding the deficiencies of 
IR Theory in its current form as it is applied to East Asia as well as the desirability, 
and even possibility, of building alternative approaches that have their origins in the 
region. More recently demands for not only a Chinese, but also a Japanese or Korean 
‘School’, of IR are coming to the fore. Increasingly, this academic endeavor has 
attracted the attention of extra-regional scholars, thus spreading this debate beyond the 
geographical context of East Asia.  
As will be discussed in Chapter one (Literature Review), the form that this demand for 
EAIRT takes varies and is presented by both East Asian scholars and Western 
scholars. Inevitably, there is academic backlash against the need for EAIRT. Some of 
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 those who claim to be dissatisfied with the current state of IR Theory are based in 
Western universities and can be expected to have been schooled in existing 
approaches to IRT (e.g. Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, and David Kang). Others are 
based within East Asia, and may or may not have been schooled in ‘Western’ 
approaches (e.g. Muthiah Alagappa, Takashi Inoguchi, and Qin Yaqing). These 
scholars also approach this issue from different directions. Some are concerned with 
apparent shortcomings in Western-based IR thinking; others are preoccupied with the 
uniqueness of East Asia practices. All claim, however, that Western theoretical 
approaches are too narrow and too tied to their place and time of origin to ever truly 
capture the dynamics of East Asia. Other scholars seem to be troubled by that 
dissatisfaction, dismissing claims for EAIRT to be mere ‘theoretical egoism’ by 
certain theorists that risks ‘dividing’ the discipline (Callahan 2008; Chen 2011a; 
Hutchings 2011; Snyder 2008). Together these EAIRT proponents and critics fuel one 
of the most fervent debates within contemporary IR literature, including many leading 
IR thinkers and generating significant profile.  
This debate about EAIRT is part of a broader trend of dissatisfaction with the 
perceived Western centricity of IRT as seen by attempts to understand IR from the 
perspective of various ‘non-Western’ regions (Cetina, Schatzki, and Von Savigny 
2000; Neuman 1998; Tickner and Wæver 2009). Observers of this process have 
questioned whether this movement suggests ‘the emergence of the new sub-discipline 
of comparative IR theory’ or if it will eventually ‘provincialize’ the discipline 
(Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 664; Hutchings 2011). Either way, the discussion 
over non-Western/East Asian IRT merits further academic attention. Recent 
interviews conducted by the Theory Talks – an interactive forum for discussing the 
underlying theoretical issues and debates in the IR discipline – indicate that many 
leading contemporary IR theorists posit that Eurocentricism and Western dominance 
in IR knowledge is one of the biggest challenges or principle debates in the field at the 
moment.6  
For instance, John Hobson – a professor at the University of Sheffield and one of the 
most vocal critics of Eurocentricism in IR knowledge – posits that reducing 
Eurocentricism and bringing the ‘Eastern agency’ into IR theory ‘is (or should be) a 
6 These theorists include, among others, Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, Ann Tickner, Pinar Pilgin, John 
Hobson, Siba Grovogui, Qin Yaqing, and Yan Xuetong.  
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 key debate-in-the-making’ (Millerman 2015, 5). Since 2009, Routledge – a prestigious 
publisher in the IR field – has also published a number of qualified volumes for its 
series ‘Worlding beyond the West’ with the aim to explore ‘the role of geocultural 
factors, institutions, and academic practices in creating the concepts, epistemologies, 
and methodologies through which IR knowledge is produced’ within and beyond the 
West (Routledge).7 The common findings of these works often point to differences in 
the way IR is being practiced among the various IR communities in the world, 
including those in East Asia. Most recently, a leading IR Journal – International 
Studies Review – devoted a special issue to the 2015 International Studies Association 
(ISA) Conference theme ‘Global IR’ which, under the Presidency of Amitav Acharya, 
aims to advance a more inclusive discipline with possible contribution from non-
Western knowledge. These publications often include specific case studies on the 
potential contribution of ‘East Asian IR scholarship’, reflecting the growing scholarly 
attention on the state of theory development in this particular region. 
Empirically, the introduction of the Teaching, Research, and International Policy 
(TRIP) project has also offered valuable data and insights on the underlying trends in 
the discipline. It should be noted that the TRIP project has recently expanded their 
faculty surveys to some East Asian countries and territories such as Japan, Singapore, 
Hongkong, and Taiwan. Its latest survey report published in 2015 found that 77% of 
IR scholars worldwide thought that IR is a Western-dominated discipline and 61.8% 
thought it was important to counter such Western dominance in the field (TRIP 2015, 
4). In particular, three claims have been put forward from the TRIP latest survey 
outcomes:  
that IR is a Western/American dominated discipline, that geography is the core 
dividing line in IR, and that there is a division of labor within IR wherein 
scholars in the West are responsible for theory production while the ‘non-
West’ supplies data and local expertise for theory testing (Wemheuer-Vogelaar 
et al. 2016, 16).  
These facts and figures further underscore the importance and timeliness of a study on 
whether, and if yes, how a prospective non-Western IR such as EAIRT could 
contribute to making IR a more representative discipline. 
7 Arlene B. Tickner, David Blaney, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Ole Wæver are editors of this series. 
There have been ten volumes being published under this series thus far. 
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 Research puzzle and focus 
Research question 
Given the rationales and contemplations mentioned above, this thesis will address the 
central question of ‘How have academic practices changed in response to the call for 
East Asian IR Theory?’ and, as a corollary, ‘what drives those changing practices (if 
any)?’ The aim of addressing these questions is to identify the extent to which the 
EAIRT debate actually shapes academic practices and where the avenues that may 
affect those practices are. More specifically, are there any substantive changes in 
terms of research, teaching, and outreach activities that are congruent to the claims 
academics made in the EAIRT debate? This question suggests it is important also to 
examine if changing practices have happened, why?; and from where does the 
pressure for change emanate? Importantly, it is also necessary to identify what 
changes implemented by scholars that are caused by EAIRT debate as opposed to 
changes that occur for other reasons (e.g. institutional, social or political pressure). 
Equally, if practices have not changed, why have scholars not felt the need to respond 
to the theoretical debate under review here? This research question, therefore, aims to 
address the broader relationship between IR theorizing (in particular discontent with 
the current status of theory) and practice, where ‘practice’ is understood as an 
academic issue rather than merely general ‘politics.’ It should be noted, however, that 
the question to be solved here is about how theory is shaping academic practices not 
the other way around and not directed toward any particular linear dynamics between 
the two. 
Why is this a good question? First, the literature on non-Western IRT/EAIRT at 
present is all about what should happen, not what is happening. There are many claims 
for EAIRT, some pro-EAIRT, some anti-EAIRT, and some more nuanced. When the 
literature tries to decode these claims, it focuses mainly on the issue of why EAIRT is 
in demand at the moment. Accordingly, there might be ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ reasons 
for an EAIRT. The pro-EAIRT groups emphasize more the objective factors (e.g. the 
rise of East Asia, disjuncture between IRT and East Asian context, and new dynamics 
in regional relations) (Acharya 2013a; Alagappa 2011a) while the anti-EAIRT group 
emphasizes more on the subjective ones (e.g. ‘theoretical nationalism’ by local 
scholars, or ‘straight jackets’ for government policy) (Snyder 2008; Callahan 2008). 
Little is known, however, as to what is actually happening on the ground – whether or 
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 not this debate has its roots in the changing perceptions and practices of academics 
generating this EAIRT literature? 
Moreover, in an attempt to ‘decode’ this academic movement, the existing IR 
literature often takes either a history of science or philosophy of science approach, 
viewing the drive toward building indigenous frameworks from the macro-lenses of 
power and counter-hegemony logics (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 20). Accordingly, 
the various calls for an East Asian paradigm have their roots in the material rise and 
growing importance of East Asia in world politics. Some other scholars have pointed 
to the ethnocentrism and anti-West sentiment embedded in such discourses as ‘Asian 
values.’ A fuller investigation into such claims, however, suggests that power shifts 
and anti-Western logic cannot fully explain the dynamics of this academic movement. 
Such top-down explanations can be applied, of course, in the case of China whose 
emerging great power status has, according to one estimate, precipitated 69% of its IR 
academia to agree on devising some sort of Chinese style theory in order to match its 
interests (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 24). Those explanations are less persuasive in 
other cases, however. A typical example is the South Korean IR community which has 
about 60% of its members having an American PhD and is often regarded as ‘an 
intellectual colony of the American international relations community’ (Moon and 
Kim 2002, 64). Yet, according to a recent survey of South Korean IR scholars,  
62.5 percent of the respondents said that there is a need to develop Korean 
paradigms of international relations, while 28.1 percent strongly urged that this 
be done. Only 1.6 percent answered that there is no need for such paradigms, 
and 7.8 percent indicated they believed the intellectual climate was not yet ripe 
for their development (Moon and Kim 2002, 56).  
Similarly, in Japan which has long identified itself as part of the Western liberal order, 
there are also assertions about the presence of Japanese IR theory in the past and 
growing scholarly interest in developing a home-grown theory (Inoguchi 2007a; 
Shimizu et al. 2008). More broadly speaking, many Western-based scholars have also 
enthusiastically contributed to this debate and present their own claims for a non-
Western/East Asian contribution to IR Theory (Kang 2003b; Tickner and Wæver 
2009; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Lizée 2011; Ling 2013b; Phillips 2014). How can we 
explain the way theorizing occurs and the many forms this demand for EAIRT takes 
across all these geographical contexts? 
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 It is worth investigating why that is the case given that ‘Western’ IR theories claim to 
have universal applicability, albeit in different ways. Realists and liberals posit what 
they claim are all-encompassing and timeless truths about the global system while 
reflectivists assume that they can incorporate difference within their frameworks. For 
instance, there are ideas held by Asians and ideas held by Europeans but there is no 
fundamental difference in what an idea is and how it impacts actors. This holistic 
conception of theorizing is particularly popular in the US where positivism is the 
dominant epistemology. That IR theorizing is an independent activity detached from 
social context is reflected in this statement by three renowned American scholars – 
Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sydney Verba –  in a leading training manual in IR: 
‘no one cares what we think – the scholarly community only cares what we can 
demonstrate’ (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 15). 
Given this, it is puzzling why there is demand for a distinctive East Asian perspective, 
most often expressed by leading Western-based and Western-trained East Asia 
specialists who would be expected to hold the claim to Western IRT universality. In 
an endeavour to resolve this puzzle, IR scholars increasingly turn to the sociology of 
science. Randall Collins, a prominent sociologist of science, challenges the traditional 
assumption that ‘thinking normally takes place independently, in a pristine realm 
driven by nothing but itself.’ Instead, he argues that ‘thinking would not be possible at 
all if we were not social; we would have no words, no abstract ideas, and no energy 
for anything outside of immediate sensuality’ (Collins 2000, 7). Similarly, L.H.M. 
Ling questions King, Keohane, and Verba’s above detachment of the individual from 
the scholarly environment in that ‘the evaluation of what we can demonstrate 
necessarily comes from what we think in terms of acceptable criteria, norms, and 
standard’ (Ling 2013b, 20). The fact that IR thinking is influenced by non-epistemic 
factors is perhaps most evident in theoretical debates where scholars put forward 
different knowledge claims and advance arguments against rival theories. As Karl 
Mannheim suggests, ‘one is never quite aware of how much one’s social location 
affects one’s perceptions and arguments until being brought into contact with a 
different way of thinking, an encounter that throws into sharp relief the way that social 
conditions shape thought’ (quoted in Jackson 2010, 171). And most recently, some 
scholars have called for more critical thinking about various ‘perspectives’ 
(understood as ‘contextualized systems of meanings’) in the process of knowledge 
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 construction and for ‘conceiving the IR discipline as a fragmented, as opposed to a 
universal, body of knowledge’ (Pellerin 2012, 59). Taken together, these growing 
discourses are ‘indicative of a general “sociology of science turn” or “sociological 
reflexivity” in IR’ (Tickner and Wæver 2009, 17). Adopting a sociological reflexivity 
would then require us to pay more attention to practices of academics – ‘the actual 
doers of IR around the world’ (Tickner and Wæver 2009, 18). 
Moreover, because of the very nature of theoretical debates in IR, discussions about 
the pros and cons of EAIRT are potentially endless. Many distinguished IR scholars 
have long acknowledged the ‘irreconcilability’ of contrasting theoretical approaches. 
‘It is often contended that different international relations theories are fundamentally 
incompatible with one another’, observe Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008, 16) in their 
comprehensive Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Similarly, in his recent 
volume titled ‘Rethinking International Relations Theory’, Martin Griffiths posits that 
‘neither conquest nor convergence between worldviews is likely in the foreseeable 
future. IR Theory in the twenty-first century is therefore inextricably pluralistic’ 
(Griffiths 2011, 14). Others have already warned about the danger of adhering to 
one’s position too rigidly. Friedrich Kratochwil, for example, observes that: ‘The 
desire to win, to stand one’s ground, perhaps not surprisingly, is most of the time 
stronger than the genuine search for an acceptable solution to a problem’ (Kratochwil 
2003, 125;  see also Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 117). These sentiments have led to the 
emergence and popularity of ‘analytical eclecticism’ which is believed to be ‘both 
focused in seeking out the best available answer for a given problem at any given 
time, and courageous, in pursuing intellectual engagements with diverse styles of 
thought and putting its wager unconditionally on the dialogical model of science’ 
(Katzenstein 2008a, 125).  
There is a parallel between leading accounts of how a theory-driven discipline is 
structured and the current state of debate over EAIRT. Given the fact that ongoing 
debates about EAIRT might not be resolvable in any foreseeable future, this thesis 
represents a study on how theoretical claims impact on the practices of scholars 
involved in the EAIRT debate and to what extent there may be a shift underway 
within that debate from Western IRT foundations to more distinctly region-centric 
forms of theory. This suggests that we need to move beyond the theoretical debates 
per se to look deeper into the inner logics of theorizing – how and why the theorists 
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 design, exercise, and validate in practice the theoretical claims they make in 
theoretical debate. To date, this remains an understudied aspect of IR as a scholar has 
noted: 
This growing interest in different views about the world and the challenge to 
the pretension of universalism of the discipline are healthy developments. Yet, 
curiously enough, it did not change fundamentally the way the story of IR as a 
discipline is being framed. Perspectives, the sets of meanings that influence 
how scholars not only see but also interpret and validate their knowledge, are 
still marginal in the discipline (Pellerin 2012, 59-60). 
For these reasons, this research is designed to examine the practices of claims about 
EAIRT. It aims to systematically investigate the presence of and variation in evidence 
of how academics have responded to the call for EAIRT as a key basis for theoretical 
discontent today. The choice of EAIRT is justified because it is the most prominent 
ongoing ‘grand debate’ within and, arguably, beyond Asia, and one that includes 
many leading thinkers and generating considerable profile. Given the scale and the 
vibrancy of this debate, it also provides the researcher the best opportunity to examine 
the link between theory and practice where practice is understood more broadly to 
include not only the behaviour of states and policy makers but also of academics 
themselves. 
In particular, this thesis will empirically investigate whether scholars involved in the 
EAIRT debate are actually implementing, or not, a desire for change. It should be 
noted that despite all the significant work that has been done in envisioning various 
theoretical claims and counter-claims for EAIRT, few of them focus on the empirical 
dimension of the EAIRT debate – whether scholars are actually changing their 
education and research agendas in light of a perceived deficit in existing IR studies. 
Finding the answers to this issue is important and interesting in many ways. If there is 
evidence of a clear change in the nature of IR scholarship in East Asia, then such 
theoretical innovation may enrich existing IR theories. Questions over the ambiguous 
direction of China’s development, the intensifying territorial disputes in East Asia, 
and the loosely structured East Asian regionalism can all be explained through 
existing Western IR. However, might they not be better addressed through indigenous 
IR scholarship? If there is no evidence for any actual change in practice then the 
ongoing demand for an EAIRT by a number of Asian ‘big names’ also tells us 
something about the nature of their dissatisfaction with Western IRT and what that 
means for the future theoretical studies of East Asian i.r. Either way, finding evidence 
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 on the practices of claims for EAIRT is a compelling subject of research that has been 
under assessed in the contemporary IR literature.  
As importantly, studying how theoretical debate shapes academic practices can fill the 
gap in the literature that is not just concerned with debate over EAIRT. The link 
between theory and academic practices has been a reoccurring blind spot in the 
discipline. As I will discuss in the following Literature Review chapter, whilst many 
have been interested in how theory and practice relate, academics have usually 
understood ‘practice’ to refer to the practice of others, such as policy makers and 
politicians, rather than the disciplinary practices found within their own ranks. The 
gap that this thesis addresses is that despite what existing studies and investigations 
may address in this general context, there is perilously little work about what is 
actually happening on the ground – whether scholars are, or are not, changing their 
practices to match the claims they put forward in the EAIRT theoretical debate. The 
research in this study spans such changes, but is also interested in evidence for change 
as manifested in the daily work of academics in bringing their claims into life.  
Such an investigation is necessary as it tells us how committed EAIRT scholars are in 
realizing their claims as well as the nature of such claims and practices. It is also a 
meaningful contribution to the theory-practice literature of the EAIRT debate in that 
scholars and analysts are linking this theoretical pursuit with the ‘practice’ understood 
as real world (the rise of East Asia) or politics (e.g. the Chinese authoritarian system 
and/or Chinese foreign policy) but are not really assessing very adequately the 
practices of scholars themselves (are they living what they preach?). Furthermore, 
addressing the gap in academic practice relative to the EAIRT debate is important 
because it gives us insights into the distinctiveness of the claims for EAIRT; and asks 
us to think about what inspires or shapes the things academics actually do. Whilst this 
author’s primary concern is to use the EAIRT debate as a basis in which to examine 
how theoretical discontent shapes academic practices, this examination will have 
broader relevance for those engaged in that current debate. It will, perhaps most 
centrally, shed light on whether the demand for EAIRT is simply something that fills 
academic publications but has no real world effect, or whether there are actual 
changes in teaching, research and outreach that are bringing this claim to life. Such a 
study will be of interest to scholars who are engaged in the EAIRT debate and those 
interested more generally in the theory-practice relationship. 
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 Research focus 
Concerning the scope of study, this research will concentrate on the theoretical 
dimension of International Relations for the following reasons. First, theory is the 
main concern of regional scholars in advancing the state of IR in East Asia. There 
have been thought-provoking questions posed by East Asian scholars in investigating 
why East Asian IRT is so underdeveloped, such as ‘Can Asians think?’ (Mahbubani 
2002) or ‘Why is there no non-Western IRT in Asia?’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010). It 
is, therefore, the area where most effort is put in by scholars in the region to develop 
East Asian perspectives. Second, it is the literature that reveals most clearly the nature 
of the EAIRT-led dissatisfaction with Western IRT. Whilst we witness convergence in 
other areas of study between Western and East Asian IR (e.g. strategic studies and 
foreign policy analysis) (Tow 2009; Khong 2014), we see continued and indeed 
developing space between East and West in the realm of IRT as can be seen from the 
various contrasting claims and counter-claims about EAIRT. It is thus interesting to 
examine why that is the case and how such a gap can be bridged through a study that 
explores how this debate has shaped the practices of involved scholars – be they on 
whatever side of the debate. 
As this study mainly focuses on the IRT dimension, it is also necessary to clarify how 
‘theory’ is understood in the East Asian context. There are basically two approaches to 
what constitutes IR Theory. The American conception of theory is dominated by its 
positivist orientation that any social theory needs to have causal relations and is 
universally applicable. The European conception of theory is more flexible and 
pluralist than the American one. European IR scholars, many of whom are from the 
reflectivist tradition of IR, believe in the Coxian ontology that ‘theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose’ and ‘the potential openness of various “taken for 
granted” aspects of world politics’ (Lake 2013, 579). These reflectivist approaches are 
generally believed to include constructivism, post-modernism, critical theory, and 
feminism.  
As Acharya and many scholars have pointed out, the way theory is understood in Asia 
is closer to the European understanding than the American one (Acharya 2013b, 3). 
This is because despite the region’s widespread acceptance of the hegemony of 
American theories, theory in the Asian context is not strictly defined in positivist 
terms and in fact often has various meanings (Alagappa 2011b; Noesselt 2015, 436-7). 
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 In their investigation of whether or not there is non-Western IR Theory in Asia, 
Acharya and Buzan (2010, 4) introduce a broad and pluralist view of theory that 
embraces ‘both the harder, positivist, rationalist, materialist and quantitative 
understandings on one end of the theory spectrum, and the more reflective, social, 
constructivist, and postmodern on the other.’ They also concede that ‘IR might include 
normative assumptions; even pretheoretical concepts are viewed as elements of an 
emerging IR theory framework in Asia’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 6). Muthiah 
Alagappa, meanwhile, observes that ‘theory’ in the Asian context has ‘a 
predominantly practical orientation with emphasis on understanding and interpreting 
the external world to develop suitable policy responses’ (Alagappa 2011b, 196). 
Theory, in this light, is embedded with the normative and ethical concerns of Asian 
countries rather than functions as a framework for analysis in positivist interpretation 
(Alagappa 2011b, 194; see also Noesselt 2015, 437).  
This thesis adopts the most extensive conception of IR Theory, including those 
mentioned above. IR Theory in this light can refer to grand theory with universal 
applicability. It can also be a ‘middle-range’ or ‘typological’ theory. A ‘middle-range 
theory’ argues for the desirability of the integration of theory and empirical research 
(Merton 1968). Meanwhile, a ‘typological theory’ (George and Bennet 2005), in 
contrast to the ‘covering law’ conception of general theories, involves ‘contingent 
generalizations that explicitly outline the differing background conditions’ (Shin 2009, 
3). In fact, some scholars have recently urged that IR Theory should be centred around 
middle-range theories for the practical purpose of resolving policy relevant problems 
(Bennett 2013, 462; Lake 2013). 
Given this broad and relatively flexible understanding of IRT in East Asia, claim for 
East Asian IRT can also, to a lesser extent, be understood as the prospect of a 
distinctive East Asian IR perspective. A perspective is different to theory in that it 
does not exclude other perspectives and unlike ‘theory’ it ‘does not claim to be the 
sole repository of “truth”’ (Ayoob 2002, 28). Also, given that Western IRT is a 
diverse lot (Alagappa 2011b, 200-4), there is no expectation that East Asian IRT can 
be reduced to a single and unified approach. Therefore, discussions about EAIRT are 
sometimes narrowed down to national IR, such as the Chinese, Japanese, South 
Korean, Southeast Asian IR Schools/perspectives. 
20 
 
 Moreover, although the EAIRT debate has spanned across and beyond the East Asian 
region, this study will focus on those IR communities where claims for EAIRT are 
strongest. Additionally, for the project to be manageable, the thesis will mainly 
investigate those IR institutions and scholars that have expressed and developed 
potential practices toward EAIRT. Put differently, this study adopts the ‘most likely 
cases’ approach in its empirical investigation. At the regional level, this EAIRT debate 
is most heatedly discussed in the Northeast Asian sub-region. The thesis, therefore, 
focuses more on the state of theory development in these Northeast Asian countries 
(e.g. China and Japan) with lesser reference to the Southeast Asian ones. At the extra-
regional level, this EAIRT debate has attracted attention and contribution from many 
Western-based theorists. These scholars often discuss a pan-regional framework that 
covers the whole East Asia and even the broader Asian or non-Western context. As 
US IR academia is a hub of leading theorists and East Asia specialists and is often 
seen as a symbol of Western domination in IR, it has been selected for empirical 
studies to showcase how EAIRT is being developed and received beyond the East 
Asian region. 
Methodology 
Chapter two of the thesis will deal specifically with the problem of developing 
arguments and applying methods. In order to address the central research question, 
this thesis will employ three specific methods: the sociology of science as the 
overarching conceptual framework, empirical case studies under the guidance of 
structured focused comparison method, and qualitative analysis based on the primary 
data collected through fieldwork (semi-structured interviews and first-hand 
observation). The first necessary step toward that end is to break down the research 
question for a better appreciation of the components of data to be obtained as well as 
for a standardization of data collection under the guidance of the structured focused 
comparison method.  
Breaking down the research question 
In order to investigate in details how the EAIRT debate has shaped the practices of 




 1) What significant changes (if any) have been made in the areas of teaching, 
research, publishing, and theorizing to match the claims scholars put forward in the 
EAIRT debate?  
To answer this initial question – which is designed to measure the extent of change by 
scholars involving in the EAIRT debate – the researcher will 1) compare changes 
made to the syllabi/curricula design at least in the two key subjects, IR Theory and 
methods (‘Introduction to International Relations’) and the other relating to the study 
of East Asian international relations; 2) examine main topics of these scholars’ 
research agenda by looking at major international, regional, and national journals for 
theory-oriented publications they have contributed to see whether there is distinct 
research agenda in comparison to that of Western scholars (i.e. different research 
questions, alternative terms of references); and 3) study their salient approach(es) to 
international relations and how these approaches have been impacted by or help shape 
their national worldviews.  
2) What structural conditions have facilitated or restricted these scholars in making 
changes to their practices? What agential role do scholars play in the course of 
knowledge production? 
The second question stems from an initial proposition that there might be some 
objective and subjective factors affecting the extent of changes scholars can 
personally make in order to bring their theoretical claims into life. These ‘intervening’ 
factors might include but are not limited to a scholar’s personal identity, the 
‘disjuncture’ between Western IRT and local thinking and practices of international 
relations, restrictions within certain boundary of national ideology, the extent of 
autonomy of the IR scholarship in relation to the policy community, and/or the rapid 
rise of East Asia in terms of material power and consequently the desire to provide 
distinctive theoretical perspectives. These factors may also explain the variation in the 
scholarly claims and practices for EAIRT.  
3) Is there evidence of ‘real changes’ toward EAIRT across the region or is it just a 
phenomenon of limited scope desired by a few number of scholars. If so, is this 
arranged geographically or along some other lines? 
The last question is designed to check the parameters and consistency in the evidence 
of shifting practices toward EAIRT. This will require examining whether there are 
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 exchanges and linkages between IR academia within different East Asian locales and 
whether they share a common approach with regard to EAIRT. These are the 
necessary conditions for a rigorous regional or national perspective on international 
relations. Lacking such concerted coordination, these scholars can hardly reject having 
a certain amount of ‘theoretical nationalism’ or even merely ‘egoism’ which could 
become a limiting factor in the quest to produce universal knowledge. That is what the 
critics of EAIRT have vehemently warned against as ‘provincializing’ or 
‘nationalizing’ IRT (Callahan 2008; Callahan 2001; Snyder 2008).  
Conceptual framework and applied methods: the sociology of science, case studies, 
and qualitative analysis 
This thesis will employ the sociology of science as the backbone for both its 
methodology and argumentation. In particular, it draws on insights from the most 
recent academic attempts in bringing the sociology of science into IR. International 
Relations’ turn toward the sociology of science reflects an academic endeavour to 
move beyond the field’s traditional approaches to scientific development and 
knowledge production – the history of science and philosophy of science. The history 
of science analyses IR theory by assessing the field’s many ‘great debates’ as well as 
the institutional growth, and international political events that have shaped the 
development of the discipline (Schmidt 2002). A related and indeed inseparable 
framework from the history of science is the philosophy of science. Philosophers of 
science view IR as a discipline ‘that is structured around a set of deep contestations 
over the very idea of science itself and the extent to which IR can, and should, be a 
science’ (Wight 2002, 23). A common point of these two approaches is that 
knowledge production is generally seen as a ‘value free’ activity that is independent of 
social contexts. Intellectuals, therefore, are believed to be detached from and 
unaffected by social factors (Jackson 2010, 170). Consequently, ‘the intricacies of 
how the knowledge is actually produced, and how validity and certainty are 
constructed, are only of secondary relevance’ (Bueger 2015, 3).  
The sociology of science, meanwhile, argues that theorizing is not a ‘value free’ 
activity because external factors such as the social, institutional and psychological 
contexts may intrude in the course of establishing knowledge (Salmon 1999, 162). 
Seen in this light, theorizing is a kind of social activity that is shaped by both the inner 
23 
 
 motivations of the theorists themselves and the wider environment in which they are 
living. Studying how theory shapes practice(s) in the case of the EAIRT debate, 
therefore, needs to examine the practices of scholars as opposed to the claims they put 
forward in that debate. 
How is the sociology of science relevant to this research? To date, the historiography 
of IR is often seen through the ‘great debates’ between proponents of various schools 
of thoughts. But most of the studies of theory and theoretical debates in IR so far view 
knowledge production as ‘given’ – an inherent scientific activity that is taken place in 
an independent sphere. Yet, if we view theorizing not from that external approach but 
from an internal angle by placing the concentration on academic practices, we would 
be able to see a different picture of the discipline that not merely comprises of theories 
and concepts per se but is intrinsically a set of practices that is closely interwoven to 
its wider environment. This presents an opportunity to grasp the nature of different 
processes of knowledge production, their social aspects, and the various pathways of 
knowledge transfer that the theorists use in order to bring their theoretical claims into 
life. Toward that end, the sociology of science provides a powerful analytical tool. 
Drawing on Ole Weaver’s model of comparative sociology of IR, I have developed in 
chapter two a three-layered analytical framework for probing the linkages between the 
EAIRT debate and academic practices. These layers include the geopolitical context, 
the institutional/organizational context, and the practices of individual academics. 
Taking a bottom-up perspective, this study posits that the practices of scholars 
involved in the EAIRT debate (the third layer) are directly and indirectly influenced 
by the two afore layers (the geopolitical and institutional contexts). In the subsequent 
empirical chapters, I will identify how each approach in the EAIRT debate has been 
shaped by scholars’ background, their institutional environment, and the national 
context in which they are operating. Furthermore, if actual changes in academic 
practices are to be found, this study aims to investigate whether these changing 
practices are the result of scholars’ commitment to theory/scientific objectivity or 
whether other ‘external factors’ have intruded in this process of establishing 
knowledge. In this sense, the sociology of knowledge-in-the-making is examined 
through both the scholars’ internal motivations and the intruding factors, not merely 
the ‘external’ ones. 
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 This sociology of science framework will be deployed in the three empirical studies. 
The method to be applied for case studies is Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s 
guidance on structured focused comparison. According to this method, a number of 
cases are selected and a set of questions are repeatedly asked in each case to 
standardize data. As George and Bennett (2005, 83) have noted, the primary criterion 
for case selection is their relevance to the study’s research objectives and variation 
required by the research problem. With that in mind, three national IR communities – 
China, Japan and the US – have been selected as case studies for this research as they 
offer a meaningful cross-section of the variety that the EAIRT debate represents at the 
national level, particularly in terms of scale, level of development, national ideology, 
indigenous IR movements, and exposure to Western IR, etc. These are the most likely 
cases where claims for EAIRT are strongest and most vigorously debated. They are, 
therefore, useful empirical studies for checking the vibrancy and/or variation in 
evidence for a meaningful shift toward EAIRT in those countries (if at all). To ensure 
the consistency of the findings, the three aforementioned component questions will be 
asked repeatedly in each case under study to ‘guide and standardize the data 
collection, thereby making systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of 
the cases possible’ (George and Bennet 2005, 67). The findings in these cases will 
allow for useful generalizations to be made and subsequently for conclusions to be 
derived as to whether or not there exists actual evidence for shifting nature of EAIRT 
studies across different national IR communities and what drives such changes (if 
any). 
In term of qualitative analysis, this thesis will draw extensively on primary data in the 
form of semi-structured interviews with approximately 30 leading IR scholars who are 
involved or interested in the ongoing EAIRT debate. The questionnaire in the 
interview is designed in a structured way so as to gain information on the three layers 
identified in the analytical framework. The author of this study also relies on field 
research and first-hand observation through textual archival research, collection of 
teaching syllabi, and discussions with graduate students at the selected IR institutions 
under study. The researcher has also benefitted a great deal from secondary sources 
such as relevant existing literature and the most recently published theoretical work of 
involved scholars, including those published in the local languages (e.g. Chinese). The 
methodological approach for data and discourse analysis is qualitative interpretation. 
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 Findings and arguments 
Deploying the aforementioned analytical framework to study the impact of the EAIRT 
debate on the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities, the researcher has 
found that there have been some actual changes employed by scholars in response to 
the call for EAIRT but the degree and form of changes vary across cases. The first 
major conclusion offered in this vein is that the EAIRT debate does have a discernible 
impact on the practical activities of scholars involved in that debate. This finding is in 
line with the assertion made by sociologists of science that scholars perceive their 
surrounding environment corresponding to their knowledge claims, or put differently, 
they are generally ‘living what they preach.’ A second major finding is that the 
EAIRT debate takes a different form and consequently shapes the practices of scholars 
in different ways and to different extents in the various cases weighed by this study.  
Accordingly, in China a general consensus has been made among its IR academia on 
the need to construct a Chinese style IR theory, be it a ‘Chinese School of IR’, a 
‘Tsinghua approach to IR’, or a ‘Chinese theory of foreign affairs.’ The biggest area 
of changes in China, therefore, is in the vibrant theory-led debate and resource 
mobilization to pave the way for building some sort of Chinese IR knowledge. The 
EAIRT discourse in Japan, meanwhile, initially presented itself in the form of re-
examining the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ in the past but has increasingly shifted 
toward ‘post-Western IR’ agenda recently. Even within the pro-EAIRT circle, the 
current trajectory in Japan points to the lack of interest in developing a narrowly 
focused ‘Japanese School of IR.’ In fact, the EAIRT literature constitutes only a part 
of Japanese IR scholarship which thus far continues to be characterized by the 
tendency toward historical and area studies. In the case of American IR academia, 
shifting practices are most clearly found among a small number of US-based East 
Asia specialists who have attempted to bring the Eastern agency into IR Theory.  Yet 
‘mainstream American IR’, given its hegemonic status in the field and the adherence 
of most IR academics in the US to this approach, has proven resilient to EAIRT. 
Moreover, unlike what has happened in East Asia, the EAIRT debate in the US 
presents itself in the form of enriching and bettering the existing body of knowledge 
with non-Western, including East Asian, ideas and experiences rather than a 
revolutionary one like the prospective Chinese IR or past Japanese IR. 
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 Based on these empirical findings, this thesis argues that these different responses to 
EAIRT can be attributable to the uneven impact of social factors on the practices of 
claims. More specifically, these different responses to EAIRT can be explained by the 
dissimilarities in the three layers of analysis presented by Weaver’s sociology of IR 
framework that this thesis has applied to study the impact of the EAIRT across various 
geographical and socio-political contexts. The researcher then classifies the social 
factors that shape EAIRT claims and practices into two main categorizations: (1) 
structural causes (geopolitical concerns, academic structure etc.); and (2) the agential 
role played by the academics themselves (training background, moral choice, and 
vision of science). This thesis further argues that understanding the impact of EAIRT 
on academic practices require appreciating both structural consideration and agential 
choice. In their covariation, structure serves as the intervening factors and agency the 
determining ones. These structural and agential factors often intersect and exert 
impact to varying extents on different national IR communities and individual 
academics, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for EAIRT.  
For instance, in the cases of China and Japan, structural causes have exerted a large 
impact on the practices of claims adopted by Chinese and Japanese scholars. The rise 
of China and a greater awareness of Chinese cultural exceptionalism, in particular, 
have precipitated a large consensus among Chinese IR academia to construct some 
kind of Chinese IR knowledge to match its material rise and ultimately reshaped 
Chinese scholars’ identity into ‘knowledge producers.’ Meanwhile, the historical 
legacy terming from Japan’s failed pan-Asianism in the past, as well as its unresolved 
national identity as a country situating between East and West, have placed constraints 
on the possibility and credibility of a prospective ‘Japanese School of IR.’ This fact 
has driven the EAIRT discourse in Japan to shift gradually to a ‘post-Western IR’ 
agenda. The impact of structural causes, however, is less evident in the case of US-
based scholars. Despite ongoing power shifts to the East and the changing dynamics in 
East Asian politics, the EAIRT debate only withholds an interest among a small 
number of US-based East Asia specialists working in the constructivist and reflectivist 
traditions whilst, for the majority of American mainstreamers, it is largely ‘business as 
usual.’  
While structural causes can have some influence on shaping scholars’ response to the 
call for EAIRT, such an impact is often exerted in an indirect manner. As will be 
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 shown in the subsequent empirical chapters, many scholars in the US, Japan, and even 
China have not changed their practices despite power shift and other socio-political 
pressure. That is because intellectual activities in general and theorizing in particular 
are most directly shaped by the agency – the practitioners of IR – and the academic 
scene. Across the empirical studies, the researcher has found that how academics 
choose to respond to EAIRT is largely subject to their theoretical identity, which has 
in turn been shaped by their personal background, training, vision of science, and 
moral choice, etc. 
Taken together, it can be said that there is clearly a sociology of EAIRT claims and 
practices. Put differently, there is an inherent relationship between scholars’ identity 
and their perspectives concerning the EAIRT debate. Given the different structural 
contexts in which academics are living as well as scholars’ diverse training and 
institutional backgrounds, the EAIRT debate often exerts an unequal impact on the 
practices of scholars, and eventually, shapes their different responses toward EAIRT. 
That explains why claims for EAIRT take various forms in theoretical debates and are 
implemented in different ways in scholars’ daily practices.  
Structure of study 
This thesis comprises of seven sections. Apart from the Introduction and Conclusion, 
there are five component chapters which constitute the main body of the thesis. The 
first two chapters are designed for Literature Review and setting the theoretical 
framework for the thesis’ methodology and argumentation. The three following 
empirical chapters are case studies on how the EAIRT debate has shaped the practices 
of scholars based in China, Japan, and the US. Details of these sections are as follows. 
Chapter one is the Literature Review chapter. It extensively and critically reviews the 
two main bodies of existing literature that are relevant to this research. One is the 
ongoing debate over East Asian IR Theory with many claims and counter-claims 
for/against EAIRT and the other deals with the theory-practice relationship. The main 
critique that this thesis presents is that the EAIRT debate seems to be intractable in the 
sense that it cannot be resolved in any foreseeable future. Instead of continuing this 
‘endless’ debate, a more practical contribution should be to examine how these 
theoretical claims have been exercised in practice. The theory-practice literature, 
meanwhile, reveals a gap in that practice is understood to include only policy and 
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 politics but not the practices of academics themselves. It then analyzes the value 
added dimensions of this study by investigating the linkages between theoretical 
debates and the actual practices of academics in bringing their claims into life. 
Chapter two is devoted to presenting the methodology and argumentation of the 
thesis. It posits that the sociology of science approach, which has been recently 
imported into IR and which can be used as a springboard into a better appreciation of 
the dynamics of theoretical innovation in East Asia. Based on the insights from the 
sociology of science, the chapter builds up a three-layered analytical framework for 
studying the linkages between theory and academic practices in the case of the EAIRT 
debate. It argues that the extent to which theory can shape academic practices is the 
by-product of the interplay of agential and structural factors in which the former plays 
the decisive role and the later serves as the intervening factors. This analytical 
framework is then employed to structuring the three subsequent empirical chapters.  
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter, focusing on decoding the EAIRT debate in 
China. By reviewing the historical and contemporary developments of Chinese IR and 
adopting the sociology of science framework, the chapter explains how the EAIRT 
debate has left an imprint to different extent on the Chinese IR academia, represented 
in the four approaches toward theoretical innovation in China. These include the 
‘Chinese School of IR’ project, the ‘Tsinghua approach’, the Beida’s ambition toward 
developing a ‘theory of foreign affairs’, and the universalists’ orientation toward 
integrating with Western IR. Through the sociology of science framework, the chapter 
postulates that it is in China that we most clearly see the impact of structural factors 
on the practices of knowledge construction, manifested in the large consensus on the 
need to construct a Chinese style IR theory in support of the perceived peaceful rise of 
China. 
Chapter four explores the impact of the EAIRT debate on Japanese IR. Like in China, 
there is a surging interest in indigenous theorizing in Japan yet unlike the case of 
China, claim for a ‘Japanese style IR theory’ is much weaker in Japan and indeed only 
constitutes a small portion of its IR academia. The majority of Japanese scholars 
remain heavily dependent on Western IR knowledge. In fact, the non-Western IR 
discourse in Japan recently has increasingly turned toward the ‘post-Western’ IR 
agenda. The chapter argues that this development is largely because the construction 
of a ‘Japanese School’ has been conditioned by the country’s failure during the 
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 Second World War and the historical legacy of its anti-West pan-Asianism embedded 
in the Kyoto School of philosophy. Such lessons provide valuable insights into the 
theory-practice relationship, particularly the ramifications of theory on the world it 
studies. Combined with Japan’s unresolved ‘in-between’ identity as a country sitting 
between Western and Eastern civilizations as well as the ‘co-existence without 
synthesis’ tradition of Japan’s social sciences, we will most likely see Japanese IR, 
just like its foreign policy at the moment, continues to be ‘at the crossroads.’ 
Chapter five is devoted to examining how the EAIRT debate has been received in the 
core – American IR. By focusing on the work of leading US-based East Asia 
specialists (particularly David Kang, Amitav Acharya, and L.H.M. Ling), the chapter 
explains why the EAIRT debate in the US has taken the form of decentring 
American/Western dominance toward making IR a better body of knowledge rather 
than focusing on a particular regional or national approach. It argues that the growing 
interests in non-Western/East Asian IR discourse among US-based scholars have been 
a combined outcome of power shift, the growing academic maturity of Asian 
immigrant scholars, and the free scholarly environment in the US which allows 
dissenting voices. The chapter also investigates how mainstream American IR – the 
‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ – has responded to such criticism of American 
domination in IR and the perceived academic challenges posed by the so-called ‘East 
Asian scholarship’ and what it may mean for the future development of American IR 
in particular and the discipline in general. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will summarize the research findings, identify its 
contribution to the field, as well as suggest avenues for future research. The pieces of 
evidence gathered from the empirical chapters point to the presence of changes 
adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, yet the degree and form of change 
vary across cases due to the uneven impact of agential and structural factors. Based on 
these findings, the researcher has made generalizations about the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for changes regarding the existing and prospective EAIRT 
scholarship. The thesis also includes an Appendix combined of a list of scholars who 
have agreed to participate in this study as interviewees and a collection of course 
syllabi to showcase how IRT is being taught by scholars advocating for non-
Western/East Asian IR Theory as compared to what it is normally taught in the West. 
Hopefully, this thesis can help the readers have a better understanding about the 
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 motivations and dynamics of the drive toward constructing EAIRT and the room for 
further improvement. It will also serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of 
the practical implications of this academic movement on the socio-political 
development of the countries under study and the East Asia region more broadly, 
beyond being just another arcane IR theory debate. 
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 Chapter 1: The debate over East Asian International Relations 
Theory and its underexplored practical aspects 
We do not typically conceive of knowledge itself as an inherently sociological 
phenomenon, as an ensemble of activities and practices… Yet in its discursive 
form, knowledge is a ‘social’, ‘sociological’, ‘structural’ and ‘material’ 
phenomenon, and manifestly so. Far better, then, for us to conceive of 
disciplinary knowledge – of theory, theorising and scholarship – as composed, 
quite literally, of active reasoning, inference, persuasion, criticism, exclusion, 
positioning and argumentation rather than just a mass of ‘information’ or a 
collection of theories and paradigms. We should examine what scholars do in 
making arguments, debating, advancing scientific theses and theorising 
(McMillan 2012, 135). 
An emerging theoretical debate on the perceived deficiencies of existing IR theory as 
it applies to East Asia and the possibility of building new theories based on East Asian 
experience is taking shape. This body of literature focuses on three dimensions: how 
the perceived Western-centric discipline of IR should response to the rise of China 
and the East; how ‘distinct’ aspects of East Asian history, culture, and traditions can 
be systematically incorporated into the existing body of IR knowledge; and whether or 
not a new IR paradigm at the national or regional level can and/or should be invented 
to match the power shift to the East. This academic movement has attracted the 
attention of a number of leading figures in the field and generates considerable profile. 
Inevitably, there is backlash against such academic attempts. As happened in the 
previous ‘debates’ in IR, there are various claims and moves against one another 
which, given their incompatibility, seem to be unresolvable.  
Notwithstanding the intractable nature of the EAIRT debate, this chapter argues that it 
can be used as a springboard to investigate an underexplored dimension of the theory-
practice linkage – the practices of theory making. A healthy and wide-ranging debate 
has emerged within IR and between IR scholars about the viability, desirability and 
even the possibility of a clear relationship between theory and practice. This body of 
literature, however, has been surprisingly quiet on a key aspect, and that is how these 
theoretical claims shape the practices of academics themselves. Put differently, there 
is little work investigating whether theorists and academics more broadly ‘practice’ 
what they ‘preach.’ This reluctance to examine how theoretical debate and 
dissatisfaction shapes the thinking and agendas of academics is all the more 
remarkable given that increasing attention is being paid to the ‘practical’ aspect of 
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 theorizing. Books, articles, and speeches all suggest that theory can ‘guide’ practice. 
This is what Hans Morgenthau believed in his writings in the 1940s (Morgenthau 
1947) and it is what Reus Smit and Snidal suggest in their Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008). In a recent article published in 
the European Journal of International Relations, Fred Chernoff has also written about 
how IRT is a key guide to policy and practitioners  (Chernoff 2009). Some others have 
already mentioned the ‘practice turn’ in IR theory which takes practice(s) as the key 
level of analysis (Cetina, Schatzki, and Von Savigny 2000; Pouliot 2008, 2010; 
Brown 2012). Whilst this research does not approach the issue of practices from the 
perspective of ‘practice turn’ scholars, it has been inspired by their pioneering work to 
think more thoroughly about what theorists actually do to validate their claims in 
practice, as opposed to being satisfied with only what they write in books and 
journals. Such academic endeavor promises to significantly enrich the existing theory-
practice literature: how major theoretical debates in IR impact not only world politics, 
policy-makers but also the individual theorists themselves. 
Addressing this dimension in the theory-practice relationship is interesting and 
important. It seems strange that a discipline as concerned with theorizing as IR has not 
paid more attention to the relationship between academic debates over theory and the 
actual practices of academics. As one scholar puts it, what makes IR distinctive as a 
field of academic endeavour is that ‘while others of a lesser intellect do the facts and 
tell nice stories about something called the real world, IR does something called 
“theory”’ (Griffiths 2011, Foreword). IR Theory is, therefore, often held to be at the 
very heart of what it means to be an IR academic. It is also the core course in major 
teaching and training programs on IR. Despite the preoccupation the discipline has 
with theory and theorizing, we have little knowledge about how academic debates, 
particularly theoretical discontent, shape the daily work of academics.  
With the aim to identify the gap and situate this research in the existing literature, this 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will review the two bodies of literature that are 
relevant to this study – the emerging debate over East Asian IR Theory and the 
discourses on the relationship between theory and practice. The main critique is that 
the EAIRT debate presents various theoretical claims and counter-claims with little 
knowledge as to how those claims are implemented in practice. The theory-practice 
literature, meanwhile, talks about the various impacts of theory on practice which is 
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 understood as policy/politics and the consequences of theory on the real world but not 
the practices of academics themselves. The chapter then presents its argument that this 
debate over EAIRT can be used as a springboard into a better appreciation of the 
nature of EAIRT theorizing as well as the theory-practice relationship understood in 
its broader sense as to how theories and theoretical debates affect not only politics and 
policy-makers but also the practices of academics. Seen in this light, both the inner 
dynamics of the EAIRT debate and the impact of IR theorizing on the real world will 
be better identified and understood to, in turn, better appreciate the linkages between 
theory and practice.  
The ongoing debate over East Asian IR Theory: advocacy and critique 
For starters, the EAIRT debate did not emerge from nothing. It is part of ‘an emergent 
collective dialogue that aims to “provincialize” the Western European heritage of IR’ 
(Riffkin-Ronnigan 2013, 7). These discourses reveal the Eurocentric foundations of 
international/IPE theory and point to ‘the need to factor in the role of Eastern agency 
into our empirical accounts and theories of world politics/economics’ (Hobson 2014, 
121). Although sharing this overarching objective, the degree and nature of their 
specific claims for EAIRT are different. Here, I categorize these claims into three key 
directions: the ‘democratizing’ IR, the ‘enriching’ IR, and the ‘East Asian School of 
IR’ approaches. Inevitably, these claims have precipitated critiques from both Western 
and Asian scholars, thus constituting a heated debate in contemporary IR literature. 
Democratizing IR: In search of IR Theory beyond the West 
The first direction of advocacy for an EAIRT comes from scholars who are 
dissatisfied with the current Western if not American domination in IR and, therefore, 
are interested in developing a non/post-Western, post-Westphalian understanding of 
International Relations/World Politics. This approach includes such scholars as 
Amitav Acharya and L.H.M. Ling (US), Barry Buzan and John Hobson (UK), Arlene 
Tickner (Colombia), Pierre P. Lizée (Canada), Ole Weaver (Denmark). Their works 
focus more on the broader non-Western context with occasional reference to East 
Asian IR as an example (Buzan and Little 2010; Ling 2002; Lizée 2011; Neuman 
1998; Tickner 2003; Tickner and Wæver 2009). The majority of these scholars often 
come from non-mainstream approaches with the most radical claims being put 
forwarded by postcolonial scholars who have been ‘debunking europeocentrism and 
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 challenging the universalist posture of American and/or European knowledge’ 
(Pellerin 2012, 62).  
The common agenda of these scholars is to ‘democratize’ the discipline of IR by 
exploring the possibility of non-Western IRT (hereafter referred to as the ‘non-
Western IRT’ approach) or by problematizing ‘the basic formulation and idiom of our 
query’ so as to ‘redefine IR’ itself (hereafter referred to as the ‘post-Western IR’ 
approach) (Behera 2007, 342; see also Shimizu 2015). This is because, in their view, 
the discipline of International Relations is overwhelmingly dominated by the West, 
resulting in the fact that it always privileges certain perspectives, pedagogies, and 
practices (Crawford and Darryl 2001; Lizée 2011). While this Western-centrism is 
true for the entire discipline, it is even more so in the field of IR theorizing. 
Specifically, two criticisms have been directed at Western IR Theory: ahistoricism and 
Eurocentrism (Zhang 2002; Hobson 2012; Wallerstein 1997). Acharya has 
summarized the implications of Western dominance in IRT by advancing four major 
points: 1) ‘auto-centrism’ in theorizing international order based on Western ideas, 
culture, politics, historical experiences and contemporary practice; 2) ‘false 
universalism’ in viewing Western theories and practices as ‘universally valid’ whilst 
non-Western ideas are deemed as ‘particularistic and inferior’; 3) disjuncture in the 
application of Western IR theory in explaining non-Western experience; and 4) 
agency denial of non-Western states, regional institutions, civil society actors in 
contributing to world order. Consequently the non-West is seen as ‘consumers or 
passive recipients’ rather than ‘producers or active borrowers of knowledge’ (Acharya 
2000a, 2007a; see also Clifford 2011). 
It is important to note that despite their dissatisfaction with Western dominance in 
IRT, these scholars do not reject the contribution of IRT in spreading the discipline in 
the non-West. They do acknowledge that there are theories, despite their Western 
origins, that are ‘more relevant to the non-Western world with the help of extensions 
and “advances”’ (Acharya 2011b, 623). For example, constructivism, post-
colonialism, feminism and strands of critical IR that have helped considerably in 
broadening the relevance and appeal of IR theory around the world (Acharya 2011b, 
623; Hobson 2007, 116). These scholars, however, are united in the belief that 
bridging the North-South gap in IRT by simply testing, extending and revising 
existing theories would not address the need and demand for change given that their 
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 Eurocentric nature remains intact (Acharya 2011b, 623). A more representative 
discipline, therefore, can be constructed with theoretical input based on the tradition 
and practice of international relations in other regions beyond the West because they 
at times do not fit in the explanations of Eurocentric theories. In this light, Acharya 
argues that  
While one cannot and should not seek to displace existing (or future) theories 
of IR that may substantially originate from Western ideas and experiences, it is 
possible, through dialogue and discovery, to build alternative theories about 
the functioning of international relations that have their origin in the South 
(Acharya 2011b, 620). 
In light of this development, many IR scholars began to call for ‘catching up’ with the 
West, ‘decentralizing, ‘democratizing IR’, ‘decolonizing IR’, ‘reinventing 
international studies’, and promoting ‘dialogue’ between West and non-West in order 
to have a more ‘inclusive’ and ‘international’ discipline (Acharya 2011b; Lizée 2011; 
Nayak and Selbin 2010; Jones 2006; Ling 2014a). This is necessary given that the 
world has become more pluralistic and ‘globalized’ in the postcolonial and post-
Westphalia era. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for instance, argue that ‘Westphalia-
based IR theory is not only incapable of understanding pre-modern international 
systems, but also… its lack of historical perspective makes it unable to answer, in 
many instances address, the most important questions about the modern international 
system’ (Buzan and Little 2000, 3). To expand the explanatory power of IR theory, 
much more needs to be known about the development and practice of international 
relations in the different regions of the non-Western world. It is important, they 
suggest, that ‘non-Western IR theorists follow the route charted by non-Western world 
history theorists and take up this challenge, which will not only transform our 
understanding of international relations in the non-Western world but also require us 
to re-construe developments in the Western world’ (Buzan and Little 2010, 214). 
While sharing the view with Buzan and Little that IR needs to take greater cognizance 
of world history and the varieties of pathways and experiences from outside the 
Western world, Acharya even goes further in envisioning an ideal scenario for a ‘truly 
international discipline’ whereby one could derive IR theory from all parts of the 
world, not only the great powers (Clifford 2011). 
The study of regions in particular, argues Acharya, brings greater richness and 
diversity to the discipline. It also offers a useful pathway for integrating area studies 
and IR to the benefit of both (Acharya 2006). In this context, East Asia stands out as a 
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 prominent example because it is an interesting case to evaluate IR in a region that is 
moving from periphery to the center of the international political economy. Pierre 
Lizée, for instance, explains that his selection of Asia as the source of non-Western 
examples is because Asia remains ‘the key points of reference when one speak of the 
“rise of the rest” and the way it would entail a reorientation of basic understandings of 
global politics: the growing influence of China, India or Japan, as the case in point is, 
most definitely, always part of this sort of debate…’ (Lizée 2011, 7). In this light, 
including voices long disregarded by mainstream Western IRT literature will ‘enrich’ 
the epistemology of the discipline and/or diversify the inter-subjective IR space, thus 
leading us to ‘a more democratic theorization of world affairs’ (Shimizu 2015, 6). 
However, some of these scholars simply point out that there are different 
interpretations of international relations in the non-West. They ‘do not make explicit 
arguments regarding the political and intellectual meaning behind offering these 
different perspectives, even though they may implicitly aim to connect this issue to a 
political re-evaluation of the discipline’ (Shimizu 2015, 5). Furthermore, apart from 
Acharya and Ling, most of these non/post-Western discourses focus more on the 
wider Third World context and thus, do not provide in-depth envisions about East 
Asian IR Theory. These shortcomings are covered by the other approaches discussed 
hereafter. 
Systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ IRT 
The second direction of EAIRT advocacy consists of the most vocal proponents for 
EAIRT, most prominently David Kang, Gerald Chan, Yongjin Zhang, and given his 
overlapping interests, Amitav Acharya. These are Western-based East Asia specialists 
who, despite their Western citizenship and working experience, are more inclined to 
take an East Asian ‘inside’ perspective. These scholars do not seek to displace 
mainstream IRT or advocate an Asian school of international relations because ‘this 
would link us to constructs (and debates surrounding them) such as Asian values, 
Asian democracy, Asian way etc.’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 229). As Acharya puts 
it, mainstream IR theories and critical IR theories ‘are relevant and useful in analyzing 
Asian IR provided they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena 
(ideas, events, trends, and relationships) that fit with them and against that which does 
not’ (Acharya 2007a). In fact, most of these scholars (Acharya, Kang, and Chan) are 
constructivists and their works have contributed to importing constructivism into the 
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 region which has advanced the understanding of Asian international relations in 
important ways. Nonetheless, ‘there is a need to incorporate more to IRT the 
distinctive aspects of Asian history, ideas and approaches’ by not stopping at ‘testing 
Western concepts and theories in the Asian context, but generalize from the latter in 
order to enrich an hitherto Western centric IRT’ (Acharya 2008, 76). This approach 
has been categorized by Iain Johnston (2012) as claims for systematically ‘bringing 
East Asia in’ to IRT by developing a ‘new analytical framework’ that reflects more 
East Asian particularities (Kang 2003a; Kang 2010b) or by ‘using Asia as the basis for 
generalization’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 14; Acharya 2010b, 167).  
The first rationale for these specialists’ call for ‘bringing East Asia in’ stems from 
their observation that Western IRT, when it is applied to the study of East Asian 
international relations, often result in ‘getting Asia wrong’ (Kang 2003a). Given that 
IRT in the West was constructed based on a history which mainly reflects anarchy and 
power politics, many doubt the contemporary utility of Western IR theory when 
applied to subsystems like East Asia (Acharya 2008; Choi 2008; Kang 2007, 2010b). 
Stephan Haggard, for example, observes that big theories regarding power, economic 
integration, and political regimes often stumble on their way to application in 
understanding international politics in Northeast Asia (Haggard 2004, 30). In the case 
of Southeast Asian states, Evelyn Goh points to the weakness of realist theory in 
explaining the ‘hedging’ and ‘enmeshment’ practices of these smaller regional 
countries in dealing with China’s rise and the growing Sino-US strategic competition 
(Goh 2008). In analyzing Asian regionalism, Peter Katzenstein comments that 
‘theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, have been of 
little use in making sense of Asian regionalism’ (Katzenstein 1997, 5). Although 
Katzenstein’s remarks primarily refer to the study of Asian regionalism, Acharya 
argues that they can be applied to Asian IR in general (Acharya 2008, 58). To make 
sense of what is happening in Asia today, he suggests, we have to understand ‘the 
local context, the local culture, the local history – and although comparative insights 
are helpful, the primary point of reference has to be local’ (Acharya in Clifford 2011, 
8). Given that existing IR theory ‘deeply reflect(s) the historical experience of the 
European states system in the past, and the cold war more recently’, Kal Holsti (1985, 
viii) posits that it ‘would be perfectly legitimate… for an Indian or African scholar to 
claim that other historical experiences should help form the basis of theories about the 
contemporary international politics.’ 
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 Sharing this view, Yongjin Zhang, who belongs to the English School, argues that ‘no 
credible IR theory can be built only upon the narrow confines of the European 
historical experience… China’s rich and deep history is an important avenue for 
exploring other world orders’ (Zhang 2001b, 63). Similarly, in his study of East Asian 
international relations in the pre-modern and modern time, David Kang suggests that 
the region has exercised a different pattern of international relations from that of the 
West – the hierarchical order and pacifism of the tribute system in the ancient Chinese 
world order that explains why East Asian countries are not balancing against a rising 
China (Kang 2007, 2010b). Nonetheless, both Kang and Acharya warn against 
focusing exclusively on Asia’s differences, because it ‘runs the risk of essentializing 
the region, resulting in the sort of orientalist analysis that most scholars have correctly 
avoided’ (Kang 2003a, 59). 
The second rationale for the need to ‘bring East Asia in’ to IRT is the fact that despite 
its rise in world politics, East Asian cases are often excluded from much of the 
analysis in the US and European IR. As noted by Acharya, much of the growth in the 
discipline, viewed in terms of the number of degree conferment, comes from non-
Western countries, especially China, India and even Indonesia. Yet, IR theory 
‘remains stubbornly Western, incorporating relatively few insights and voices from 
the non-West’ (Acharya 2007a). In his article titled ‘What (if anything) does East Asia 
tells us about International Relations Theory?’ Alastair Iain Johnston (2012, 54) points 
out that only 9% of US IR scholars mainly worked on East Asia in their own research 
although the majority of them believe that East Asia is/will be the area of greatest 
strategic importance to the US at the moment and in the next 20 years. This relative 
neglect of the region has come in different forms: ‘excluding East Asian cases from 
analysis, including East Asian cases but miscoding or misunderstanding  them, or 
including them but missing the fact that they do not confirm the main findings of the 
study’ (Johnston 2012, 53). 
Reviewing East Asia–related literature on three important clusters of theorizing – 
structural theories of conflict, institutional design and efficacy, and historical memory 
– Johnston (2012) acknowledges that there are distinctive aspects of East Asian 
international relations that have not been adequately incorporated into transatlantic IR 
theorizing. These are also the key issues whereby East Asia IR specialists have 
different views with their Western counterparts. For instance, they point to the 
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 deficiencies of structural theories e.g. power transition theory as it is applied to the 
Asian context given that there have been few evidences of a balance of power against 
either China or the US in East Asia (Kang 2007; Goh 2008).8 David Kang further 
argues that such anomalies can be better explained by looking at the historical order of 
East Asia which was based on China’s pacifist tribute system and the cultural 
commonalities of Confucian norms and values (Kang 2005; Kang 2010b). In 
explaining regional conflicts, many East Asia specialists believe that ‘historical 
memory (and its expression in nationalism and ethnocentrism) is a key source of 
interstate conflict, persistent security dilemmas, and ongoing disputes over territory’ 
(Johnston 2012, 169). As for explaining the cooperative dimension in international 
relations, these specialists note the under-institutionalized reality of East Asian 
multilateral institution building characterized by the ‘ASEAN Way’ (sometimes 
termed the ‘Asian Way’), and the lack of a NATO-like multilateral security alliance in 
East Asia (Acharya 2000b, 2010b; Acharya and Stubbs 2009).  
Johnston (2012) suggests that this neglect of the Asian region may not be beneficial to 
transatlantic IR, not only in terms of data problems but also in terms of omitted or 
downplayed explanatory variables and theoretical arguments. Nonetheless, unlike 
Acharya and Kang, Johnston is more skeptical as to whether systematically ‘bringing 
East Asia in’ will make any major difference for IR theorizing. Rather he suggests that 
‘bringing East Asia in’ is necessary for the own sake of the discipline’s development 
but this is a responsibility of the IR field as a whole, not just of East Asia IR 
specialists. A more in-depth study of East Asia IR, he concludes, ‘can be a platform 
for greater theoretical innovation in transatlantic IR’ (Johnston 2012, 70). 
Toward East Asian School(s) of International Relations 
The third direction of advocacy for EAIRT comes from local IR scholars. These 
include, among others, Muthiah Alagappa of Malaysia, Kishore Mahbubani of 
Singapore, Qin Yaqing of China, Takashi Inoguchi of Japan, and Chaesung Chun of 
Korea. They do demand for some form of a distinctive East Asian IRT either at the 
regional or national level based on the unique aspects of the history, ideas, and 
relationships that drive international relations in East Asia. Muthiah Alagappa – a 
prominent scholar from the region – observes that ‘there is growing interest among 
8 It should be noted that these claims were put forwarded before the U.S. announcement of its pivot/re-
balancing to Asia in 2011. It will, therefore, be interesting to see how scholars may respond to such 
changes in world politics in their theorizing. This will be analyzed in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
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 Asian scholars in developing indigenous ideas, concepts, and perspectives. As it 
flourishes, Asian scholarship has the potential to enrich, pluralize, and make IR a 
more international discipline’ (Alagappa 2011b, 195). 
Explaining why this is the case, Alagappa (2011a) posits that previously Asia 
mattered on the margins primarily as an extension of Western interests in a 
subordinate region, but the current rise of Asia into a core world region have altered 
this situation. The worldviews and practices of international relations of Asian 
countries are commanding increased attention. Moreover, Alagappa (2011a, 156-64) 
points out four new developments that will alter the state of IR in East Asia: 1) Asia 
has transformed from a subordinate to a dominant region; 2) Asia has evolved from a 
war-prone to a more peaceful and stable region, 3) Asia has changed from an 
impoverished to a prosperous region, and 4) Asia’s strategic environment has become 
more complex. These changing patterns of Asian international relations are not fully 
explained by structural theories, particularly in terms of anarchy or distribution of 
power. As anarchy is a constant in a system of sovereign states, it cannot explain 
change, including the transition to peace in Asia. Anarchy also cannot account for the 
termination of some types of war and the persistence of others. Likewise, distribution 
of power (unipolar, bipolar and multipolar) explanations cannot explain war and peace 
in Asia. Instead, ‘contestations, advances, and setbacks in making states and nations 
along with changes in state capacity have been the primary drivers of war, peace, 
cooperation, and order in post-1945 Asia’ (Alagappa 2011a, 155). 
Meanwhile, a number of other local scholars believe that there are key concepts and 
practices of East Asian international relations that have not been adequately captured 
by theoretical paradigms developed from Western experience. These include, amongst 
others, Chinese pacifist views of world order (Tianxia and Datong) (Zhao 2005, 2006, 
2009), Japan’s pan-Asianism through its vision of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere’, the soft-institutionalism and open regionalism embedded in regional 
institutions such as ASEAN, or the strict adherence of East Asian states to the non-
intervention norms and its skepticism to multilateralism. In their comprehensive 
volume that investigates the question of ‘why there is no non-Western IRT in Asia’, 
Acharya and Buzan and their local colleagues conclude that there is a prospect for 
building IRT beyond the West in Asia. It can be done by theorizing East Asian history 
and various of pathways and experiences, including but not limited to classical 
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 traditions and thinking of religious, military, political and military figures (e.g. Sun 
Tzu, Kautilya), thinking and foreign policy approach of local leaders, the work of 
Asian scholars who have taken up Western IRT, and policies and praxis of Asian 
countries (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 10-6).  
In practice, there have been efforts by local scholars to construct indigenous 
frameworks, most noticeably in Northeast Asia (China, Korea, and Japan). IR scholars 
in these countries have begun to study the English School model of ‘international 
society’ and ‘modified sovereignty’ for theory making based on their distinct culture, 
philosophy, and history. Others have already called for ‘democratizing’ IR study with 
culture as a method, ‘indigenization’ e.g. Eastphalian order, East Asianism, East 
Asianization etc (Shimizu et al. 2008; Shin 2009; Qin 2006). Some of the most radical 
accounts among these attempts strive to criticize Western modernity and emphasize 
the ‘Asian values’ in IR knowledge. They do so by inverting ‘power relations, 
represented in resisting hegemonic narratives and discourses, in order to create “our” 
version of “Self” and “Others’”’ (Shimizu 2015, 6). 
Critics’ responses: the pros and cons of EAIRT 
Unsurprisingly, there has been backlash on the need/desirability of an EAIRT. The 
most vehement critique of EAIRT, unsurprisingly, comes from Western IR scholars, 
including Jack Snyder, William A. Callahan, and Kimberly Hutchings. They are 
joined by a number of other local (Asian) scholars – many of whom were trained in 
the United States or Europe – who are skeptical or against the ideas of building 
regional/national school(s) of IR in East Asia. These include Ching-Chang Chen, 
Chih-Yu Shih, See Seng Tan, etc. 
The primary critique of the non/post-Western IR writings is that they are too intent on 
drawing a distinction between the Western and non-Western worlds. The West/non-
West distinction seems to be understood as constructing the non-West as the ‘Self’, 
and the West as ‘Other’ or vice versa. As Hutchings argues, neither the term ‘West’ 
nor ‘non-West’ is homogenous and  
whatever the differences between them, ‘non-Western’ experiences and 
perspectives remain defined in a negative relation to ‘West’. The terminology 
of ‘West’/‘non-West’ is over determined by the ways in which it has been used 
to mark distinctions, for instance, between different ways of life, different 
histories, different political institutions or regimes, and different territories or 
42 
 
 regions. Any attempt to pin any of these meanings down empirically collapses 
very quickly (Hutchings 2011, 645).  
Moreover, the fact that not only non-Western scholars are taking up the issue of 
Western dominance in IR knowledge but increasingly many Western scholars are also 
uncomfortable with the status quo led some to object that this distinction between 
West and non-West has become increasingly unsustainable and should be subsumed 
under a single global conversation about the nature and purpose of IR theory. 
Importantly, although Acharya says that he and his colleagues do not aim to set up a 
new debate and that they seek for ‘dialogue and discovery’, many believe that current 
efforts to construct IR beyond the West will possibly divide rather than unite the 
discipline (Chen 2011a; Frost 2009; Hutchings 2011). 
Concerning the relevance of Western IRT in the East Asian context, some Western-
based East Asia specialists defend the universalism of Western IRT and reject claim 
of East Asian exceptionalism (Friedberg 1993; Berger 2002; Mearsheimer 2006; 
Wang 2011c). After reviewing 4000 years of East Asian history, Warren Cohen 
concludes that there are no major differences in the international relations of East 
Asia. As he argues, 
regardless of the teachings of Confucius and other great Chinese thinkers or 
strategists, China has behaved in the past, as it does in the present, as do all 
great powers throughout recorded history: it has been aggressive when it was 
strong and defensive when it was weak. Despite the German words that have 
become part of our vocabulary, the Chinese invented the practices we call 
Realpolitik and Machtpolitik. Nothing in Chinese culture or tradition either 
demands or precludes aggressive action (Cohen 2000, 478).  
Other scholars (e.g. Johnston 1995; Wang 2011c) similarly question the claims about 
the pacifism of Chinese tribute system Tianxia promoted by David Kang or Zhao 
Tingyang. While acknowledging the parallel existence of Confucian pacifism, which 
is said to be ‘symbolic and inoperative’, Johnston contends that China’s strategic 
culture has been largely ‘realpolitik’ or ‘parabellum’ (Johnston 1995). Meanwhile, 
some East Asia specialists do acknowledge the region’s distinctiveness and diversity 
in terms of history and culture but argue that there is a nexus toward convergence as 
East Asia is socialized into the international system (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 
2003). Jack Snyder, for example, concedes China’s claim to a distinctive strategic 
culture but rejects the need for a ‘distinctive theory’ to analyze it. He argues instead 
for using Chinese distinctiveness to test and broaden existing IR theories because 
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 ‘mainstream theories are universally applicable paradigms, whereas Confucianism is 
formulated specifically to Chinese or East Asian civilization’ (Snyder 2008, 10). More 
thought-provokingly, Snyder postulates that current efforts to build a monolithic 
Chinese IRT may be healthy provided that it is not harnessed to legitimizing Chinese 
policies in domestic and international politics and thus used as a social ideology. 
William Callahan seems to share this viewpoint as he questions Chinese scholars’ 
theorizing of world order through the hierarchical ‘all under heaven’ (Tianxia) 
concept:  
Tianxia’s most important impact will not be on the world stage, but in China’s 
domestic politics, where it blurs the conceptual boundaries between empire 
and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. Hence rather than guide us 
toward a post-hegemonic world order, Tianxia presents a new hegemony 
where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first 
century (Callahan 2008, 749). 
For local IR scholars, some also warn against the building of local school(s) of IR 
given the region’s complexity and a wide range of divergent interests among its 
proponents (Choi 2008; Yan 2011a). As a South Korean scholar notes, theorizing 
endeavors are most dynamic in Northeast Asia, nonetheless ‘conversations among 
academia in Northeast Asian countries are rather lacking. IR scholars in Korea, China 
and Japan have different approaches. Without systemic conversations among scholars 
in the same region, it would be very hard to have regionally coherent IR theories’ 
(Chun 2010, 85). Taiwanese scholar Chih-yu Shih also suggests three methods for the 
formation of Asian Schools of IR but simultaneously explains how it would backfire 
in each case (Shih 2010a, 3). Moreover, as a scholar has recently warned: 
simply calling for greater incorporation of ideas from the non-West and 
contributions by non-Western scholars from local ‘vantage points’ does not 
make IR more global or democratic, for that would do little to transform the 
discipline’s Eurocentric epistemological foundations. Re-envisioning IR in 
Asia is not about discovering or producing as many ‘indigenous’ national 
schools of IR as possible, but about reorienting IR itself toward a post-Western 
era that does not reinforce the hegemony of the West within (and without) the 
discipline. Otherwise, even if local scholars could succeed in crafting a 
‘Chinese (or Indian, Japanese, Korean, etc.) School’, it would be no more than 
constructing a ‘derivative discourse’ of Western modernist social science 
(Chen 2011a, 1).   
Other scholars have similarly dismissed recent non-Western efforts to build alternative 
perspectives and indigenous theories of IR as ‘copying’ or ‘mimicry.’ As See Seng 
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 Tan puts it, that is the tendency of ‘auto-Orientalism’ whereby ‘for no matter their 
ideological and intellectual preferences, they remain for the most part wedded to 
Western methodological categories and terms of reference’ (Tan 2009, 128). 
Therefore, in the immediate future the most feasible way to advance East Asian IR, 
according to EAIRT critics, is to incorporate more East Asian contexts and 
experiences to enrich IR theories (see, for example, Choi 2008; Tang 2010c; Yan 
2011a; Zhang 2012c). Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, has done pioneering work in 
developing ‘subaltern realism’ where he thinks ‘IRT meets the Third World’ (Ayoob 
1995). Chinese scholar Tang Shiping also contributes solid theoretical development of 
defensive realism to analyze Chinese foreign policy behavior. As Acharya also 
acknowledges, ‘instead of drawing a sharp distinction between what is Western and 
what is Asian, theoretical perspectives on East Asian international relations should 
explore commonalities that are quite substantial and would constitute the core of a 
universal corpus of knowledge about world politics’ (Acharya 2008, 76). 
Another ‘debate’, so what? On the need to ‘open the black-box’ of IR theorizing 
As we can see from the above, there is a lively debate in the existing literature about 
the possibility and desirability of an East Asian IR. However, we may wonder whether 
this emerging EAIRT discourse will eventually become one of the many unresolved 
debates in IR. All the claims and counter-claims for EAIRT presented in the debate 
have their own rationales and certainly appear ‘heartfelt’ but there are endemic 
reasons to the nature of theorizing that suggest this theoretical discussion will remain 
intractable. This debate over EAIRT, however, raises many interesting and important 
questions: Are all these claims and counter-claims justified? What is the relationship 
between real world events and theories about them? Can we, or should we, aim to 
achieve a consensus or compromise between these sides? As one scholar has noted, 
the end of ‘great debates’ and the diversification of theoretical approaches indicate 
that ‘all major conflicts within IR have not been resolved and are not being resolved’ 
(Sylvester 2007, 566). David Lake, therefore, has urged the IR community to stop 
claiming the superiority of one approach over another and instead ‘seek progress in 
understanding real problems of world politics’ to fulfil our responsibilities toward the 
society (Lake 2011, 478). 
Against that background, this thesis posits that we need to look into the inner 
dynamics of theory making. Amidst all the debates over EAIRT, one aspect has 
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 remained surprisingly understudied; that is how this debate has actually shaped the 
practices of academics who are engaged in that debate, on whatever side that might 
be. There are many big claims but what have academics actually done to bring their 
preferred theoretical claims and approaches into life? In the current form, all these 
claims and counter-claims about EAIRT seem to be impressionistic or normative at 
best. If anything, they recall the previous bold assertions of ‘Asian values’ and the call 
for constructing ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ in the 1990s which, as will 
be analyzed in Chapter 3, is considered no more than a political project. We, therefore, 
should exercise caution on the quality of all these claims and counter-claims about 
EAIRT because almost no systematic research has been done to document empirical 
patterns or verify causal hypotheses.   
In light of such development, this study postulates that theoretical claims are only 
valid when the practices of the theoretician align with them. By validity I mean that is 
for a theoretical assertion to be counted as knowledge claim and by alignment I mean 
the match between the claims scholars put forward in the theoretical debate and the 
practices they adopted in daily life. Lacking actual practices, these various calls for 
EAIRT are considered merely ‘hollow claims’ with no significant impact on both the 
study and practice of i.r. This view about the validity of knowledge claims particularly 
applies for mainstream IR scholars – the current ‘gate-keepers’ of knowledge. Note, 
for example, the below critique of a leading US-based East Asia specialist about the 
various claims for a Chinese worldview: 
American scholars care about capabilities. They care about what China and 
other countries’ capabilities are. They don’t pay attention to words. Chinese 
have slogans after slogans, theories after theories (peaceful rise, new 
international political order, new security concept, harmonious world, Chinese 
dream, etc.). To them, they are not slogans, they are real values and ideas 
about how the international system and order should work. But frankly to 
Westerners, they are just slogans – they are propaganda that does not provide 
blueprints for an alternative world order. Westerners, in my view, do not take 
Chinese assertions about world order seriously. They dismiss it as propaganda, 
myself included… Latin America, Africa, maybe the Middle East and Central 
Asia, in these four regions there may be some interest in the Chinese vision of 
world order… but it does not resonate in the West (David Shambaugh, 
Interview, November 2013). 
Given this fact, a more useful contribution to the evaluation of the quality and impact 
of the EAIRT debate would be to examine its practical aspects to uncover why 
knowledge claims occur the way they do, what factors have shaped those claims, and 
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 how they influence scholars in their daily practices. In other words, there should be an 
attempt to ‘open the black-box’  (Fuchs 1992, 3) of IR theorizing to see how theorists 
actualize their claims in practice. As a scholar has noted, we should not consider 
theorizing as ‘given’ but need to ‘examine what scholars do in making arguments, 
debating, advancing scientific theses and theorising’ (McMillan 2012, 135). For 
example, some claims about the distinctiveness of East Asian international relations 
such as the absence of a balance of power against China may be outdated with the US 
recent pivot to Asia. How have scholars responded to such evolving changes in world 
politics as well as to the critiques placed on their claims so as to advance their 
theoretical approaches? And how have they implemented those claims not only in 
their theoretical research but also in teaching, networking, and other outreach 
activities? Toward that end, the EAIRT debate can serve as an excellent springboard 
for investigating the practices of knowledge-in-the-making as it is arguably an 
example of ongoing ‘big debates’ in contemporary IR literature. 
Toward a better appreciation of the theory-practice relationship 
To explore how and in what ways the EAIRT debate has influenced, or shaped, 
academic practices, it is necessary to initially discuss the theory-practice relationship 
more broadly. There is a well-developed literature that is probing different aspects of 
the theory-practice linkages: the (ir)relevance of IR knowledge to policy and politics, 
the responsibility of individual academics for the implications of their theories on the 
real world, and the desirability to bridge the policy-scholarly gap (to name but a few,  
Hill and Beshoff 1994; Wallace 1996; Smith 1997; Nincic and Lepgold 2000; Smith 
2004; Walt 2005; Ish-Shalom 2009). While some are worried that academics are 
getting too distant from the world they are studying and that IR knowledge risks 
becoming irrelevant to policy-makers, others are deeply concerned that IR theories are 
getting too close to politics and, in some instances, such as the democratic peace 
theory, even help to justify political actions of practitioners (Wallace 1996; Hobson et 
al. 2011). Despite such divergence regarding the perceived theory-practice gap or 
nexus, it has been well noted by various scholars that ‘theory and practice are 
intrinsically combined rather than opposed’ (Grenier 2013a, 16; see also Walt 2005; 
Nye 2009). 
In what way, then, can theory be linked to or ‘guide’ practice? The existing literature 
emphasizes at least three dimensions: theory can be made policy-relevant to help 
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 guide policy-makers; theory can have real and sometimes negative impact on world 
politics and society; and theory is embedded in the scientific practices involved in the 
process of knowledge production. Although this thesis discusses all these dimensions 
because they are somewhat interrelated, it is the third kind of potential linkages 
between theory and disciplinary practices that will be intensively examined to unveil 
how theorists bring their claims into life. In what follows, I will briefly discuss this 
body of theory-practice literature with the particular emphasis on the third dimension 
– the practices of knowledge claims. 
First, the current theory-practice literature predominantly focuses on the desired 
policy relevance of IR knowledge, particularly in answering the question of what kind 
of IR theory may be useful to foreign policy and politics. Bruce Jentleson argues that 
‘middle-range theory’ is best suited to the daily needs of policy makers as ‘the policy 
relevance of IR theory inversely correlates to the level of abstraction’ (Jentleson 2002, 
145). Fred Chernoff believes that for the discipline to enhance its policy relevance, it 
should produce theories with predictive power as it guides policy-makers on what to 
do (Chernoff 2009). The ‘practice turn’ scholars meanwhile have tried to develop a 
practice theory that focuses on the everyday, highlighting embodied capacities such as 
know-how, skills and tacit understandings and apply it to world politics.9  
The paradox here is that theory and policy need to be congruent, but in order to inform 
policy ‘theory needs to be autonomous and ahead of the practical game, rather than 
chasing behind it’ (Hill and Beshoff 1994, 214). In this light, the more autonomous 
and independent science is from policy and politics, the stronger its scholarship and 
the greater its potential influence (Haas 2004, 576). Furthermore, ‘policy-relevant’ 
theories may also risk turning into ideologies which can only be avoided if they 
strictly refer to reality. As some scholars have noted, ‘Reality is not a given, but an 
intellectual construct and thus a precondition for theory-building and action. A 
relevant dimension, it should be stressed, is the normative aspect. Normative factors 
determine what is relevant and what is not’ (Girard, Eberwein, and Eber 1994, 154).  
9 These practice scholars have used Bourdieu’s analytical framework for studying concrete practices in 
world politics such as multilateral diplomacy, nuclear deterrence, global banking or migration. In one 
of the first attempts to apply practice theory to the study of International Relations, Vincent Pouliot 
builds on Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to devise a theory of practice of security communities and applies 
it to post-Cold War security relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia 
(Pouliot 2010, 2008). Practice theory has also been employed to study the operation of East Asian 
institutions, such as ASEAN (Davies 2016). 
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 This normative aspect relates to the core question: should theory inform practice? 
There has been much debate on this critical issue, mainly in two dimensions – the 
impact of theory on the world and the responsibility of the theorist to that world. The 
predominant objectivist conception of science in IR, influenced by philosophers of 
science Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, holds the view that science aims to produce 
theories that truthfully represent how the world is. Theory is, therefore, independent of 
social values and human interventions and the scientist is said to be observing the 
world without affecting it (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 417). This positivist approach 
hence rejects the notion that theories have any influence and power outside of 
academia and no substantial real-world ramifications (Keohane 1986). Moreover, as 
theory is not real, we cannot use the reality to test its validity. Theories, therefore, can 
only be falsified by another theory (Popper 1959; Lakatos 1976). This philosophy of 
science has dominated in IR together with the rise of structuralist theories of neo-
realism and neo-liberalism. 
Post-structuralists (particularly critical theorists) reject this objectivist position on two 
counts: the world is socially constructed and that theorists have responsibility for the 
impact of their theories on the society. Critical theorists argued that theories not only 
grew out of reflections on real world politics but may also affect and even constitute 
the world they purport to explain and eventually reinforce the common sense of 
everyday political discourse (Ish-Shalom 2009, 305). The ‘end of history’ and 
‘democratic peace’ theories are among those powerful examples of how theoretical 
work can directly contribute to the world they are observing (Ish-Shalom 2009, 170; 
Hobson et al. 2011; Nossal 2001). Most emphatically, Steve Smith declared in his 
2003 International Studies Association (ISA) Presidential Address that the whole IR 
discipline has been ‘one voice singing into existence the world that made September 
11 possible’ (Smith 2004, 515).  
But if we assume that theory has real world implications, it should also be legitimate 
to raise a concern about ‘responsible scholarship’ and the responsibility of theorists 
upon theorizing. Steve Smith first questioned the ‘ethic of responsibility’ of IR 
theorists in the wake of the disastrous events of 11 September 2001. He feels that ‘all 
of us in the discipline need to reflect on the possibility that both the ways in which we 
have constructed theories about world politics, and the content of those theories, have 
supported specific social forces and have essentially, if quietly, unquestioningly, and 
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 innocently, taken sides on major ethical and political questions’ (Smith 2004, 500). 
Instead of portraying themselves as ‘merely’ reporting on the world of politics, Smith 
urges academics to take a normative stance on it. From this perspective, IR theorists 
have a social task and agency role in designing what they theorize and preach (Smith 
2004).  
Advancing this point, Pikki Ish-Shalom (2009, 303) posits that while social science 
theorists do not bear moral responsibility or blame for the ramifications of their 
theories (which is known as ‘blame responsibility’), they do ‘bear social responsibility 
for the actions or effects that derive from their theories’ (which is known as ‘task 
responsibility’). In this sense, while theorists cannot reasonably expect the political 
abuse of theory to disappear totally, they must do their best to reduce such abuses. To 
discharge the task responsibility and work against theories’ vulnerability, ‘theorists 
need to renounce the principle of objectivity, and to adopt instead a normative ethic, 
making it harder for politicians to abuse their theories, and theorists would be able – 
and morally obliged – to use theories for the benefit of society’ (Ish-Shalom 2009, 
304). Moreover, all causal claims in social science may have phenomenal, or ‘real-
world’, implications but real-world implications are not necessarily policy 
implications; there would be social implications as well (Hobson et al. 2011). The 
theorists, therefore, should take both political and social responsibilities to ensure that 
their theories not only being misused by policymakers but more importantly to 
‘achieve their maximum potential for the public good.’ In so doing, Ish-Shalom 
believes that theorists should put themselves forward as public intellectuals – or, in his 
preferred terminology, ‘theoretician citizens’ (Ish-Shalom 2011, 182). 
Smith and Ish-Shalom’s work is the tip of an iceberg in the theory-practice literature 
that advances the notion of practice beyond the ‘doings’ of politicians and states. It 
refocuses our attention on the behavior and normative stance of theorists themselves 
when they do the theorizing. Nonetheless, to call for the relevance of theory to 
practice or academics’ responsibility when theorizing is not only about asking 
theorists to either engage with policymakers to improve policies or to act as 
‘theoretician citizens’ in educating and enlightening the public about the ‘uses’ of 
theories. It is a fuller commitment to examining how theorizing is conducted and 
stabilized, e.g. how theories and theoretical debates shape understanding and 
agreement with certain propositions, and particularly what scholars themselves do in 
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 their day to day practices to perpetuate or change how their theories and theoretical 
claims are shared and supported. 
Moreover, if we assume that the environment that shapes IR theorizing is not limited 
to policy and politics then these linkages become more complicated. As a scholar has 
noted, the theory-practice debate ‘does not only concern the potential relation between 
academic IR and policy-practice. It is also related to the identity of academic IR itself’ 
(Grenier 2013a, 16). In this light, the notion of practice should be broadened in order 
to enable a better appreciation of the encounters between theory and practice. 
Accordingly, it should be more satisfactory to speak about practice as multiple 
‘doings’ than to think of it merely as the ‘doings’ of politicians or states. Practice, in 
Knud Erik Jorgensen’s categorization, includes three kinds: 1) practice of states 
(policy-making); 2) practices in society concerning international affairs (e.g. political 
action and international thought); and 3) the practice of academics, no matter whether 
they theorise, analyse empirical issues or engage in critical self-reflection (Jørgensen 
2004, 335-6). In this light, a study of how theory can shape academic practices in IR, 
e.g. teaching, research, and other knowledge diffusion activities, can offer a 
significantly different outlook on the theory-practice debate (Grenier 2013a, 16). 
It should be noted that this broadened conception of practice(s) is inspired by the 
practice turn in IR theory. The practice turn take practices as the core unit of analysis, 
seeing ‘practices’ as the stuff that drives the world and makes it ‘hang together’; 
thereby it entails a distinctive way of studying the world (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 
449). The symmetrical perspective of practice theory implies not only considering the 
world studied as a practical configuration, but also conceiving of (academic) 
knowledge generation as practice. Practice theory, then, provides a tool for studying 
scientific disciplines (such as IR), for understanding the multiple relations between 
scientific and other social and political practices, and for examining the practical 
activities involved in generating knowledge (Bueger and Gadinger 2007). Such an 
encompassing conception of practice promises to place ‘scholars in a better position to 
contribute to real-world problems and to produce statements of relevance beyond a 
community of peers’ (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 9-10). Disciplinary practices 
scholars, hence, call for more ‘self-reflexive accounts of the discipline’ by focusing on 
the links between space and knowledge production and the practices inside the 
discipline. In particular, they place emphasis on ‘the everyday practices of IR scholars 
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 who navigate between various cultural and linguistic settings’ (D'Aoust 2012a, 124; 
see also Büger and Gadinger 2007; Berling and Bueger 2013).10  
Among these ‘everyday practices’ scholars, Christian Büger and Frank Gadinger are 
most proactive in introducing concepts and insights from the sociology of science in 
order to explore and to illustrate in what way these can advance IR’s disciplinary 
sociology. In arguing for moving from epistemology to sociology of science in IR, 
Büger argues that ‘academic disciplines are communities organised by a distinct set of 
shared practices, vocabularies, and institutions. They give meaning and legitimacy to 
academic practices such as writing and presenting research, reading or teaching; they 
are a means to evaluate one’s status, and give intelligibility to distinct claims to 
knowledge’ (Büger 2012, 101).  Drawing on this logic, these two scholars claim that 
we can address one of the key issues of disciplinary sociology – the character of the 
relations of IR to other actors and their institutions and discourses – by treating IR as a 
scientific practice that is closely tied to its social environment. In this light, the 
discipline of IR is not only constituted by theory and concepts but ‘doing IR’ is a 
technique, a set of practices in which IR scholars are closely linked with the wider IR 
environment (e.g. policy, practitioners, funding agencies, media, public etc) (Büger 
and Gadinger 2007, 91). Hence, ‘understanding IR scholars in ‘doing IR’ requires 
taking into account their daily and sometimes trivial practices’ (Büger and Gadinger 
2007, 90). 
How, then, is theory linked to academic practices? McMillan (2012, 135) posits that 
we should see disciplinary knowledge as a product/output/outcome of other processes 
and practices (research, learning, data collection, observation, inference, teaching), 
which are in their turn the result of wider social and structural conditions that drive 
and shape them. From this perspective, IR is pivotally a culture constituted by 
different domains of practice, or put differently, different pathways of knowledge 
transfer. Therefore, knowledge production in IR can only be understood by taking into 
account the rich IR network of actors, discourses, and their practices that allows for 
the stabilization of knowledge. Those different domains of practice are systemized 
into key categories, namely ‘mobilizing the world’ (such as translating the actions of a 
10 Most of the ‘disciplinary practices’ scholars I mentioned here collectively argued for bringing the 
sociology of science deeper into IR in a 2012 issue of the Journal of International Relations and 




                                                          
 foreign policymaker into a scientific article), ‘autonomy’ (self-organization and 
maintaining the imaginary boundary to ‘non-science’), ‘alliance’ (seeking allies and 
influence through the enrolment of funding agencies, clients and publics), and ‘public 
representation’ (engagement with the public) (Büger and Gadinger 2007, 101-5). 
‘Being an IR scholar’ and ‘producing IR knowledge’ depends inevitably on these sets 
of practices and IR is intrinsically interwoven with its environment through these 
pathways (or, in their words, ‘links and knots’). In and through these practices, 
knowledge circulates and ‘content’ is made and re-made (Büger 2012, 106). 
On the value added of studying the practical aspects of the debate over EAIRT 
Why is the EAIRT debate a good lens through which to analyse practice(s), including 
academic practices? Linking the theory-practice literature with the ongoing EAIRT 
debate, we can see an echo of what has been much debated above. Like their 
colleagues in the debate on the theory-practice linkages, academics engaged in the 
EAIRT debate also argue over the (ir)relevance of an emerging EAIRT to policy and 
politics as well as the roles and functions of involved academics vis-à-vis the policy 
circle. As these scholars sharpen their arguments on the claims and counter-claims for 
EAIRT, some of the practical aspects of this debate become increasingly apparent. 
Accordingly, some scholars link the desirability of an emerging EAIRT with the 
nature of theorizing (to explain and predict reality) and the need to build new 
frameworks to reflect new developments in practice (new dynamics in East Asian 
international relations) (Alagappa 2011a; Qin 2006). Conversely, others have raised 
concerns that such a theory is too close to policy (e.g. serving as ‘government straight-
jackets’ or ‘political ideology’ in Acharya and Snyder’s respective terminology) 
(Acharya 2011b; Snyder 2008). Academics, hence, may indeed inadvertently exercise 
a certain amount of ‘theoretical nationalism’ and thus risk losing their intellectual 
integrity or end up producing ‘unscientific’ knowledge (Snyder 2008). 
Yet, most of the above assertions about the connection between theory and practice in 
the case of EAIRT thus far have adopted a top down approach, linking the claims for 
EAIRT with the practice understood as ‘politics’ or the policy practice of scholars. 
Little has been known as to how claims about EAIRT have altered the way academics 
approach their work, research, education and other professional activities. This issue 
has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT directly, 
whatever their perspective on that debate, and by those who study the relationship 
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 between theory and practices more generally, whose focus tends to be external 
(practices beyond academia) rather than internal (practices within academia).  
In this context, a study on how academic practices have changed in response to the 
call for EAIRT provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, significance 
and depth of the contemporary EAIRT debate. First, it is interesting and understudied 
– there is an empirical gap on what is actually happening on the ground and this gap is 
both regional and country specific. Second, filling that gap may bring about ‘new 
knowledge’ – findings of vital clues relating to the ‘genuineness’ of the claims for 
EAIRT. Third, the research may be able to develop more precise traction about where 
changes may or may not be happening in a broader regional and extra-regional 
context. For instance, is there evidence of disinterest in Western IR theory? Is there 
evidence of multiple new approaches being called for not only by ‘the big names’ 
working on IR in Asia, but also by numerous other scholars? What form does this 
demand manifest itself and is that demand pan-regional or vary between countries?  
Furthermore, the investigation on how theory shapes academic practices enables not 
only a better understanding of the factors contributing to the construction of 
knowledge but also the identification of the ‘practical (performative) effects that 
academia has’ (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 457). As Christian Büger convincingly 
argues, ‘a study of the [IR] discipline allows for a better understanding of the 
knowledge produced, which might influence political decision making’ (D'Aoust 
2012b, 91). Utilizing the debate over EAIRT which is the key site of knowledge-in-
the-making in the IR discipline today to explore academic practices, therefore, should 
unveil valuable insights into the theory-practice linkages. To conceive of disciplinary 
knowledge from the scientific practices angle in this light ‘would begin to undermine 
the implicit assumption of significant ontological difference between knowledge, the 
activities of knowledge-production and the social conditions of knowledge-
production’ (McMillan 2012, 135). This approach promises to provide a better 
appreciation of the theory-practice relationship more broadly which is enabled through 
the sociology of science framework to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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 Chapter 2: Exploring the EAIRT claims and practices - a sociology of 
science perspective 
The sociology of science suggests that disciplines are not necessarily universal 
in their methodologies, results and outlooks, and that a number of factors that 
often go unrecognized serve to structure the ways in which particular national 
academies view the world. These include the role and concerns of a particular 
state in the international arena, the educational culture of a society, the size 
and structure of its internal academic market, and the relationship of this 
national social scientific academy with other national social scientific 
academies (Bacon and Newman 2002, 23). 
Back in 1985, K.J. Holsti made an interesting observation about the state of the IR 
discipline: that IR is not a unified body of knowledge; and that in understanding how 
IR has developed in and beyond the U.S. academia, it is necessary to take into account 
the geographical and social context of those who produce knowledge (Holsti 1985, 
viii). In fact, his work can be counted as one of the first attempts to analyse IR from 
the ‘sociology of science’ perspective. This is an innovative approach to science that 
has recently been infused into IR in a relatively comprehensive and systematic 
manner. It started with Ole Wæver’s 1998 article on comparative sociology of IR and 
later coming to the fore with ‘disciplinary practices’ discourses.11 It is also the key 
conceptual framework upon which this study draws to construct its method and 
argument with regard to the linkages between theoretical claims over EAIRT and 
academic practices. The reason why these two parts of method and argument are 
mixed together is that the method designed to study the links between the EAIRT 
debate and academic practices facilitates an assessment of the central claims and 
arguments put forth in this thesis.  
Methodologically, this chapter develops an analytical framework for probing the 
linkages between the EAIRT claims and academic practices. This framework is a 
combination of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science with the sociology of 
science serving as the backbone. The history of science helps explain how IR has been 
developed into a distinct field of study in a particular national context as well as how 
EAIRT-related discussions emerged in such disciplinary evolution. Understanding the 
development and characteristics of IR studies in each country will serve as a 
springboard for evaluating the extent of changes and impacts that the current EAIRT 
11 I use the term ‘disciplinary practices’ to distinguish with the ‘practice turn’ which, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, understands ‘practice’ in a related but somewhat different meaning.  
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 debate may have incurred in those countries and on the practices of individual 
academics. The philosophy of science, meanwhile, informs this study in the sense that 
it serves as a basis to analyse the nature of different knowledge claims presented by 
scholars involved in the EAIRT debate and their respective epistemological and 
ontological positions. It will also help evaluate the extent of innovativeness and 
distinctiveness (if any) of those claims and practices for EAIRT as compared to the 
existing theories. 
Both the history of science and philosophy of science have already expressed their 
strength in uncovering some of the logics of the EAIRT debate such as through the 
lenses of power transition and what constitutes legitimate knowledge (Snyder 2008; 
Lu 2012; Cunningham-Cross 2012; Callahan 2001; Acharya 2013a). These ‘top-
down’ approaches, however, tell us little about the practices of theoretical innovation. 
In particular, they have difficulties explaining the way theorizing occurs and the fact 
that, in the case of EAIRT, it takes various forms. As Peter Kristensen and Ras 
Nielsen (2013, 19) have pointed out, what is missing in the literature is an attempt to 
view theorizing from a bottom-up perspective – to open the black-box of IR 
theorizing. Given the diversity of value-laden knowledge claims presented by scholars 
involving in the EAIRT debate, it is necessary to explore the importance of social 
context in theory making. Toward that end, the sociology of science offers a powerful 
analytical tool. The sociology of science claims that science (knowledge construction 
in particular) is a social construct, and therefore it is shaped by the social-political 
concerns and social relations of scientists. Taking this into IR, there have been claims 
that social factors such as culture, ideologies, languages or geography do play a role in 
the process of IR theorizing (Agnew 2007; Rathbun 2012; Pellerin 2012; Grenier 
2013b).  
Drawing on the insights from the sociology of science, I construct a three-layered 
model to investigate how academic practices change in response to the call for EAIRT 
and what drives such changes (if any). These layers include the geopolitical context, 
the institutional/organizational context, and the individual practices of scholars. 
Taking a bottom up approach, this thesis posits that analysing academic practices 
needs to take into account not only the activities of scholars in bringing their claims 
into life but also the broader environment in which the scholars are living – the 
geopolitical and institutional context that indirectly shaped their knowledge claims 
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 and practices. In addition, comparative case studies on the Chinese, Japanese, and 
American IR communities and qualitative analysis based on primary data in the form 
of interviews with scholars involving in the EAIRT debate are employed as 
supplementary tools to the sociology of science framework. Together, these blended 
methods enable a systematic investigation into and generalization about the link 
between EAIRT and academic practices.  
I argue in response to the research question that there have been actual changes 
adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate but the degree and form of change 
vary across cases. These different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the 
uneven impact of intervening social factors. The central argument is advanced here 
that understanding the impact of the EAIRT debate on the practices of academics 
requires appreciating two factors – structural considerations (power shift, 
policy/politics, and academic institutions) and agential choice (personal background, 
vision of science, and moral concerns). These structural and agential factors often 
intersect and impact on various national IR communities and individual academics to 
varying extents, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for an 
EAIRT.  
To demonstrate why such is the case, this chapter is divided in three parts. First, an 
analytical framework is constructed to explore the dynamics of the EAIRT debate and 
practices based on the insights from the sociology of science. Second, the central 
arguments about the linkages between the EAIRT claims and practices are presented. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that the EAIRT claims and practices are socially 
constructed by various structural and agential factors relevant to scholars’ personal 
background, institutional, and national settings. The interplay of structure and agency 
shapes scholars’ respective responses to the call for EAIRT. 
Exploring the EAIRT claims and practices from the sociology of science 
perspective 
Sociology of science as the overarching analytical framework 
This thesis draws on the insights from the sociology of science to build up its own 
model for probing the linkages between theoretical debates and the practices of 
academics. In particular, a three-layered analytical framework is applied here to probe 
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 the possible linkages between EAIRT debate and the actual practices of academics 
engaged in that debate (see Table 2.1). This framework primarily draws on Ole 
Wæver’s explanatory model for comparative sociology of IR (Waever 1998, 696) and 
the notion of disciplinary practices developed by other sociologists of science in the 
field (Büger and Gadinger 2007). 
 
 
Layer 1: The social and political context 
      a. Geopolitical concerns 
      b. Cultural, intellectual styles 
      c. ‘‘Ideologies’’ or traditions of political thought 
      d. Form of state; state-society relations 
      e. Foreign policy 
Layer 2: The institutional/organizational context 
      a. The IR discipline (Theoretical traditions, structure, and historiography) 
      b. Universities (Policy-scholarly relations, Autonomy, Grants and Resources) 
      c. IR Departments (Mission Statement, Funding, Hiring patterns) 
Layer 3: Individual academic practices 
      a. Research (theorizing, publishing, conference attendance) 
      b. Teaching (curriculum, syllabus, supervision) 
      c. Outreach activities (policy consultancy, networking, media speech, public 
services etc.) 
 
Table 2.1. Analytical framework for studying the EAIRT claims and practices 
What is the sociology of science and why is it employed here for constructing the 
above analytical framework? At the first approximation, sociology of science is the 
study of science as a social activity, especially dealing with ‘the social conditions and 
effects of science, and with the social structures and processes of scientific activity’ 
(Ben-David and Sullivan 1975, 203).12 By examining the various epistemic and non-
epistemic factors that influence science, the sociology of science ‘opens the black-box 
of scientific rationality and inspects the actual internal dynamics of science-in-the-
making’ (Fuchs 1992, 3). In this light, sociology of science argues: 
Science is a set of practices shaped by their historical, organizational, and 
social context. Scientific knowledge is produced in a set of practical 
contingencies. In its practice, science produces its realities as well as 
describing them. Scientists participate in the social world, being shaped by it 
12 Contemporary sociology of science can be traced back to the sociology of knowledge developed by 
European sociologists such as Émile Durkheim and Karl Manheim in the early 20th century. It emerged 
in the 1970s as an alternative approach to the dominant history of science and philosophy of science 
and thus far has incorporated a number of variants including ‘the sociology of scientific knowledge’ 
and ‘science studies.’ For the purpose of convenience, all these variants are collectively referred in this 
study as sociology of science or sociological approaches unless otherwise noted. 
58 
 
                                                          
 and simultaneously shaping it. Consequently, scientific knowledge is 
something that is constructed within those practices (Law 2004, 8; quoted in 
Büger and Gadinger 2007, 96-7). 
Understood from this sociological perspective, it does not make sense to treat the 
process of knowledge production as an internal exercise separated from its context as 
the philosophy of science argues. Rather, ‘theorizing’ is an activity that will inherently 
absorb values in the course of establishing knowledge. ‘New’ knowledge, then, is 
understood as ‘being produced not through disembodied reason but through the 
situated context of the “knower” producing it’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 10). 
Science is seen as a cultural formation and research as a social process constituted by 
practice (understood as ‘a set of practices’). In this sense, academia is also a set of 
practices centring on the activities of the scientists. Therefore, the scholarly practices 
relating to knowledge claims (such as researching) are linked to those types of 
practices by which scholars connect with their environment (e.g. seeking for allies and 
funding and public representation). In short, ‘scientists assemble their environment 
with the claims they make… The practices by which scholars engage with their 
environment form a unified whole with “internal” knowledge production practices, or 
in other words, there is a “constant traffic” between the two’ (Büger and Gadinger 
2007, 105).  
The sociology of science started to be infused into IR in the 1990s, first and foremost 
as a response to the scholarly inquiry of whether or not IR is or remains an ‘American 
social science.’ Ole Wæver pioneered this dimension of research. In his International 
Organization article, Wæver (1998, 692) first observed that ‘the relationship between 
IR and sociology of science is virtually non-existent.’ This is perhaps true given that 
almost anything that relates to the conception of science in IR so far has been under 
the framework of philosophy of science (including Karl Popper’s criteria of 
‘verification’, Thomas Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigm’, and Imre Lakatos’s notion of 
‘research programs’). Although acknowledging ‘the merits philosophy of science 
approaches might have as schemes for measuring progress in the discipline’, Wæver 
(1998, 693) believes that ‘they have not proven useful for generating sociologically 
informed studies of the development of IR.’  
In his pioneering attempt to bring sociology of science into IR, Wæver developed a 
model for comparative sociology between American and European IR. He posits that 
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 academic disciplines are social and intellectual structures and vary in their structure 
over time. In this light, IR is ‘an American structure’ in that the US houses the leading 
journals for IR research and produces most of the funding for that research. However, 
he also reminds readers that there are other regional and national centres ‘doing IR.’ 
Drawing on the sociology of science, Wæver outlines a three-layered model to explain 
comparative developments of IR in America and Europe. He argues that the 
development of IR studies in different societies is the outcome of the interplay among 
three layers – the nature of their society and polity, the state of social sciences, and the 
intellectual activities within an IR academia (Wæver 1998, 696). Wæver applies this 
model in four case studies (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) to explain why the discipline has developed the way it has in these four 
countries and more importantly, how IR communities in those countries, given their 
dissimilarities in these three layers, have adopted different development trajectories 
than their American counterpart. 
Following Weaver, sociology-oriented scholars started arguing strongly for applying 
sociology of science in IR on at least two counts. First, if we see IR scholarship as a 
constitutive element of world politics and its aim is to investigate the particulars of 
how IR makes the world it studies then there is a logical reason for IR to engage with 
sociology of science (Büger 2012, 100-1). Second, the sociology of science offers 
promising insights into the praxis and function of the discipline, or in other words, it 
moves the discipline ‘inside-out’ (Büger 2012; Büger and Gadinger 2007; Buzan and 
Albert 2010; D'Aoust 2012b). In particular, the sociology of science, its advocates 
maintain, promises to give ‘a better and different look at IR’ as it points us to a 
different focus – the everyday practices of IR scholars and the associated epistemic 
and non-epistemic factors that shape those practices. The sociology of science, 
therefore, provides a useful platform to probe the relationship between knowledge 
claims and academic practices that this study will build on to assess the practical 
dimension of the ongoing debate over EAIRT. There is a direct contribution of the 
sociology of science approach in providing tools by which we can systematically 
explore the conversation (or links) between context (or IR environment), knowledge 
production (or EAIRT claims) and practice (or the practices of academic involved). 
Given the relevance of the sociology of science to this study, it can serve as a 
springboard for probing the theory-academic practices relationship which is at the 
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 heart of this study. Like many of the aforementioned sociologists of IR, I employ the 
sociology of science (particularly the actor-network and/or agency-structure 
discourses) as a broad conceptual framework for analysis. However, unlike them, 
whose work aims to capture a general ‘big picture’ of the sociology of IR, I focus on a 
more specific and indeed narrower aspect of disciplinary sociology – how theoretical 
claims impact on academic practices in the context of the EAIRT debate. Weaver’s 
model of comparative sociology of IR hence has been adjusted as identified in Table 
2.1. 
Taking a bottom-up sociological approach, the actual practices of academics, 
comprised mainly of their research, teaching, and outreach activities, is the key and 
last level of analysis (layer 3). Yet, as argued by sociologists of science, those 
practices are inseparable from the social contexts that have shaped them – the socio-
political and institutional/organizational layers. In this light, scholars do have an 
agency in carrying out their daily activities but the practices they choose to be 
implemented should be placed and/or understood within certain contexts. These are 
the socio-political and institutional/organizational contexts which constitute the first 
two layers of the above framework.  
The socio-political context (layer 1) shapes the wider IR environment in which 
academics operate. As manifested in the previous section, there are specific national 
traditions, determined by the social and political development patterns such as culture, 
ideology, form of state, and foreign policy that directly or indirectly influence the 
development of social sciences (IR included) as well as the nature and quality of 
knowledge produced. That is because political and economic forces constitute the 
largest structure which feeds the science-related organizations in layer 2 (Collins 
2000, 51). An investigation on the linkages between EAIRT claims and practices 
hence needs to take into account this overarching socio-political context. As one 
recent study has revealed, the development of political science in three East Asian 
states (China, Japan, and Korea) has been associated with the key theoretical trends in 
the US; yet at the same time they also developed some distinct features. This is 
because ‘their development has been inexorably grounded on the nature and dynamics 
of their society and politics, especially the nature and dynamics of their democracies’ 
(Inoguchi 2012, 12). The aim here, therefore, is to identify what, if anything, is 
happening at the national level (culture, ideologies, form of state, foreign policy) that 
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 might serve as the broader context for any social and political changes within an 
institutional framework that are found. 
The institutional context (layer 2) is comprised of the IR discipline, universities, and 
IR departments – the organizational base in which academics are working. The 
importance of these intellectual and social organizations in shaping the development 
of science in general and theoretical orientation in particular cannot be ignored 
because they provide material resources and social structures that shape how scientists 
perform their work (Whitley 2000; Fuchs 1992).13 Moreover, it is through these 
institutions that academics exercise their ‘alliance’ practices (e.g. how they mobilize 
funding resources and support from peers for their theoretical claims). Therefore, in 
order to investigate the link between EAIRT claims and practices, it is necessary to 
look into the academic institutions and the scholarly linkages with policy circles of the 
national IR communities under study. This step, in turn, facilitates an evaluation of the 
impact of policy and institutional factors that have shaped the development of the IR 
discipline in a particular national context and the quality of ‘knowledge’ produced in 
such an environment. Pertaining to this ‘institutional layer’, university/research 
institute and departmental statement missions as well as their funding, their hiring 
policies, and their broader policies and activities will be carefully examined. It is also 
necessary to examine the link between IR departments and universities in the 
countries under study with their governmental or private grants and funding agencies. 
For this project to be manageable, I have focused on some of the top IR departments 
and universities in designated sites (namely China, Japan and the United States) where 
there is clearest sense of (dis)satisfaction and the possible presence of changing 
practices by their academics.  
The third and most important layer for this study is to examine the various practices of 
individual academics that might reflect any moves toward actualizing the theoretical 
claims they put forward in the EAIRT debate. To investigate these academic practices 
properly, it is necessary to be aware of the linkages between academic practices and 
the social, political, and institutional contexts outlined in the two previous layers. That 
said these three layers are interrelated and one is generally instrumental in producing 
13 The proposition that material factors have influence on knowledge production has its roots in 
Marxism which argues that ‘how people think is related to how the material means of mental 
production are distributed. Those who control these means are in a good position to control how ideas 
are produced as well, and even these ideas themselves’ (Fuchs 1993, 935). 
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 the others. Nonetheless, academics do have an agential role in restraining or 
stimulating the impact of external factors in shaping their choices. For example, not 
merely being driven by structural and institutional factors alone, academics can shape 
their surrounding environment by exercising their ‘theoretician citizens’ role or, in 
Buger and Gadinger’s words, ‘mobilizing the world’ and adopting ‘public 
representation’ practices.  
This analytical framework helps uncover the inner logic of theorizing – how and why 
theoretical claims and practices occur the way they do and what actually drives those 
changes. This model will be deployed in three empirical case studies – China, Japan, 
and the US – with the rationale as follows. 
Case Study Justifications 
As an additional method to the sociology of science, this study employs the 
comparative case study method as a mean to test the aforementioned analytical 
framework. The specific guidance for conducting case studies is the structured 
focused comparison approach that Alexander George and Andrew Bennett have 
developed. According to this approach, a set of variables is identified and then their 
variation is analysed across several detailed qualitative cases studies to derive 
systematic conclusions (George and Bennet 2005, 67; Bailes et al. 2011, 1). The case 
studies selected may contribute to theory development through ‘building block’ 
analysis whereby the research asks the same questions in each case under study to 
standardize data (George 1993). These studies can be component parts of larger 
contingent generalizations and typological theories (George and Bennet 2005, 75-6). 
Given the need to appreciate the geographical and social-political context in the 
process of knowledge construction as claimed by the sociology of science, three 
empirical cases – Chinese, Japanese, and American IR academies – are chosen to 
provide a cross section where theoretical claims regarding the EAIRT debate may take 
particular forms in particular contexts (layers 1 and 2). Given that many of the 
scholars who are involved in the EAIRT debate work outside of East Asia, it would be 
restrictive to focus only on what is happening within the region. Furthermore, some of 
the most vociferous critiques on IRT as it currently stands are about the Western-
centrism/domination in the field. It would, therefore, be helpful to investigate the 
impact of this EAIRT discourse on a Western academia. The researcher, therefore, 
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 selects two regional cases (China and Japan) and one extra-regional case (U.S.-based 
academics) for empirical investigations. These are places where there is a high 
concentration of scholars involving in the EAIRT debate. They also represent different 
types of geographical conditions, socio-political practices, and academic institutions. 
This variation is meaningful because assessing the impact of the EAIRT debate from 
the sociology of science perspective requires an appreciation of the context in which 
that debate is generated – national, regional, and extra-regional contexts. Furthermore, 
these three cases also offer insights into the influence of power shift and geopolitical 
concerns on the practices of knowledge claims: the US as the hegemonic 
country/discipline facing relative decline; China as the most likely ‘challenger’ to 
Western/US dominance in the field thanks to the rapid rise of its material power; and 
lastly, Japan as the once dominant then resurgent and now declining power in East 
Asia. Together, these case studies promise to unveil an inner look into the sociology 
of knowledge production. 
To ensure the standardization of data and uniformity of findings, the case studies 
included in this research address three sets of questions: How have academic practices 
changed in response to the claims for EAIRT in the country under study? Why is this 
so? And what does it tell us about the theory-practice relationship more generally? 
The focus on the individual, institutional and policy contexts will be asked repeatedly 
in each case to standardize the data. The key variable as identified in this study is the 
practical moves by academics to follow through with their (dis)satisfaction about the 
current state of IRT. The variations of that dissatisfaction will be analysed across the 
selected case studies. Such methodological approach allows systematic conclusions to 
be made here on whether there are uniform or homogenous claims and academic 
practices toward EAIRT. 
The national and regional contexts: China and Japan 
China and Japan are the two regional powers that have influenced East Asian 
international relations in many important ways. These are also places where academic 
dissatisfaction with the state of IRT and desirability for an indigenous framework are 
strongest in East Asia. For China, its IR academia has long yearned for building a 
‘Chinese School of IR theory’ and such a desire is being emboldened with the current 
geopolitical rise of China. Similarly, there is also renewed interests among Japanese 
scholars in developing an indigenous framework, most clearly manifested in recent 
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 attempts by a number of Japanese scholars to prove that ‘there were Japanese IR 
theories criticizing the western IR theories and endorsing the new East Asian order’ 
(Kamino 2008, 31). While sharing the desirability for indigenous frameworks, China 
and Japan represents two different types of IR academia. China has a newly emerging 
and fastest growing IR community with close linkages to the policy circle, thus its 
theorizing efforts are often accused as ‘government straightjackets’ whereas Japan 
possesses the largest, most developed and most democratic scholarship in East Asia. 
These two countries hence reveal two different institutional settings to explore how 
dissatisfaction might shape academic practices.  
Moreover, with regard to the policy context, both China and Japan are facing critical 
policy issues that may drive the practices of their IR communities. For China, that is 
the implications of its current rise and subsequently growing interests in its 
worldview; for Japan, its relative decline and deepening historical animosity amid 
heightening territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Given that IR in general 
and IR scholars in particular aim to study the functioning of world politics and states’ 
foreign policy, the desirability for building indigenous frameworks in these two 
countries may usher in significant policy implications. China and Japan, therefore, 
provide important evidence for both the variation in claims for EAIRT and the 
relationship between theory and practice where practice is understood in its broadest 
sense. 
The extra-regional context: US-based academics 
A study on how theoretical claims shape the actual practices of extra-regional 
academics is necessary given that this EAIRT debate has spanned beyond the region. 
In particular, the US, with its free and vibrant academic environment and a high 
concentration of leading IR theorists and East Asia specialists in the field, has become 
a venue for EAIRT discussion. I, therefore, include an empirical study on US-based 
academics to showcase a situation concerning EAIRT outside the region. Such an 
extra-regional case study also facilitates a better appreciation as to whether indigenous 
scholarship developed in the ‘East’ can travel beyond their place of origin, and thus 
measure the potential and enduring impact of EAIRT on overall IRT. 
The selection of these empirical studies is meaningful in two ways. First, it ensures a 
good variation in checking the validity of claims for EAIRT and evidence of changes 
in academic practices across different geographical and socio-political contexts. 
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 Second, it offers a chance to explore the similarities and differences in the academic 
structures and theorizing practices among various IR communities in the East and 
West. For example, academic scholars in America ‘are protected by tenure and not 
directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, so they are uniquely 
positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and conventional wisdoms’ (Walt 2012a, 
40). It might not be the case for most East Asian scholars who are less autonomous 
and ‘dare to know’ only in their retirement.14 It will then facilitate the generalization 
of the impact of theoretical debates on academic practices in different contexts and 
ultimately answer whether there is a uniform impact, or if the impact of EAIRT on 
academic practices changes from case to case.  
Semi-structured interviews and interpretive analysis 
As this study applies the sociology of science framework and comparative case 
studies, it employs interpretive methods throughout. Field-based observation and 
interviews, therefore, are important research techniques for collecting and analysing 
key data. The main source of data that this researcher relies on is semi-structured 
interviews with approximately 30 scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, textual-
archival research of their relevant research and publications, and collection of 
pedagogy and course content at leading IR institutions under study. The selected 
interviewees hold different positions in the debate, ranging from vocal proponents to 
vehement opponents of EAIRT. The scope of their claims and counter-claims for 
EAIRT also varies with some focusing only on national frameworks while others are 
more interested in pan-regional perspectives. In fact, they represent different types of 
(dis)satisfaction with the state of IRT and desirability for EAIRT in different contexts 
– a variation inherent to this kind of study. The interviews were structured in line with 
the three-layered analytical framework. Accordingly, interview questions were geared 
toward attaining information on how the EAIRT debate has shaped a scholar’s 
research, teaching, and outreach activities and how these practices are linked to their 
training background as well as the wider institutional and socio-political context 
where he/she is working.  
Although these interviews constitute valuable input for this study, the author of this 
study does not solely rely on them; rather the information provided is cross-checked 
14 Japanese scholars may be an exception to this observation. Japanese IR academia, therefore, makes 
an interesting case in this regard. 
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 vis-à-vis other sources of data e.g. analysis of published work and investigation of 
scholars’ teaching pedagogy. The triangulation of research methods (sociology of 
science framework, case studies, and interpretive analysis of interviews and other 
data) helps overcome the disconnection between the author’s own suppositions and 
those of the academics under review in this study. In particular, this methodological 
approach might provide a parallel inasmuch as it queries less what people say than the 
contexts in which them saying it makes sense to them. It also helps untangle the 
‘truth’ of the matter from the perspective of the other. Most importantly, the blended 
method adopted here is in itself innovative because to explain academic practices 
requires bringing together all these things – semi-structured interviews, examination 
of the objects of academic practices, and qualitative interpretation.  
With a three-layer analytical framework, comparative case studies, and interpretive 
analysis, the researcher can systematically grasp the theory-academic linkages, and 
thus ultimately manage to answer this study’s research question of how theory and 
academic practices relate in the context of the ongoing debate over EAIRT. 
On the structural and agential factors shaping EAIRT claims and practices 
Based on the afore-mentioned insights and methods drawn from the sociology of 
science and interpretive analysis of data collection through fieldwork,  a set of claims 
and arguments will be presented about the two central questions of this research: 1) 
how academic practices change in response to EAIRT; and 2) what drives such 
changing practices (if any). On the first question, I argue in line with the sociology of 
science accounts that theorists assemble their environment with the claims they make 
in theoretical debate. Put differently, scholars are expected to adopt changes in 
practice corresponding to the claims they made in the EAIRT debate. In this light, 
there are inherent linkages between theoretical claims and academic practices in 
which the practices involved in academics’ engagement with their surrounding 
environment are linked to the ‘internal’ practices of knowledge production. Second, 
on the issue of what drives changes in theoretical innovation, the research here points 
to the view that those EAIRT claims and practices did not evolve from nothing but 
were a product of social construct. From this perspective, theory building is not a 
value-free activity but other socio-political, institutional, and personal factors may 
intervene and affect scholars’ commitment to theory and scientific objectiveness. As 
one distinguished scholar has noted: 
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 It goes almost without saying that all theories of International Relations have a 
perspective, sometimes explicit but often implicit. Given the nature of the 
phenomena that scholars have to deal with in this field this is inevitable… In 
other words, theories of International Relations, no matter how refined and 
complex they may be, derive their perspectives from their historical and 
geographic contexts. Most theorists tend to make claims of universal validity 
for their theories. However, almost all paradigms in International Relations 
are, in the final analysis, the products of theorists’ perception of what they see 
around them. These perceptions are in turn shaped by the theorists’ 
experiences, and theories, therefore, become prisoners of time and space 
(Ayoob 1998, 31-2). 
Theorizing, in this light, is a type of social activity, and therefore it inevitably, 
sometimes unconsciously, absorbs the values and norms of society (Doppelt 2007, 
189). Therefore, three specific propositions to assert that the EAIRT claims and 
practices are socially constructed are presented here. First and foremost, academic 
practices are driven by a scholar’s theoretical identity (personal training and working 
background). Second, academic practices are directly influenced by organizational 
and material factors (e.g. funding, hiring, and career incentives). Third, academic 
practices are indirectly shaped by the broader social and political developments at the 
national, regional, and international level at present. That scholars’ theoretical 
perspectives and academic practices have been shaped to different extent by those 
different social factors explains why EAIRT claims occurred and are practiced in 
different ways. This characteristic is not unique just to the EAIRT debate. It has been 
part of the wider sociology of the IR field. Sociologists of IR have pointed out that IR 
scholarship in different places has been unevenly influenced by structural factors such 
as ‘higher education policies, financial resources, publication opportunities, citation 
patterns, research infrastructures, hiring rationales, and career advancement rules’ as 
well as agential causes e.g. ‘nationality, personal loyalty, or paradigmatic fidelity’ 
(Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 295; see also Tickner and Wæver 2009; Waever 
1998).  
Taken together, these propositions form the central argument of this thesis that 
understanding the impact of the EAIRT debate on the practices of academics requires 
appreciating two things – structural considerations and agential choice. Rationalist 
paradigms (realism and liberalism) often overemphasize the importance of structural 
causes whilst overlooking the role of agency. Constructivism, meanwhile, argues that 
what matters in shaping human behaviour is not only structure and process but also 
agents. Importantly, structures and agents are not separate from each other but 
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 intersect. In this inter-subjective relationship between agents and structures, 
‘structures exert influence on the formation of agents’ collective identity as well as 
their interest and state’s policy, while on the other, identity thus formed in turn 
constructs or reproduces structures’ (Moon and Kim 2002, 63-4). 
Therefore, an argument is advanced here that the interplay of structural and agential 
causes shapes the responses to EAIRT. In this course, structure serves as a source of 
‘intervening factors’ and agency as ‘determining factors.’ By this I mean that there are 
structural causes that create preponderances toward shaping academic practices 
concerning the EAIRT debate but ultimately it is the agency that decides whether and, 
if yes, how to respond to such call for EAIRT in practice. The interplay of structure 
and agency in shaping academic practices explains why within and across individual 
states we witness various kinds of responses to EAIRT. 
In clarifying the question of what drives those different academic practices in various 
geographical and social contexts, this thesis will identify the structural causes that 
develop a set of pressures on theoretical debate as it stands within a specific country 
under review and the agential factors that come together within that structure to 
promote a particular response to EAIRT and academic practices. Drawing on the 
sociology of science, I argue here that the practice of deriving theoretical claims is 
directly shaped by the agential factors embedded in a scholar’s background, vision of 
science and moral choice. It is further impacted – at least indirectly – by the structural 
factors, including power shifts, the socio-political practices of the countries in which a 
particular academic is residing and working, and the academic institution in which 
he/she operates (see Table 2.2). In short, to understand academic practices requires an 
awareness of both structural and agential factors across scholars’ identity, academic 
institutions, and socio-political development components. 
Structural 
factors 











Table 2.2. The factors shaping EAIRT claims and practices 
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 In what follows, I will identify why these factors matter in the establishing of 
theoretical claims and practices and reconstruct the conditions under which such an 
impact is more likely in the case of those scholars involved in the EAIRT debate. 
Furthermore, I will identify the importance that one factor may have in relation to the 
other as well as the relationship between the various factors in play that determine 
outcomes. 
Structural causes: Power shifts, Socio-political Practices, and Academic Institutions 
The first structural cause shaping academic practices is the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ 
(D'Aoust 2012b, 94) or, in other words, the significance of geopolitical concerns in 
the shaping of IR theorising. The key question here is whether this factor delegitimises 
the theoretical work or that it is an inherent part of theorising anywhere in the world at 
any time. Here, controversies remain. If viewed from the American positivist 
conception, there should be a separation between power and knowledge for the sake of 
scientific objectivity and neutrality.  Yet, as some sociologists of IR argue, 
regardless of whether one subscribes to, for instance, the Kuhnian notion of 
paradigm shifts, Wittgenstein’s idea of therapy, or Foucault’s arche´, as soon 
as the well-trodden paths of positivist philosophy of science are re-situated 
within a series of relations, practices, institutions, and persons, questions 
regarding scientific endeavour stop being solely confined to objectively 
instituted rules of evaluation (Kessler and Guillaume 2012, 110).  
This study, adopting the sociology of science perspective, argues that power does play 
a role in knowledge construction as Michael Foucault famously claimed decades 
ago.15 The current drive toward EAIRT is no exception. While traditional theories of 
science view knowledge production as a neutral, value-free, and universal process, 
Foucault sees it as an integral component of power and domination. In his view, 
‘power is everywhere’, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and ‘regimes 
of truth’. According to Foucault, power can be said to create knowledge through ‘the 
institutions of power’ which establish the circumstances under which scientific claims 
can be counted as true or false (Foucault 1991). On the other hand, Foucault also 
believes that ‘every production of knowledge serves the interest of power. Thus 
knowledge produced in economics, medicine, psychiatry and other human sciences is 
15 Foucault uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to signify that power is constituted through accepted 
forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and ‘truth’ (Foucault 1980, 1982). 
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 nothing but a part of the power of the social institutions that have grown around these 
disciplines’ (Panneerselvam 2000, 21). While discussing the power-knowledge 
interrelationship, Foucault affirms that it is power that is a pre-condition of knowledge 
rather than vice versa (Panneerselvam 2000, 24). 
Is IR an exception to this claim? Such is hardly the case. Kenneth Waltz – the founder 
of structural realism – states succinctly that a general theory of international politics 
should be based on and/or written in terms of the great powers of the time (Waltz 
1979, 73). As Western powers have dominated world politics for the past centuries, IR 
theories, particularly mainstream paradigms, have also mostly evolved from 
European/Western history. These theories, therefore, reflect the logic of power politics 
and imperialism. The inception of the English School, for instance, is largely believed 
to be an intellectual response to the decline of Britain in the international order. 
Perhaps it was not a mere coincidence that IR emerged as an academic discipline in 
the wake of two devastating World Wars, with the geopolitical rise of the US. In fact, 
Stanley Hoffmann was one of the first American scholars acknowledging that power 
is important in constructing the field by confirming in his 1977 article that IR is an 
‘American social science’, born and raised in the US and reflected American interests 
in the global politics (Hoffmann 1977; see also Smith 2002). 
Both Hoffman (1977) and Walt (2011) have attempted to provide explanations to this 
Anglo-Saxon/American dominance in IR. First, there is a clear linkage between power 
and knowledge production: great powers tend to produce ‘big thinkers’ who help 
conceptualize their visions about world politics. Given British and American 
dominance in world politics since the nineteenth century to this moment, it is 
understandable that they also dominate in the field of knowledge production. As 
Acharya points out, there is a ‘close nexus’ between power and knowledge production 
as has been the case with the US, Britain, and Europe in the past and arguably China 
at the moment (Acharya 2011b, 625; 2013a). This raises concerns as to whether 
theories are meant to be constructed to justify the rise or decline of powers. That 
power-knowledge linkage becomes more obvious under the lens of postcolonial 
scholarship. Accordingly, the current hierarchy of the perceived Western-centric 
discipline is structured around the core-periphery distinction that resembles the 
contemporary international political economy order (Wallerstein 1984; Tickner 2013). 
Within the joint Anglo-American ‘intellectual condominium’ (Holsti 1985), the U.S. 
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 serves as the ‘core’ and the declining Britain is considered ‘semi-periphery’ whilst 
‘the rest of the world represented various dependent “peripheries” importing and 
consuming knowledge generated by the few in the center’ (McMillan 2012, 132).16  
Although IR is one of the least American-dominated social sciences and is ‘not as 
“American” as it was 45 years ago’ (Kristensen 2015b, 259), that US hegemony still 
prevails in the field is beyond question. Given its material affluence and the sheer size 
of its academia, the US ‘accounts for 33% of the world’s research funding (55 
countries surveyed), employs 24% of the world’s researchers in terms of fulltime 
equivalent (53 countries surveyed), produces around 26% of the world’s PhDs in 
social sciences (48 countries surveyed), and 30-40% of all social science research 
articles’ (UNESCO survey data, cited in Kristensen 2015b, 247). The hierarchical 
structure in IR is organised around the leading journals which are still in the control of 
Anglo-Saxon IR. These journals serve as the ‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ and every 
scholar wishing to be published in these journals needs to convince those at the centre 
about relevance and quality of her or his research (Kristensen 2015b). The same logic 
can also be applied in the dimension of IR teaching. Among the ten best PhD 
programs in IR as ranked by IR scholars worldwide in 2014, the US has seven and the 
UK has three.17 As Peter Katzenstein observes, IR is ‘a handmaiden of great power’ 
and ‘a consolidated field related to power’ (Katzenstein in Schouten 2008, 6). 
If it is true that power and power shifts do play a role in theorizing, then we can 
assume that the three case studies selected for this study will offer valuable empirical 
insights. If the rise of the US in the post-WWII era stimulated the formation of the IR 
discipline, what will happen when America’s material power is in relative decline? 
Conversely, is the current drive toward constructing a ‘Chinese School’ a by-product 
of the rise of China? Somewhere in between, how have the past failure and 
contemporary resurgence of Japan shape the development of IR thinking in that 
country? These issues will be intensively explored in each empirical chapter. Yet, the 
basic assumption here is that power is a factor integral in the course of knowledge 
production.  
16 Alerne Tickner broadens the status of ‘semi-periphery’ to include Western Europe, Canada, and, 
perhaps, Australia (Tickner 2013, 640). Despite the surging interest in Chinese IR perspectives 
recently, China has not been granted the ‘semi-periphery’ status (Hellmann 2010, 11). 
17 These 10 best PhD programs are (in order): Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford 
University, Columbia University, University of Oxford, Yale University, LSE, University of Chicago, 
University of Cambridge, and University of California – Berkeley (TRIP 2015). 
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 In what ways, then, can power influence knowledge? From the sociology of science 
perspective, the development of the IR discipline in a country and the practices of 
academics are influenced by material factors. In that light, ‘the geopolitical and 
economic rise or fall of states shifts the location of resources, expanding the material 
bases for some intellectual networks at the expense of others. Networks realign; new 
philosophical positions appear’ (Collins 2000, 623). The role of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in the promotion of theoretical innovation that met US foreign policy 
interests in the wake of WWII (particularly its sponsored conference in 1954) and its 
financial support for the construction of the ‘English School’ (via the British 
Committee on the Theory of International Politics) perhaps offers the most relevant 
guidance in this regard (Wæver 2011, 116; Guilhot 2011).18 Similarly, a rising power 
like China presumably has more material resources to invest on science from which its 
IR academia may benefit. Growing interest in Chinese perspectives on international 
relations may also attract collaboration and/or funding from foreign institutions. For 
instance, Chih-yu Shih – a Taiwanese professor who develops the ‘balance of 
relationship’ theory based on the model of Chinese foreign relations with 
neighbouring countries (Huang and Shih 2014; Shih and Yin 2013a) which somewhat 
resembles the Chinese School’s key thesis of guanxi (relationality) – reveals to this 
author that he has greatly benefited both intellectually and financially from ‘the rise of 
China’: 
I have practically benefited from the rise of China but not necessarily worked 
for China. [This is] because a few Chinese scholars are interested and even 
enthusiastic about what I have been doing with my research on intellectual 
history of Sinology. They are willing to provide platforms and to sponsor my 
research. They are able to use their money and resources to organize 
international conferences with me being the coordinator behind the scene so 
they would invite scholars to come to the conference to interact with me. So I 
take advantage of the rise of China because they have resources and people are 
going to China. If I am doing the same thing in Taiwan they will not come. So 
because they are willing to do this for me, I enormously appreciated the 
generosity. I have had four conferences held in China in the past three years, 
two in Beijing via Chinese Academy of Social Sciences the other two in 
Nanning’s Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences. The theme of these 
conferences is not about the rise of China but I think they may find it 
comparable. I don’t know how they conceptualize my work. I suspect some or 
18 The head of the Rockefeller Foundation at that time was Dean Rusk who was subsequently a U.S. 
Secretary of State. Other participants attending the 1954 conference include policy makers. As Robert 




                                                          
 most of them don’t even know what I am doing. They just feel that this is a 
good thing for China to have (Chih-yu Shih, Interview, February 2015). 
While a shift in geopolitical power and policy concerns necessarily changes 
something in theorising, it may not exert an equivalent impact across various national 
IR communities as the empirical chapters of this study will show. It is argued here that 
these different responses to power shifts can be attributed to the two factors: first, 
changes in knowledge production are often slower to responses than are power shifts 
and secondly, scholars do have an agential choice in modifying the impact of 
structural factors. Historically, the transfer from material power to intellectual power 
often takes time. Furthermore, theorizing is mainly an intellectual endeavour of an 
innovative mind by itself. The role of agency played by the theorists, then, is of 
critical significance. Power, in this light, should only be seen as a stimulating rather 
than determining factor. As Ole Wæver puts it, ‘the rise and fall of power centers 
influence the discipline but do not directly translate into theory’ (Wæver 2011, 101).  
Indeed, a recent study on the number of articles produced by scholars coming from 
emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil which have managed to be published in 
mainstream IR journals shows that ‘emerging powers still cannot speak in mainstream 
IR.’ While growing attention to emerging powers opens up the discursive space of IR 
for scholars located in those countries to become published in leading mainstream 
journals, these scholars merely serve as ‘theorisers within established Western 
theoretical traditions such as realism, constructivism or English School’, ‘native 
informants presenting empirical material’, or as ‘quasi-officials representing a 
perspective from their country’ (Kristensen 2015a, 648). Consequently, the non-
Western/EAIRT discourse has mainly been discussed in native language journals 
and/or the newly established English publishing platforms such as the China-based 
Chinese Journal of International Politics and the Japan-based International Relations 
of the Asia-Pacific. 
While power shift can exert a large impact on IR theorizing, other structural factors 
also play a part in shaping the type of responses to EAIRT in different national 
contexts. Most notable among these are socio-political structure and the characteristics 
of academic institutions that each country under this study represents. The impact of 
these external social factors upon theorizing is revealed in a remark by a ‘Chinese 
School’ proponent:  
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 Those who produce any particular theory have different background 
(nationality/concerns/experience etc.) in shaping their own research question. 
When they try to answer it, they incorporate their own experience into theory 
building. People who produce theories are social animals in a social world in 
the sense that their interests and concerns impact on their theorizing and 
theoretical efforts (Ren Xiao, Interview, August 2013). 
Among these factors, the international position and foreign policy environment of the 
country in which the theorists are living and/or attached to have a particular impact on 
the knowledge they produce. This is because no matter how objective a scholar thinks 
his/her description of the real world is, ‘scholars’ [policy] preferences may play a role 
even in their most abstract theories’ (Jervis 2011, 42). As a scholar has noted, 
‘theorists respond to the challenges facing their country because these issues present 
themselves as the most pressing to the research community, or because research in 
policy issues is more easily funded, or a combination of the two’ (Breitenbauch 2013, 
30).  
Nonetheless, the extent to which policy and politics can influence theory depends on 
the degree of their direct exposure to the policy-making process e.g. to temporarily 
leave the academia to work for governments or international organizations and/or to 
undertake substantial policy consultancy assignments  (Parks and Stern 2013, 1). This 
revolving door mechanism has long existed in the West, particularly the US, and has 
recently gained a foothold in China with distinguished scholars being appointed as 
members of Chinese Foreign Ministry’s consultancy board or ambassadors and 
diplomats at Chinese embassies overseas (Wang 2015).  
That said similar arguments on the implicit influence of policy and politics on 
academic claims and practices can be applied for the EAIRT claims and practices. 
Once more, the most relevant case in this instance is the Chinese IR community given 
its government’s tight intellectual and ideological control and the large extent of 
overlapping themes between Chinese foreign policy and the hard-core of the 
perceived emerging ‘Chinese IR theories.’ Nonetheless, it is not argued here that 
policy relevance is always bad for IR theorizing as long as scholars can retain their 
autonomy. In this light, Ole Wæver (2011, 102) has noted that ‘a question about the 
theory that ought to be put forward is shaped in relation to the academic world. Policy 
relevance is ultimately causally relevant to the extent that it translates into power 
within academe.’ As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, the lessons of the Kyoto 
School of philosophy in pre-war Japan may offer useful insights in this regard. 
75 
 
 While overarching structural factors such as power shifts do matter, theories are 
shaped to a greater extent by their immediate social setting – the academic scene 
(Wæver 2011, 101). What, then, is the characteristic of the academia? Randall Collins 
argues that intellectual life and disciplinary development are most shaped by ‘conflict 
and disagreement’ (Collins 2000, 1). The key practice of scholars, therefore, is always 
related to making moves against a rival position. That constitutes the core idea of his 
‘law of small numbers’ thesis. Among other things, Collins argues that intellectual life 
is featured with ‘structural rivalry’ and that theoretical innovation is motivated by 
competition for prominence among ‘a small number of warring camps.’ Competition 
in academia concentrates on two dimensions: 1) material resources such as grants, 
jobs, and access to research facilities; 2) symbolic resources, such as reputation, 
journal space, or innovations. These two kinds of resources are closely linked because 
‘without material resources, one cannot contribute to science; without such 
contributions, researchers would have difficulties getting funded’ (Fuchs 1993, 937).   
Incorporating the above factors into the IR field, Wæver argues that ‘this specific 
structure explains the most-often noticed peculiarity of IR: its fondness of “great 
debates.” Debates ensure that theorists remain central but empirical studies important 
(in contrast to economics)’ (Wæver 2013, 315). Therefore, in order to be a ‘star’ in the 
field, scholars have to do theory. Given the aforementioned competition for material 
and symbolic resources, theoretical debates in the field are often limited by a focus on 
certain topics and by the search for allies via scholarly and social interaction/networks 
(Collins 2000, 1). As Collins (2000, 7) further explains this process: ‘thinking consists 
in making “coalitions in the mind,” internalized from social networks, motivated by 
the emotional energies of social interactions.’ Potential allies are often peers who 
share similar approach but can also be formed by training excellent students. And this 
kind of ‘law of small numbers’ often repeats after a certain generational span, 
approximately 35 years (Collins 2000, 5-6). Changes to the intellectual fields or 
knowledge construction may occur if there are generational change and/or changes in 
the control/allocation of these material resources. The importance of career incentives, 
generational change, and mobilization of material resources, hence, will be critically 
analysed in the case of EAIRT debate to uncover the nature and dynamics of such 
claims and practices. 
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 Agential factors: Personal identity, moral choice, and vision of legitimate 
knowledge 
The sociology of science posits that the practice of knowledge production is inevitably 
affected by external factors; nonetheless, it is more directly driven by the internal 
factors closer to the academic scene. Most importantly, it emphasizes the agency role 
played by academics in the production and practice of knowledge claims. Although 
being driven to a different extent by structural factors, theorists do have an agency in 
choosing their theoretical approach and decide what to practice. In the case of EAIRT, 
this agential role of academics is threefold: personal identity, moral choice, and vision 
of legitimate knowledge. Personal identity refers to a scholar’s background including 
his/her prior education, political beliefs, and personal inclinations which, in turn, 
shape his or her moral choice, vision of science, and ultimately one’s preferred 
theoretical framework.  
Through the literature review chapter, we can see that most of the scholars who 
advocate for or who sympathize with the calls for non-Western IRT/EAIRT have been 
trained in and/or adopted a reflectivist approach to IR whilst the EAIRT opponents are 
often theoretical mainstreamers. Empirically, the TRIP project also provides very 
helpful data to further verify the linkage between scholars’ preferred theoretical 
approach and their political beliefs. Based on TRIP surveys, a recent study on the 
‘implicit ideology’ of IR scholar comes up with a fascinating finding that there is a 
‘resonance between the content of ideology and the key propositions of different 
schools of thought in IR.’ Accordingly,  
Realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of international relations 
scholars, while Liberals are more liberal and left-leaning. Although neither 
approach has any intrinsic ontological content, rationalism and constructivism 
also have a distinct ideological profile, the former being more conservative 
than the latter. Post-positivist epistemological commitments are associated 
with the political left (Rathbun 2012, 607).  
In this light, Brian Rathbun argues that scholars’ choice of a conceptual approach 
might be ‘at least partially and implicitly, most likely unconsciously’ a function of 
their ‘political beliefs toward certain understandings of international politics’ 
(Rathbun 2012, 608). The link between paradigms and ideology is stronger in the case 
of non-/post-positivists and is much weaker for positivists. Applying this into a 
specific issue – American scholars’ attitude toward the US-led war in Iraq – the TRIP 
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 researchers find that ‘ideologically conservative scholars were far more likely than 
liberals or moderates to support the US invasion of Iraq’ (Long et al. 2015, 33). 
If scholars do have their ‘implicit ideology,’ it is also legitimate to ask a question: 
what is the role of moral/ethical reasoning in the choices of scholars as they shape 
their research agendas? And, more central to this study, is EAIRT driven by these 
concerns? The answers to those questions depend on which ontological and 
epistemological background a scholar accrues. Accordingly, positivist scholars believe 
that ‘science’ is bipartisan and scientists are not influenced by their ethical and 
political values when they do science. They, therefore, contend that ‘their work has no 
implications for society and that there are no potential nonepistemic consequences of 
error’ (Douglas 2007, 136). On that ground, leading structural realist Kenneth Waltz 
used to coin a theoretically rational and politically-wise but morally controversial 
thesis that Iran (and with similar logic, perhaps North Korea as well) should pursue a 
nuclear bomb in order to preserve regional balance and stability (Waltz 2012). Post-
positivists, meanwhile, insist that science is indispensably value-laden and IR 
theorizing should always have its normative aspects (Sober 2007). In fact, post-
positivist scholars are also the most fervent advocates of bringing the sociology of 
science to IR. As two among these sociologists of IR observe: 
the sociology of the discipline is in various ways linked to questions of the 
post-positivist turn in social theory, which has entered IR via the so-called 
third debate (Lapid 1989). That said, this debate has not only a philosophy of 
science dimension (i.e., the difference between explaining and understanding), 
but also a sociological one (Kessler and Guillaume 2012, 112; in-text quote in 
original).  
Where the third debate between positivists and post-positivists meets the sociology of 
science is the call for more critical reflexivity in IR. Reflexivity, in this case, is ‘a call 
for the producers of social knowledge to locate their knowledge-claims in relation to 
the everyday understandings of particular social groups’ whose vision they seek to 
advance (Jackson 2010, 176). Reflexivity also means critical self-reflection by the 
theorists on the non-epistemic implications and potential consequences of their work 
on the real world (Douglas 2007, 135-6; Smith 2004; Ish-Shalom 2009). Given its 
normative ideals – to transform the existing social order – reflectivist IR scholarship 
is, more often than not, associated with ‘subordinate segments of society’ (Jackson 
2010, 176). Reflectivist scholars, therefore, have focused on unveiling the social, 
political, and moral responsibilities toward such marginalized or dissident social 
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 groups as women, aboriginal tribes, and refugees. Since many of the pro-EAIRT 
scholars also come from the reflectivist tradition of IR, EAIRT discourses may also 
imbue with normative concerns: representing the voices and concerns of the non-
West, non-English speaking IR communities who for long suffered an inferiority 
complex as knowledge consumers and backward societies.19 This will, in their view, 
transform IR into a truly representative discipline. As one observer has aptly noted, 
‘understanding who is marginalised, where, and through which mechanisms allows us 
to identify sites for potential change and transformation. This potential for 
transformation affects social hierarchies inside the discipline as much as it produces 
knowledge about the world’ (D'Aoust 2012b, 91). 
Given the diversity of ontological and epistemological positions of scholars involved 
in the EAIRT debate, the role of moral claims in shaping theorizing need not be 
uniform across the different facets of EAIRT practices (Kincaid 2007, 229). As pro-
EAIRT scholars are mostly non-/post-positivist scholars, there are more opportunities 
for ideology/political values to have a larger impact on them than those EAIRT 
opponents who often side with the mainstream IR camp. This explains their different 
interpretation of theory and the ethical concerns embedded in knowledge construction 
with pro-EAIRT scholars focusing more on social factors, including the morality of 
theory and theorists, whilst EAIRT critics are less interested in this particular 
dimension of IR theorizing.  
Interestingly, recent research has also proved that historically there have often been 
moral contradictions in the transitional period of power shift and/or paradigm shift. In 
term of power shift, E.H. Carr points out that many people in Great Britain in the 
1920s and 1930s believed that the status quo power projected moral superiority. The 
general point, as inferred by Robert Jervis, is extremely important: ‘states that have 
gained a favourable position in the international system tend to conclude that their 
country is uniquely wise and just and that those who are seeking to displace them are 
morally inferior’ (Jervis 2011, 36). Similarly, during IR paradigm shifts that occurred 
in the 1950s, realists believed that ‘liberals and idealists were prone to make the world 
19 It should be noted that not all EAIR-related discourses focus on these reflectivist dimensions. Much 
of the Chinese IR scholarship, for example, on the one hand reflects the counter-hegemonic 
dimensions; yet, on the other hand, presents its own hegemonic power politics. The role of 
marginalized or dissident social groups such as women, the Wigurs and/or the Tibetans is seldom 
mentioned in Chinese IR scholarship (Blanchard and Lin 2016). This will be further explained in the 
following empirical chapter concerning Chinese IR academia. 
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 worse because of their mistaken belief that there were no conflicts between what was 
good for the country and what was best for the world’ (Jervis 2011, 36).  
It can, therefore, be argued that the current discourse on EAIRT are also shaped by 
such moral concerns with American mainstream scholars dismissing de-centring 
American scholarship as ‘inferior’ and ‘unscientific’ whilst claims for EAIRT, as has 
been the case with the Kyoto School of philosophy in the past and some discourses 
presented in the Chinese School of IR currently, often reveal both counter-hegemonic 
and new hegemonic orientations i.e. to promote their own moral values (Callahan 
2008). For example, Wang Fan – a professor from China Foreign Affairs University – 
urged Chinese scholars in the 2013 Annual Meeting of Chinese IR community to 
introduce new concepts to the world because ‘Western values are of monopolistic, 
exclusive and lacking of integrity whereas Chinese values are holistic and inclusive’ 
(Wang, quoted in Mao 2013).  
Another question is how scholarly practices have been shaped by and/or insulated 
from theoretical innovation as compared to other intervening factors. An important 
corresponding argument here is that theoretical claims shape the epistemic practices of 
scholars more clearly than their non-epistemic practices. As the empirical chapters of 
this study will show, the EAIRT debate shapes the research practices (e.g. theoretical 
discussion, publishing, organize and attend conferences, and seeking for funds and 
allies) of scholars more clearly than their teaching and other social practices 
(networking, policy consultancy, public presentation, etc.). This is because research 
constitutes the most important and frequent practice of the intellectual life. In this 
way, strengthening one’s own theoretical work and making further discussion with a 
rival position should be seen as the core practical response to the claim for EAIRT.  
Teaching is another important epistemic practice but the impact of EAIRT debate on 
scholars’ teaching practices may be less evident than in the field of research because 
in many cases it is governed by academic institutions and in the case of China, 
ideology. Presumably, however, scholars may adopt changes in teaching to match 
their preferred theoretical approaches wherever possible, as a scholar has noted:  
These are some very real and powerful obstacles to the enactment of a more 
self-reflexive pedagogy of international studies, from public stakes in ranking 
and evaluative rating schemes to individual concerns with career development 
and institutional concerns with departmental positions. These constraints 
notwithstanding, instructors do have agency to revise reading lists, and hence 
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 an individual ability, dare we say a social responsibility, to develop a more 
pluralistic IR curricula today (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 21). 
Similarly, the degree theoretical debate can exert its impact on scholar’s outreach 
activities depends on how far academics are willing to move from their Ivory Tower. 
Often, junior scholars are not much involved in policy consultancies and/or public 
presentations. Distinguished scholars, meanwhile, have more chances to be invited to 
engage in policy advocacy and/or participate in social events (media interviews, 
public presentation etc). Thus, it can be argued that although scholars generally 
practice what they preach, the extent to which EAIRT claims shape scholars’ other 
practices beyond research largely depend on the level of exposure to the wider social 
environment in which they are working. However, it cannot be presumed that scholars 
only undertake EAIRT in their own research but do not pursue it in other activities.  
Last but not least, the agential factor involves the vision of legitimate knowledge 
adopted by individual academic. Here in the EAIRT debate, we see a series of 
discussions about the multiple meanings of science – how science as a symbol to be 
aspired to (and thus as a powerful motivating goal) can be reconstructed in different 
social/institutional/political contexts to mean different things (indigenous modes of 
thought in China being valid versus the rejection of non-Western theories in the US 
and elsewhere). There have been heated debates about not only science versus non-
science but also debates about the legitimate parameters of science. Basically, 
Western social sciences in recent decades have been structured around the two schools 
which have their roots in 19th century debates between the economists and the 
sociologists. The economist school of thought looks for universal laws – mostly 
ontologically materialist and rationalist. The historical sociology school, by contrast, 
asserts the appropriate unit of analysis is not the individual but the relationships 
between different individuals. It does not search for universal laws because 
individuals are self-reflexive: you cannot just think that they are atoms or monocles 
because they are aware of what they are doing and they will correct – and thus distort 
– the prediction one attempts to make. Those are the two big traditions which, Max 
Weber, among others, tried to bring together. As Peter Katzenstein observes, the basic 
contours of contemporary social science have been defined and articulated in the 19th 




 From that understanding of social science, there has been skepticism that EAIRT 
scholarship is neither theoretically innovative nor methodologically different from 
Western IR theorizing. As a colleague of Amitav Acharya at American University 
argues, ‘to be genuinely non-Western, we need ways of generating theory that are not 
prone to King, Keohane, and Verba type of generating theory’ (quoted in Acharya 
2011b, 633). Acharya goes on to suggest that ‘what is, then, important is not just the 
content of IR, but the ways of doing IR. Part of the answer lies in broadening our 
conception of what the philosophy of science behind IR actually means’ (Acharya 
2011b, 633). Understandably, if viewed from a typical American philosophy of 
science vantage point, value-ladden EAIRT, particularly the proposed ‘Chinese 
School’, is at best ‘pseudo-science’ given its ideological orientation and unverifiable 
claims (similar to Karl Popper’s critique toward Marxism). Objectivity remains the 
key principle of science but the presence of values in knowledge construction would 
mean rejection of objectivity and universality of knowledge for the sake of someone’s 
individual interests (Betz 2013). Therefore, apart from cognitive value (worth, merit), 
to ensure the neutrality of science, non-cognitive value (personal, moral, social, 
aesthetic, etc.) should play no role in developing theories (Lacey 2005, 16). 
Much of the current EAIRT scholarship, however, actually embodies non-/post-
positivist conception of IR theorizing. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2010) and other 
sociologists of IR have made a powerful case for pluralism of what constitutes 
legitimate ‘science’ and ‘knowledge construction.’ As they argue, theorizing is a 
social activity that certainly incorporates values in the course of establishing 
knowledge. Theories should also be less strictly defined in term of positivism, 
particularly claims for objectivity and universalism of knowledge. In this light, 
acknowledging value-laden science/knowledge in the case of EAIRT or elsewhere 
does not mean to ‘dismiss non-Western experiences and voices as the “stuff of area 
studies” or as “unscientific”’ (Acharya 2011b, 633). Similarly, as a notable Japanese 
scholar has noted: 
It seems to be already a biased view to see scientific approach as non-biased. It 
may be true when we are looking at natural science, but human world is full of 
irregularity which often refuses the straightforward application of natural 
scientific methods. In such situation we cannot ultimately prove the very 
neutrality of the approach itself, and to me, it may be a better option to locate 
the science as a part of what makes human intellectual. Closer to IR, if the rise 
of national schools from non-Western world could be criticized because of the 
lack of science, I think this criticism would become self-defeating. Thus as the 
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 calls for Chinese or Japanese School are not scientific, neither claims of 
American Social Science or the English School are (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, 
February 2014). 
In short, as this section has attempted to demonstrate, knowledge construction, be it in 
the East or West, is not a ‘value-free’ but socially constructed activity. Yet, the 
inevitable presence and acceptance of values in IR theorizing does not mean that 
knowledge inevitably loses objectivity. This is because even value-laden scholarship 
is subject to evaluation and criticism during which it can be further improved or 
rejected. Therefore, to paraphrase Heather Douglas’ observation on the merits of 
value-laden knowledge: by understanding EAIRT as value-laden, we can better 
understand the nature of theoretical controversy in many cases and even help speed 
resolution of those controversies (Douglas 2007, 120). 
The interplay of structural and agential causes in shaping the responses to EAIRT 
The above section has identified the key structural and agential factors that shape the 
claims and practices about EAIRT. This final part will further discuss the covariation 
of structure and agency in determining outcomes. As will be shown in the subsequent 
case studies, there are some noticeable changes in the practices of scholars in China, 
Japan, and even the US, in response to the call for EAIRT. Shifting practices are most 
clearly found among those EAIRT proponents while there are few changes being 
witnessed from EAIRT critics and observers. This is understandable because the 
burden of theoretical innovation is often shouldered on those who want to make the 
change whilst, for those who enjoys the status quo, it is largely business as usual. 
Another finding is that the degree and type of changes vary across the three national 
IR communities under study. In the case of Chinese IR academia, the biggest area of 
changes is in their vibrant theory-led debate and resource mobilization for the 
construction of a Chinese style IR theory to match its material rise. The EAIRT 
discourse in Japan, given the country’s historical legacy and structural constraints, is 
geared toward the ‘post-Western IR’ direction rather than a challenging agenda like 
the ‘Chinese School.’ Meanwhile in the US, the call for EAIRT debate only garners an 
interest among a small portion of East Asia specialists while the majority of 
mainstream American scholars are largely indifferent to such call for EAIRT. 
This thesis argues that such diverse response to EAIRT is attributable to the uneven 
impact of structural and agential factors on the practices of claims. Accordingly, 
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 structure and agency often intersect, and their interplay shapes the degree and form of 
response to EAIRT. Structurally, the three national IR communities under this study 
are undergoing a similar context that is power shift to the East; yet they are dissimilar 
in many other socio-political aspects including ideology, the form of state, political 
concerns, the historical development of IR discipline, and academic institution. As 
will be analysed in Chapter 3, it is in China that the influence of power shift and 
structural causes on the practices of claims is most evident as seen through their effort 
to construct a Chinese style IR theory to match the country’s material rise and its 
government’s policy practices. The impact of power shift on the Japanese and the US 
IR communities, however, is less evident. In agential terms, scholars involved in the 
EAIRT debate also have different background regarding their training, vision of 
science, and moral choice. Therefore, while all scholars are presumably affected by 
structural factors, it is a scholar’s own interpretation of the geo-political, social, and 
institutional environment in which they are living that shapes one’s choice of reaction 
to structural pressure. In other words, the various types of claims and practices 
adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate are the outcome of the interplay 
between those structural and agential causes. 
In this light, it is argued here that in their covariation, structure plays the intervening 
role and agency the determining role. That is to say, agency is the most direct factor 
shaping academic practices. Although structural factors do exert their influence on 
academic practices, and in some case an unyielding impact such as in the case of 
Chinese IR academia, ultimately it is the agency that decides whether, and if yes, how 
to respond to EAIRT. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, many scholars in 
the US, less in Japan, and even some in China have not changed their practices to 
match with structural changes. The interplay of structural consideration and agential 
choice, therefore, explains why there are diverse responses to EAIRT among 
individual scholars as well as across national IR communities. 
Conclusion 
Recently, the sociology of science has garnered growing interest from scholars 
studying the development of national IR beyond the US or the West. According to this 
approach, ‘any academic discipline by its very nature consists of a complex of social 
relationships, relationships not ancillary to or separable from the knowledge which it 
contains and produces, but rather constitutively intertwined with – and embedded in – 
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 that knowledge’ (McMillan 2012, 134). Applying this to IR, scholars have attempted 
to investigate the social conditions of IR theorizing – how IR knowledge is produced 
and explained by the organisation of its (internal/external) social setting and 
infrastructure across different geographical contexts. At the micro level – the everyday 
practices of academics, the sociology of science argues that knowledge construction is 
a social activity in which the theorists inevitably absorb social, ethical, and political 
values. At the macro level – disciplinary sociology, the sociology of science suggests 
that IR has been practiced differently in different national contexts because of the 
dissimilarities in their socio-political concerns, form of state, ideology, and academic 
institutions, etc. In other words, the sociology of science ‘examines the social 
mechanisms at play in the social universe of researchers – internally in each 
community as coordination, control, and contestation, between fields in processes of 
delineating disciplines and superseding them interdisciplinary, and vis-a`-vis the 
external world of economic and political interests’ (Wæver and Tickner 2009, 11; 
emphasis in original). 
Drawing on the sociology of science model developed by Ole Wæver and other 
‘disciplinary practices’ scholars, a multi-layered analytical framework has been 
constructed here to analyse the causal relationship between the claims and practices 
that surround EAIRT. Based on these innovations, this study argues that EAIRT 
claims and practices are socially constructed by both structural and agential causes. 
While this chapter has identified the different roles played by these structural and 
agential factors in the shaping of knowledge production, EAIRT included, it argues 
that structure and agency often intersect and the interplay between them is crucial in 
determining outcome. This analytical model will be hereafter applied in the three 
national contexts – China, Japan, and the US – where the EAIRT claims and practices 
have taken different shapes due to the unequal impact of and indeed the interplay of 
structural and agential factors. 
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 Chapter 3: China’s Rise and the ‘Chinese Dream’ in International 
Relations Theory20 
 The most obvious candidate for an independent IR tradition based on a 
unique philosophical tradition is China, though very little independent theorizing has 
taken place (Waever 1998, 696). 
Many years after Marx’s picture was moved from Tiananmen Square, the statue of 
Confucius was set up there (Yan 2011b). 
Although the debate over East Asian IR Theory has intensified across the region, it is 
in China that the discourse exposes its most vibrant dynamics. This is most evident in 
but not restricted to the controversial ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ or more 
recently the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project. In the latest development, some staunch 
‘Chinese School’ proponents have gone as far as promulgating a ‘Chinese dream’ in 
IR Theory whereby the emerging Chinese IR paradigm would overcome the existing 
pitfalls of Western IRT and eventually replace it as the dominant School of IR Theory 
(Wang and Han 2013).21 Efforts to theorize from the Chinese perspective, however, 
also create a backlash among not only Western but also East Asian and even other 
Chinese scholars who are concerned about the nationalistic if not hegemonic nature of 
the Chinese IR scholarship. These two contending visions have formed one of the 
most heated debates within and beyond the Chinese IR community about the 
necessity, possibility, and substance of a Chinese style IRT.  
While the existing literature has shed much light on the various dimensions of the 
Chinese IRT debate per se (Chan 1999; Ren 2008; Song 2001; Qin 2009a; Wang 
2009; Zhang 2012b); there has been little discussion about how this debate actually 
shapes the practices of involved academics. Specifically, are there actual changes in 
research agendas to match various theoretical claims or are they merely ‘hollow 
slogans’ to fill up Chinese academic journals? This chapter explores the activities of 
Chinese scholars in bringing their theoretical claims to life. It finds that Chinese 
scholars have made some noticeable changes in practice to match the claims they put 
forward in the debate. In particular, the research shows that the biggest area of change 
in China is in the vibrant theory-led debate and resource mobilization to make way for 
the construction of a Chinese style IRT. Another finding is that the EAIRT debate has 
20 Part of this chapter has been published in Global Change, Peace & Security Journal (Do 2015). 
21 I thank Professor Wang Yiwei for providing me the English version of this article for reference.  
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 been exerting an impact on Chinese scholars in different ways and to different extents 
as manifested in the four key movements toward theoretical innovation. These include 
the ‘Chinese School of IR’ movement, the ‘Tsinghua approach to IR’, the Beida-led 
ambition to build a theory of foreign affairs, and the Universalists’ orientation toward 
integration with Western IR. Many of these theoretical endeavors are narrowly 
focused, working mainly on developing a Chinese perspective on IR while there are 
also some scholars aiming to develop universal knowledge. 
This leads to another thought-provoking question: what actually drives those who 
adhere to a ‘Chinese School’ outlook on IR? Is this because of a genuine commitment 
to theory by Chinese scholars or is it due to other causes? Much of the literature on 
Chinese IRT debate takes either a history or philosophy of science framework, 
explaining the drive toward theoretical innovation in China through the lens of 
China’s geopolitical rise and/or the nature of its authoritarian politics (Snyder 2008; 
Lu 2012; Cunningham-Cross 2012; Callahan 2001; Acharya 2013a). This top-down 
approach, however, has difficulty explaining why theorizing takes various forms in 
China. Recently, Peter Kristensen and Ras Nielsen have attempted to decode the 
Chinese IRT debate from a bottom-up perspective – to ‘open the black box’ of IR 
theorizing. Drawing on Randall Collins’ sociological theory of intellectual change 
(particularly his ‘law of small numbers’ thesis), these scholars argue that it is 
opposition and debate rather than agreement and consensus that drives Chinese IR 
theorizing. In this light, the Chinese IRT debate should be seen as moves by small 
numbers of Chinese scholars seeking attention and prominence rather than looking at 
the issues in terms of power transition and counter-hegemony (Kristensen and Nielsen 
2013, 19-20). While this approach is helpful in uncovering some of the inner logic that 
has shaped the Chinese IRT debate, it still leaves an analytical puzzle: ‘69% [of 
Chinese IR academics] agree or agree very much that building a Chinese IR theory or 
IR school is an important task – only 18% disagree or disagree very much’ 
(Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 24). How can we explain this large consensus and more 
importantly, are there real changes adopted by Chinese scholars in practice to match 
such determination? 
The aforementioned ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions of the Chinese IRT debate, I argue, 
would be better explained under the sociology of science framework discussed in the 
previous chapter. Accordingly, EAIRT claims and practices are the outcome of the 
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 interplay of both structural and agential causes. Applying this to Chinese IR, the 
Chinese IRT debates and practices can be interpreted as being shaped not only by the 
theoretical identity of scholars but also by their engagement with the broader 
intellectual, political, and social environment unfolding in China. This chapter finds 
that it is in China that the impact of structural factors on academic practices is most 
evident. The rise of China, in particular, has precipitated a redefinition of its national 
identity which in turn reshapes Chinese scholars’ personal identity into ‘knowledge 
producers.’ In this light, the turn toward Chinese IRT is a result of an endeavour by 
Chinese scholars to redefine their national as well as their own identity. 
To ascertain why this is the case, my analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I briefly 
reconstruct the historical development of IR studies in China to reveal the background 
in which the current ‘Chinese IR Theory’ movement is placed. Second, I discuss the 
various theoretical claims put forward in the Chinese IRT debate and how they shape 
the changing practices of Chinese IR scholarship. Third, I investigate the underlying 
factors that actually drive those changes under the sociology of knowledge 
framework. Lastly, I conclude by arguing that while there are certain internal 
motivations for establishing Chinese IR knowledge, social factors, ranging from 
China’s rise, national interests, ethnic nationalism, and cultural exceptionalism, have 
intruded in and undermined Chinese scholars’ commitment to universally applicable 
theory. The primary response to EAIRT in China, therefore, is the vibrant theory-led 
debate among various camps within Chinese IR academia and their respective 
resource mobilization to make way for the construction of a Chinese style IR Theory. 
The development of IR as an academic discipline in China 
Although there was research in and teaching of IR in China prior to the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,22 most relevant and ongoing accounts 
are in general agreement that IR became a distinct ‘field of study’ in that country 
during the 1960s. This was when the first IR-related departments were established at 
Peking (Beida), Renmin (Renda) and Fudan Universities.23 IR, however, was not 
22 Lu Peng argues that IR studies existed in China during the late 1920s and early 1930s. But the period 
under Kuomintang rule has been ignored for political purpose, primarily due to the political 
intervention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the early 1950s (Lu 2013).  
23 These three IR departments were established initially to serve the government’s need to study the 
world and to conduct independent research against the political background of its deteriorating ties with 
the Soviet Union. They were intended to specialize in different areas of teaching and research with the 
Beijing University department focusing on Third World movements; Renmin on the international 
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 recognized as an independent academic discipline in China before the 1980s given the 
PRC’s commitment to Marxist assertions that segregated the Chinese discourse from 
non-Marxist theories (Geeraerts and Jing 2001, 254; Shambaugh 2011, 341). As a 
result of this problem, together with the fact that China on the whole was isolated 
from the world (a reality particularly in evidence during the disastrous Cultural 
Revolution that interrupted the whole Chinese social sciences from 1966 to 1976), 
Chinese scholars missed the opportunity to participate in the first and the second 
‘great debates’ of Western IR (Interview with Ni Shixiong, Shanghai, August 2013). 
The comprehensive domestic reform and opening up to the outside world initiated by 
a politically resurgent Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s breathed a new life into 
China’s IR studies. After his return to power, Deng urged Chinese academia to ‘buke’ 
(make up the missed lessons) and ‘catch-up as soon as possible’ in the fields that had 
suffered from the loss during the Cultural Revolution such as political science, law, 
sociology, and world politics (Geeraerts and Jing 2001, 254; Wang 2002a, 72). In 
May 1977, a separate Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was established as 
part of the government’s effort to modernize science and technology (social sciences 
included). IR studies resumed at leading universities (Peking, Renmin, and Fudan 
Universities, and then the Foreign Affairs College) and later at IR research institutes 
initially to serve the purpose of assisting the government’s formulation of foreign 
policy (Shambaugh 2011, 342). To meet the rapidly increasingly demand for 
developing IR as a separate discipline, particularly China’s opening to the outside 
world and establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries, the National 
Association of History of International Relations was set up in 1980 as the first nation-
wide academic body in the field.24 Western thought started to be imported initially to 
assist the government’s foreign relations with Western counterparts in the period of 
Sino-West rapprochement.25  
The Tiananmen Incident in June 1989, however, precipitated another setback to most 
social science disciplines in China. Restraints on sensitive research topics in the fields 
communist movement; and Fudan on the study of capitalist or Western countries (Wang 2002a, 71). 
For other studies on the establishment of the IR discipline in China during the 1950-1960s, see (Song 
2001, 61-2; Chen 2010; Qin 2010b, 315; Lu 2012).  
24 The Institution later changed its name to China National Association for International Studies in 1990 
(Qin 2009a, 186).  
25 A review of China’s IR studies by Wang Jisi states that classical realism and neo-realism were first 
imported to China, followed by other American and non-American theories such as the English school, 
dependency theory, constructivism, and neo-liberal institutionalism (Wang 2001, 11). 
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 of political science, sociology, and journalism were applied because of the 
government’s fear of ‘ideological liberalism’ within the Chinese intellectual circles as 
the result of the so-called ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian) campaign initiated by 
the West to erode the communist rule (Song 2001, 62). However, the IR discipline 
was less affected because Chinese leaders were more concerned about the risk of 
China being isolated from the outside world than being ‘peacefully undermined’ from 
within (Song and Chan 2000, 16). As a result, Western IR theoretical work continued 
to be translated and exchange programs between Chinese IR institutions and their 
Western partners were expanded under the co-sponsorship of Chinese Government 
and American grants such as the Ford Foundation (Song and Chan 2000, 16). With 
China’s political reform geared toward liberalisation and market economy back on 
track in 1992, some conceptual restrictions on ideological and political topics imposed 
since Tiananmen began to be lifted. The following period witnessed the diversification 
of research agendas and especially the waning influence of Marxist thought 
(Shambaugh 2011, 344-51).  
In this opening-up period, Chinese scholars began to get involved and contribute more 
to the global field of IR. According to Professor Ni Shixiong – one of the pioneers in 
introducing Western IR theories in China, Western IR had a big impact on Chinese 
academic community starting from the ‘third debate’ in the 1980s (Interview, 
Shanghai, 12 August 2013).26 Chinese scholars actively participated in these 
discussions and there were many exchange programs in teaching and research 
between Chinese and Western scholars during this period. Notably, American funding 
sources (e.g. the Ford, Rockefeller, Asia, and MacArthur foundations) played an 
important role in the promotion of IR studies in China and this ensured the domination 
of American knowledge in Chinese IR discourse during this period. American 
foundations supported activities such as translating Western IR textbooks, sending 
Chinese scholars overseas for higher education training, bringing Western scholars to 
China, and organizing conferences on IR research. Within a decade (1990s-2000s), the 
Ford Foundation invited three distinguished Chinese and American scholars to 
conduct in-depth research about the development of IR studies in China and make 
suggestions for its further engagement with Chinese IR (Wang 2001; Johnston 2003; 
26 One of the examples of the impact of the third debate on Chinese IR is that Alexander Wendt’s 
‘Social Theory of International Politics’ volume was immediately translated by Qin Yaqing. It was 
published in 2000 - only one year after the English version. 
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 Shambaugh 2011). As a result of intensive exposure to Western IR, by early 2000s 
almost all major Western IR theories were imported to China.27 Leading Chinese 
scholars started to self-designate their work or were schooled in IR theory; for 
example, Qin Yaqing as a ‘Wendtian constructivist’, Yan Xuetong as a ‘Waltzian 
realist’, Wang Yizhou as a ‘globalist’, and Shi Yinhong as an ‘English School 
proponent’ (Zhang 2002, 104-5; Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 22). 
To date, IR has become an increasingly established field of study in China. In fact, the 
country is witnessing some of the fastest developments in the global field of IR. As of 
2010 there was 46 degree-conferring institutions nationwide, and Chinese IR research 
and institutions equalled those of the US in size (Shambaugh 2011, 352). The quality 
of Chinese IR scholarship, however, remains questionable as many scholars do not 
have solid IR backgrounds and rarely publish in the field’s recognized peer-reviewed 
disciplinary journals. Nevertheless, the professionalization of the discipline in China 
has produced some outstanding scholars whose voices are well-respected domestically 
and internationally.28 As China’s IR community matures, it is increasingly concerned 
about the risk of over-dependence on Western knowledge. As a result, some Chinese 
scholars began to define their own research agenda and to call for developing a 
distinctive Chinese IR theory. Since the early 2000s, many Chinese scholars have 
continued to learn from Western IR, yet at the same time they started looking at 
China’s own history and practice of international relations for inspiration – in the 
words of Prof. Ni Shixiong, a so-called ‘walking on two legs’ phenomenon 
(Interview, Shanghai, August 2013).  
Regarding the current state of the discipline in China, leading IR scholar Wang 
Yizhou has advanced an interesting observation. Wang believes that the IR discipline 
in China at present is ‘booming’ in quantitative terms (e.g. number of students, degree 
conferring institutions, and individual and collaborative research projects with foreign 
colleagues). Yet ‘there is a really deep sense of crisis in that we are losing direction 
for further development, and that scholars [are] seemingly lost [in establishing] 
27 A comprehensive study of contemporary  IR studies in China lists the following Western theories that 
have been imported and intensively studied in China over time: Marxism, Realism, Liberalism 
(International Regime), Constructivism, English school, Feminism, Globalism, Regionalism etc (Wang 
2006a). 
28 These following Chinese IR scholars are listed as intellectuals who have affected the development of 
contemporary China: Yan Xuetong, Wang Yizhou, Shi Yinhong, and Wang Jisi (Hao 2003, 288). In 




                                                          
 common language for communication and the inner energy and emotion for debate’ 
(Interview, Beijing, 6 September 2013). The fundamental problem lies in the risk of 
getting lost in a period of growing plurality and diversity in Chinese IR. Wang has 
observed:  
The situation is like we are going from a poor land to a deep forest. In the poor 
land you see nothing but if you go deeper and deeper into the forest you see 
many trees, but there is no light and no right way (North or South, East or 
West) to go. People just talk about themselves with little interest in what others 
are thinking and talking about. Many people just want to pursue areas or issue-
specific studies rather than doing theoretical research (Interview, Beijing, 
September 2013). 
Notwithstanding this situation, Wang observes that there are some ‘deep-minded 
scholars’ who do serious theoretical work. They have generated a number of 
theoretical attempts that may drive the future development of IR studies in China. 
These characteristics of disciplinary evolution in China and the ongoing generational 
change in Chinese IR academia form the background for a vibrant debate about the 
future trajectory of Chinese IR to be discussed in the subsequent section. 
Understanding these underlying trends is important given that theory development is 
seldom separated from the socio-political and institutional context in which academics 
operate. 
Debating ‘Chinese’ IR Theory: theoretical claims and actual practices 
Although serious IR theoretical research in China only began in the late 1970s, it was 
as early as in 1982 that Chinese scholars started mentioning the need for China to 
have an IR theory of its own.29 This perceived desire was formally embraced by 
several scholars in a Chinese journal article in 1986 (Wang, Lin, and Zhao 1986). 
Since then, there have been a number of movements to map out a desirable Chinese 
contribution to IR Theory. These include the ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ 
(juyou Zhongguo tese de guoji guanxi lilun), the ‘indigenization’ (bentuhua) and 
‘Sinicization’ (Zhongguo hua) of IRT approaches in the 1980s and 1990s. More 
recently, they incorporate the ‘Chinese perspective’ (Zhongguo shijiao), the ‘Chinese 
29 Li Huichuan – the then Director of China Institute of International Studies – first talked about a 
Chinese IR theory in a welcome speech given to the visiting graduates of Peking University in 1982 
(quoted in Lu 2012, 164).  
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 School of IR theory’ (Zhongguo xuepai), the ‘Chinese IR theory’ (Zhongguo guoji 
guanxi lilun), and the ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR.30  
The various drives toward theoretical innovation in China are manifested in Table 3.1. 
A number of prominent Chinese scholars are involved in the Chinese IRT debate and 
represent contrasting positions. Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong are known as the key 
proponent and critic, respectively, of the ‘Chinese School’ project. Qin has won the 
support of many scholars while Yan’s ‘Tsinghua approach’ is followed mostly by his 
colleagues and former PhD students at Tsinghua University. Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi, 
and Ni Shixiong, are proponents of a Chinese perspective on IR – albeit in different 
ways. Shi Yinhong and Zhang Xiaoming are among proponents of the English School 
in China, calling for greater awareness of history in Chinese IR research.31 The 
‘universalist’ camp, represented by Tang Shiping and Zhang Ruizhuang, strives 
toward integrating further with Western IR and its theoretical orientations. 
This study finds that four conceptual schools of thought among these various positions 
have shaped into noticeable theoretical movements with actual practices. These 
include: the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project; the ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR; the Beida-
led ambition to shape a foreign affairs theory; and the Western camp’s movement 
toward deeper integration with Western IR. Each of these approaches focuses on a 
particular aspect of IR theorizing: some are more preoccupied with introducing a 
‘Chinese brand name’ in IRT, others are concerned about producing policy-relevant 
knowledge to guide Chinese foreign policy, and only a few scholars are interested in 
developing universal knowledge. Before the emergence of these movements, there 
was a precursor approach called ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ which, 
despite its lack of actual practices and loss of popularity recently, still has some 
lingering influence in Chinese IR academia, arguably through the revision of ‘Tianxia’ 
philosophy by Zhao Tingyang. It is necessary to discuss this old approach as Chinese 
scholars have somewhat learned from its flaws and weaknesses to develop more 
credible theoretical perspectives. 
30 For the purpose of convenience, these academic movements are hereafter referred to collectively as 
the ‘Chinese IR Theory’ debate.   
31 Some scholars have identified Shi Yinhong as an ‘English school’ proponent (Zhang 2002, 104-5; 
Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 22). I found this observation largely true during my interview with him in 
Beijing in September 2013. Throughout the interview, Shi explained how his educational background 
in history shapes his perspective on IR. He also criticized the current Chinese IR theoretical debates for 




                                                          
 Movement  Scholar Affiliation Training Position in the 
debate 




School of IR’  
project 
Qin Yaqing China Foreign 
Affairs University 
(CFAU) 





- A ‘Chinese School of IR’ 
is not only necessary but 
also possible and even 
inevitable. 
- Chinese IR theory can be 
built upon the richness of 
Chinese philosophy and 
tradition. 
- The perceived Chinese 
IR theory can be 
universally applicable (Qin 
Yaqing) and/or integrate 
other approaches within it 
(Wang Yiwei). 
- Qin Yaqing’s development of a 
relationality theory. 
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese 
Dream’ of IR Theory.’ 
- Translation of selected texts (Qin). 
- Resource mobilization and collaboration 
with foreign scholars (e.g. English School 
scholars) for developing Chinese School. 
- Some changes in teaching practices. 
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese 
government and involvement in East Asian 
Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and 
Wang Fan). 
Ren Xiao Fudan University Fudan U (PhD) 
Proponents of the 
‘Chinese School’ 
Wang Yiwei Renmin 
University 
Fudan U (PhD) 
 Wang Fan CFAU CFAU (PhD) 












Yan Xuetong Tsinghua 
University 
UC Berkeley (PhD) Representative of 
‘Tsinghua 
approach’ 
- The ‘Chinese School’ is 
not possible and desirable 
given its narrow focus and 
the diversity of Chinese 
thought. 
- IR Theory should be 
universally applicable. 
- Chinese traditions can be 
used to enrich IR theory 
and provide a blueprint for 
Chinese foreign policy. 
- Yan Xuetong’s research team on ancient 
Chinese thought and ‘moral realism.’ 
- Policy relevant and quantitative research. 
- Research on East Asian ancient tributary 
system and current order. 
- Teaching quantitative research methods. 
- Employing quantitative methods in 
research (e.g. measuring Chinese soft 
power). 








Tsinghua U (PhD) 
 
Tsinghua U (PhD) 
Former PhD 
students of Prof. 
Yan; followers of 
the ‘Tsinghua 
approach’ 


















Wang Yizhou PKU CASS (PhD) Advocate for a 
Chinese theory of 
foreign affairs 
- Not much interest in 
‘Chinese School’ because 
time is not ripe enough. 
- Diversity in theoretical 
perspectives of scholars. 
- Developing Chinese 
- Wang Jisi’s development of Chinese grand 
strategy and editorship of a book series 
entitled ‘World Politics - Views From 
China.’ 
- Wang Yizhou’s work on ‘creative 
involvement.’ 





 foreign affairs 
32 
strategy’ perspectives on foreign 
affairs is necessary e.g. to 
guide Chinese foreign 
policy. 
 
- Research on the South China Sea disputes 
(Zhu Feng heads an entire institute at 
Nanjing University dedicated to this 
question). 
- Policy consultancy for the government. 
- Blended teaching of both Chinese and 
Western IRT approaches.  
- Summer school course on China’s rise and 
its impact on i.r and IR. 
Zhang 
Xiaoming 
















UC Los Angeles (PhD) 
 
PKU (PhD) 
Proponents of a 










Tang Shiping Fudan University UC Berkeley (MA); 
Wayne State Uni. 
(PhD - Biology) 
Representative of 
universalist camp, 
critic of a 
Chinese-style IR 
theory 
- A ‘Chinese IR theory’ is 
undesirable given its 
ideological orientation. 
- Universalism should be 
the end point of IR Theory. 
- Chinese cases can be 
used to enrich IRT. 
- Integration with Western 
IRT, produce qualified 
knowledge in Western 
standard. 
- There should be a greater 
awareness of history in 
Chinese IR theorizing. 
- Tang Shiping’s work on defensive 
realism and the social evolution of 
international politics. 
- Zhang Ruizhuang’s work on applying 
realism in explaining Chinese foreign 
policy 
- Teaching Western IR perspectives and 
promoting a greater sense of scientific 
rigor in IR research and teaching. 
Zhang 
Ruizhuang 
Nankai University UC Berkeley (PhD) Realist camp, 
critic of Chinese 
Foreign Policy 




Critic of ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ 
project 






Table 3.1: The key movements toward theoretical innovation in China33
32 There have been some academic movements in the Beida camp recently. Accordingly, Zhu Feng moved to Nanjing University to head the China Center for Collaborative 
Studies of the South China Sea in 2014 and Jia Qingguo became the Dean of the School of International Studies (SIS) in replace for Wang Jisi who is now the President of Beida’s 
Institute of International and Strategic Studies. 
33 There are, of course, many other Chinese scholars who are involved in this debate. Given the limited scope of a case study chapter, however, I have focused on the most 
influential ones in each movement. Their position in the debate is identified based on existing literature as well as personal interviews conducted during my fieldwork in China 
during August and September 2013. 
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 Setting the scene: from ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ to ‘world 
philosophy with Chinese characteristics’ (Tianxia tixi) 
The Chinese IRT debate began with the ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ 
movement. The term was initially introduced at the first national conference on IR 
theory in Shanghai in 1987. From the very beginning, this idea was largely seen as a 
transplant of the ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ political slogan coined by 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. The initiative was strongly promoted by Liang Shoude 
(the then Dean of the International Politics Department at Peking University) and was 
followed by other senior scholars. Some proponents of the idea argued that ‘IR Theory 
with Chinese characteristics’ should focus on developing Marxist theory while others 
instead argued for assimilating Chinese culture and traditional diplomatic theory and 
practice (Wang 2009, 109; Song 2001, 67-8; Ren 2008, 294). The question of what 
constitutes ‘Chinese characteristics’ and how such a theory should be constructed, 
however, was poorly addressed. This resulted in scepticism if not opposition to the 
idea by younger scholars who believed that theories should be scientific, universal, 
and generally acknowledged. Critics of this ‘Chinese characteristics’ project posit that 
it is highly questionable whether Chinese scholars, so obsessed with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’, can build a theory that has ‘transnational appeal’ (Shambaugh 2011, 
366). In fact, there were no remarkable theorizing efforts to match these claims. 
Professor Song Xinning (2001) from Renmin University hence dismissed this 
movement as highly ideology-driven and concluded that such a pursuit constituted 
nothing more than a political project.  
Given such strong scepticism on the academic value of ‘IR Theory with Chinese 
characteristics’, it has not been in the spotlight of Chinese academia since the early 
2000s. It has been replaced by the current dominant narrative of a ‘Chinese School of 
IR theory.’34 Nevertheless, ‘Chinese characteristics’ remains a popular term in 
Chinese IR discourse, particularly from institutions close to the CCP line. There are 
continuing efforts by Chinese scholars to conceptualize terms like ‘power’, ‘soft 
power’, ‘geopolitics’, ‘grand strategy’ (and so on) with ‘Chinese characteristics’. The 
common ground of these writings is to introduce China’s unique way of understanding 
34 A search in Chinese Online Academic Journal system (http://cnki.net/) with the keywords ‘Chinese 
School’ and ‘IR theory’ shows 70 articles discussing the various aspects of a possible ‘Chinese School 
of IR theory’ during the time between 2000 to 2013.  
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 international politics. Arguably, the most notable work in this respect is Zhao 
Tingyang’s recent attempts to provide a ‘world philosophy with Chinese 
characteristics’ by revising the concept of ‘Tianxia’ (all-under-heaven).  
Zhao Tingyang is a political philosopher at the Institute of Philosophy of Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS). As China’s largest think-tank, CASS is believed 
to be a ‘heavily politicized and doctrinal Marxist institution’ (Shambaugh 2011, 359) 
which represents the classical and conservative component of Chinese IR (jingdian 
pai). In 2005, Zhao published his first book on the ‘Tianxia system’ and it quickly 
became popular in China and abroad. In the introduction, titled ‘Why is it necessary to 
discuss China's worldview?’, Zhao posits that the problem facing the rise to great 
power status of the modern Chinese nation is not merely that China has not yet truly 
become an ‘economic power’ but also that it is not a ‘knowledge producing power.’ If 
it cannot become a ‘knowledge producer’ then no matter how great its economic and 
material power is, China remains a ‘small state’ (Zhao 2005, 1-2). 
Zhao (2005, 2) argues that the most important background for the emergence of 
Chinese thought is that China’s problems today have become the world’s problems. 
China's problems, however, cannot be explained by Western theories because they 
paint a wrong picture of China, such as the ‘China threat’ or ‘China's rise’ theses. 
Western thought, Zhao (2005, 10) notes, ‘can explain conflicts but only Chinese 
thought can fully explain harmony’ because hidden in Chinese traditional thought is a 
completely different system of worldview, values, and methodology. Therefore, China 
can act as a ‘responsible power’ and contribute to international scholarship by 
providing alternative and indeed better theoretical solutions to China and the world’s 
problems. In so doing, Zhao suggests Chinese scholars should ‘rethink China’ in order 
to eventually ‘reconstruct China.’ Therefore, China can act as a ‘responsible power’ 
and contribute to international scholarship by providing alternative and indeed better 
theoretical solutions to the world's problems. ‘Rethinking China’ has three 
components. These are, to make Chinese knowledge an important foundation of 
international scholarship; to renew Chinese thought by developing China-related 
thought into world-related thought; and to ultimately ‘rethink the world’ (Zhao 2005, 
11). Zhao finds such a material for Chinese theory building in the ancient Chinese 
concept of ‘all-under-heaven’ system which dates back 3000 years ago under the Zhou 
Dynasty (1046-256 BC).  
97 
 
 Basically, the Tianxia thesis posits that although we are living in the era of rapidly 
expanding globalization, the world today is still a ‘non-world’, a ‘failed’, or ‘bad’ 
world. This is because there is no ‘truly coherent world society governed by a 
universally-accepted political institution’; it remains a ‘Hobbesian chaos.’ Although 
there are international organizations such as the UN or EU, these institutions remain 
state-centric and are unable to prevent many international conflicts. In other words, 
there is no real ‘worldism’ or ‘worldness’ but only ‘internationality’ (Zhao 2009, 6). 
In this context, Zhao argues that the Chinese philosophy of ‘Tianxia’ offers a different 
vision of a world institution that is more effective in solving world issues. In ancient 
Chinese thinking, the meaning of ‘Tianxia’ was threefold, consisting of the physical 
world (all the land under heaven), the psychological world (the hearts and minds of 
the people), and the political world (a world institution or a ‘world-as-one-family’ 
system). The Tianxia system is featured with long-lasting peace and order because, as 
Zhao argues, in the minds of the kings of the all-under-heaven system, creating 
harmony is the ultimate goal (Zhao 2012, 46). In addition, during the Zhou dynasty 
which was the first and only one thus far to put the all-under-heaven system into 
practice, the world is seen as a starting point for political thinking. Zhao, therefore, 
suggests that Tianxia is a philosophy of ‘true world-ness’ because it takes the world as 
a whole as the key philosophical issue (Zhao 2009, 11). 
At the core of Zhao’s holistic view of the world is Confucian ‘family ties’. In his 
view, if nation-states and Tianxia are built upon the spirit of family-ship, the world 
can evolve into a place of great harmony (that minimizes economic and cultural 
conflicts) and inclusivity (in which nobody is excluded or pushed aside). In other 
words, it is a commonly agreed institution ‘of all and for all’ (Zhao 2012, 60). 
Therefore, he concludes, ‘today’s chaotic world is in need of a new “all-under-
heaven” to establish perpetual peace’ (Zhao 2012, 52) In intellectual circles, the world 
needs to divert away from ‘wrong-minded philosophy’ to employ a new philosophy of 
true world-ness (Zhao 2012, 54-5).  
Zhao’s Tianxia philosophy generates heated debates domestically and internationally. 
Apart from admiration for the sophistication of his work, there was also a wave of 
criticism against his ‘over-beautiful’ if not utopian worldview (Callahan 2008). For 
example, how can Tianxia explain the increasing assertiveness of China in territorial 
disputes with neighboring countries e.g. Beijing’s posturing in the South China Sea? 
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 This led to several IR scholars writing to explain how his philosophy has been 
misunderstood (Xu 2014; Zhang 2010a). Noting the shortcomings of his work 
including the theory-practice gap and the unidentified pathways to such an ideal world 
institution, Zhao has been working on a new book entitled ‘Making the World into 
All-under-heaven (Tianxia)’ (Qin 2012a, 72). Although being a philosophy rather than 
IR theory, Zhao’s work is an important starting point for the Chinese IR community as 
it opens a way for indigenous IR theorizing – to go back to Chinese traditions and 
ancient thought.35  
The ‘Chinese School of IR’ movement 
Since 2000, the Chinese IR debate has been increasingly dominated by the narrative of 
the ‘Chinese School of IR’ (Zhongguo Xuepai). Compared to its ‘IR Theory with 
Chinese characteristics’ predecessor, the ‘Chinese School’ project has won more 
support and increasingly received international attention, particularly when leading 
Chinese theorists (such as Qin Yaqing, Ren Xiao, Wang Yiwei) joined the camp and 
played an instrumental role in developing the approach. The pursuit of China’s 
distinctive brand of IR theory reflects the generational change in Chinese social 
sciences, particularly the return of high qualified Western-trained scholars and their 
subsequent socialization into the socio-political context of China. The movement from 
think-tanks to universities by leading IR scholars has also pulled Chinese IR into the 
direction of more in-depth theoretical research.36 Calling for the ‘China School of IR’ 
reflects the professionalization of Chinese IR academia and their desire to ‘catch up’ 
with the global intellectual community.  
Given their high hopes and expectations for indigenous theorizing, how have Chinese 
scholars made the case for the ‘Chinese School’ and what has been done so far to 
match their desire? Over time, three fundamental issues have become the heart of the 
‘Chinese School’ discussions. First, why is there no distinct Chinese IR theory at 
present? Second, is a ‘Chinese School’ desirable and possible? And third, if yes, how 
can it be constructed? A number of leading scholars had attempted to address the first 
35 Most of the Chinese IR scholars whom I interviewed in 2013 did not perceive Zhao’s Tianxia theory 
as part of the Chinese IR Theory movement, largely because his work is about philosophy rather than 
about the real world (see also, Yan Xuetong in Creutzfeldt 2012). 
36 For example, Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi and Tang Shiping moved from different institutes of Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS), Yan Xuetong and Chu Shulong from China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), and Shi Yinhong from the Center for International 
Strategic Studies at International Relations Academy, Nanjing. 
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 question (Qin 2010b, 36-41; Yan 2011a, 256; Wang and Han 2013, 38). Qin Yaqing 
summed up these discussions, arguing that ‘uncritical critiques, insufficient empirical 
studies, and unsophisticated research designs impede theory breakthroughs in China’ 
(Qin 2008, 467-8).  
Since 2005, Chinese scholars have started to discuss the possibility of a Chinese 
School. Qin Yaqing argues that a Chinese School is not only justified but also possible 
and even inevitable because every social theory has ‘geographic and cultural 
birthmarks based on the experience and practice of people living there’ (Qin 2009b, 
18). Qin agrees with Zhao Tingyang that Chinese ancient philosophy is a major source 
for building new theory but disagrees that it should be the sole one. Even in 
establishing the ‘Chinese School’, Qin argues, Chinese scholars need to combine 
Western approaches, ideas, and concepts with a modern, contemporary 
reinterpretation of traditional Chinese discourses (Creutzfeldt 2011, 9). Qin’s 
approach received the support of many Chinese scholars who are united by a Coxian 
ontology that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981, 128). 
For example, Zhang Xiaoming – an English School proponent – believes that in the 
English School, along with other major Western IR theories, it is  
hard to escape ethnocentrism or cultural bias in their perceptions of and 
dealings with the non-Western countries. They are all culture-laden and value-
laden. In fact, there is not a true value-free and universal IR theory in the 
world. Every IR theory is provincial in cultural terms (Zhang 2011, 785).  
If all theories are cultural and provincial then claims to universality on the part of 
Western theory are unnecessarily exclusive. Chinese theory, in this sense, is just as 
provincial and thus just as valid. Another vocal advocate of the ‘Chinese School’ 
Wang Yiwei argues that IR theory is both science and art in the sense that even if 
some features appear to be universal, it is in essence still a kind of art with nationality 
(Wang 2002b, 2007). In an article in 2007, Wang placed lengthy and harsh criticism 
of Western IRT which, he believes, has increasingly lost its appeal. The main flaw of 
Western IRT, he points out, is ‘seeking the common grounds when it cannot reverse 
differences and cannot solve the original inequality (identity, interests) problem.’ For 
this reason, he dismissed Western theories as ‘vulgar’ IRT that contradicts with 




 In this context, Wang Yiwei and his student Han Xueqing suggest that the world 
needs a ‘Chinese dream’ in IR theory. If anything, this slogan recalls Xi Jinping’s 
‘Chinese dream’ policy posture which was coined in November 2012. While most 
other proponents of Chinese School claim that a future Chinese theory can sit 
alongside as equally valid and partial approaches to IR, Wang and Han actually pursue 
a more ambitious claim – that Chinese approaches can be the integrative framework in 
which Western theory exists. In their ‘Chinese dream’,  
grand theories might be replaced by meso and micro theories. Encouraged by 
Chinese inclusiveness of Indian Buddhism into Chinese Zen, China can also 
include Western universalism into Chinese theoretical framework. As a 
consequence, the Chinese dream in IR will turn into reality with the full 
shaping of global China’ (Wang and Han 2013, 38).  
What China has beyond Western IRT, in their view, is threefold: Chinese style 
cosmopolitanism (Tianxia zhuyi), ethical idealism (daode lixiang), and harmonious 
mentality (hexie linian) (Wang and Han 2013, 32-7). The ‘Chinese dream’ in IRT then 
can be realized in three ways – that is, by reviving Chinese cultural traditions; by de-
Westernizing, especially de-Americanizing, IRT while remaining ‘open and inclusive’ 
regarding Western civilization; and by constructing IR theory that ‘originates in China 
and belongs to the world’ to ‘innovate’ the IR theory system (Wang and Han 2013, 
38-9). As William Callahan has noted, the Chinese dream is similar to the American 
Dream in that both of them are a debate about values which ‘knits together culture and 
politics’ (Callahan 2014, 151). Put differently, the Chinese and American dream serve 
as some sort of ideology e.g. to promote and export their sets of values abroad. 
However, the difference between a ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘American dream’ of IR 
theory, as claimed by Chinese scholars, is that while Western IR theory subscribes to a 
universal dream, Chinese IR theory harbours a ‘harmonious but different’ (he er bu 
tong) dream. There is a belief that with the pacifist tradition and tolerance of diversity 
embedded in the Chinese culture, the future Chinese IR theory will contribute to 
making both the real world and the discipline of IR ‘a better place’ than the ones that 
Western IRT offers (Wang and Han 2013, 39; see also Wang 2007).  
Interestingly, in making a case for the ‘Chinese School’, Chinese scholars increasingly 
refer to Western philosophy of science on how a theory comes into being. At one 
extreme, Wang Yiwei foresees that ‘the real revolution will take place through the 
deconstruction of the Western international system by the Eastern one’ in Kuhnian 
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 sense of scientific revolution or paradigm shift (Wang 2007, 207). Qin Yaqing 
meanwhile borrows Cox’s ‘core problematic’ and Lakatos’ ‘research program’ thesis 
as a methodology for constructing a Chinese School. Accordingly, a Chinese School 
can be constructed if Chinese scholars find a new and different ‘theoretical 
problematic’ in their research program. Comparing the theoretical problematic of 
American IR (hegemonic maintenance) and British IR (international society), Qin 
argues that the successful construction of the English School is attributable to the 
different problematic it holds from American mainstream theories. In this light, 
China’s peaceful integration into international society, Qin argues, is most likely to 
become the theoretical problematic of a ‘Chinese School’ (Qin 2005, 65-9). 
To date, the ‘Chinese School’ proponents have produced only some distinct research 
outcomes. Most notable is Qin Yaqing’s development of a systematic theory on 
relationality (guanxi) and process (guocheng) by employing processual constructivism 
as the analytical framework and taking the Chinese concept of ‘relationality’ as the 
theoretical hard-core. His aim of developing ‘Chinese relationalism’ is ‘to universalize 
Chinese concepts’ (Qin 2009a, 197). In his recent publications, Qin has sketched the 
key elements of his ‘relational theory of world politics.’ It focuses on process rather 
than structure; it takes Chinese yin–yang dialectics as the meta-relationship; and it 
develops a model for ‘relational power’ and ‘relational governance’ (Qin 2012a, 
2012b, 2016). Such a theory, Qin argues, has three distinctive dimensions as 
compared to Western mainstream theories.  
First, while most existing Western theories (including constructivism) place emphasis 
on structure, Qin’s theory focuses on process, defined as ‘dynamic relations’. Process 
is significant in that in that ‘it shapes national interests, develops norms, nurtures 
collective emotion and builds shared identity through inter-subjective practice. 
Mainstream constructivism has done considerable studies on norms and shared 
identity, but missed collective emotion’ (Qin 2009b, 12). A theory focusing on 
process can thus explain change. Second, the Chinese yin and yang dialectics, unlike 
the Hegelian dialectics, see relations between the two opposite poles as generally non-
conflictual. Yin and yang indeed can be developed into a harmonious synthesis by 
means of Zhongyong, or ‘the mutually inclusive way.’ The relevance of this meta-
relationship to the current international politics, Qin argues, is that it provides an 
alternative explanation for cooperation and conflict between the actors of different 
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 cultural and civilizational backgrounds in global society (Qin 2012a, 81). Third, a 
theory on relationality can explain ‘relational governance’ – a feature in East Asian 
Confucian societies as opposed to ‘rule-based governance’ in Western society. The 
former model is based not only on cost–benefit calculations but also relationships 
(such as the management models in East Asian companies).  
Relational governance is defined as ‘a process of negotiating socio-political 
arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce order so 
that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative fashion with mutual trust that 
evolves through a shared understanding of social norms and human morality’ (Qin 
2012a, 83). This model of relational governance, Qin argues, can be applied to explain 
regional politics such as East Asian regionalism and ASEAN Way (Qin 2016, 43). He 
even believes that relationality theory may also be universal because ‘society must be 
defined in terms of relations of some kind’ (Liu Xin, quoted in Qin 2009b, 18). It 
should be noted that unlike Zhao Tingyang, Qin does not see Chinese and Western 
theories, such as relational and rule-based governance, as mutually exclusive but 
rather mutually complementary to ‘create a more effective and humane approach to 
global governance’ (Qin 2012a, 85). Qin’s nuanced approach of blending Western 
methodology with Chinese concepts is thus supported by many other Chinese 
scholars.  
At present, the ‘China IR Theory’ research led by Qin has become one of the three 
research focuses of at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign 
Affairs University (CFAU).37 As the only higher learning institution directly under 
China’s Foreign Ministry and responsible for the country’s ‘Track-two Diplomacy’, 
CFAU sponsors training and research that are policy-oriented. The perceived purpose 
of Qin’s theorizing on relations and process is to apply it in explaining China’s 
peaceful integration into the international society and East Asian peace and 
cooperation. In an article co-authored with his CFAU colleague in 2007, Qin first 
discussed ‘process-oriented regional integration’ (Qin and Wei 2007; see also Qin and 
Wei 2008). He argued that the enduring of peace and economic development in East 
Asia in the past three decades is largely attributable to ‘the regional processes that 
37 Qin is the long-time Vice President of CFAU. The other research specializations of CFAU’s Institute 
of International Relations comprise ‘China and the International System’ led by Professor Zhu Liqun 
and ‘East Asian Regional Cooperation and International Security’ led by Professor Wang Fan (CFAU’s 
website, accessed 17 June 2014). 
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 produce dynamics socializing powers and spreading norms’ (Creutzfeldt 2011, 3). To 
investigate this aspect further, Qin has formed a small group of his CFAU colleagues 
to work on innovating constructivism to explain Chinese foreign policy with a focus 
on the East Asia region. Their aim is to revise and develop key constructivist concepts 
such as the role of languages (the Chinese language), special social linkages such as 
China’s informal relations with ASEAN (Track 2 and Track 3 dialogues), and how to 
develop new social forces (Interview with Wang Yizhou, Beijing, 6 September 2013).  
With regard to training at CFAU, Qin has been teaching the ‘IR Theory’ and 
‘Research Methodology’ courses. The content of these courses, according to an 
American professor, looks very similar to a typical syllabus of a US undergraduate IR 
course.38 As Qin himself acknowledges, despite the recent shift in CFAU’s research 
focus, there has been no course on Chinese IR at that institution, and there are no 
changes in the teaching curriculum yet. Nevertheless, Qin also notes that he does 
teach a diversity of Western IR theories and methods; at the same time, however, he 
encourages students to study Chinese narratives to seek inspiration from them (Qin in 
Creutzfeldt 2011). In his courses for post-graduate students (where the professor has 
more freedom to design the syllabus), Qin has included articles and books related to 
the Chinese and non-Western IRT written by both indigenous and foreign scholars to 
manifest that different cultural and historical settings lead to distinct practices that 
Western theories sometimes fail to explain adequately. For example, he includes his 
own writings as well as Zhao Tingyang’s ‘Tianxia system’, Victoria Hui’s ‘War and 
State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe’, David Kang’s ‘China 
Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia’, and Erik Ringmar’s ‘Performing 
International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order’ (Qin 
2013, 168-9). 
Qin also utilizes his membership in national and international editorial boards of 
journal and book series (particularly in his capacity as the Deputy Editor-in-chief of 
the Journal of China Foreign Affairs University,) to promote research about Chinese 
IR and the translations of relevant Western theoretical books. He has been assisting 
major Chinese presses to select books for translation with a focus on liberalism (with 
38 This remark is from Alastair Iain Johnston (2003, 32-3), who has reviewed Qin’s course syllabus. 
Students in Qin’s class study major Western paradigms and methods including realism, liberalism, 
constructivism, as well as other sociological and marginalized approaches. The key reading assignment 
for his IR theory course is Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr’s World Politics: Menu of Choice. 
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 Peking University Press), the English School (with the World Affairs Press), and 
constructivism (with Shanghai People’s Publishing House). Qin himself has translated 
a dozen IRT books with different theoretical orientations, including Carr’s ‘The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis’; Robert Jervis’s ‘Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics’; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner’s ‘Exploration and Contestation in the 
Study of World Politics’; Katzenstein’s ‘A World of Regions’ and ‘Civilizations in 
World Politics’, and most recently Sil and Katzenstein’s ‘Beyond Paradigms’ (Qin 
2013, 170). 
Other pro-Chinese School scholars are also contributing new research topics to the 
Chinese School discourse. These include Ren Xiao’s re-examination of the history of 
the tributary system and the practices of East Asian ‘symbiotic’ order (e.g. rules, 
norms) for modern-day application (Ren 2013) and Wang Yiwei's work on a ‘Chinese 
Theory of New Great Power Relations’ that claims to go beyond the path dependence 
of Western theories (Wang 2013b). Nevertheless, these agendas have not been 
developed into sophisticated propositions in the same manner as Qin’s relationality 
thesis. As Ren Xiao admits, theorizing is a difficult and time-consuming task that 
requires both independent thinking and peer collaboration. However, thus far much of 
the ‘Chinese School’ scholarship is individual efforts or institutional-based.39 There 
has been little, or no, cross-institutional collaboration or joint research among pro-
Chinese School scholars, reflecting a certain amount of ‘theoretical egoism’ even 
among scholars who share the same goal.  
 The ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR 
Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the IR Department at Tsinghua University, is known as the 
most vocal opponent of both Qin Yaqing-led ‘Chinese School’ project and Zhao 
Tingyang’s Tianxia philosophy. As a realist, Yan does not believe in the possibility of 
harmony like Zhao or Qin. As a proponent of Western quantitative methods, he 
believes that any theory worthy of that name should be constructed in a scientific way 
and be universally applicable regardless of time and space. Yan, therefore, criticizes 
Zhao’s Tianxia theory as unrealistic and Qin-led ‘Chinese School’ project as narrowly 
39 In my interview with him in August 2013, Professor Ren Xiao said that he had suggested with 
Professor Qin Yaqing to form a hard-core group of scholars to work on the construction of the Chinese 
School but so far this has not been realized. Ren, meanwhile, has been the leading advocate for a 




                                                          
 based. Apart from his accusation that Qin is making a case for a national IR theory, 
Yan further criticizes the ‘Chinese School’ proponents for giving name to the theory 
before giving birth to it. Moreover, he argues that it is impossible to have a single 
Chinese IR theory given the diversity of its traditions. Even Confucianism, he 
believes, cannot represent all of Chinese thought. Therefore, it is not feasible that a 
single school of thought or theory could represent the entirety of Chinese thinking 
(Creutzfeldt 2012, 2; Yan 2011a, 252-9). This view is largely shared by Yan’s 
collaborator Xu Jin: ‘China is too big and diverse. No one can represent the whole 
China and no theory can capture China’s diversity. Hence, there can only be a ‘Han 
Chinese approach’ or a ‘Tsinghua approach’ but not [an all-encompassing] ‘Chinese 
School’’ (Interview, Beijing, 5 September 2013). 
Although criticizing the ‘Chinese School’ initiative and calling for universal 
knowledge, Yan Xuetong and his colleagues at Tsinghua University are actually 
proposing another Chinese style IR theory – the so-called ‘Tsinghua approach to IR’ 
(Zhang 2012c). The ‘Tsinghua approach’ is characterized by its self-acclaimed 
commitment to the universalism of ideas, its quantitative methodology, and policy-
relevant orientation. This approach attempts to, in Yan’s words, ‘create something 
universal, applicable not only to China, but the world’ (Creutzfeldt 2012, 2). This has 
driven Yan and his followers to look into the diverse literature of ancient Chinese 
thought as an alternative source for Chinese IR theorizing. In fact, despite his 
opposition to the ‘Chinese School’ idea, Yan shares many common points with the 
non-Western IR theory movement. As he argues,  
if we want IR theories to become truly rich and develop more universal values, 
we should encourage these scholars and students to take a deeper look into 
their own culture, knowledge, philosophy, and political theory, to enrich this 
field (Yan in Creutzfeldt 2012, 4).  
In order to build new theory, Yan suggests that Chinese scholars rely on both 
Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs and Laudan’s problem-solving 
criterion to guide their research. Chinese scholars, he believes, should ultimately aim 
for developing a new research program with a distinct hard-core as Lakatos suggests. 
The first step toward this end is to follow Laudan’s suggestion that ‘they focus on 
solving existing theoretical and empirical puzzles by wisely using traditional Chinese 
thought and literature’ (Yan 2011a, 258).  
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 Starting in 2005, Yan and his Tsinghua colleagues have deeply studied the thought of 
seven pre-Qin (before 221 BC) masters, namely Laozi, Mozi, Kongzi (Confucius), 
Mengzi (Mencius), Guanzi, Xunzi, and Hanfeizi. The outcome was a number of 
articles and books in Chinese which were eventually translated and gathered into an 
English volume titled Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, published by 
Princeton University Press in 2011. In this important work, Yan first places ancient 
Chinese thinkers within the analytical framework of Western IR theories. He classifies 
pre-Qin thinkers by their epistemological ideas (conceptual determinism, dualism, and 
materialist determinism) and the analytical level of their thought (system, state, and 
individual) (Yan 2011a, 26). He then tries to study how ancient Chinese thinkers 
understand international order and political power.  
Yan outlines three types of order/power envisaged by ancient Chinese masters: 
‘kingship’ or ‘humane authority’ (Wangquan), hegemony (Baquan), and tyranny 
(Qiangquan). He rules out the relevance of tyranny, which is entirely based on 
military force and stratagems, to today’s world. Rather he focuses on comparing the 
two other forms of rule: hegemony which seeks domination by means of maintaining 
strong force and strategic reliability (e.g. assurance through alliance) and ‘Humane 
authority’ or ruling by morality and justice (Yan 2011a, 84-91). It is humane authority 
that Yan thinks is a superior model because it wins the hearts and minds of the people. 
Yan further claims that pre-Qin understanding on morality and power may enrich 
existing IR theory, particularly realism, in at least two dimensions. First, hard power 
cannot be disregarded in realist understandings of power but morality can provide 
legitimacy for states to use force. Second, although classical realist writings (such as 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations) presume that morality is an important 
component of power, Yan suggests that ‘realism should take morality as a constant 
and specific, not simply an abstract concept’ (Yan in Creutzfeldt 2012, 5).  
Given his emphasis on the role of morality, Yan has been labelled as a ‘moral realist’ 
or ‘Confucian realist’ (Zhang 2012c, 95). The core principles suggested by Yan’s 
moral realism are fairness, justice, and civility, followed by equality, democracy and 
freedom (Huang 2016). When being questioned in an interview with the New York 
Times as to whether China should exercise such ‘human authority’ or ‘moral realism’ 
by sanctioning North Korea for its recent nuclear tests, Yan gives a frank answer:  
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 That would be a Western hegemonic idea. A humane authority sees everyone 
on equal terms. If North Korea is not entitled to nuclear weapons, then China 
and the United States should guarantee North Korea its security in return for 
denuclearization. That’s what we call leading by example and fairness. It’s 
only Western countries that are calling for sanctions without considering a fair 
solution, and they make up only about 20 percent of the world’s 195 countries 
(Yan in Huang 2016). 
It can be said that the aim of Yan’s revision of ancient Chinese thought into ‘moral 
realism’ does not merely stop at ‘enriching IR theories’ for its own sake but more 
importantly provides a guide for China’s rise to global leadership. Yan sees the power 
competition between the US and China as a zero-sum game – in order for China to 
prevail, it needs to provide higher-quality leadership than the US. ‘Humane authority’, 
as suggested by pre-Qin thinkers, is an important pathway to that end. In this course, 
he suggests China to build an inspiring model at home first and then to seek alliances 
abroad as a way to prove the credibility of Chinese model and leadership in attracting 
more high-qualified friends than the US. Policy relevance, hence, is the ultimate aim 
of Yan's theorizing. In fact, for Tsinghua University, which has a reputation of ‘king-
maker’, this has become an open goal of many faculties. An associate professor 
explains the mission of the Tsinghua IR Department and the foundation of their 
research as follows:  
We do not have the ambition to establish a grand theory. We think we are 
more realistic in producing some sort of middle-range theory, for example, 
those focusing on regional order, policy transformation as well as conducting 
empirical test. We always keep the balance between theoretical innovation and 
policy relevance. Many faculties in the department have a strong background 
in policy analysis and empirical research. We, therefore, do not want to 
separate theory from the practice of foreign policy (Interview, Beijing, 
September 2013). 
Apart from the aforementioned pre-Qin thought project, the ‘Tsinghua approach’ 
scholars are also studying the ancient and modern practice of East Asian international 
relations as a source for theory building. The Deputy Dean of the Department, Sun 
Xuefeng, has been working on probing ‘a quasi-anarchical regional order’ (the 
anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system) in East Asia and its impact 
on China’s rise (Sun 2013; see also Sun 2010). Zhou Fangyin, meanwhile, has done 
preliminary research on ancient China’s tributary system (Zhou 2011). The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics of which Professor Yan is the Editor-in-chief and 
Sun Xuefeng, Zhou Fangyin, and Xu Jin are among the editors, has served as the key 
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 outlet for distributing the Tsinghua approach’s research outcomes and generating 
debates.  
The Tsinghua’s IR department has also been taking the lead in heightening the 
scientific and methodology awareness among the younger generations of Chinese IR 
community. They are particularly interested in using quantitative methods to make 
scientific predictions for a number of dimensions in China’s foreign relations (e.g. 
Yan and Zhou 2004; Yan 2009).40 They have also been educating students and junior 
faculties all over China about quantitative methods (game theory, statistical analysis, 
systems analysis, psychology, etc). Professor Yan himself has been involved in 
convening a number of annual workshops and summer schools on quantitative 
methods. The book on methodology for IR research that he co-authored with his 
colleague, Sun Xuefeng, has been selected as a national textbook on methodology for 
IR curriculum (Yan and Sun 2007). The Tsinghua IR Department’s graduate course 
syllabus titled “Contemporary Theories of International Relations” convened by 
Zhang Chuanjie looks very similar to a typical IRT program at Western universities. 
The major theories and issues discussed in the course are realism, liberalism, 
constructivism, foreign policy making, perceptions in IR, and new asymmetric threats. 
Zhang has students read the work of leading Western theorists such as Thucydides, 
Machiavelli, Waltz, Mearsheimer, Keohane, and Alexander George. The only reading 
from a non-Western scholar assigned for the course is Zhang’s own piece titled 
‘Affective US Image Predicts Chinese citizens’ Attitudes toward the United States.’41 
Tsinghua’s IR Department also includes separate courses on ‘Classical Chinese 
Thought on Foreign Relations’ and ‘Theory and Practice of Chinese Foreign Policy’ 
in its contemporary graduate curriculum (Tsinghua). Blending Western theories and 
scientific methodology with Chinese ancient thought and practice of international 
relations, therefore, is a ‘trademark’ of the Tsinghua approach to IR. 
The Beida’s ambition to shape a theory of foreign affairs 
Much of the attention to China’s theoretical innovation focuses on the three 
aforementioned approaches. Yet the movement toward conceptualizing new 
dimensions of Chinese foreign policy by Beida’s School of International Studies (SIS) 
40 Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, for example, were the first Chinese scholars to measure Chinese soft power 
in quantitative terms, arguing that it is currently one-third that of the US (Glaser and Murphy 2009, 17). 




                                                          
 scholars should not be disregarded because it includes leading scholars such as Wang 
Jisi (a self-described ‘cautiously optimistic realist’ (Wang 2012b), Wang Yizhou (a 
globalist), Zhang Xiaoming (an English School proponent), and Jia Qingguo. Given 
the diversity of perspectives adopted by the faculty and their prudent approach in the 
ongoing Chinese IRT debate, there has been no Beida equivalent to the ‘Tsinghua 
approach’ despite sharing an ambition for developing ‘middle-range’ theories to 
explain and inform China’s foreign policy. In the past, SIS focused more on area 
studies but its current priority has shifted to the study of comparative politics and 
China’s foreign policy (Shambaugh 2011, 355). In fact, Beida scholars do aim for 
developing ‘middle-range’ theories to explain and inform Chinese foreign affairs. 
Two ongoing projects at Beida are worth mentioning: Wang Jisi’s designing of 
China’s grand strategy and Wang Yizhou’s conceptualization of ‘creative 
involvement.’ Both these academic endeavors aim to provide a blueprint for Chinese 
foreign affairs in the future. This movement reflects the Chinese traditional 
understanding of theory which is meant to serve practical purposes rather than to 
explain the causality of social phenomena. The policy relevance/impact of Beida’s 
approaches should not be disregarded as many Beida SIS scholars are members of the 
government’s Consultancy Committee on Foreign Affairs. Professor Wang Jisi, for 
example, is widely known as former President Hu Jintao’s ‘chief brains truster’ for 
foreign policy (Leonard 2012, 118). Other SIS scholars such as SIS’s current Dean Jia 
Qingguo and Vice Dean Wang Yizhou are also members of the Consultancy 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
As the scholar most exposed to policy, Wang Jisi – former SIS’s Dean and current 
President of Beida’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies – has been the 
leading force in designing a ‘grand strategy’ for China over the years. Unlike Yan 
Xuetong who coins a controversial vision of ‘humane authority’ strategy for China’s 
global leadership, Wang advocates for a more modest, prudent, and practical Chinese 
strategic design (Wang 2011a, 2005, 2012a). In the context of China’s rapid rise, 
Wang believes that the low-profile tradition of Chinese foreign policy needs to be 
revised. Yet he is also cautious about the idea of making China a competitor for global 
leadership (Kato 2012).  
Most recently, Wang Jisi has been working on developing a new grand strategy for 
China (Xin zhanlue or Da zhanlue in Chinese) – the first of its kind in Chinese IR 
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 since the PRC’s founding. This ambitious project aims to conceptualize and provide a 
blueprint for China’s future foreign policy development. It tries to entail many 
important areas of China’s policy development including foreign policy, economics, 
ecological environment, social and cultural development, and demographic 
approaches (Interviews with SIS scholars, Beijing, September 2013). Apart from this 
important work, Professor Wang also serves as the chief editor of a comprehensive 
theoretical book series entitled ‘World Politics - Views From China.’ Published by 
Beijing-based New World Press since 2007, this eight-volume series has brought 
together 184 treatises that present the views of almost 200 leading academic experts in 
the various fields of IR including international order, national interests, strategies of 
the great powers, China’s foreign affairs, international security, non-traditional 
security, the world economy and global governance, to name but a few (Zan 2007). As 
Wang states in Robinson and Shambaugh’s seminal volume ‘Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice’, he does believe that ‘there are distinctive Chinese approaches to 
observing international politics’ (Wang 1994, 481). Providing Chinese perspectives in 
this regard is both natural and necessary given that IRT whether originating from 
China or the West is always ‘value-oriented.’ He nevertheless urges Chinese scholars 
to refrain from building a distinctive Chinese IR theory when conditions are not ripe: 
When learning from Western International Relations Theory, we can only 
copy some features; if we copy the entire value system, it will become 
completely Westernized. This is impossible and also unacceptable. At the 
moment, there is a phenomenon of distancing our theoretical research from 
Western theoretical studies at some level. That is we employ Western 
methodology but stay away from its core values; while we have yet managed 
to build up our own, it is difficult to succeed. Only after our mainstream value 
system were completely constructed could we talk about establishing a 
universally acceptable Chinese International Relations Theory (Wang 2004a). 
Another prominent scholar – SIS’s Associate Dean Wang Yizhou – has been leading a 
research team at Beida in conceptualizing new concepts and terms for Chinese 
diplomacy. Before moving from CASS to Beida in 2008, Wang Yizhou has been 
known as a key figure in introducing Western IR theory in China and a long-time 
Editor-in-chief of the leading Chinese IR journal, World Economics and Politics. He 
is a critic of the former ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ project given its 
ideological and doctrinal orientation and a prudent observer of the current ‘Chinese 
School’ narratives. Yet, since China is now emerging as a great nation that will help in 
constructing the world, Wang sees the need for Chinese scholars to provide ‘abstract 
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 theoretical ideas and guidance about how to integrate China’s own interests with 
world peace, sustainability, development, and an orientation for great-nation relations’ 
(quoted in Wang 2013a, 22-3). He, therefore, is taking the lead in designing a Chinese 
theory of foreign affairs to reflect China’s diplomatic behaviour and systematic world 
outlook.  
To date, Wang Yizhou has published two key volumes introducing the concept of 
‘creative involvement’ (chuangzaoxing jieru) which advocates China playing a more 
active role in international affairs to match its rapid rise. His work deals with big 
questions such as how China can provide public goods, how it can learn from other 
global powers, and how China can build up its own identity (Wang 2011b, 2013c). In 
fact, Wang Yizhou is one of the leading Chinese scholars involved in the ongoing 
intense debate between the ‘internationalists’ and ‘realists’ in China as to whether 
Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of ‘taoguang yanghui’ (keeping a low profile) is still 
relevant. Both sides agree that Deng’s policy has become somewhat obsolete and 
support China’s active involvement in international affairs. The two groups, however, 
have fundamental differences over specific diplomatic approaches and strategies. The 
internationalists (e.g. Wang Yizhou, Qin Yaqing) oppose assertive policies, urge self-
restraint, advocate compliance with international norms, and utilize the international 
system to participate in global governance. The realists e.g. Yan Xuetong, meanwhile, 
argue for China to quit its age-old non-alignment policy and seek alliances to serve its 
own national interests. However, the mainstream Chinese academic community still 
maintains that the benefits of further adherence to non-interference outweigh the 
potential costs of a major policy change (Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Hang 2014, 5; Roy 
2012; Zhang 2012a; Yan 2014; Qin 2014). 
In this light, Wang Yizhou recommends cautiously modifying Deng Xiaoping’s 
dictum of ‘Taoguang Yanghui’ (keeping a low profile) and the long-standing ‘non-
intervention’ principle for the country to actively play a bigger role and voluntarily get 
involved in international affairs, or in his terminology, ‘creative involvement’. In his 
view, China’s ‘creative involvement’ has three core elements. First, it should operate 
under the international legitimacy framework; second, it must be carried out with 
great caution, e.g. only in cases concerning China’s vital national interests; and third, 
it places more stress on soft power (diplomacy and economic assistance) rather than 
military force (Ding 2012). As Wang describes the nature of his work: 
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 ‘Creative involvement’ is a new kind of thinking in China’s foreign policy. It 
is neither a systematic ideological doctrine nor a logical assumption nor a 
traditional theory of international relations or diplomacy. Instead, it is a 
guiding thread somewhere between a metaphysical theory and an exemplified 
interpretation of policy (Wang 2012c, 109). 
Recently, Wang has been working on the last volume of his ‘Creative Involvement’ 
trilogy series. It focuses on further covering diplomatic innovation and related 
domestic political and social points in the belief that ‘China can influence the world 
by changing itself’ (Wang 2012c, 109). His work has been praised by many scholars. 
Wang Fan (CFAU) and Zhang Zhizhou (Beijing Foreign Studies University), for 
example, see it as an attempt to contribute to de-Westernize international scholarship. 
Zhang comments that ‘Western political and diplomatic theories, pertaining to 
economic management and financial governance, have been found wanting. As a 
major power, China should take responsibility and provide public goods such as 
policies and theories to the world’ (Ding 2013).  
The moderate approach of SIS’s scholars is also reflected in their teaching activities. 
The IR Theory course for graduate students at Beida, co-taught by several lecturers, 
includes both Western writings (in English and Chinese translations) as well as 
China’s own sources. For example, the general required reading list includes 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s ‘Contending Theories of World Politics’ (translated by 
Yan Xuetong), Wang Yizhou’s ‘International Politics in the West: History and 
Theory’, Zhu Feng’s ‘Theory of International Relations’, and Ni Shixiong’s 
‘Contemporary Western International Relations Theories.’ Other recommended 
readings include the translations of key Western theorists’ writings such as Carr, 
Morgenthau, Waltz, Keohane, Wendt, Mearsheimer etc. After a thorough assessment 
of Western IR theory and methods, the final session discusses the topic ‘China’s 
diplomacy, East Asian security, and International Relations Theory’ where the 
relevance of Western IRT in explaining China’s and East Asian international relations 
is examined from a Chinese perspective.42 Another course titled ‘The Rise of China 
and Change in World Politics’ offered by PKU for its annual summer school discusses 
more directly about the implications of China’s rise in both the academic world and 
the international system. Convened by Xu Xin – a former academic at PKU and 
current associate professor at Cornell University, this is one of the most intensive 
42 I thank the graduate students at Beida’s SIS for providing me the course syllabus for reference. 
113 
 
                                                          
 courses in China that directly link the material rise of China with ‘paradigm change’ 
and the changing dynamics of East Asian international relations (for detailed course 
syllabus, see Appendix). 
The Universalists’ movement toward integrating with global scholarship 
As can be seen, there are many faces of an emerging ‘Chinese Dream’ in IR Theory. 
Despite such ‘different dreams’, these scholars do share the ‘same bed’ – they all 
attempt to bring the Chinese perspectives into global knowledge. Yet, there is also 
another dream which is less vocal and provocative in manner and more sophisticated 
in substance – to produce qualified knowledge in Western style theorizing. Professors 
Zhang Ruizhuang from Nankai University and Tang Shiping from Fudan University 
are representatives of this approach. These scholars are not actively involved in the 
current Chinese IRT debate, believing it is of little value (and, indeed, a waste of time) 
if there is no real progress made. Instead, they seek further integration with Western 
IR in both its methodological and theoretical trends using Chinese cases and beyond. 
Zhang Ruizhuang, as the only Chinese (PhD) student of Kenneth Waltz, has pursued 
his main academic interests in applying Waltz’s theory to empirical studies (e.g. 
Zhang 2013c, 2009; Liu and Zhang 2006). He does not regard the English School 
highly and thinks it does not qualify as IRT.43 He is, therefore, not interested in the 
Chinese IRT project although he has not openly written against it. In the 2013 meeting 
of China’s Association of International Studies regarding China’s IR studies and 
theoretical development, Zhang emphasizes that first and foremost Chinese scholars 
should not try to ‘propose new theories simply from a place of impetuousness or 
impatience to see progress in the field’ (Mao 2013; see also Zhang 2003b). Zhang has 
also built his reputation as an independent thinker and constructive critic of the 
official guidelines of China’s foreign policy (Zhang 2003a, 2001a). His recent book 
titled The Unharmonious World applied structural realism in explaining and predicting 
China’s foreign policy amid the growing power competition between China and the 
US. It actually challenged both the party line and the core thesis shared by many other 
Chinese theorists on a ‘new type of great power relationship’ between China and the 
US or the dominant discourse of ‘harmonious world’ (Zhang 2010b). Given his 
43 I thank Lu Peng for this observation. 
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 unconventional thinking, Zhang’s work often has difficulties in getting through 
China’s publishing censorship. 
Tang Shiping meanwhile is one of the few Chinese theorists that have published 
intensively theoretical work that transcends existing mainstream theories. He is among 
the few Chinese theorists who have managed to get recognition from their Western 
colleagues for the rigor and quality of his work. After a number of publications 
focusing on defensive realism, the theory of institutional change, a new theory of 
attribution in IR (Tang 2004, 2010c, 2010a, 2012), Tang (2013) recently published a 
very sophisticated volume on ‘The Social Evolution of International Politics.’ Largely 
influenced by his prior educational background in biology (PhD), Tang borrows 
Darwin’s theory of biological evolution into IR to explain the evolutionary system of 
world politics from Mearsheimer’s offensive realist world (before 1648 or 1945) to 
the Jervis’s defensive realist world in contemporary terms (post 1945). He also 
suggests the course toward a more rule-based international system while ruling out the 
possibility and desirability of a ‘world state’ or ‘world society’ utopia (Tang 2013, 6, 
141-7; see also Tang 2010b). By examining the social evolution of international 
politics, Tang argues that mainstream IR theories are ‘time sensitive’ because they 
emerged and best explained world politics in different historical epochs. In this light, 
the many great debates in IR that compared different theories at the same phase of 
history, particularly that between offensive and defensive realism, are questionable. 
Tang’s work, despite its remaining shortcomings, has been praised by Barry Buzan 
who notes that ‘quality big thinking like this does not come along often’ (Buzan 2013, 
1304).44  
This social evolutionary approach also affected Tang’s teaching of the ‘International 
Relations Theory: a Critical Introduction’ course (in English) at Fudan University. He 
has students read general texts such as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s ‘Contending 
Theories of International Relations’, Robert Jervis’s ‘Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics’, and Sokal and Bricmont’s ‘Fashionable Nonsense: 
Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science.’ After reviewing the development of 
Western IRT from classical realism to post-modernism in the first 10 sessions, the 
remaining sessions are dedicated to the themes ‘Social Psychology of International 
44 Tang’s aforementioned volume won the ISA Annual Best Book Award at the 56th Annual 
Convention of ISA in 2015.  
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 Politics’, ‘Social Evolution of International Politics: Emerging Paradigm’, ‘Theory of 
Foreign Policy’, ‘Theory of Region and Regionalism’, and finally ‘Game Theory, and 
Systemic Complexity: Some Challenges in Theorizing IR.’ Tang does include a 
number of his work in the syllabus but no writings of other Chinese scholars are 
listed.45 
In short, it can be seen that the Chinese IRT debate has shaped the research practices 
of Chinese scholars quite clearly, with a number of endeavors to realize their 
theoretical claims. Chinese scholars have also developed greater awareness in 
blending the Western and Chinese approach in IR syllabus. The teaching practices of 
scholars are also manifested in their supervision of graduate students during which the 
supervisor generally have an intellectual influence on their students. There are many 
examples of the supervisor – PhD student relationship later resulted in collaboration 
for joint research such as the case of Prof. Ni Shixiong and Prof. Wang Yiwei and Yan 
Xuetong and his many followers such as Xu Jin, Sun Xuefeng, and Zhou Fangyin. 
There is also evidence of actual changes in outreach activities by Chinese scholars in 
realizing their claims such as alliance building, the establishment of new publishing 
platforms, and fund-raising for theoretical research, etc. This reflects the logic of 
resource mobilization to make way for theoretical innovation as has been identified in 
the previous chapter. It can, therefore, be said that the EAIRT debate in China has 
taken the form of discussion about the construction of a Chinese style IR theory, be it 
the Chinese School, the Tsinghua approach, or a Chinese theory of foreign affairs. In 
other words, the EAIRT discourse in China is predominantly a debate about different 
pathways to construct Chinese IR knowledge. Why that is the case and what are the 
underlying factors that are actually driving Chinese scholars in their course toward 
theoretical innovation? 
What drives changes? An interpretation from the sociology of science approach 
Iain Johnston (2003, 34-5) once argued that the turn toward Western IRT in China in 
the 1990s was largely thanks to three factors – the return of Western-trained scholars; 
the growth in translations of Western IR works; and the rise to journal and book series 
editorship of a key group of younger IR scholars in Beijing and Shanghai. Arguably, 
the current turn toward Chinese IR theory has also been facilitated by very similar 
45 Course syllabus was retrieved from the official website of Fudan University (see Tang). 
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 factors. While Western theories remain dominant in Chinese IR discourse, three major 
causes have contributed to indigenous theorizing of Chinese IR academia. These are, 
first, the socialization of returning Western-trained scholars in the intellectual and 
political environment in China; second, the growing reliance on China’s own sources 
as the result of the heightened awareness among Chinese academics about their 
identity as ‘knowledge producers’; and third, the role of the ‘gate-keepers’ who 
control institutional resources and access to funding and publications in shaping the 
research agenda. China’s continued rise and the overarching political atmosphere in 
China further drives the majority of Chinese scholars into the direction of building 
Chinese IR theory. In a sense, structural and agential factors do intrude in the 
establishment of Chinese IR knowledge. The interplay of structure and agency 
determines the degree and shape of response by Chinese scholars toward EAIRT; that 
is debate surrounding and resource mobilization for the construction of Chinese IR 
knowledge. The following sections will discuss the specific roles played by these 
factors in shaping the practices of Chinese scholars. 
The changing theoretical identity of Chinese scholars 
First off, it can be said that Chinese scholars have now promoted a desire to become 
‘knowledge producers.’ I argue in line with the sociology of science accounts that this 
theoretical identity of Chinese scholars has been directly or indirectly shaped by their 
educational background as well as the broader institutional and social context of 
China. Given the socio-political atmosphere and academic structure in China, 
unsurprisingly the majority of locally trained Chinese scholars would have some 
nationalist sentiment in their call for constructing a distinct Chinese perspective on IR. 
It is striking, however, that many returning Western-trained Chinese scholars have 
also proactively participated in this movement. It, therefore, makes sense to assess the 
impact of the possible ‘intervening variables’ on two main targets: returning Western-
trained scholars, and the remainder of Chinese IR community. Although nearly all 
leading Chinese scholars today have undertaken short-term visiting fellowships at a 
Western IR institution, those who received intensive higher education in the West 
should logically have a greater awareness of research methodology and theoretical 
rigor. It is, therefore, interesting and indeed important to know why some of these 
scholars, exposed to Western thinking and practices, are nevertheless calling for the 
building a ‘Chinese style’ IR theory. 
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 Commitment to theory versus socialization of theoretical identity 
Leading Western-trained scholars such as Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong, Chu Shulong, 
Tang Shiping, and Zhang Ruizhuang have been playing an important role in importing 
Western IRT and raising the awareness of scientific rigor in Chinese IR. In fact, they 
were all trained in American universities during the 1980s-1990s period and at the 
time of their graduate training, all adopted a highly positivist (and, in most cases, 
realist) approach. After returning to China, however, only Tang Shiping and Zhang 
Ruizhuang continue to strictly adhere to realist accounts and thus see no need for a 
Chinese IR theory to explain China’s behavior. For Tang Shiping, China serves 
‘merely as a data point’ in his theorizing (Interview, Shanghai, August 2013). In a 
recent interview, Tang noted that ‘a decent mastery of research methodologies’ and ‘a 
noble concern for reality’ are the two biggest factors that have shaped his work. When 
asked about the relationship between theory and practice in China, Tang suggests that 
Chinese scholars should not be limited to simply explaining policies but also offering 
theoretical knowledge and developing instruments to inform policies (Zhang 2013b).46 
He has specifically warned about the overt Sino-centrism and U.S.-centrism in 
China’s academic discussions of its foreign policy (Tang and Qi 2008). For Zhang 
Ruizhuang (2009), China’s rise does not necessarily differ from other cases in history 
and China’s foreign relations can be explained by existing realist frameworks. A blind 
pursuit of idealism, he believes, is not only unhelpful but also dangerous and 
disastrous. The answer to the puzzle of ‘Which diplomatic theory should China 
choose?’ in his view is thus simple – to safeguard China’s national interests (Zhang 
1999, 2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that commitment to universally applicable 
theory and scientific objectivity is the main driver of Tang and Zhang’s theorizing. 
The Chinese IRT debate and other China-related social factors have little impact on 
their work.  
Yet, reading the Chinese IRT literature one may wonder why other scholars like Qin 
Yaqing and Yan Xuetong – those who were also trained in the West, well aware of 
what social science is, and already schooled into IR theory end up calling for 
‘bringing China in’ to IRT, albeit in different ways. It is argued here that these 
scholars’ theoretical identity has been socialized with their engagement in the 
46 Nonetheless, for IR to be more relevant for the real world, Tang agrees with Acharya that ‘we need 
an IR enriched by a diversity of theoretical perspectives, a diversity of geographical focus, and a 
diversity of scholars from different ethnic, national, geographical backgrounds’ (Tang 2016, 162). 
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 intellectual and social environment in China. As leading Chinese theorists and public 
intellectuals, they have become ‘speakers’ of China in the international intellectual 
community where solid knowledge of Western IR is deemed necessary but no longer 
sufficient to speak on equal terms with Western counterparts. This sentiment is 
revealed in a remark by Yan Xuetong: 
For Chinese scholars, if you are doing research with American style theory 
you cannot surpass those American scholars. [This is] because all these 
theories are rooted in Western culture. So you can only follow up, you cannot 
surpass that. So if you want to do a real achievement, you need to do 
something that the Westerners cannot understand (quoted in Kristensen and 
Nielsen 2013, 27). 
Nonetheless, ‘doing something that the Westerners cannot understand’ is not 
necessarily or automatically synonymous with an achievement, per se. Despite his 
strong wording above, Yan’s work on ‘ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese 
power’ actually employs Western IR frameworks in categorizing ancient Chinese 
thought. That is to say, he still uses the languages understood by Western scholars. 
Blending Western methodology and Chinese knowledge, rather than proposing an 
entirely different worldview like Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia philosophy, is the 
foundation of Yan’s work and the Tsinghua approach more generally. 
Qin Yaqing, meanwhile, is not satisfied with the indigenization of existing Western IR 
theory (e.g. a Chinese-style Realism, Liberalism, or Constructivism) because ‘the 
result would be a localized explanation that verifies Western theories’ (Qin 2011, 50). 
A distinct Chinese IRT, in this sense, is needed for the Chinese IR community to 
overcome an inferiority complex of a backward society ‘learning and borrowing from 
existing theories of advanced societies to explain native phenomena’ (Qin 2011, 50). 
Arguably, a certain extent of theoretical egoism and nationalism has been forged 
during this socialization process. This is seen in the course of Yan Xuetong’s 
movement from a ‘Waltzian realist’ to a pre-Qin ‘moral realist’ and Qin Yaqing’s 
transformation from an American style realist to a Chinese style ‘prosessual 
constructivist.’  
For Yan Xuetong, despite his opposition to the ‘Chinese School’ idea and his claim 
for universally applicable theory, the Chinese nationality factor is ironically an 
intruding factor in his scholarship. This is seen in Yan’s simple and straightforward 
explanation for his theorizing of ‘ancient Chinese thought’: 
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 Because I’m Chinese, my Western cultural background is lacking. It is 
difficult for me to understand that culture, because I did not grow up with it. 
But I’m familiar with the Chinese culture: I know international politics today 
are very different than two thousand years ago, but I also find some similarities 
between now and then. Perhaps we can get some important resources from 
ancient Chinese thought, to help us to develop theory – to help us to surpass 
Alexander Wendt (Creutzfeldt 2012, 4).  
Yan also admits that national identity has influenced both his choice of research 
questions, and the direction of his research in that he only chooses questions that are 
‘highly relevant to China’ and ‘central to China’s core interests (quoted in Wang 
2013a, 6). In fact, Yan is often described using a dual image – a political realist and a 
‘nationalist.’ The purpose of his ‘moral realism’ is to provide a strategy for China to 
defeat America in the competition for global leadership by not only reducing the 
power gap between them but also providing ‘a better model for society than that given 
by the United States’ (Yan 2011a, 99; see also Yan 2011c; 2013). To manifest that 
this is not merely rhetoric, Yan actually applies this theory to interpret China’s 
increasingly ‘assertive’ foreign policy under Xi Jinping which, he argues, has shifted 
from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achievement’ approach (Yan 2014). His 
seemingly ‘zero-sum’ outlook on international order and IR theorizing actually 
reconfirms Western scholars’ assumptions about China’s hegemonic ambitions and 
the nationalist nature of his moral scholarship.  
This self-fulfilling conflictual worldview (proposed both by Yan and Western 
scholars) has precipitated a strong criticism from Qin Yaqing (2014). While Yan 
Xuetong’s motivation for theorizing is somewhat driven by his ‘theoretical 
nationalism’, Qin Yaqing’s theoretical orientation is largely impacted by his 
involvement with policy and politics. Qin has served as the Vice President of China 
Foreign Affairs University which is under the Foreign Ministry, a member of the 
Foreign Ministry’s Policy Advisory Committee, and the China national coordinator of 
the Network of East Asian Think-tanks. In fact, as Qin himself acknowledges, it was 
his experience as a track two practitioner, not a scholar, that distanced him away from 
his former ‘highly positivist, highly quantitative, and highly Waltzian’ approach (Qin 
in Creutzfeldt 2011, 3).47 Upon his return to China in late 1990s, Qin started to doubt 
47 Qin’s PhD dissertation at the University of Missouri titled ‘Staying on top: Hegemonic Maintenance 
and US choice of sides in International Armed Conflicts Behavior, 1945-89’ heavily depended on 
structural realism and quantitative methods, using a regressional model combined with hegemonic 
stability theory. Qin uses the same model in his first book published in China in 1999, titled ‘Baquan 
tixi yu guoji chongtu’ (Hegemonic structure and international conflict) (Qin 2013, 161). 
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 realist arguments as he matched it with the conduct of China’s foreign policy. In his 
observation, China’s foreign behavior has become less and less ‘hawkish’ since 1978. 
That rendered Qin to shift to constructivism in the late 1990s as he believes the latter 
better captures China’s foreign behaviour (Qin 2013, 162). His intensive involvement 
in East Asian track-two diplomacy further convinced him of the disconnects between 
the major Western IR paradigms and the practice of East Asian regional integration. 
Even constructivism, he argues, is not dynamic because like realism, it still focuses on 
structure while missing process without which nothing happens. This is a turning 
point in his theorizing on relations and process based on Western constructivist theory 
and Chinese philosophical traditions. As he explains how the process of his theorizing 
evolved: 
In my thinking, I also draw a lot on Western theories but including Chinese 
and Oriental considerations. I try to find key dynamics underpinning the 
Chinese way, integrating Oriental ideas and concepts, reinterpreting them in 
the light of established IR theories and problems. The reinterpretation is based 
upon a Chinese understanding, a Chinese way of thinking, or a Chinese 
worldview (Qin in Creutzfeldt 2011, 4). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the turn toward indigenous theorizing by some 
returning Western-trained scholars has been affected by external factors such as 
national identity and/or involvement with policy and politics. Nevertheless, 
commitment to theory and scientific rigor still matter given their prior serious training 
and solid knowledge of Western IR. The result of this socialization process is a 
mobilization for de-Westernification (at least in terms of hegemony) of the discipline 
via the inclusion of conceptually Western but Chinese-oriented work. While opposing 
the domination of Western learning and proposing a ‘Chinese School’, Qin Yaqing 
has also warned about the danger of ‘cultural revisionism’ that lies in the ‘restoration’ 
of Chinese culture that excludes other cultures including the West (Qin 2013, 173-
4).48 This integrative approach differentiates these scholars from the most radical 
accounts of Chinese IR – those who are more obsessed with Chinese uniqueness and 
exceptionalism (see Figure 3.1). That is not to say that there is no intrinsic value in the 
latter’s theoretical work but it does say that other factors may overshadow their 
scientific objectivity.  
48 Qin Yaqing notes that the only reason he uses the ‘Chinese School’ label although he thinks it is not 
entirely correct is to catch international attention and to open a way for changing the status of Chinese 
marginalized IR in the intellectual status quo (Creutzfeldt 2011, 9). 
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Figure 3.1: The underlying factors driving the Chinese IRT debates and practices 
China’s Rise, the national socio-political context, and academic institutions 
One scholar has noted that if China were not a rising power, the Chinese IR discourse 
would not draw much attention (Wang 2013a, 126). It is true that there are some 
inherent causal relationships between material power and knowledge production, as 
seen in the dominance of American IR in global scholarship. Yet apart from the 
power-knowledge linkages, the question of how China’s geopolitical rise actually 
shapes academic debates and practices is not adequately examined. My interpretation 
is that the rise of China has precipitated a redefinition of its national identity which in 
turn reshapes Chinese scholars’ personal identity into ‘knowledge producers.’ In this 
light, the turn toward Chinese IRT is a result of an endeavour by Chinese scholars to 
redefine their national as well as their own identity. 
Chinese cultural exceptionalism and national interests 
Wang Yiwei once argued that IRT should be understood under the ‘personal identity-
national identity-features of the time’ paradigm (Wang 2003; 2009, 115). Under his 
lens, the current identity of IRT has been strongly affiliated with ‘Americanization’ 
because these theories are produced by American scholars and imbued with American 
values and interests e.g. (Hoffmann 1977; Wohlforth 1999; Mearsheimer 2001). They 
are then transmitted worldwide thanks to the American domination in world affairs. 
As a result, ‘IRT with American characteristics thinks of what America thinks, 
worries what America worries’ (Wang 2004b, 3). The current movement toward 
‘Sinicization’ of IRT, Wang similarly argues, is shaped by the personal identity of 
Chinese scholars, the emerging national identity of China as a new great power, and 
the most salient feature of the contemporary era – China’s geopolitical rise in the 
international system. As his view represents the most radical and popular account of 
the Chinese IRT debate, I will apply his framework for interpreting the underlying 
factors that have forged such a large consensus among Chinese scholars toward 
building indigenous theory, be it the Chinese School, the Tsinghua approach, or a 
Chinese theory of foreign affairs.  
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 First, the personal identity of Chinese scholars at the moment is shaped by their 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and determination to become ‘knowledge 
producers’. Constructing a ‘Chinese School’, as Ren Xiao has noted, is such a boring, 
time-consuming and painstaking task that only with long, sustained effort could it be 
possible to produce real results. Yet this academic pursuit ‘indicates the self-
confidence of Chinese scholars and the aspirations to become producers of 
knowledge’ (Ren 2009, 15). The personal identity of Chinese scholars, however, not 
merely refers to their mindsets but also connections with policy and politics (Wang 
2009, 116). So in order to understand the evolving identity of Chinese scholars, we 
need to examine the broader context in which they are living – the political 
environment, cultural values, and historical traditions of China. As Wang Hungjen 
(2013a, 31) puts it, the attitudes, intentions, and emotions of Chinese scholars are 
inseparable from ‘their China’ – or their national identity and interests. In the search 
for their new national identity, a discernible and growing consensus has been formed 
among the Chinese people that their country has been transforming from a 
revolutionary power to an increasingly responsible stakeholder in the international 
society. It is one that has discarded its inferiority complex of century-long humiliation 
and isolation to become an increasingly confident power with positive contributions to 
the world (for example, Qin 2003, 2010a). This growing confidence and benign self-
view are rooted in the Chinese people’s pride of their country’s natural greatness 
(Tianfu weida), rich traditions, and pacifist history.  
In light of this perception, Chinese theorists commonly assert that the rise of China 
will take a different course than what existing IRT and their Western counterparts 
generally project. Hence, there have been numerous academic debates between 
Western and Chinese scholars about the prospect of China’s rise such as those 
between Barry Buzan, Zhang Xiaoming, and Qin Yaqing (Zhang and Buzan 2010, see 
also Qin 2010a), and between John Mearsheimer and Yan Xuetong, even though they 
are in the same schools of IR theory (Mearsheimer and Yan 2013). There has been a 
surge of Chinese counter-discourses on the issues of national concerns including 
China’s peaceful development, great power responsibility, strategic culture, soft 
power, public diplomacy, new type of great power relationship etc. In effect, a number 
of scholars claim that China should take independent research because some of the 
questions related to China’s rise and Chinese foreign policy are best answered via 
Chinese scholarship (Ren 2008, 306; Men 2005; Su 2014). 
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 Unfortunately, in the course of constructing their country’s ‘self’, Chinese scholars 
have increasingly Occidentalized the ‘other’ or, for most of the cases, Western 
scholarship as ‘evil’ and ‘conflictual.’ Conversely, China’s future IRT is self-viewed 
as ‘peaceful’, ‘moral’, and ‘harmonious’ (Zhang 2013a, 13; see also Callahan 2012, 
641; Callahan 2013, 157-8). This sentiment is evident in the most radical accounts of 
Chinese IR – those who are portraying China not only as a unique but also superior 
kind of great power. Obviously, there is a certain amount of ethnic nationalism and 
cultural exceptionalism at play here. Moreover, theorizing on Chinese pacifist 
Confucian culture and benign practice of diplomacy, whether intentionally or not, has 
been seen by some scholars as serving the national interests of the PRC, both for 
strengthening its soft power and one party system as well as for lessening the 
repercussions of the ‘China threat’ theory (Schneider 2011, 9; Zhang 2012b, 81-2; 
Noesselt 2015). As one recent work has observed, ‘in the 21st century, Confucianism 
and socialism are officially intertwined’ (Shih and Yin 2013a, 68). It was hardly a 
mere coincidence that the cultural and ideological rise of China has begun around 
2005 – simultaneously, as Feng Zhang (2013a, 3) has noted, with the introduction of 
Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ rhetoric, Zhao Tingyang’s ‘Tianxia system’ thesis, 
and the commencement of Tsinghua project on pre-Qin thoughts. All these discourses 
are characterized by the bias selection of Confucian pacifism as the foundation for 
Chinese IR theorizing without mentioning other rich Chinese traditions such as 
Legalism or Buddhism as well as its silences on the contributions of marginalized 
voices such as feminism and ethnic minorities in Chinese IR (Blanchard and Lin 2016, 
54-9). Thus efforts to theorize IR from a  Chinese perspective often encounter 
skepticism that it presents a new hegemonic logic rather than emancipation toward a 
universally inclusive discipline (Callahan 2008; Blanchard and Lin 2016). 
Academic institutions and the role of ‘gate-keepers’ in shaping research agenda and 
distributing research outcomes 
The changing practices toward constructing Chinese IR knowledge has also been 
shaped to a large extent by the academic structure of Chinese academia, particularly 
the tight government’s intellectual control, the professionalization of Chinese IR 
academia, and the role of the ‘gate-keepers of knowledge.’ At the global level, ‘the 
gate-keepers of knowledge, which include specialised journals, academic associations, 
foundations and academic experts in the core’ have arguably been a key obstructing 
factor for the penetration of periphery IR in the global scholarship (Tickner 2003, 
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 301). Interestingly, that observation may also be true in the case of Chinese IR. Given 
China’s authoritarian politics, the biggest ‘gate-keeper’ for Chinese IR is perhaps the 
CCP. Although there is no separate instruction on and funding allocation for the 
Chinese IRT project, the Chinese government ‘plays an important role in knowledge 
generation, and can therefore shape Chinese IR theory to meet its needs and interests’ 
(Wang 2013a, 115). The key pathways for the CCP’s impact on the Chinese IRT 
discourse are its funding system for social sciences, general guidance and statement, 
and the recruitment of IR scholars for the government’s consultancy and policy 
analysis.  
First, a rising power like China generally has sufficient material sources to support 
education in general and research of its own interests. Until 2011, less than 3.5% of 
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was reserved for education but in 2012 this 
number was raised to 4%, reflecting the higher awareness of the role of education in 
China. Particularly in its quest for world-class universities, since 1993 the Chinese 
government has provided extra funding for a group of elite universities through the 
‘Project 211’ and ‘Project 985’ and the ‘Quality Project.’ Being the top four ranked 
universities in China, Peking, Tsinghua, Fudan, and Renmin Universities are among 
the largest beneficiaries. As the result conditions for research (e.g. access to research 
materials, library holdings, exchange and collaboration with foreign scholars) and 
academic well-being (salaries, healthcare, weekly working hours, etc.) have been 
significantly improved (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 33-5). For example, per capita 
income at Peking University more than tripled from RMB 22,612 in 2000 to RMB 
75,738 in 2008 (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 33). Better working condition and 
greater academic freedom have explained why leading IR scholars e.g. Wang Yizhou, 
Wang Jisi, Yan Xuetong, Shi Yinhong, Chu Shulong, and Tang Shiping moved from 
think-tanks to universities. This movement helps promote the theoretical research in 
China as IR theorizing is largely seen as ‘a preserve of university-based scholars.’49  
Most universities in China are public universities, so a considerable amount of 
funding (approximately one-third or one-fourth of their annual budgets) comes from 
the government (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 53). In the ‘opening up’ stage of 
Chinese IR (1980s-1990s), various American and European funding agencies (e.g. the 
49 Some institutions within CASS such as IWEP also produce theoretical research but the majority of 




                                                          
 Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and various European grants) provided 
generous support for IR research as well as for sending Chinese scholars overseas for 
higher education. This contributed to the domination of Western knowledge in 
Chinese IR studies during this period. Yet China now has its own funds to support 
academic research so that universities and scholars do not need to rely as much on 
foreign grants anymore. The Chinese research funding system for social sciences 
includes the National Social Science Foundation, the Humanities and Social Science 
Foundation of China which is under the Ministry of Education, and the research 
projects system of CASS. These foundations primarily support policy relevant and 
applied research but also encourage some theoretical projects focusing on ‘pre-defined 
topics’ such as ‘Peaceful Rise’, ‘Harmonious World’, ‘IR Theory with Chinese 
characteristics’ and most recently the ‘Chinese dream’. Access to these government 
funds is not easy as these are ‘grants that come with conditionalities’ (Kristensen and 
Nielsen 2013, 34).  
Second, as Wang Jianwei (2002a, 86) has noted, ‘although to a much lesser degree 
than before, IR teaching and research are still subject to government control and 
supervision. One of the main functions of scholars and researchers in the field 
continues to be the interpretation and advocacy of party and government policies.’ 
Wang Yizhou further points out that ‘Chinese political structure and institutions 
determine the basic features of almost all kinds of research. Completely going against 
the mainstream ideology risks the loss of opportunities and resources’ (quoted in 
Blanchard and Lin 2016, 58). In this light, those research and discourses that do not fit 
with the government’s interests are hard to procure through the ‘gate-keepers.’ In his 
2010 ‘Unharmonious World’ volume, Zhang Ruizhuang complained that many of his 
previous writings were rejected by Chinese journal editors or publishers for 
contradicting Party doctrine (quoted in Wang 2013a, 18). Thus, pro-Chinese IR 
theorists ‘can be viewed as operating in a space of strategic necessity and in what 
amounts to a tacit alliance with the CCP’ (Blanchard and Lin 2016, 58).  
The turn toward Chinese IRT, therefore, is a by-product of government’s effort ‘to 
rejuvenate its values and political system’ (Zhao 2015, 167). As a senior scholar at 
Fudan University notes, since the early 2000s, the Chinese IRT debate has quietened 
and the previous critics no longer raise their voices (although it does not mean that 
they were convinced) because ‘Beijing has decided that it is time for China to build up 
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 its own social science’ (Interview, Shanghai, August 2013). In fact, many scholars 
based their calls for building a ‘Chinese school’ on Hu Jintao’s 2003 speech titled 
‘Creating outcomes for Chinese characteristics, Chinese style, Chinese vigor culture’ 
and his subsequent 2004 speech on how to make advancements in the study of 
philosophy and social sciences (Ren 2009; Zhao 2007). Following this, in March 2011 
the Planning Office of the National Social Science Foundation formulated the 
National 12th Five-Year Plan for Research in Philosophy and Social Science, which is 
oriented toward constructing a system for innovation in philosophy and social 
sciences in China (Ren 2012). When Xi Jinping came to power, he largely promoted 
the ‘Chinese dream’ idea, which is thus far vaguely defined as ‘the great rejuvenation 
of the China nation’ and this has already become a popular topic for Chinese 
academics. In 2013 the Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau issued a 
notice to nationwide research institutions to register research topics on deepening 
research on Marxist theory and the Chinese dream. The 15 suggested topics, as posted 
on the website of China’s National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science 
(NPOPSS), cover almost every aspect of the ‘Chinese dream’, including its origin and 
contemporary background, opportunities and challenges, basic content and main 
characteristics, and how it is related to the current development of China (see 
NPOPSS). As has been seen, these themes have generated a number of publications in 
IR including the ‘Chinese dream in IR theory’ thesis. 
While the government’s intellectual control has somewhat directed the orientation of 
Chinese IRT discourse, what seems to be encouraging is an emerging new base and a 
new flow in the Chinese IR system including diversified funding sources, theoretical 
inputs, greater academic freedom, and other social forces that may hopefully help 
Chinese IR to gradually move beyond the Party line. While central government 
funding continues to account for one-third to one-quarter of universities’ annual 
budgets, universities can mobilize other sources generated from tuition, profit-making 
enterprises, and applied projects for the business sector. If scholars do not want to or 
cannot apply for ‘conditional’ grants from the government, they can now find extra 
funding to support the theoretical work of their own interests. Although to a lesser 
extent than before, Western grants (e.g. the Ford, Asia, and MacArthur Foundations) 
continue to be an important source for theoretical research in China, particularly in 
promoting the collaborative research/forums and deepening the integration between 
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 Western and Chinese scholars and scholarships. Tang Shiping, for instance, has been 
publishing mainly in English and in the West.  
Funding from Chinese private foundations is another important source for research. 
For example, scholars can now find extra funding to support the theoretical work of 
their own interests, particularly as publication remains costly. A scholar at Renmin 
Univeristy informed this author that scholars are expected to contribute approximately 
RMB 30,000-50,000 (AUD 6,000-10,000) for purely theoretical work which do not 
produce profits for the publishing house, so they have to mobilize funds from other 
sources (Interview, Beijing, September 2014). Another example is the generous 
support of a private foundation – the Wang Xuelian Education Fund – for the 
Tsinghua IR Department in numerous activities. These include the running of its 
World Peace Forum, Yan’s pre-Qin thought research project, and the Chinese Journal 
of International Politics (of which Yan is the chief editor) as well as the organization 
of national conferences and international forums that Tsinghua hosts or co-hosts with 
foreign partners (e.g. the Brookings–Tsinghua Center for Public Policy and the 
Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy).50 One distinguished professor shared 
his insightful observations with this author about the growth of such scholarly–policy 
linkages and the diversification of scholars’ academic choices that have helped expand 
the agendas of Chinese academics: 
As people who have had the chance to join government’s committees, we can 
on the one hand clearly see the Government’s intentional efforts to include 
some ideological traditional thinking to encourage, for example, Marxist 
ideological school or [other] ideological traditional agendas. However… the 
new development means that more and more sources, more and more 
initiatives come up from other directions such as from large companies, from 
localities, from the society, from rich millionaires, and other foundations etc. If 
you observe the development of Chinese IR in 1990s, you [would conclude 
that] the choices and the alternatives were narrower then. But now it becomes 
more diverse. There are so many agencies and jobs that you can choose. If you 
really have some talents or you have a deep mind, you can find your own way 
(Interview, Beijing, September 2013). 
In addition to these diversified resources, Chinese universities now have greater 
freedom on recruitment and remuneration policy. As a result, prominent scholars who 
often hold administrative positions and editorial memberships of leading journals and 
50 Ms Wang Xuelian is a member of the China Democratic League and Chairman of the Jia Lian Group. 
In 2009, she donated 21 million Yuan to Tsinghua University in the form of the ‘Wang Xuelian 
Education Fund.’ Much of this Fund has been allocated to Tsinghua’s Institute for International Studies, 
including its research, teaching, administration and students in need (Tsinghua 2010). 
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 book series are taking advantage of institutional resources and personal influence to 
promote their research and seek followers. This is in line with the logic of ‘law of 
small numbers’ as the sociology of science has rightly noted. One of the examples is 
Yan Xuetong’s successful formation of a hard-core group of Tsinghua scholars to 
work on pre-Qin thought and scientific methodology. As one scholar has observed, the 
‘Tsinghua’s approach’ to IR is possible largely because ‘Yan is using the resources of 
Tsinghua’s Institute for International Studies to train PhD students, hire new staff, and 
edit national and international journals to produce and distribute the results of this 
research project in both Chinese and English’ (Callahan 2011, 168).  
Furthermore, the pursuit of a distinct brand of Chinese IRT has also attracted 
international attention and have, therefore, created opportunities for joint research 
collaboration between Chinese and foreign scholars. There have been calls for the 
current ‘Chinese School’ (Zhongguo xuepai) label to be replaced by a more broad-
based brand like a ‘Greater China School’ (Zhonghua xuepai) for in-depth collective 
‘brainstorming’ (Wang Yiwei, Interview, Beijing, September 2013). The theoretical 
development of a ‘Chinese School’ has also received the contribution from Western 
scholars and other diasporas Chinese scholars (Wang and Buzan 2014, 44-5; Zhang 
2015a, 2015b; He 2012). Yuen-fong Khong, for example, argues that the Chinese 
concept of ‘tributary system’ can be applied in other cases, such as the American 
alliance and partnership system (Khong 2013). Prof. Chih-yu Shih and his associates 
at National Taiwan University are also working on a theory of ‘balance of 
relationship’ which is partially related to Qin Yaqing’s theory of relationality (Huang 
and Shih 2014). With a grant from Taiwan’s Chang Ching-kuo Foundation, Professors 
Yongjin Zhang, Chang Teng-Chi, and Barry Buzan have held several conferences in 
China and Europe on comparing the ‘Chinese School’ and ‘English School.’ The 
proceedings of these conferences were later turned into a volume titled ‘Constructing 
a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing Debates and Sociological 
Realities’ (Zhang and Chang 2016). The pluralization of these material and 
organizational resources together with scholars’ growing self-confidence, mobility, 
and quest for independent inquiry with the contribution of diaspora Chinese and 
Western scholars may be the centrifugal forces that give Chinese IR scholarship the 




This chapter has examined the actual practices of the Chinese IRT debate, manifested 
in the four major movements toward theoretical innovation. An interesting finding is 
that the Chinese IRT debate has exerted an unequal impact on the practices of scholars 
given their diverse training and institutional background. In fact, different approaches 
toward theoretical innovation in China have been shaped by very different causes. At 
one end of the spectrum, the ‘universalist’ scholars are genuinely committed to 
theoretical universalism and are largely unaffected by China-related factors. At the 
other end, the most radical accounts of Chinese IRT are largely driven by their ethnic 
identity, cultural exceptionalism, and national interests. Somewhere in between, the 
pro-Chinese IRT Western-trained scholars project a hybridization of Western and 
Chinese learning as the result of their socialization into the Chinese contexts. 
Intertwined with the overarching ideological and political environment in China and 
the impetus of China’s rise, these structural and agential factors have pulled the 
Chinese IRT debate in the direction of attaining a general consensus on the need to 
construct indigenous IR theory. Yet they differ on what pathways must be followed to 
achieve that end. This explains why theorizing in China has taken various and, at 
times, seemingly contradictory forms.  
Given China’s authoritarian political system, however, the attempt to construct 
Chinese IRT inevitably raises questions of credibility. This is because, although to a 
lesser extent than before, there remain discernible intertwinements between the CCP’s 
rhetoric and Chinese scholars’ research agendas. How to balance theoretical integrity 
and policy relevance, therefore, will be a major challenge for Chinese academics in 
the future. Even a staunch pro-Chinese School professor is well-aware of this theory-
policy dilemma: ‘you cannot keep a distance to the government because in that case 
you cannot find the information to build theory. However, if you get too close to the 
government, your theory will only explain but cannot predict or inform foreign policy’ 
(Interview, Beijing, August 2013). Moreover, the fact that the Chinese IRT discourses 
are concentrating mainly on China’s own sources but with little or no interest in a pan-
regional theory or other national paradigms (e.g. Japanese or Korean approaches) 
suggests that this academic pursuit is quite ‘nationalistic.’ More worryingly, is there 
indeed a sense of ‘Sino-centricism’ in that even an emerging pan-regional/East Asian 
paradigm must start with a Chinese theory or must be drawn on China’s resources? As 
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 Wang Yizhou (Interview, Beijing, September 2013) has rightly noted, ‘during this 
booming period, how to find your own thinking identity, how to find China’s own 
unique contribution at the same time to learn from each other and learn from the other 
countries will be a challenge for Chinese IR.’ 
As has been the case with Western knowledge production, critical debate is vital for 
China’s IR theorizing. China’s IR community is currently on this trajectory, struggling 
between dependence on Western knowledge and endeavour to develop its own distinct 
frameworks. The dynamics of the Chinese IR theory debate therefore not only lies in 
the diverse visions for building a Chinese IR theory but also how to harmonize the 
‘Chinese essence’ (ti) and the ‘Western function’ (yong) in constructing new 
knowledge. As the Chinese national identity as a great power continues to deepen with 
China’s continuing rise and the growing confidence among Chinese IR community, it 
is likely that this theoretical debate will continue to dominate the Chinese IR 
literature. The pursuit of a distinct Chinese brand in IRT has hitherto produced some 
initial outcomes such as Qin Yaqing’s theory of relationality and Yan Xuetong’s re-
examination of ancient Chinese thought for contemporary relevance. These 
intellectual endeavors by Chinese scholars have also attracted the increasing 
contribution of many other Sinophone and Western scholars. Therefore, 
notwithstanding its remaining flaws, the Chinese IRT movement should be seen as an 
academic movement that reflects the growing self-reflexivity of a non-Western IR 




   Chapter 4: Between East and West: Japanese IR at a crossroads 
As an in-between state, Japan’s international identity combines both Western 
and Eastern influences enabling Japan to develop a world culture that other 
states can adopt… At the same time…, Japan is neither in the East or the West, 
instead Japan is removed from either camp and thereby has its own distinct 
identity (Black and Hwang 2010, 102). 
That East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge construction 
has become self-evident. While the form that this interest is taken in Chinese IR 
academia is quite narrowly focused on the developing of a Chinese style IR Theory, 
the situation regarding theoretical development in Japan is much more diverse and 
complicated. Japan’s ‘in-between’ identity – its position as a country situated between 
the Western and Asian civilizations – and the legacy of its defeat during World War II 
(WWII) have been the two primary factors shaping the trajectory and characteristics 
of post-war Japanese IR studies. With the aim to provide an academic inquiry into 
why Japan failed in WWII and how the country fits into the evolving regional order, 
IR studies in Japan has been developing predominantly in the direction of historical 
and area studies. Theoretical research, which constitutes a small portion of Japanese 
IR studies, is mainly an importation and adaptation from American and European 
theoretical approaches. Since 2007, however, the ‘non-Western’ IRT debate has 
intensified within the country and has created renewed interest in indigenous 
theorizing among the younger generation of the Japanese IR community.  
Against this background, Chapter 4 examines the impact of the non-Western/East 
Asian IR debate on the Japanese IR community. Among East Asian IR communities, 
Japan has the earliest and most advanced IR studies both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. As a ‘bridge of civilizations’ (Shih 2010), Japan also serves as a 
good case to evaluate both the influence of Western/American IR knowledge and the 
trans-national appeal of an emerging ‘East Asian’ paradigm such as the ‘Chinese 
School.’ The chapter finds that the call for non-Western/East Asian IR theory has been 
quite heatedly debated among the younger generation of Japanese IR academia in 
recent years. The inner motivations for these Japanese scholars are their sense of 
‘inferiority’ to and desire to catch up with Western IR as well as their presumption 
about the existence of original and innovative IR theories in modern Japan’s history.  
The external forces that drive this emerging indigenous discourse are Japan’s relative 
economic decline and its increased ‘non-Western’/Asian identity, the robust diffusion 
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 of the English School as the result of the collaboration between the English School 
scholars and returning Britain-educated Japanese scholars, and the financial support 
from Japanese government and funding agencies to promote world-class universities 
and researchers. Younger Japanese IR scholars initially tried to confirm the existence 
of ‘Japanese Schools’ of IR theories in the past e.g. the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy 
and the theory of East Asian Community. They, however, gradually realized the 
pitfalls and dangers embedded in such IR discourses. This leads to the emerging shift 
toward post-Western IR direction. An interesting and important finding is that despite 
growing interests in knowledge production in Japan, there have been few claims for 
and actual theorizing on a ‘Japanese brand-name’ in IR Theory like the ‘Chinese 
School.’ Such development has its roots in the structural restraints embedded in 
Japan’s unresolved identity as a de facto polity situated between ‘East and West’ and 
the heritage of its war-time history. What would occur, at best, is either historical 
explorations of Japanese IR or theoretical engagement with the broader non/post-
Western IR in general. 
To evaluate these points, this chapter is structured as follows. It begins with an 
introduction of the historical development and characteristics of IR studies in Japan. It 
then discusses the non-Western/EAIRT discourses and practices manifested in the two 
academic movements that have been taking shape in Japanese IR – the English-School 
inspired Japanese IR and the post-Western IR approaches. The underlying factors 
actually driving these approaches at the national, institutional, and individual levels 
will also be analysed. Given the relatively large size of the Japanese IR academic 
community, I focus mainly on those Japanese scholars who are interested in non-
Western/East Asian IR and have published in English. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that given the aforementioned historical constraints of Japan and its 
unresolved ‘in-between identity’, the country’s IR academic components will most 
likely follow their own trajectory without integration and synthesis. This will position 
Japanese IR, just like its foreign policy at the moment, at a crossroads.  
Historiography and characteristics of IR studies in Japan 
Despite budding interests and ‘practical needs’ (Inoguchi 1989, 251) in understanding 
world affairs since the 1868 ‘Meiji Restoration’, IR came into existence in Japan, as in 
the West, during the early 20th century, especially as a result of World War I (WWI) 
(Kawata and Ninomiya 1964, 190; Huang 2007, 179-93). In the pre-WWII period, IR 
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 studies in Japan were strongly influenced by European intellectual traditions, 
particularly Staatslehre – the German teaching about the state. This tradition tends to 
supply ‘ample historical-institutional backgrounds and describing events and 
personalities in contexts and their consequences in minute detail’ and therefore ‘was 
valued for analysing international change that might affect Japan’s foreign relations’ 
(Inoguchi 2010, 52). However, the field was only recognized as a professional 
discipline in Japan after WWII. This situation was unlike that in the West where IR 
was established as a free-standing discipline (e.g. in the UK) or a subfield of political 
science (in the US). IR in Japan was developed firstly as ‘a complex of different 
subjects or a patchwork’ of five disciplines: International Law, 
Diplomatic/International History, Modern Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy (Ikeda 
2011b, 17; Inoguchi 2007a). This diversity has hindered the emergence of IR as ‘a 
discrete and centralized discipline in Japan’ in the sense that there are/were no 
separate autonomous IR or political science departments within Japanese universities 
(Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 15-6; Inoguchi 2002, 121). Instead, Japanese IR scholars 
have been working in area studies institutions or diplomatic history and law 
departments. Students undertaking an IR major are often awarded Bachelor of Laws 
(LLB) degrees instead (Kazuya Yamamoto, Interview 2014). As a result, Japanese 
scholars tend to produce interdisciplinary work that transcends the traditional 
boundary of IR and thus appears to be ‘inappropriate to be called IR literature’ by 
English-speaking readers (Shimizu 2008, 69). 
The development of the IR discipline in Japan was also strongly affected by both 
international and domestic politics. Foreign studies in modern Japan tended to serve 
the purposes of justifying government’s national and international policies (e.g. pan-
Asianism). For example, area studies in pre-war period were focused overwhelmingly 
on East Asia  (Hosoya 1988, 5) partly as a result of Japanese government’s ambition 
to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS). Japan’s 
unconditional surrender in the wake of WWII set the stage for political science which 
in turn led to growing interest in IR studies. The 1945–60 timeframe was the 
embryonic period for the IR scholarship in Japan. The Japan Association of 
International Relations (JAIR) was established in 1956, and the Japan Institute for 
International Affairs was created by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1959. 
A number of research institutes focusing on area studies were also established during 
this period. During this incipient stage, Japanese scholars were interested in studying 
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 war and conflicts, particularly the reasons why Japan failed in the war, the emerging 
US-Japan alliance and the dynamics of ongoing Cold War. In particular, scholarly 
inquiry into questions such as what went wrong with the country during the first part 
of the 20th century and why it failed relative to the West was the key factor shaping 
early post-war IR studies and explains why Japanese IR has gone in the direction of 
historical studies, including diplomatic history and other aspects of modern Japanese 
history (Inoguchi 2007a, 375; Shimizu 2008, 70).  
As Japanese scholars were trying to understand war and peace under the context of 
their country’s defeat in WWII and the ongoing Cold War, they became increasingly 
interested in theoretical explanations of international politics. They turned to Western, 
particularly American, theories in order to ‘fill in their intellectual vacuum as quickly 
as possible’ (Hosoya 1988, 7). Many of them were heavily influenced by realist works  
(e.g. those of Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, George Kennan) while others opted for 
idealist/pacifist approaches, arguing that Japan should be a peaceful and neutral state 
in the emergent postwar ideological confrontation (Huang 2007, 180). This resulted in 
a debate between the two camps that somewhat resembles the first ‘great debate’ 
between the realists and idealists in American IR (Inoguchi 2007, Sato 2008).51 
Another prominent feature of theoretical studies in Japan during this time was the 
American analytical frameworks, concepts, methodologies, and theories were 
introduced into Japan. These included Morton Kaplan’s theory of international 
systems, Ernst Haas’s theory of international integration, and Thomas Schelling’s 
theory of negotiating strategy. Japanese IR studies during the 1980s and 1990s were 
considerably interested in the theories of world systems and hegemonic stability.  
As a seemingly natural counter-reaction to the Americanization of Japanese 
scholarship, many scholars paid more attention to European approaches (Murata 2010, 
359). The interest in theories that stress historical perspectives such as the theories of 
world systems in the 1980s was shifted to the English School in the 1990s. Some 
researchers have assimilated the argument of this School and developed their own 
arguments regarding the international order (Yamamoto 2011, 272-3). In the late 
1990s, constructivism was imported to Japan. Due to its tendency of avoiding 
overgeneralization, constructivism quickly became a popular approach in Japanese 
51 Inoguchi argues that the first ‘great debate’ in Japanese IR was relatively different than the one in 
American IR in that ‘realism’s victory over idealism was somewhat incomplete’ (Inoguchi 2007a, 376; 
see also Sato 2008). 
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 academic circles (Murata 2010, 359).52 In fact, some scholars posit that Japan’s IR 
Theory outlook is oriented toward constructivism. This is because the focus of 
constructivist scholarship is largely aligned with Japanese IR scholars’ devotion into 
historical and cultural aspects of IR (Inoguchi 2007a, 2010; Shimizu 2008).53  
In fact, the lack of a clear hierarchy and tangible reward structure in Japan has 
encouraged a diversity of approaches, contrary to those who argue that constructivism 
dominates the IR paradigm in the country (Bacon and Newman 2002, 40). IR studies 
in Japan are characterized by the ‘self-sustaining in a mutually segmented fashion’ 
influence of the four distinctive major intellectual currents – Staatslehre, historicism, 
Marxism, and positivism (Inoguchi 2002, 115; 2007a). The most important 
‘characteristics’ of theoretical studies in Japan, according to Takashi Inoguchi, is the 
co-existence without integration of these four traditions. The tendency of accepting 
diversity in IR scholarship can be attributed to the absence of a centralized and 
competitive structure given the interdisciplinary nature of the discipline in Japan 
(Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 15). As a result, there were no ‘great debates’ among 
different paradigms and approaches as what occurred in Western IR (except for the 
first ‘incomplete’ great debate between realists and idealists in Japan cited above) 
(Inoguchi 2007a). This characteristic could be viewed as one of the reasons why 
Japanese IR has maintained a focus on historical and cultural traditions. This, in turn, 
leads Japanese IR scholars to be more concerned with pragmatic issues rather than 
theoretical issues (Shimizu 2008, 71). In addition, the influence of American IR on 
Japanese IR studies is not as strong as in other Asian countries (e.g. South Korea or 
Taiwan) both in terms of the number of American PhDs (3-4% of its academy) and 
their positivist orientation (Inoguchi 2012, 17-8). Instead, Japanese scholars are 
selectively absorbing American approaches and then endogenizing them to fit the 
Japanese context. This tradition of ‘permeable insulation’ has something to do with 
the large domestic market for academic publications in Japan, the country’s long-time 
model of self-reliance and the limited English proficiency of Japanese scholars 
(Inoguchi 2012, 22). 
52 Despite the dominance of constructivism in Japanese IR, Yamamoto observes that many Japanese 
researchers do not regard these constructivist approaches as ‘new’ and ‘innovative’ given Japan’s long-
term emphasis on the cultural and historical dimensions of IR (Yamamoto 2011, 270). 
53 Among the variants of constructivism, Inoguchi and Bacon observe that Japanese scholars are more 
interested in ‘non-postmodern constructivism, and other assorted pursuits that could not be defined as 
rationalist’ (Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 11). 
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 It must be noted, however, that such diversity and lesser American-centrism in 
research agenda is not replicated in the teaching of IR Theory. The standard IR 
Theory syllabus in Japan does not seem to be much different than those taught in 
Western universities. Specifically, theoretical, or philosophical, perspectives on IR are 
introduced. Specific issue areas such as military security, international political 
economy, and environmental problems follow. For example, the IR Theory syllabus 
posted on the official websites of Waseda University and The International University 
of Japan include the teaching of major IR theories including realism, liberalism, 
constructivism, and critical approaches (post-structuralism, Neo-Gramscianism, and 
Feminism). The key required reading for both of these courses is John Baylis, Steven 
Smith, and Patricia Owens’s Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. The theoretical triad among neo-realism/neo-liberal 
institutionalism/social constructivism seems to be the very core of IR teaching at these 
esteemed Japanese universities, which means there may be less opportunity to study 
other theories in depth, such as post-structuralism, post-colonialism or critical realism. 
According to Josuke Ikeda (Interview, February 2014), this trend already appears 
through the contents of IR textbook in Japan – many of them do devote space for 
explaining Anglo-American positivist approaches, but not for others. For instance, 
some years ago when the JAIR launched a four-volume work on ‘International 
Relations in Japan’ that theoretical triad was covered but nothing more than that. In 
addition to introducing Western IR theories, some course conveners may include 
contemporary Japan’s diplomatic policy in order to attract greater student interest. 
Another different feature is that more lectures tend to be assigned to the history of 
international politics than those in other countries (Kazuya Yamamoto, Interview 
February 2014).  
With regard to the organizational settings, the Japanese IR community to date is the 
third largest of its kind in the world (more than 2,000 members). However, as 
Inoguchi and Pacon (2001, 2) have argued, ‘Japanese international relations has been 
held back by decentralization, and the lack of a secure and discrete institutional 
foothold in Japanese universities. These factors, compounded by a substantial 
language barrier, have constituted a serious bar to extended dialogue between 
Japanese scholars and scholars from other national academies.’ Nonetheless, there 
have been significant efforts in improving the situation in recent years. With the 
growing interest in IR studies, some separate IR Departments have been established 
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 within Japanese Universities (e.g. the School of International Relations at the 
International University of Japan, the College of International Relations at 
Ritsumeikan University, and the School of International Studies at Kanazawa 
University). There have also been various efforts to liberate Japanese academics from 
their slight isolation from the global IR community by the publications of influential 
Japanese and English journals. Kokusai Seiji (International Relations), one of the key 
journals of JAIR, has been publishing articles primarily in three areas: Japanese 
diplomacy and international relations; area and international studies of the rest of the 
world; and international relations theories. Another key journal is Japanese Journal of 
Political Science (JJPS), published by Cambridge University Press since 2000. The 
most vigorous of these efforts was the launching of an influential English-language 
journal, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (IRAP), published by Oxford 
University Press in 2001. This journal aims to be a first-rate IR journal with a focus on 
important developments in the Asia-Pacific and strives to become a meeting place 
where various issues and all methodological approaches and schools of thought are 
debated, including non-Western theories of international relations (Oxford Journals).54  
In comparison with Kokusai Seiji, which tends to publish a larger number of articles 
that employ historical approaches, or with JJPS which focuses more on broader 
political science issues, IRAP more actively publishes theoretical oriented articles. 
Most recently, the launching of the new English journal Asian Journal of Comparative 
Politics (AJCP) in 2015 targets the publication of theoretically or methodologically 
original articles that articulate conceptual and theoretical perspectives in Comparative 
Politics. Although this journal is mainly comparative politics oriented, it also touches 
other subfields of political science, particularly International Relations.55 Such 
publications indicate that ‘an increasing number of Japanese IR researchers are more 
eager than before to use a common lens to engage in dialogue with researchers around 
the world’ (Yamamoto 2011b, 273). This growing confidence and maturation of the 
Japanese epistemic community together with the aforesaid development and 
characteristics of Japanese IR studies set the background for the non-Western/East 
Asian IR debate that will be discussed below.  
54 IRAP has gained A-ranking journal status in Australia (as ranked by Australian Political Science 
Association). 
55 Edited by the leading Japanese IR scholar Takashi Inoguchi, sponsored by Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science, and published by Sage, AJCP aims to become a new meeting place for political 
scientists and IR scholars with an interest in Asian politics (Sage Journals). 
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 The non-Western IR Theory debate and its imprints on Japanese IR 
At the outset, it should be noted that the current non-Western/EAIRT debate does 
have an impact, albeit a modest one, on Japanese IR community. In particular, the 
Japanese IR community does not share a strong vision or endeavours in practice to 
develop a national School of IR like a substantial faction within its Chinese 
counterpart. This is because the development of ‘Japanese’ IR is conditioned by the 
historical burden of Japan’s ‘failed’ pan-Asianism in the past, the country’s relative 
decline at present as well as its ambiguous identity as the country situating between 
the Western and Asian civilizations. As a result, the knowledge construction 
movement in Japan has taken the form of broader discussions on the non-/post-
Western IR agenda. At present, this theoretical approach has garnered interest among 
a portion of Japanese IR academia, particularly those younger Western-trained 
scholars. Other theoretical oriented scholars are still working within the framework of 
existing theories. Their response toward the non-/post-Western theoretical narratives 
will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. In what follows, I will analyse the 
national and institutional settings that have stimulated discussions on non-Western IR 
from Japanese perspective and how it shapes the practices of involved individual 
academics.  
Power shift, national identity, and generational change 
For starters, why have non-Western IR narratives emerged in Japan now? It is argued 
here that the growing interest in non-Western IR in Japan is the result of three factors: 
1) power shift (the relative decline of America and consequently the lesser appeal of 
American theories to at least a portion of Japanese IR academia); 2) interests (the need 
for Japan to build a new identity in the coming ‘Asian century’ amid China’s rapid 
rise); and 3) generational change (the emergence of younger generation of well-
educated scholars who are trying to eradicate the long-time inferiority complex of 
being a knowledge consumer of Western knowledge). Cross-cutting among these 
three factors is the financial support by the Japanese government in order to build 
‘global centers of excellence’ in science (GCOE) which have been utilized to invest in 
research projects on non-Western IR as well as to disseminate research outcomes. 
First, the surge of interest in non-Western IR discourses in Japan occurs at the time 
where there is a big transition in the international political economy, particularly the 
relative decline of US. Most of the Japanese scholars interested in non-Western IRT 
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 whom this author had the chance to interview attribute the emergence of non-Western 
IR discourse to the decline of the US and the lesser appeal of Western IR theories to 
them. After its WWII defeat, Japan tended to subscribe to the dominant post-war and 
U.S.-led liberal international order. This order is premised on American dominance 
and the importance of other industrialized advanced democracies such as Europe and 
Japan. Naturally, Japanese IR scholars have followed US-centered theoretical 
development (Yoshihide Soeya, Interview, December 2013). Nevertheless, the 
changing dynamics in the international relations of Asia and Japan, particularly the 
unprecedented power transition have posed some important puzzles for American IR 
theories. Leading Japanese IR scholar Takashi Inoguchi (Interview, December 2013), 
for example, questions along such line: ‘what theories explain when the US is 
declining? Will the second and third [great power] assume that role? Why is there no 
balance of power against a rising China? Realism, balance of power, offensive realist 
theory, and ‘tributary system’ theory – all these theories are interesting but none of 
them fits and are not persuasive sufficiently.’ In his view, ‘the West has gone 
bankrupt’ in the sense that ‘it has not introduced new appealing knowledge (end of IR 
theory).’  
This observation of Inoguchi is largely shared by other proponents of non-
Western/Japanese IR such as Kosuke Shimizu, Shiro Shato, and Josuke Ikeda who, as 
will be discussed later in the chapter, are also dissatisfied with the Western 
domination in IRT.56 In the view of these scholars, the decline of American power and 
knowledge leaves an intellectual vacuum for scholars beyond the West to fill. In the 
case of Japanese IR scholars, this desire is manifested in their ambition to construct 
middle-range theories rather than grand theorizing to explain this unprecedented 
power transition in the region. This is because, as Inoguchi (Interview, December 
2013) observes, ‘we are not particularly interested in doing theorizing for theorizing’s 
sake, rather we try to make sense out of important empirical phenomena like the rise 
of China or the decline of the US.’ 
Second and partly flowing from the above trend is the sharpening of Japan’s identity 
as a non-Western state. While Japan has largely identified itself as part of the Western 
liberal order since 1945, its Asian identity has been recently revived. In fact, as a 
56 As noted earlier, I will first discuss the rationales and motivations of those Japanese scholars who are 
interested in non-Western/Japanese IR. The impact of the EAIRT debate on ‘mainstreamers’ and other 
factions of the Japanese IR communities will be analyzed in the later sections of the chapter. 
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 country sitting between Western and Eastern civilizations, Japan has been struggling 
to locate itself between the two worlds. Its first detachment from the West to Asia 
(1894-1945) culminated in ‘Asia for Asians’ vision. Yet, pan-Asianism ended up in 
calamity for Japan and the entire region. Meanwhile, the post-war alignment to 
Western circles, from a Japanese perspective, has not been so easy. Recently, concerns 
have been raised regarding the ‘declining morality’ of the West. As one professor 
observes, ‘some people started wondering if the Western/American IR is something 
we can keep relying on. Thinking about 9/11, invasions of Afghanistan or Iraq, people 
may ask is it a right way? Something might be wrong here’ (Kosuke Shimizu, 
Interview, February 2014). According to Takashi Inoguchi, a ‘Japan in Asia’ school of 
thought has been regaining strength in Japan, especially after Japanese strengthened 
perceptions over the West’s (and mainly the United States’) ‘seemingly exploitive or 
opportunistic behavior’ during the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Inoguchi 2001, 205).  
This ‘Asian identity’ has also been translated into the field of IR. In 2007, on the 50th 
anniversary of JAIR, IRAP – the JAIR’s English journal – published its special issue 
titled ‘Why is there no non-Western IR theory?’ This was the first time when non-
Western IR specialists seriously attempted to provide an answer by devoting a single 
volume of an academic journal to this question. Inoguchi, as IRAP’s founding editor, 
contributed a piece to this issue exploring the situation in Japan. In particular, he 
propounded two questions emphasising Japan as a member of the non-West: (1) To 
what extent has Japan contributed original theories to the discipline of IR? (2) In what 
manner has Japanese IR been developed thus far? (Inoguchi 2007b, 157; 2007a; Sato 
2008, 50). Inoguchi argues that if IR theories are not understood in the American 
positivist way, there were Japanese IR theories in the past under the form of middle-
range theories. These theoretical contributions can be found in the work of three 
prominent modern Japanese scholars – Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano 
Yoshitaro – which were categorized by Inoguchi respectively as an innate 
constructivist, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law and a Marxist 
theorist of regional integration (Inoguchi 2007a, 370-83). These ‘theories’ were not 
recognized in the West because of the differences in the academic areas and concerns 
between Japanese (philosophical, regional, and history studies) and American IR 
(positivism) (Inoguchi 2007a, 70-1; Shimizu 2008). Also in 2007, there was another 
publication by Sakai Tetsuya that further explained history and genealogy of IR in 
Japan (Sakai 2007). As can be seen, there have been new narratives and discourses 
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 coming to the frontline of IR in Japan, creating renewed interest in indigenous 
theorizing.  
Third and most importantly is the chain effect among non-Western IR academia in 
general and generational change within Japanese IR community in particular. Prior to 
the 2007 IRAP special issue of on ‘non-Western IR Theory in Asia’, there were a 
considerable number of papers and books which had already suggested possible 
‘paradigm change’ in the discipline of IR (e.g. Chan 2001; Ling 2002). These 
pioneering works open up the possibility of alternatives, apart from Western 
mainstream theory. What makes these contemporary offerings on non-post/Western 
IR different from previous works may be ascribed to the collective endeavours: there 
has been a chain effect among different scholars, both inside and outside the West or 
Asia, touching on and arguing about the same questions – why haven’t we looked at 
non-Western traditions and enriched the discipline? These underlying currents have 
generated an intention of some Japanese scholars to ‘catch up with Western 
counterparts’ (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, February 2014). 
This ‘chain effect’ is rooted in the inferiority complex to the West shared among non-
Western IR communities. In Japan, this sentiment can be traced back to the 1960s. In 
1966, Hikomatsu Kamikawa, the first president of JAIR, raised the question ‘Are we 
monkeys?’ The question came from Adolf Hitler’s controversial book Mein Kampf. 
Among other things, Hitler argued that the Japanese race was a typical race of ‘the 
bearers of European and American culture’ but not ‘the creators of the culture.’ 
Applying this to IR, Kamikawa then posed the question, ‘Are Japanese IR scholars 
only monkeys to import European and American IR theories?’ (quoted in Kamino 
2008, 29). There was, however, no distinct research program in response to 
Kamikawa’s question apart from a small number of research investigations on the 
development of Japanese IR studies and the possible contributions of Japanese 
experience to a more ‘international’ discipline of IR (e.g. Inoguchi and Pacon 2001; 
Murata 2010). In 1996, the American scholar Samuel Huntington advanced a no less 
controversial ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis in which he listed Japan as one of the eight 
civilizations in the world – an acknowledgment of Japanese cultural uniqueness. In 
this context, a distinct type of Japanese exceptionalism came into play. This was 
reminiscent of those works relating to Nihonjinron (theory of Japanese uniqueness) in 
the 1980s and 1990s which argued that ‘Japanese culture is unique, exceptional, and 
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 thus parochial’ (Hagström 2015, 129). The chain effect from the non-Western IRT 
movement thus gave Japanese scholars a chance to eschew their traditional inferiority 
complex. Note the following remarks of a Japanese professor who identifies himself 
with the non-Western IRT camp: 
Scholars in this country (and many other countries as well) continue to have a 
feeling of inferiority to the West. It is more like (what presents in) post-
colonialism. In postcolonial countries, they have got the same feelings. If they 
have the chance to say something which actually asserts that they have 
advanced IR theory beyond those of the West, I am sure they will go for it 
(Kosuke Shimizu, Interview, February 2014).  
This ‘chain effect’ also occurred at the time of generational change within Japanese IR 
academia, particularly the return and/or recruitment of qualified Western-trained 
scholars. Among the scholars who are interested in a Japanese contribution to IR 
theory, a group of young scholars (Josuke Ikeda, Shiro Sato, Kosuke Shimizu, 
Tomoya Kamino, among others) based at universities across the Kansai region 
(Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe) have been very active in exploring the ‘non-Western’ IR 
agenda in the Japanese context. Rooted in their prior training in the reflectivist 
traditions of IR Theory (critical theories, post-modernism/post-structuralism, and 
English School approaches), these scholars are inspired by Acharya and Buzan’s call 
for non-Western IRT in general and Inoguchi’s inquiry about Japanese IR theories in 
particular. Yet they have even gone further than what senior scholars e.g. Takashi 
Inoguchi and Sakai Tetsuya have claimed about the existence of IR theories in Japan. 
These younger scholars have taken actual steps in re-examining Japan’s modern IR 
discipline to give a positive answer to the question of whether there were Japanese IR 
theories in the past. Josuke Ikeda and Shiro Sato – the two pioneers of this project – 
actively invited would-be interested colleagues from within and beyond Japan (e.g. 
Kosuke Shimizu, Yongchul Cho, Tomoya Kamino, and Ching-chang Chen) to join the 
camp of ‘non-Western IR Theory’ in Japan, believing it to become ‘the next 
generation of IR Theory’ (Shimizu, Interview, February 2014). As Josuke Ikeda 
further explains the inner motivations for his own engagement with ‘non-
Western’/Japanese IR: 
Originally I was not much interested in such greater questions of non-Western 
IR. My beginning was an independent study regarding the disciplinary 
development of Japanese IR. The background was my consideration that the 
newest academics in Japan were eager to import and expand the latest 
approaches, namely social constructivism or post-positivism, but why not 
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 focus more on past literature of my own country, creating something ‘new’ 
through exploring ‘old’ (Interview, February 2014). 
These scholars formed a panel at the 2008 ISA Convention in San Francisco which 
was dedicated to the single theme ‘Is there a Japanese IR?’ As this was the first time 
Japanese scholars comprehensively examined the presence of IR theories in Japan, the 
presentations attracted many comments and critiques (Giorgio Shani, Interview, 
February 2014). The papers were later amended and edited into a volume with the 
same title, published by Ryukoku University in Kyoto. This book drew noticeable 
attention from abroad, presumably because it was written in English and was publicly 
available on the Ryokyu University’s website (Kosuke Shimizu, Interview, February 
2014). In this volume, chapter contributors supported Inoguchi’s argument that there 
were operative IR theories in Japan even before WWII. These ‘theories’ were mainly 
introduced by former disciples of the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy. They criticized 
Western IR and proposed a new emerging order in East Asia. The rationale for the re-
examination of ‘past Japanese IR,’ despite the fact that these ‘theories’ were 
discredited by the ‘failed’ Japanese experience in WWII, was to learn from its 
intellectual contributions and flaws to construct ‘new Japanese IR.’ 
Since then, non-Western/Japanese IR has become a research subject of growing 
interests at several Kyoto-based institutions, including Ritsumeikan, Kyoto, and 
Ryukoku Universities. The reason Kyoto becomes the center of research on non-
Western/Japanese IR is largely threefold. Culturally, Kyoto is the former capital of 
Japan which represents the traditional culture, values, and history of Japan while 
Tokyo – the current capital – is believed to adopt a more modern lifestyle which is 
closer to Western values and scholarship. Intellectually, it is the place of origin of the 
‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy – a ‘brand-name’ for intellectuals in the country and a 
rich resource for constructing ‘Japanese IR’. Institutionally, the Kyoto-based 
universities have benefitted from viable funding sources (see Table 4.1) and a 
remarkably high concentration of theory-oriented scholars who are well-trained in 
both the mainstream and reflectivist traditions of IR Theory (including post-
structuralism and the English School) discussed above. 
It is also important to acknowledge the role of government funding in promoting this 
research. In 2006, the Japanese Cabinet approved the Global Centers of Excellent 
(GCOE) Program. This is an initiative by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, 
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 Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to provide financial support for the 
development of internationally outstanding centers of education and research and 
internationally competitive universities (Website of Kyoto University). Another 
Program for enhancing the profile of Japanese universities funded by MEXT is the 
Project for Advancement of Academic Research at Private Universities. At least three 
education and research centers based in the Kyoto surrounding region have received 
funding from these Programs to promote their research on non/post-Western IR: the 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University, the Afrasian Centre for Peace 
and Development Studies at the Ryukoku University, and the Institute for 
International Relations and Area Studies at Ritsumeikan University. Other funding 
agencies include the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research (JSPS) and 
Japan Society for Intercultural Studies (JSIS). JSPS is an incorporated administrative 
agency which was established by MEXT to provide academic research funding. JSPS 
and MEXT generate funding for research training, promotion of international 
exchanges and other academic activities. JSIS meanwhile supports young scholars in 
academic ‘dispatch’ programs i.e. sending Japanese scholars to foreign institutions as 
visiting or postdoctoral fellows. These institutions have made use of these funding 
sources to organize a number of high-profile international conferences and seminars 
on the theme of non/post-Western IR Theory (see Table 4.1). Moreover, these centres 
have good collaboration with other national and regional institutions in Europe 
(Leiden and Aberystwyth Universities), Taiwan, Korea, and India etc., thus spreading 
such research and the discussions that accompany it beyond Japan. 
In addition, the surge of interest in non-/post-Western IRT in Japan is partly linked to 
the ‘globalization’ of the English School. Unlike Chinese scholars who are inspired 
mostly by the reputation rather than the substance of the English School in their 
attempt to construct the ‘Chinese School’ (see Chapter 3), Japanese scholars seem to 
be genuinely interested in developing a Japanese vision of international society. This 
is because the diffusion of the English School in Japan has been a genuine and robust 
process of two-way travel: through returning Britain-educated scholars (although this 
number remains less than US-educated scholars) and via frequent visits by and 
cooperation with leading English School scholars. For example, Josuke Ikeda, one of 
the most pro-active scholars in importing the English School approaches to Japan 
acknowledges that his attitude and ideas about theory was rooted in his education at 
Aberystwyth University during 2003-2004. At that time, Aberystwyth had a number 
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 of theorists in English School, Critical Theory and post-positivism in general. Thus his 
orientation both in teaching and research is very much influenced by his British 
educational background (Interview, February 2014).  
In April 2009, the Institute for International Relations and Area Studies at 
Ritsumeikan University conducted a three-year project entitled ‘Critical Analysis of 
the English School and Post-Western IR Theory.’ The participants of this project are 
mostly well-trained English School scholars in Japan (e.g. Hiroaki Ataka (PhD – 
University of Warwick), Josuke Ikeda (MA - Aberystwyth University), Makoto Onaka 
(2004-2005 Nitobe Fellow, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford), Ching-chang 
Chen (PhD-University of Wales, Aberystwyth). Moreover, Ritsumeikan University 
has organized five annual international conferences/seminars that frequently bring in 
renowned English School experts such as Andrew Linklater, Hidemi Suganami, and 
Ian Hall to teach students and discuss the work of their Japanese counterparts. As the 
result of this robust engagement, the first comprehensive volume/textbook on the 
English School and its relevance to Japanese IR was published in Japanese in October 
2013 (Sato, Onaka, and Ikeda 2013). Many other articles written in English linking the 
English School with the Japanese IR movement have also been published in these 
universities’ websites and journals as well as abroad (e.g. Ikeda 2010; Chen 2011b; 
Kamino 2008; Ikeda 2008). As a scholar who has contributed a chapter in that English 
School volume explains the interest in the English School among Japanese scholars:  
The English School has some kind of attraction simply because it is not 
American. There has been a common understanding that IR in the post-war 
period has been dominated by the US for ages. So the English School is one of 
the best counter-arguments. That’s the reason it is popular. If that is a real 
issue, then there are some connections between the English School and non-
Western IRT (Shimizu, Interview, February 2014). 




Associated research projects 
and grants 
27/11/10 The Hegemony of Western/Non-











were organized as parts of the 
two Research projects at 
Ritsumeikan University on the 
themes: ‘Critical Analysis of the 
English School and Post-
Western IR Theory’ and 
‘Deconstructing Western 
Paradigms in International 
Relations’. 
Grants: Ministry of Education, 
23- 
25/03/10 
International Theory at the 
Crossroads: Critical Scrutiny 
from Western/non-Western Views 
26/03/12 English School in International 
Relations Theory and Post-
Hegemony in International Order 
09/03/13 The English School of IR: its 
Impacts on East Asian and Global 
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Culture, Sports, Science and the 
Japan Society for the Promotion 
of Science Research Project, 
Grant Category: ‘International 
Theory in the Age of 
Conviviality and Post-
Hegemony.’ 
24/02/14 English School, Post-Western IR, 
and Beyond 
15/10/11 Rethinking the Discourse of 
‘Non-Western’ IR Theories 
18/05/14 Future of International Relations 
Study (Speakers: Amitav Acharya 
and Hiroshi Nakanishi (Kyoto 
University). 
29/11/10 Politics of ‘Non-Western’ 




Western’ International Relations 
Theories (Kyoto Working Papers 








International Relations Theory 
based on Area Studies in Asia. 
Grants: ‘Junior Researchers 
Support Program’, CSAS’s 
Global COE Program ‘In Search 
for Sustainable Humanosphere 
in Asia and Africa.’  
06/02/10 Conflict Resolution in the 
Afrasian Context: Examining 










Research project:  
Multiculturalism and Conflict 
Resolution in Afrasian context. 
Grants: Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology’s grant ‘Project for 
Strategic Research Base 
Formation Support at Private 
Universities; and Japan Society 
for Intercultural Studies (JSIS). 
 
24/11/11 Asian International Relations and 
Peace in Korea 
08/03/12 Critical Review of Prospects for 
East Asian International Relations 
11/2013 In Search of Non-Western 
International Relations Theory: 
The Kyoto School Revisited 
21/01/11 Toward Multi-lineal International 






The Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science Research 
Project’s Young Researchers 
Overseas Dispatch Program.  
25/03/11 Toward East Asian International 
Relations Theory: More May Be 




Co-organized with Kyoto 
University’s Global COE 
Program. 
23/02/11 Politics of East Asian 
International Relations Theory: 
Toward ‘Non-Western’ 
International Relations Theory 




Organized by Josuke Ikeda, who 
by then was a visiting researcher 
at Leiden University. 
24/02/12 Theorizing Asia – The 
Development of Post-Western IR 
Theory 
O.P. Jindai Global 
University 
(India) 
Co-organized with Ryukoku 
University’s Afrasian Center for 
Peace & Development Studies. 
15/11/14 Dialogue between Different IR 
Traditions for One World: 
Western IR and the Challenge of 
non-Western/post-Western IR. 
Japan Association 
of Int’l Relations 
(JAIR) Annual 
Convention 2014 
The Research Caucus for Junior 
Researchers and Graduates 
Students – JAIR. 
Table 4.1. Major International conferences and research projects on non/post-Western IR 
organized and/or participated by Japanese scholars57 
57 Information was retrieved from the official websites of relevant Universities as well as via this 
author’s personal interviews with Japanese scholars in late 2013 and early 2014. 
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 The above discussion about growing Japanese interest in non-/post-Western IR serves 
as a springboard for the following section where I will further analyse how these 
structural and agential factors have shaped the two major currents about theory 
development in Japan: the Japanese IR project and the emerging turn toward ‘post-
Western IR’ agenda. One significant implication the EAIRT debate has had on the 
practices of Japanese scholars is that they have gradually shifted from the claim for 
some sort of distinctive ‘Japanese IR’ toward the more broadly focused post-Western 
IR agenda. The dynamics and constraints of each of these academic movements will 
be investigated hereunder. 
‘Japanese IR’ as a by-product of modern Japanese philosophy and the expanded 
‘international society’ 
When non-Western IR discourse reached the Japanese IR community in 2007, it 
initially presented itself in the claim for a ‘Japanese School of IR.’ The two major 
intellectual inputs for developing ‘Japanese IR’ are modern Japanese philosophy and 
the extended English School concept of ‘international society.’ First, if Chinese 
scholars go back to their ancient thinkers and concepts in the attempt to construct a 
‘Chinese School’, Japanese scholars similarly nurture their history and traditions – 
Buddhist, Shinto and Confucian thinking which were collectively embodied in 
modern Japanese philosophy, particularly within the ‘Kyoto School.’ Second, with the 
recent import of the English School into Japan, some Japanese scholars have tried to 
develop a Japanese vision of international society by categorizing modern Japanese 
philosophical thought into the English School language. The by-product of these dual 
attempts is a confirmation of the existence of Japanese style IR theory during the 
prewar period. This is a particularly significant historical epoch for Japan when the 
country encountered the expansion of European ‘international society’ after the 
successful Meiji Restoration. According to Josuke Ikeda, Japan, during the 1920s-
1940s period, was faced with an identity dichotomy due to its unique geographic 
location between the Western colonizers, as an emerging major power, and the 
colonized, and yet as a country outside the Western world. The structure of Japanese 
vision of international society is based on ‘in-between-ness’ – a bridge between the 
Western and Eastern (Asian) civilizations. In other words, ‘Japaneseness is in-
between-ness’ (Ikeda 2008, 22). This distinct identity has its root in modern Japanese 
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 philosophy, particularly the pioneering work of Kyoto School’s founder Nishida 
Kitaro. 
After the Meiji Restoration era (1868-1889), Western cultural and intellectual 
traditions were intensively imported into Japan. Japanese intellectuals then were eager 
to learn and absorb them and combined these ideas and thoughts with Japanese 
traditional philosophy. This led to the formation of the two prominent schools of 
thought in modern Japan: the ‘Tokyo School’ and the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy. 
Among these two factions, the Kyoto School has been more widely known thanks to 
its development of original systems of thought by creatively drawing on the 
intellectual and spiritual traditions of East Asia as well as the methods and content of 
Western philosophy. The School was associated with academics from the Department 
of Modern Philosophy at the University of Kyoto. Nishida Kitaro, the Department’s 
first Chair (from 1913 to 1928) is regarded as the founder of and most prominent 
figure within the School. From the outset, the Kyoto School tried to bridge the gap 
between Western and Eastern philosophy. It was influenced by both European 
philosophers (Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche) and Asian philosophic tradition (Buddhism 
and Confucianism) (Williams 2014, 19). Although the Kyoto School’s contribution to 
the global field of philosophy has long been a subject of intensive study for scholars 
(e.g. Waldenfels 1966; Heisig 1990; Goto-Jones 2007, 2009; Williams 2014), its 
relevance to the field of IR was explored only recently when the non-Western IRT 
movement reached the Japanese IR community. Accordingly, contemporary Japanese 
IR scholars have learned from both the innovation and failure of the Kyoto School, 
particularly how the theory was abused by the wartime Japanese government to justify 
their imperialism in Asia, to guide their course of theory development. 
Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) characterizes the Kyoto School as an effort to reply to the 
Hegelian challenge that Asia is ‘the land of Oriental despotism’ (Shih 2010a). 
Throughout his years of contemplation and publication, Nishida has always 
endeavored to provide a truly universal philosophy by combining the Western 
philosophy of self and the Eastern philosophy of Zen Buddhism. The Kyoto School 
evolved based on Nishida’s conceptualization of pure experience, self-awakening and 
place of nothingness which together constitute a theory of identity formation.58 Often 
58 Nishida defines ‘pure experience’ as direct experience without deliberative discrimination and 
identified ‘self-awakening’ with the state of the ‘absolute free will.’ In 1926, when Nishida combined 
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 called a Japanese style constructivist (Goto-Jones 2009; Inoguchi 2010), Nishida 
developed the consciousness of Japanese identity when the country is allocating 
between the East and West by employing Asian philosophies systematically in his 
thinking and methods.  
Ontologically, Nishida’s theory of identity formation relies on East Asian religious 
concept of ‘nothingness’ as opposed to Western philosophical concept of ‘being.’ In 
Nishida’s conceptualization, ‘being’ is understood as ‘the objectivity of determinate 
things’ while ‘nothingness’ is associated with a kind of ‘transcendental subjectivity of 
consciousness or the heart-mind’. In other words, they represent the ‘subjective 
(noetic) and objective (noematic) dimensions of reality’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy – Kyoto School). The notion of nothingness recalls Chinese Daoism, 
particularly Laozi and Zhuangzi’s concept of wu or ‘non-existence’ and Buddhist 
expression of suntaya or ‘emptiness.’ In Zen Buddhist thought, when one enters the 
state of absolute nothingness, there is no distinction between subject and object while 
such distinction is essential to Western philosophers (e.g. Aristotle and Kant). 
Attempting to apply this to reality, Nishida provided an explanation of the agency-
structure relations that supposedly transcend the boundaries of cultures or history 
(Shimizu 2011, 164). Reality is thus understood as a dynamic ‘identity of the absolute 
contradiction’ between subjective nothingness and objective being (Shimizu 2011). 
Nishida ultimately developed the notion of place of absolute nothingness (basho) as a 
non-dualistic ‘concrete’ logic through the affirmation of what he calls the ‘absolutely 
contradictory self-identity’ (Shimizu 2011). Like the Hegelian dialectics, basho is a 
contradiction between opposites but unlike the Hegelian dialectics, the tension of 
thesis and anti-thesis in the place of nothingness needs not be resolved with a 
synthesis but rather they can co-exist. For example, in 1934 Nishida wrote:  
Reality is being and at the same time nothingness; it is being-and-nothingness 
[u-soku-mu], nothingness-and-being; it is both subjective and objective, noetic 
and noematic. Reality is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and thus the 
self-identity of what is absolutely contradictory. Or rather, it is not that [the 
separate spheres of] subjectivity and objectivity come to unite, and then we 
first have reality. [The opposition of] subjectivity and objectivity must instead 
be thought from out of a dynamically dialectical reality that is self-
determining’ (Nishida 1970, 29; quoted in Standford Encyclopedia).  




                                                                                                                                                                       
 Nishida’s conceptualization of place of nothingness has been employed by 
contemporary IR scholars to analyze Japan’s identity in the period of the ‘expansion 
of European international society’ (Watson and Bull 1984). During this time, Japan 
faced the identity puzzle of whether or not it should be a Western or Eastern nation. 
For Nishida, Japan apart from being a normal state can also be a ‘culture that could 
provide a place of nothingness, thus absorbing the elements of other cultures and 
integrating them into one cultural piece’ (Shimizu 2011, 177). The idea of Japan being 
a ‘place of nothingness’ can resolve Japan’s difficult in-between position in a number 
of ways. First, Japan can avoid choosing sides between the seemingly contradictory 
East and West, thus alternating comfortably ‘among different moral principles without 
any sense of its identity being threatened’ (Shih 2010b, 549). Second, it enables 
Japan’s free reentry anywhere into the world, therefore ‘overcoming the arbitrary 
modernist historiography or stagnant Confucian harmony’ (Shih 2010a, 17).  
Despite his initial aim to bridge between Western and Eastern philosophy, Nishida’s 
theory of place of nothingness was later radicalized by his disciples into the 
confrontation and class of sovereign states. After the successful Meiji Restoration, 
Japan emerged as a modern state and the first non-white country which managed to 
defeat the Asian long-time great power (China in 1895) and a powerful European 
power (Russia in 1905). Such military strength allowed Japan to declare its autonomy 
and proclaim a distinctly Japanese set of values (Heisig and Maraldo 1995, 293). As 
the Japanese government was determined to expand its country’s influence across 
Asia after the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in 1933, they asked Kyoto School philosophers to provide intellectual 
justification for its policy objectives. In 1942, the Kyoto School scholars organized the 
Chuo Koron (Overcoming Modernity) symposia titled ‘The Standpoint of World 
History and Japan’ (Williams 2014, 15). The idea of ‘overcoming modernity’ implies 
an overcoming that ‘moves through and beyond’ the limits and problems of Western 
modernity by replacing ‘modern materialistic civilization, based on individualism and 
avarice,’ with ‘a spiritual culture based on the moral values of the East and the 
scientific achievements of the West’ (Shillony 2006, 429; see also Williams 2004).  
In 1943 Yatsugi Kazuo, a member of the Center for National Strategy, approached 
Nishida and asked him to provide a scholarly rationale for the so-called ‘Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (GEACS) which was initially announced by the Japanese 
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 government in July 1940. Nishida later wrote an essay entitled ‘Principles for a New 
World Order’ in which he helped justify Japan’s central role in East Asia – the key 
foundation of GEACS (Standford-Encyclopedia). Some ‘Kyoto School’ disciples then 
developed a ‘Theory of East Asian Community’ to proclaim the superiority of 
Japanese vision for GEACS and Japan’s central role in East Asia as the Japanese was 
the only people in the world that succeeded in converging the West with the East. This 
was an attempt to displace the West from Asia to create a new, pluralistic world order 
based on East Asian traditional values (Heisig and Maraldo 1995, 292). Japan was 
able to lead in the formation of a universal GEACS allegedly because ‘Japanese 
people were the only children of Goddess Amaterasu in the world that, unbounded by 
the limitation of one’s place, could know both sides. Manchukuo was the 
quintessential site of such imagined infinity because it was the origin of the two major 
civilizations – Christianity and Confucianism’ (Shih 2013, 17; Shih and Huang 2011). 
Undoubtedly, this logic has helped to justify Japanese imperialism across Asia during 
the 1930s and 1940s in the guise of pan-Asianism, starting with the invasion of 
Manchuria – the ideal ‘place of nothingness’ in the Kyoto School’s imagination. In 
other words, the Kyoto School of philosophy or pan-Asianism had been abused by the 
Japanese government and turned into an ‘ideology’ (Hotta 2007, 3). 
Although predominantly regarded as pre-war Japanese philosophy, the Kyoto School 
still has a lingering impact on contemporary Japanese IR in a number of aspects. The 
fact that the ‘Kyoto School’ has been recently rediscovered by contemporary Japanese 
IR scholars tells us something about how non-Western IRT is constructed and how it 
is calculated in Japan. On the one hand, it is believed by Japanese scholars that the 
Kyoto School philosophers were among the first academic communities outside the 
West who managed to develop original and creative theories based on ‘non-Western’ 
traditions. This confirms that there  have long been ‘non-Western’ IR theories in Japan 
(Inoguchi 2007a; Shimizu et al. 2008). The Japanese-ness in IR can be found in the 
understanding of the relationship between Japan and the world – its location between 
the two civilizations (East and West) and the two orders (the colonizer and the 
colonized worlds) (Ikeda 2008, 10). This unique and exceptional position of Japan as 
a quasi-power beyond the West, put in the terms of contemporary Japanese scholars, 
provides a distinct Japanese vision of international society (Ikeda 2008, 7) and 
international order (Sakai 2008; Shimizu 2008, 72-3) or in the words of Shogo Suzuki, 
‘an alternative international society’ through the ideal of pan-Asianism (Suzuki 2014; 
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 see also Suzuki 2005). More specifically, the ‘Japanese-ness’ presents itself in the 
form of the question of autonomy, based on the self-identity of being ‘in-between.’ 
The ‘“in-between-ness” posed a question to what extent Japan should have been 
autonomous in international politics (or to what extent Japan should have been free 
from European rules).’ And it is ‘this question about autonomy that differentiates a 
Japanese vision of international society from others, and thus gives a positive answer 
to the inquiry of “Japanese IR”’ (Ikeda 2008, 21). 
Beyond the English School, the claim for Japanese ‘in-between’ identity is also found 
in the work of contemporary Japanese constructivist scholars. Takashi Inoguchi 
observes that there is no strong national identity in Japan because, given the 
domination of pacifism in the post-war period, ‘Japanese are intrinsically hesitate [sic] 
to identify themselves with the state/nation.’ Similarly, Japanese have ‘ambiguous 
feelings about Asia’ (Inoguchi 2009, 174); however, Asia ‘was essential to the 
Japanese identity because it reminded Japan that it was not Europe. To be Asian is to 
be not European, but neither to be anything specific’ (Shih 2010b, 150). This dual 
identity is a key to understanding some of the puzzles surrounding Japan’s 
inconsistent foreign policy. One example is Japan’s adherence to international 
environmental norms on the one hand and its rejection of anti-whaling norm on the 
other (Sato and Hirata 2008). Other examples include Japan’s de-valuation of the 
‘human rights’ norms in relations with ASEAN members (Katsumata 2006) or its 
kakehashi Official Development Aid (ODA) policy (Black 2013).59 As can be seen 
through the country’s difficulties with regard to the Yasukuni shrine, to the East Asian 
summit, and to the United States military bases in Japan, ‘Japan’s identity between the 
West and the East (Asia) has not been well sorted out’ (Inoguchi 2007, 383). 
Yet the confirmation of Japanese distinctiveness in IR has two important caveats. 
Although there may be some grounds for claiming that the ‘Japanese School’ was one 
of the earliest attempts for developing non-Western IR theories, it should be noted that 
such a ‘revolt’ ended with failure (Kamino 2008, 40-1). In particular, the Kyoto 
School has a clear tendency to prioritize Japanese culture over others and ultimately 
59 The rationale behind Japan’s kakehashi approach (or bridging policy) ‘lies in the construction of 
Japan’s self-identity as a state able to reenter international society after World War II through focusing 
on economic development rather than military and coercive action. Proponents of the kakehashi 
approach construct Japan both as a model of successful democratization through development which 
other states can learn from, as well as the means through ODA to ‘bridge’ the divide between repressive 
regimes and liberal democratic capitalism’ (Black 2013, 337). 
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 provided rationales for Japanese invasions in Asia. ‘Japanese IR’, in that sense, has 
had quite negative implications (Ikeda 2008, 26). Nonetheless, the case of Kyoto 
School provides an important lesson that may contribute to the growing body of 
literature that deals with the relationship between theory and practice as well as 
between scholars and policy makers. The ‘Kyoto School’ philosophers from the 
beginning were seen as nationalists/patriots who wanted to defend/expand the interests 
of their country (Williams 2004) but their close connection with the wartime regime 
eventually rendered them to produce harmful knowledge to the society. As a pro-
Japanese IR scholar offers his critical self-reflection on the Kyoto School that parallels 
Steve Smith and Pikki Ish-Shalom’s concerns about the ramifications of theories: 
I believe that the theory of East Asian Community was one of the creative 
Japanese IR theories but was one of the morally questionable theories. How 
should we judge a researcher’s morality and responsibility if his/her theory 
does harm to a real society? And how should we consider researchers who 
maintain a close relationship with governments in order to actualize their own 
theory in real politics? Or how should we consider researchers who keep their 
distance from governments and as a result consign their theory to the world 
within the library walls? Social scientists should make a conscious effort to 
deal with the crisis in the relationship between theory and practice (Kamino 
2008, 41). 
This negative legacy of ‘past Japanese IR’ inhibits the construction of ‘new Japanese 
IR’. Although contemporary ‘Japanese School’ has not come into being yet, its would-
be influence and impact may be seen from reactions to Japan’s regional policy 
initiatives. Since Japan’s re-engagement with Asia in the late 1970s, there have been a 
number of initiatives for new Asian Regionalism such as a call for a ‘new concept of 
Asia’, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, or ‘East Asian Community’. These ideas, 
however, have never really taken hold due to skepticism relating to Japan’s 
‘unforgettable past’ (Shimizu 2007). Note this insightful remark about the ‘Japanese 
School’ of a Japan expert in the US:  
Japanese after 1945 do not have an indigenous voice (they lost the war so 
badly). But there was a Japanese school of IR during the 1930s because they 
provide the ideology for Japanese aggression (fighting for Asian national 
liberalization). While the ‘Japanese school’ has ended, the legacy of that 
thinking remains powerful and it is still relevant. So if you say there is a 
Japanese social science and IR independent from the government, I say ‘Yes’ 
but on the issue of memory politics I would say ‘No’, because although it 
happened two generations ago, that legacy still has an enormous liability for 
the Japanese. It is now the only one who believes it; the US does not believe it, 
neither do China and Korea (Interview, October 2013). 
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 Given these historical legacy and structural constraints, claims for distinct ‘Japanese 
IR’ has quieted down in recent years and the current trend in Japan’s non-Western IR 
debate has gradually turned toward the ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. This means that 
Japanese scholars no longer focus intensively on the ‘Japanese distinctiveness’ in 
theory development but rather to learn from the pitfalls of past Japanese IR to repair 
the existing problems in both Western and non-Western IR.  
The emerging turn toward ‘post-Western’ IR in Japan 
‘Post-Western IR’ has become more salient in the latest discussion of non-Western IR 
in Japan. To date, there is no consensus as to what constitutes post-Western IR. In 
what follows, I will discuss a number of understandings of post-Western IR developed 
by Japanese scholars and how they have shaped the respective practices of scholars 
involved in the EAIRT debate. So far, there are two major projects that focus on 
exploring post-Western IR in Japan: first, using the Kyoto School as a basis for 
repairing the inherent shortcomings of emerging non-Western IR, and second, 
reformulating IR beyond its ‘Western/European centric’ ontology and epistemology. 
Both these attempts ultimately aim at creating ‘a decolonized IR.’ This academic 
attempt works on two levels. On the one hand, it puts forward proposals for non-
Western IRT; on the other hand it criticizes the new hegemonic or parochial pattern 
embedded in some non-Western IR discourses (e.g. the establishment of national 
Schools of IR) in order to construct a truly representative and indeed better body of 
knowledge (Kwon et al. 2011, 109). 
Learning from the Kyoto School: back to the future 
Among Japanese scholars interested in the non-/post-Western agenda, Kosuke 
Shimizu – Professor and Director of the Afrasian Research Centre at Ryukoku 
University – is particularly interested in studying and drawing lessons from the pitfalls 
of the Kyoto School to guide the current ‘non-Western IR Theory’ discourse. His 
sympathy to the current non-/post-Western IR can be traced back to his training in 
post-structuralism at the Victoria University of Wellington which has shaped his post-
modernist understanding of IR Theory.60 As he explains: 
The American understanding that IR is universal I think is actually 
provincializing the understanding of IRT. Theories can be different and 
60 Shimizu’s doctoral thesis is entitled ‘Modernism, Postmodernism, and Japan: An Inquiry Into the 
Making of Identity and Contemporary International Political Economy’, submitted in 1998. 
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 particular to some places and time. History is the contingency. It really 
depends on how you see the world. If you think that you have to develop, you 
have to grow up, you have to become adult, you need to get mature, etc.; that’s 
modernist understanding of time. But if you read some other stuff in other 
areas other than the West/US, accumulation of knowledge is based on a 
different perception of time. If you don’t have to grow up to develop, you 
don’t have to become bigger then theories can be seen in a completely 
different way (Interview, February 2014). 
This approach also influences his teaching of the IR Theory course at Ryukoku 
University. The teaching of IRT in Japan, as discussed earlier, is much like in the 
West with a tendency to place a strong emphasis on mainstream theories and lesser 
attention directed toward reflectivist theories. Shimizu actually reverses this order in 
his class. He decides to teach critical and poststructural approaches first before 
introducing mainstream IRT (realism and liberalism) because he thinks the latter are 
‘boring.’ As the result, his students tend to be influenced by critical approaches and 
become critical as well (Shimizu’s remarks at the ISA Annual Convention – ‘Post-
Western IR’ panel, 21 February 2015). Shimizu also teaches a course entitled ‘Culture 
and Politics in Japan: From Kyoto School to Miyazaki Anime.’ The aim of the course 
is to understand the historical relationship between politics and culture in Japan, and 
its meanings to Japan studies as well as contemporary world affairs. The core 
questions to be explored include 1) what were the preconditions of the two World 
Wars in Japan?; 2) why did many Japanese, intellectuals in particular, enthusiastically 
support the imperial government in the WWII?; 3) how could a few intellectuals 
maintain their anti-war attitude under the oppressive government before and during 
the WWII, while the vast majority of intellectuals and political activists converted 
their beliefs to the totalitarian politics?; and 4) are there any similarities and/or 
differences between cultural politics in the pre-war time and the present? In 
addressing these questions, Shimizu briefly discusses IR theories of Essentialism and 
Constructivism before introducing Kyoto School philosophy (Nishida Kitaro and 
Tosaka Jun) and how these thoughts are relevant to Japan’s contemporary politics 
including its recent effort to construct its soft power by the means of pop culture.61  
Similarly in research, Shimizu is particularly driven by the contradiction between the 
world-class level philosophical understanding by Kyoto School philosophers and their 
involvement in the war and justifications for foreign invasions by the Japanese 
61 I thank Professor Kosuke Shimizu for providing me the syllabus of this course. For more details 
about this course syllabus, see Appendix. 
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 government. His theoretical work, therefore, is directed toward investigating why they 
were involved in the war regime during that time relative to contemporary IR Theory. 
As he further explains the ultimate aims of his theorizing to this author: 
My intention is not to provide grand theory but to give or to present some 
historical epochs which actually relate to the question of how these theories 
can be abused. So in that sense, I am just a historian. I am more concerned 
about empirical issues. So describing what happening in the past in this 
country is an effort to develop a grand theory of philosophy and what 
happened after that, how it was abused, and how actually it shattered people 
living in Japan as well in Asia (Interview, February 2014).  
This research project has profound implications on the two important issues in the 
existing IR theory-practice literature: how theory shapes the world it studies and what 
is the ideal relationship between the policy and scholarly worlds. In his recent 
publications, Shimizu tries to identify the connection between the political and social 
atmosphere in pre-1945 Japan and contemporary Japanese politics and non-Western 
IR discourses. He has found some worrying similarities in these two periods: 1) the 
international political economic background (relative decline of the West and rise of 
East); 2) the method of setting the West as the only reference point; and 3) an 
emphasis on the cultural aspects that leads to an attempt to essentialize Eastern culture 
while displacing the West. That drives him toward developing critical readings about 
the Kyoto School and creating some cautionary tales about contemporary Japanese 
politics as well as the non-Western IRT movement. Like the current non-Western IR 
movement, the Kyoto School started with an objective to enrich Western philosophy 
and bridging the East/West distinction. However, Kyoto School philosophers ‘never 
attempted to problematize the philosophical tradition itself’ (Shimizu 2015, 7). 
Shimizu argues that the main reason why Kyoto School philosophers were involved in 
the war regime was their ‘abstract theorization of politics and culture, which trapped 
them in the timeless and spaceless thinking practice and weakened their connection 
with the everyday world’ (Shimizu 2015, 4). Similarly, non-Western IR scholars are 
placing too much emphasis on the dichotomy ‘between the West and the rest’ in 
configuring new IR theories, thus ignoring the everyday lives led by people in non-
Western regions. This may result in a simple affirmation of the prevailing hegemony 
and thus perpetuate power relations within non-Western countries. As a result, some 
discussion of non-Western IRT runs the risk of being co-opted into the Western 
positivist mainstream IR that it intends to criticize. 
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 Shimizu then turns to the work of Tosaka Jun. Tosaka was initially a member of the 
Kyoto School (a student of Nishida) but later became a Marxist and was jailed for his 
opposition to Japan’s imperialist wars in Asia. Examining his work helps shed light on 
how non-Western theoretical work can both be truly inclusive and not to be abused. 
Tosaka’s writings are often understood as the antithesis of the mainstream Kyoto 
School philosophers and unlike the latter, he never offered justification for the war. In 
Tosaka’s writings, he often criticized the Kyoto School as ‘promulgating a bourgeois 
idealism that ignores material historical conditions and issues of social praxis’ 
(Standford-Encyclopedia). According to Shimizu, what characterizes Tosaka’s 
political philosophy was his unchanging focus on ordinary citizens’ everyday 
experiences such as culture and literature and critical reflection on morality (Shimizu 
2015, 15). Yet Tosaka did not hold an essentialist and parochial understanding about 
culture and morality like other Kyoto School philosophers. Tosaka argued that culture 
has an important function for moral reflection beyond that of a mere means to identify 
one’s distinctiveness from the West. Put differently, it should be a mirror for critical 
reflection of morality (Shimizu 2014, 691). Shimizu make use of the Kyoto School 
and Tosaka’s story as a benchmark for criticizing the current non-Western IR 
discourse as well as the current soft power foreign policy of Japan for their tendency 
of adopting an essentialized understanding of culture (e.g. using culture to distinguish 
their values from alleged Western values), thus losing the opportunity for self-
reflection (Shimizu 2014, 696). 
Given the lessons drawn from the case of the Kyoto School and their relevance to the 
contemporary non-Western IR narratives, Shimizu (2014a) posits that a more 
promising and useful agenda for the non-Western IR movement is an approach to 
overcome the dichotomy of the Western and non-Western IRT. This can be done by 
problematizing ‘the basic formulation and idiom of our query’ (Behera 2007, 341). 
Accordingly, post-Western IR is not merely an attempt to establish a new School of 
IR in non-Western regions, but an attempt to ‘redefine IR itself’ (Behera 2007, 342). 
The post-Western IR approach clearly involves critical engagement with IR as an 
academic discipline by re-envisioning the epistemology and ontology of IR (Shimizu 
2013). This has been the key theoretical approach adopted by Shimizu’s Afrasian 
Research center at Ryukoku University (Kyoto campus). This center has focused on 
researching multiculturalism and post-Western discourses such as languages, culture, 
and conflict resolution based on the empirical cases of African and Asian people. This 
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 kind of research promises to enrich the existing Western IRT as well as the emerging 
non-Western IRT literature as such discourse focuses on providing the perspectives of 
the ‘marginalized people’ in the non-West rather than attempting to replace Western 
IRT with a new kind of hegemony and parochialism under the form of national 
Schools of IR in Asia. 
Along with Kosuke Shimizu, Josuke Ikeda is also aware of the dual ‘triumph’ and 
‘trauma’ legacy of the Kyoto School and thus calls for Japanese IR to turn to the post-
Western approach (Ikeda 2014b). The Kyoto School, in his view, was a project that 
faced squarely the question of Western centricity for the first time, at least in Japan, 
from a non-Western standpoint. Yet, it increasingly lost the balance between Western 
and Eastern Philosophies, which it aimed to bridge, in the direction of essentializing 
East over West. It thus eventually became supportive of government policy. Ikeda 
sees similar risks in the construction of IR ‘Schools’ in Asia that ‘differentiate from 
the mainstream IR, retreating to their own cultural and logical standpoints to show 
their superiority in the name of uniqueness, as has been the case of the former Kyoto 
School’ (Ikeda 2010, 32). The problem with ‘non-Western’ movements, in his view, is 
that the West-centricity question cannot always solved by extending its theoretical 
reach toward the non-Western world, or by just emphasizing the uniqueness of 
particular areas or states. It can only be done by de-essentializing the Western way of 
thinking about international/world politics (Ikeda 2010, 32). In this sense, post-
Western IR avoids the fallacy of claiming uniqueness by de-essentialising the Western 
way of theorizing, not the West itself (Ikeda 2011b). Ikeda then suggests 
reformulating IR theory in more imaginative and creative way. This would not be 
mere criticism toward ‘Western’ mainstream but indeed would be the process of 
‘intaking, criticising, picking up and tailoring wider range of knowledge among 
cultures.’ In this light, his exploration of modern Japanese ‘will only be one possible 
ingredient for cooking IR in more tasteful manner’ (Interview, February 2014).  
Yet, unlike Shimizu and others, Ikeda’s call for ‘post-Western’ IR is rooted in his 
British education and scholarly linkages. His proposed agenda for ‘post-Western IR’ 
is based on the inter-civilizational dialogues rooted in a collaborated project between 
Japanese and British English School scholars entitled ‘The English School, post-
Western IR, and beyond.’ As part of the said project, English School professors 
Andrew Linkater and Hidemi Suganami traveled to Japan almost every year between 
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 2010 and 2014, teaching students and publishing articles on the expansion of 
international society through the ‘civilizing process’ (see, for example,  Linkater 
2011). Another source for Ikeda’s turn toward ‘cross-civilization’ dialogues is found 
in the thought of Tokyo School scholar Nakamura Hajime whose work aims to 
introduce a cross-civilizational method for comparing ideas (both religious and 
secular)  that connect with the notion of world community and peace (Ikeda 2011b). 
That said the current drive toward indigenous theorizing in East Asia has been 
inspired by and is closely linked to the global expansion of the English School. 
Most recently, Ikeda has been engaging in a project with scholars in Taiwan, Turkey, 
US and others, in which he would project the re-theorisation of the world along with 
the notion of ‘road’ or ‘road networks.’ He suggests a means for a paradigm shift in 
IR Theory by shifting the current focus on politics and the political of 
Westphalian/Western IR to the ‘non-political.’ In doing so, Ikeda suggests that this 
requires a turn toward history from theory, together with an insertion of comparative 
analysis to ultimately develop International Relations as ‘cosmopolitan of ideas’ 
(Ikeda 2011a). While it has been the idea of space and territory that has dominated to 
theorise our world, Ikeda introduces his idea of possible re-theorisation by focusing on 
what penetrates territories, in which communication and exchange of ideas about the 
world itself would be a major pillar of understanding. This latest approach has just 
emerged in somewhat coherent manner, with the help of the conception of 
‘civilization’ (Interview, February 2014; see also Ikeda 2014a). 
Post-Western IR as ‘decolonized IR’ 
Giorgio Shani, one of the first scholars to coin the term ‘post-Western IR’ back in 
2008, however, disagrees with the interpretation of ‘post-Western’ IR through the lens 
of the English School. As he critiques: 
Post-Western IR [in that light] would be to say ‘Look we live in a world which 
was colonized and which still has Western values and assumptions, we can’t 
really escape from that. So we can’t really talk about a Japanese IR and there 
can’t be a Japanese school of IR as such.’ That’s very different and I don’t 
think we can start with the English School approach and expand the 
international society. That’s not post-Western because if we look at the 
expansion of international society, we just say that the values of international 
society were synonymous with European values and then they become 
internationalized. That’s not post-Western (Interview, February 2014).  
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 In contrast, Shani’s understanding of post-Western IR has its roots in post-colonialism 
and South Asia studies. In fact, Shani was not aware that post-Western IR existed and 
that other people are also working on this issue when he first used the term in his 2008 
article. His main area of specialization at that time was South Asia which explains 
why he became interested in the idea of post-Western IR (Shani 2001, 2008, 2006). 
Then having moved from India to Japan, he became more exposed to East Asian ideas 
of the structuring of society and more specifically what shape their values. And this 
stimulated his search on understanding or trying to conceptualize what post-Western 
IR would be. As he further explained his vision of post-Western IR to this author: 
For me, ‘post Western IR’ comes out of certain traditions. On the one hand, we 
have British critical political theory which looks at the idea of universality and 
cultural differences. Then we have another tradition which I would say draws 
on postcolonial theory. The biggest distinction between post-Western IR 
Theory and post-colonialism would be that post-Western IR firstly believes 
that those societies which have not been colonized have still internalized 
Western assumptions and secondly it is certainly a possibility of engaging with 
differences, with something other than the West. So this is different from 
postcolonial theory which will say that everything is contaminated by 
colonialism. They would not look at the possibility of reaching universality in 
the sense that comes out of critical theory and postcolonial theory traditions 
(Interview, February 2014).  
Similarly, Shani differentiates his ‘post-Western’ IR project from Acharya and 
Buzan’s non-Western IRT initiative. According to Shani, Acharya and Buzan presume 
that there is no international theory and they look at the national Schools of IR. So 
they pose the question of why there is no IRT in the non-West that resembles the 
English School of IR. Such an approach, in his view, is neither ‘non-Western’ nor 
‘post-Western.’ As he further explains: 
My argument is if you look at national Schools, it is not ‘non-Western.’ Look 
at Japan! Japanese School of IR is basically a Western School of IR. You have 
to identify core values. If you look at Chinese scholarship, it is different 
because I think they have developed certain core values – Confucian values 
specific to China – upon which you construct a school of thought. You cannot 
construct national schools; you can only construct schools of values. So, the 
English School is not about being ‘English’ but the central concept is 
international society. So then what other concepts can we use to build other 
forms of international relations? (Interview, February 2014). 
The task of enriching IR theory and modifying its Western-centric nature, Shani 
argues, cannot be realized simply by the addition of new voices from the Global South 
as Acharya and Buzan suggest. A genuinely ‘post-Western’ critical IR, in his view, 
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 would seek ‘to go beyond mere mimicry of the “derivative discourses” of the modern 
West by identifying critical discourses on the political from within non-western 
traditions’ (Shani 2008, 722). Post-Western IR in this light is trying to de-essentialise 
the hegemony of Western IR theorizing, yet at the same time avoiding to end up 
‘reproducing the very hegemony they set out to critique’ (Shani 2008, 723). 
In recent years, Shani has worked mainly in the area of human security. This agenda is 
partly related to the Departmental setting where he is working – the International 
Christian University (ICU). Unlike other Japanese universities where IR is associated 
with the Department of Law, ICU concentrates on a very different scope of peace 
studies. Shani is the associate director of the Peace Research Center within ICU so he 
was hired, in his words, to look at conflicts, human security, and peace studies 
(Interview, February 2014). Combining his personal interest with this institutional 
setting, Shani is trying to work on the linkages between religion, identity and human 
security from a post-Western perspective (Shani 2014). In his latest work, Shani 
criticizes Western IR with reference to conventional theories of human security. He 
advocates that a ‘post-Western’ and ‘post-secular’ conception of human security 
should be sought instead that recognizes multiple religious and cultural contexts in 
which human dignity is firmly embedded (Shani 2014, 2015). He plans to edit a 
volume on a pan-Asian perspective with the hope to create more venues to interact 
with other Asian scholars (Interview, February 2014).  
Shani’s understanding of post-Western IR is largely shared by Ching-chang Chen – a 
Taiwanese scholar working at Ritsumeikan University. Despite having been trained in 
Britain (as a student of Hidemi Suganami) at the same IR Department with Josuke 
Ikeda (Aberystwyth University), Chen, unlike Ikeda, has not been predominantly 
influenced by the English School. Rather, his ‘intellectual identity’ is rather ‘eclectic’: 
If I really need to categorize myself, I would say that I am using some 
constructivism and some post-colonial studies as well. And I am familiar with 
the mainstream IR language because I think in order to understand how power 
relations actually work, it is important to figure out the language that is often 
employed by mainstream IR theories. My orientation is somehow in between 
critical approaches and mainstream theories. But I am not using mainstream 
theories per se. I am trying to understand why certain policy discourses are 
more powerful than others because they involve the language of mainstream 
theories (Interview, February 2015).  
Chen is one of the most vocal critics of the efforts by East Asian IR communities in 
constructing national Schools of IR modeled after the English School. He criticizes 
162 
 
 that the discourse of non-Western IRT represented through national Schools of 
thought would also be hegemonic if they just aim to be another English School or to 
show superiority over Western IRT (Chen 2011b, 59). Chen particularly criticizes 
what he views as the uncritical adoption of the English School’s concept ‘international 
society’ among Japanese scholars. The English School, he believes, is essentially a 
Eurocentric theory with its own selection bias (Interview, February 2015). Chen 
argues that those non-Westphalian societies ‘must lack some crucial qualities of 
international society’ in their regional system. Hence they are ‘unable to produce any 
English School-comparable theory that can meet the Western standard’ but serves 
merely as a ‘derivative discourse’ of Western IR  (Chen 2011b, 45). In other words, 
‘the non-Western tortoise will never catch the European hare’ if the former continues 
to use Western IR as a sole reference point (Kayaoglu 2010, 196; quoted in Chen 
2011b, 45). Rather, he suggests that for scholars who are involved in theory building, 
one of the first important tasks is to unpack the problematic embedded in existing 
mainstream theories, and that is Eurocentricism. Nonetheless, it seems to him that 
in experiencing the recent joys to develop a national school of IR in China and 
to some extent in Japan several years ago, these scholars [non-Western IRT 
theorists] did not really challenge the structure embedded in mainstream 
theories. Rather they reproduced the structural and power relations in their 
indigenous theory building. To me, it is a problem that should be addressed by 
scholars who are interested in alternative theory development (Interview, 
February 2015). 
This ‘post-Western’ method has been employed in Chen’s recent systematic studies 
on the diplomatic disputes between China and Japan over the Ryukyu islands 
(Okinawa) in the 19th century – an understudied inquiry which will help to illuminate 
how historical roots might affect contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In this 
project, Chen (2014) criticizes the narrow European-centric conception of 
international society presented by the English School. He believes that if the concept 
of international society can be used more critically and broadly, it can help us explain 
why China responded to Japan’s incorporation of the Ryukyu in a rather passive way. 
Accordingly, China could have more coercive measures to prevent Japan from 
annexing Ryukyu or it could have accepted a US proposal to divide the Ryukyus in 
two parts with China controlling the Southern part. As it happened, China chose not to 
do anything and Japan eventually took over all the Ryukyus. This puzzle has not been 
adequately addressed by materialist perspectives (China’s lack of hard power to 
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 forestall Japan) or other mainstream scholarly work (e.g. Chinese strategic culture). 
Nor were domestic politics perspectives (corruption and incompetence of late Qing 
leaders) sufficient to understand what happened. Instead, Chen argues that China 
reacted the way it did because it was deeply socialized into the old norms and rules of 
East Asian society and institutions embedded in the tribute system.  
The alternative explanation proposed by Chen is based on the premise that the norms 
and institutions originating from European international society (e.g. equality among 
members demonstrating their sovereignty, balance-of-power politics, etc.) should not 
be treated as a universally valid starting point when analyzing the strategic behavior of 
political entities outside the West. In the case of pre-modern East Asia, he argues, the 
institution is the hierarchical tribute system with China at the top. The shared norms 
are Confucian norms, values and practices rather than those focusing on material 
power (including control of territorial possessions) (Chen 2014, 90). In this context, 
Japan was no longer considered a member of the East Asian international society but a 
‘treacherous’ outsider (Chen 2014, 100). Employing compellence against Japan over 
the Ryukyus or dividing up the islands with Japan, however, would violate this key 
aspect of status hierarchy and call into question China’s position as the genuine center 
within Confucian cosmology, along with the assumed moral superiority of its 
leadership. To preserve the hierarchical order and its moral authority and legitimacy 
as the ‘father’ of Asian family, China decided to settle the Ryukyu issue like a family 
affair because the use of force would expose its failure to keep the family in harmony 
(Chen 2014, 98-9). 
This finding shows that European-centric concepts and theories of international 
society need not be applied in the case of East Asia. It also has significant policy 
relevance for today’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan. 
While the current IR literature on Sino-Japanese relations tends to focus on either 
‘power’ or ‘interest’, Chen’s study has illustrated how the Ryukyu debacle paved the 
way for transforming Chinese perceptions of Japan, or, to put it another way, the 
borders of a once-shared civilization. A sustainable resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
issue, then, should move from calls for putting aside sovereignty differences toward a 
more inclusive, post-Westphalian bordering practice in East Asia where it is not 
always power or interests that matter (Chen 2014, 87). Chen’s thesis, thus, seems 
similar to David Kang’s (and arguably John Fairbank’s) earlier argument about the 
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 China’s hierarchical world order in pre-modern East Asia – a perspective which has 
already precipitated critique from several Japanese scholars for its Sino-centric 
tendency and selection bias of historical cases (e.g. Kohno 2013; Inoguchi 2006). 
As can be seen, while Japanese scholars are increasingly interested in a post-Western 
IR agenda, they have not yet reached a consensus on what constitutes its substance. To 
further this agenda, Giorgio Shani organized a panel titled ‘Post-Western IR: What is 
it and how does it work?’ at the 2015 ISA convention in New Orleans, USA. The 
panel included scholars from within and beyond Japan who have intensively talked 
about post-Western IR recently (Chair: Giorgio Shani, Panelists: Kosuke Shimizu, 
Navnita C. Behera, Chih-yu Shih, and Robbie G. Shilliam). The three questions 
heatedly discussed at the panel included 1) what is ‘post-Western’ IR and how does it 
differ both from ‘Western’ and ‘Non-Western’ IR; 2) how does post-Western IR 
‘work’ in practice, and what should be the focus of post-Western research agendas in 
IR; and 3) what is the saliency of post-Western IR in a rapidly globalizing world? 
Should it be subsumed under the category of ‘Global IR’ and, if so, whose histories 
are occluded? The panelists held widely diverse views about these questions and in 
the end no agreement was reached. Nonetheless, this ‘post-Western IR’ agenda seems 
to be the most likely orientation for Japanese scholars in the years to come. As Ching-
chang Chen observes: 
Some may think that ‘post Western’ itself is still Western in the sense that the 
West is always there as a reference point. Still, I think that it is kind of positive 
and productive strategy because post Western can mitigate the possibility of 
producing IR discourse which committed the mistakes of building non-
Western national school. I think it is still one step further. That is a positive 
move (Interview, February 2015). 
At a crossroads: Whithering Japanese IR? 
Given all the scholarly initiatives and developments mentioned above, will the non-
/post-Western IR movement critically change the course of IR studies in Japan similar 
to what has occurred within Chinese IR academia? This final section will evaluate the 
impact of this academic movement on Japanese IR academia as a whole as well as 
project what future developments of IR theorizing in Japan might be.  
Initially, this study finds that researchers who are interested in the Western/non-
Western IR debate constitute only a modest portion of the Japanese IR community. 
The movement toward indigenous theory building in Japan, therefore, has only a 
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 limited impact on the whole Japanese IR academia. Another influential theoretical 
direction in Japan consists of researchers employing mainstream and constructivist 
theory although they are also a part of the Japanese IR academia. This is because, as 
analysed above, Japanese IR studies are predominantly occupied by diplomatic history 
and regional studies. The encounter between these two major intellectual streams and 
the mainstream Western/non-Western theoretical approaches creates a crossroads for 
Japanese IR as seen in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Major theoretical directions in Japan concerning the EAIRT debate 
As could be expected, scholars working in mainstream (rationalist) IR tradition are 
mostly unimpressed and thus largely unaffected by the non-Western IR theory in 
general and ‘Japanese’ IR in particular. Like their Western counterparts, they believe 
that theory, in a strict sense, should be universally applicable and that social sciences 
should use the term ‘theory’ to indicate a logical explanation in which causal 
relationships are articulated in an objective way. Kazuya Yamamoto – an associate 
professor at Waseda University who was trained in positivism and quantitative 
methods – argues that ‘there is neither Western theory nor non-Western theory’ if 
theory is understood in this sense. While not disregarding the value of diversity of 
ideas in IR studies, Yamamoto believes that the non-Western IRT movement initiated 
by Acharya and Buzan and followed up by Japanese scholars should be seen as 
‘normative and ideological’ rather than a fully-fledged theoretical debate because 
what they are advocating for is not theory but philosophy. Yamamoto’s critique is that 
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 proponents for non-Western IRT do not distinguish the two notions clearly (Interview, 
February 2014). In his article reviewing the development of IR in Japan, Yamamoto 
(2010) argues that while Japanese IR studies continue to be dominated by the 
historical tradition, there has been growing interest in theoretical studies and 
diversification of approaches. His implied message is that theory should be understood 
rigorously and that IR studies in Japan will follow this theoretical direction. 
Another professor who identifies himself as a ‘hard realist’ – Yoichiro Sato (PhD - 
University of Hawaii, USA) – is even more sceptical about moves toward building 
national schools of thought or non-Western IR orientations. The reason is not so much 
that he does not think they have different new perspectives to contribute to the 
discussions about IR but more that too much diversification of approaches in the form 
of national IRs will become ‘closed circles’ and valuable dialogues will thus be lost. 
In the process of constructing indigenous perspectives, the lack of engagement with 
mainstream approaches, according to Sato, will lead these scholars to ‘encircling 
themselves.’ As he further observes:  
My scepticism (toward the non-Western/Japanese IR movement) is related to 
my scepticism of critical studies and constructivist approaches. They end up 
creating their own jargon and creating new jargon becoming a game within a 
closed circle and that disrupts communication across different approaches. 
Some people in the constructivist camp are very much going in that direction 
although others try to keep engaging with mainstream approaches and 
traditional utilitarian theories. In Japan, I think both types have already 
presented themselves among the so-called Japanese IR people and also some 
foreign scholars who work with those ‘Japanese School’ scholars (Interview, 
February 2015). 
Although these scholars acknowledge that existing theories at times do not adequately 
explain all the dimensions of Japanese/East Asian international relations (as seen in 
Kang 2003a; Hughes 2007), they disagree that those misfits disqualify Western IR. 
Rather, alternative method would be employing eclectic framework as Katzenstein 
and Okawara has set an example (Katzenstein and Okawara 2006; Akimoto 2013; 
Sato and Hirata 2008). Rationalist approaches have recently regained their influence in 
explaining Japan’s security issues as the Shinzo Abe’s administration adopts policy 
changes reflecting a ‘normal country’ vision amid Japan’s heightened tensions with 
China. 
Another dimension of Japanese IR theory is its constructivist orientation. As discussed 
earlier, constructivism is a popular approach among Japanese IR academia, not least 
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 because of its affinity with the historical and cultural studies tradition of IR studies in 
Japan. The popularity of constructivism in Japan may also have significant practical 
implications. According to Koji Murata, Japan’s relative decline, as opposed to 
China’s rapid rise, means that Japan needs a new national identity that subsumes its 
former status as the world’s second largest economy. Constructivism, in this light, 
may be of great help (Murata 2010, 364). In fact, constructivism has been employed 
extensively in research about Japan’s identity and soft power. Hiro Katsumata 
(associate professor at Kanazawa University) is the Japanese scholar who employs 
constructivism extensively in explaining Japanese politics and East Asian integration. 
He particularly focuses on the cultural aspects e.g. the role of norms and cultural 
exchanges (e.g. Japanese pop culture) in promoting regional integration and forming 
an East Asian regional identity (Katsumata and Iida 2011; Katsumata 2012). Japan 
and ASEAN regionalism, in Katsumata’s view, represents an appropriate case study 
for enriching existing theories in both senses of analytical eclecticism and broadened 
constructivist research agenda today e.g. the issues of multiple ideational factors or the 
agency role of local actors (Katsumata 2006, 262; 2009; 2011, 559). Katsumata argues 
that Japanese norms, particularly those focus on Japan’s in-between identity (as an 
advanced industrialized democracy and an Asian country) effectively explain the 
country’s visions and behaviours within an East Asian context (e.g. the initiative for 
creating an East Asian Community, its response to the ‘Asian values’ debate, and a 
non-intrusive approach in ASEAN human rights issues) (Katsumata 2006, 261-2). In a 
comparison of Japan’s new Asianism today (to ‘keep the West engaged in Asia’) with 
the former pre-war pan-Asianism (to ‘push the West out of Asia’), Katsumata argues 
that these differences may be understood by advancing the premise that Japan is in the 
process of transformation of its identity (Katsumata 2004, 3).  
Other scholars who are working intensively on Japan’s new identity and its culture 
and vision of Asian regionalism under the lens of constructivism include Takashi 
Inoguchi (Inoguchi 2000, 2011; Collet and Inoguchi 2012; Inoguchi and Newman 
1997) and Akitoshi Miyashita (Miyashita 2007; Miyashita and Sato 2001). As noted 
earlier, given some overlapping interests in the research agendas between 
constructivism and the current non-Western IRT (e.g. the issue of Japanese identity), 
there has been sympathy generated for the non-Western IRT movement from the 
beginning, as seen in the case of Professor Inoguchi. It is important to note, however, 
that despite being one of the pioneers in exploring the question of whether there are 
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 non-Western IR theories in Japan back in 2007, Inoguchi has not proactively 
participated in the development of ‘Japanese IR theories’ ever since. His research 
agenda thus far has not moved well beyond the existing IR theories, particularly 
constructivism (see, for example Inoguchi 1999, 2014; Inoguchi and Bacon 2005; 
Inoguchi and Ikenberry 2013). In fact, Inoguchi has become more cautious with the 
non-Western IRT movement recently. As he shared in an interview with this author in 
December 2013, the biggest question for those who like to regard themselves as 
theoreticians elsewhere as well as in Japan is that they should articulate concepts and 
theories more carefully, especially when distinguishing themselves from mainstream 
Western IR theories. He further observes: ‘all the Indian, Chinese, Korean scholars are 
confirming that the products of their research are coming soon… Yet, just saying “I 
do believe this or that” may not be able to persuade many others, especially the 
Western counterparts’ (Interview, December 2013). I have, therefore, identified him 
with the constructivist faction in Japanese IR academia rather than the non-Western 
IRT movement. 
In short, the impact of this non-Western/EAIRT debate on the rest of Japanese IR 
academia is not large. One of the reasons is the modest interest in theory generally and 
the dominance of empirical and historical studies that have characterized IR studies in 
post-war Japan. As Keio University’s Professor Yoshihide Soeya observes, ‘theories, 
in Japanese tradition, are not necessarily mainstream theories. There is not much 
interest nor necessarily respect for theory for theory’s sake. Empirical studies are what 
scholars primarily do’ (Interview, December 2015). Given this, Japanese scholars tend 
to produce empirical work relating to Japan’s diplomatic history and regional studies. 
Although this kind of work may be policy relevant, it is important to note, however, 
that unlike the controversial involvement of modern Japanese intellectuals in Japan’s 
imperialist policy during the interwar period, there is no strong linkage between the 
policy and scholarly circles in Japan nowadays. This characteristic has its root in the 
political inclination of Japanese scholars as Kosuke Shimizu observes: 
I found it quite interesting in this country that IR as a discipline has been quite 
critical about Japan’s foreign policy. In that sense, scholars in this country are 
pretty much left-wing if you applied some understanding of politics. They are 
working more on history and regional studies and I don’t think this trend will 




 Therefore, unlike what we have seen in the case of Chinese School, empirical work by 
Japanese scholars tends to explain and guide rather than justify Japan’s foreign policy. 
One such example is Yoshihide Soeya’s conceptualization of a ‘realistic and 
appropriate’ grand strategy for Japan which in his word, is ‘not necessary theory but 
practical for policy discussion’ (Interview, December 2013). Since 2005, he has 
published a number of writings arguing for Japan to pursue ‘middle power 
diplomacy.’ His main argument is that in the age when Sino-American relations are 
critical to the shaping of Asia’s regional order, there is not much room left for other 
countries to compete with these two great powers or to influence the future evolution 
of China-US relations. In this context, Japan should stop pursuing great power politics 
and instead regard itself an equal player to other East Asian states which aims to 
promoting regional cooperation whenever possible.  
Regional cooperation is essential for Japan as well as other regional states because no 
country can deal with the ramifications of Sino-American relations or rivalry alone 
(Soeya 2005, 2011). Nonetheless, according to Soeya, regional states do have an 
agency and legitimacy in creating a sort of infrastructure of regional order out of 
cooperation among themselves for peaceful survival purpose. ‘It is a survival strategy 
in the era of East Asian G2, and the survival will be much more effective if we can 
cooperate among ourselves’ (Interview, December 2013). In the concluding chapter of 
his 2005 book, Soeya analysed a middle power network including Japan, Korea, 
ASEAN (Soeya 2005). He argues that Japan did pursue ‘de-factor middle power 
diplomacy’ in the past; examples of which include its explicit commitment to 
international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, its continued reliance 
on the alliance with the US, and particularly the rise of human security as a central 
pillar of Japan’s diplomatic agenda in recent years (Soeya 2011, 89).  
When being questioned by this author about the relevance of his ‘middle power 
diplomacy’ framework to the current policies of Shinzo Abe’s government, Professor 
Soeya indicated that he has been working on the second volume to review Japanese 
foreign policy changes during the past ten years. He argues that despite Abe’s recent 
policy innovations, Japan’s post-war foreign policy framework which consists of 
Japan’s Peace Constitution, the US-Japan security alliance, and historical burden of 
Japan’s past military aggression remains the same even for Abe’s administration. As 
long as this unique framework stays intact, it does not allow Japan to behave like a 
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 great power (Interview, December 2013). Although Soeya is modest about the 
theoretical contribution of his work, this conceptualization of Japan’s past behaviour 
and strategic choices will help expand and enrich realist arguments about balance of 
power and hegemonic stability.  
All these above discussions seem to suggest that the non-Western/EAIRT debate will 
most likely continue to command interest among a portion of the Japanese scholarly 
community discussed in the previous section. It is interesting to note that even among 
this group of scholars, there is not much enthusiasm and even much less optimism or 
indeed a desire for the construction of a distinct ‘Japanese school’ of IR theory. Most 
of the scholars interested in non-/post-Western IR that the author has interviewed for 
this study share a belief that the non-Western IR debate will not greatly influence 
Japanese IR thinking. One major reason for this is the burden of Japan’s past history. 
As Josuke Ikeda posits, ‘Japanizing IR is still having an impact closer to the 
sophisticated modification of ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ even we 
might change its name to ‘East Asian Community’ or whatever. So simply stated, 
Japanese scholars have been hesitant and still do hesitate’ (Interview, February 2014). 
In fact, leading scholars in the global non-Western IRT camp similarly warn about the 
pitfalls of pre-war ‘Japanese School’ embedded in the ideas of Kyoto School of 
philosophy and pan-Asianism (Acharya 2010a, 1003-4; 2011a, 855; Ling 2000, 283-4; 
Shih 2010b, 545-6).  
Another reason that works against the prospect of a distinct Japanese School of IR is 
power shift. Yoshihide Soeya argues that as the result of China’s rapid rise and the 
Chinese aspiration for a China-centered world, the tendency for Japan to side with the 
established liberal international order has become stronger. In the competition of big 
thinking and ideas on IR between China and the West, ‘there is no room for countries 
like Japan to come up with its independent attempt to build some theory’ (Interview, 
December 2013). Interestingly, despite their differences on a desirable Japanese 
contribution to the field of IR, Japanese scholars from all approaches almost 
unanimously disregard the value of a ‘Chinese School’, be it its motive, content, or 
applicability. This is because the attempt to construct Chinese IR knowledge has been 
seen by many Japanese scholars not as providing an alternative analytical framework 
for existing Western theories but as serving the Chinese national interests and 
promoting cultural exceptionalism. Kosuke Shimizu – a pro-EAIRT scholar – 
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 indicates that his effort to study Japanese pre-war philosophy is to give the Chinese 
counterparts caution regarding how theories can actually shape the world it studies 
and how they can be abused by the governments to justify aggressive behavior to 
toward other countries (Interview, February 2014). Such thinking is seen in the below 
remarks of Yoshihide Soeya: 
So-called ‘Chinese IR theories’ are mostly justification of their foreign policy 
or the reality that China is getting strong. That reflects the strong Sino-centric 
mentality. The flipside of that is that not many non-Chinese scholars are ready 
to buy into Chinese arguments. So to what extent you can call that theory 
building I think that is dubious to be frank (Interview, December 2013).  
Given all the pros and cons of developing a Japanese style theory, it can be concluded 
here that post-Western IR agenda seems to be the most promising candidate for a 
Japanese contribution to IR theory. This approach aims at developing a better body of 
knowledge by reformulating rather than displacing Western IRT. The Japanese theory 
development in this context may constitute a part of the broader regional body of 
knowledge fuelled by post-Western IR discourse. Considering the development of IR 
in Japan so far, together with Japan’s position as a ‘bridge between civilizations’, 
there is an expectation that Japan might be ‘the center of “Asian IR dialogue” in the 
future’ as Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi – Vice President of Japan Association of 
International Relations – has explicitly stated (Ritsumeikan-News 2014). In fact, there 
have been ongoing pan-regional dialogues in the form of collaborative projects as well 
as international seminars convened not only in Japan but also in Taiwan, South Korea, 
and India with the participation of many Japanese scholars. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the impact of the non-Western/EAIRT debate in Japan. It 
maintains that this theoretical debate has held an interest among a cohort of younger 
Japanese IR scholars, mostly based in the greater Kyoto area. These scholars were 
initially trying to confirm the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ theories in the past through 
re-examining the work of pre-war Japanese intellectuals for contemporary IR 
relevance. Nonetheless, they have increasingly realized and acknowledged the 
problems of this kind of parochial knowledge and gradually shifted to a post-Western 
IR agenda. Beyond this hard-core group, however, this particular theoretical 
dimension has had modest impact on the other intellectual traditions in Japanese IR 
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 studies, including the mainstream IRT camp, the increasingly popular constructivist 
faction, and the dominant streams of diplomatic history and regional studies. As noted 
earlier, the Japanese IR discipline is characterised by its acceptance of diverse 
perspectives and approaches without competition and efforts for integration and 
synthesis. In this light, it is likely that these major currents will continue to go down 
their own conceptual and separate path, thus leading theoretical development in the 
country to a crossroads.  
As this chapter has asserted, there is a clear linkage between the theoretical identity of 
Japanese scholars and their preferred approach to IR. This theoretical identity is 
largely shaped by their prior education, scholarly networking, as well as the 
unresolved national identity of Japan as a country situated between East and West. 
Accordingly, scholars interested in indigenous theory building often come from the 
critical traditions of IR and are more prone to identify themselves to the ‘non-West’ 
(Asia) whilst other theory-oriented scholars largely categorize themselves as part of 
the Western liberal order and theoretical orientation. As a scholar has observed about 
these divergent perspectives: 
In some sense, it can be understood as a problem of generational outlooks. 
While senior scholars are more interested in producing sophisticated 
frameworks and analysing actual international relations, younger scholars are 
more intent on building a disciplinary identity (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, 
February 2014). 
The reality that the number of Japanese IR academics interested in theory building is 
not large has something to do with the overall ‘characteristics’ or nature of IR studies 
in Japan. Japanese IR has retained its interdisciplinary tradition, serving as a 
patchwork of several disciplines. Accordingly, history, IR, and area studies are the 
three key elements constituting the whole body of knowledge of Japanese IR studies. 
That the majority of Japanese scholars are doing area and empirical studies explains 
the comparatively low interests in theory and theorizing in Japan. This is further 
complicated by the legacy of Japan’s pan-Asianism and the past involvement of 
modern Japanese intellectuals in the country’s imperialist wars. Such a historical 
legacy renders any effort or even discussion on developing a new Japanese paradigm 
for East Asia less credible to regional scholars. In practice, therefore, not much 
interest exists even among the non-Western IR theory oriented scholars in developing 
a Japanese equivalent to the ‘Chinese School’ of IR. As one scholar has noted, 
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 Japanese IR studies, in comparison with other East Asian counterparts such as China 
and Korea, ‘are neither policy relevant/engaged nor theoretically intensive/original. IR 
academics were ill-equipped to pursue policy relevance and theoretical innovation’ 
(Huang 2007, 180). 
Given the aforementioned constraints and characteristics of IR studies in Japan, it is 
hardly surprising that the latest publication on Japanese IR and non-Western IR in 
Japan emanated from historical inquiry rather than theoretical endeavour and the study 
of political history rather than IR per se. As Takashi Inoguchi has observed, the 
question is not so much about ‘Japanese IR theories’ but to historicize and 
contextualize selected American IR theories ‘to generate insights and positions much 
more sensitive to [Japan’s] historical and cultural complexities’ (Inoguchi 2002, 115). 
Against this background, more general theoretical discussions such as the post-
Western IR research agenda, which attempts to reformulate IR theory into a stronger 
body of knowledge, may be the only feasible direction for the non-Western/EAIRT 
discourse in Japan to pursue. In fact, Japanese IR, with its ‘large market, long 
tradition, political freedom and economic affluence’ (Inoguchi and Newman 2002, 11-
2) and the emerging reorientation toward post-Western IR, is most likely destined to 
prevail in future dialogues relating to defining and shaping a pan-regional paradigm 




 Chapter 5: Trailblazing, eclecticism, and business as usual:  
US academia responds to EAIRT 
On the basis of institutional development and research infrastructure, 
international relations no longer is an American social science. On the 
important dimension of theoretical hegemony, however, reports of American 
decline has been overstated. Unfortunately, a growing field composed of 
national parochialisms may not be best equipped for making sense of the new 
world politics that will merge in the next century (Kahler 1993, 412). 
International Relations as an academic discipline has not much changed since Stanley 
Hoffman’s famous statement in 1977 that it is an ‘American social science.’ 
Increasingly, however, regrets about the American domination in IR have intensified 
within and beyond American IR academia. This is because from the postcolonial turn 
in the 1980s to the more recent discourses on non-/post-Western IR Theory, there 
have been various attempts directed toward ‘de-Americanizing’ IR knowledge. While 
this academic movement has aroused significant interest in studying various non-
Western IR traditions in East Asia, there has been little analysis on how this debate is 
received in the US. In particular, how has American IR academia actually responded 
to the challenges from the ‘East Asian’ scholarship? 
To fill the gap, this chapter examines the presence and impact of the current East 
Asian IR theory (EAIRT) debate on the US IR academic community.62 It finds that 
this debate does hold an interest within a small number of US-based (in most of the 
cases, foreign-born) East Asia specialists and for American scholars working in the 
constructivist and reflectivist traditions. Among the various positions, three have 
morphed into actual claims accompanied by distinct the ‘bringing East Asian in’ 
movement led by David Kang; the ‘Global IR’ approach spearheaded by Amitav 
Acharya; and the postcolonial agenda of re-envisioning IR with Daoist worldism 
advocated by feminist theorist L.H.M. Ling. These conceptual developments have 
shaped the practices of these scholars quite clearly as seen through their trailblazing 
endeavours in terms of research, teaching, and networking activities. Collectively, 
these efforts are intended to re-orient global IR scholarship toward a less 
Western/American-centric nature and with theoretical inputs from Asian traditions. 
62 As one recent work has noted, it is difficult to define ‘what is an “American IR scholar” (e.g. should 
she/he be based, employed, born, or educated in the United States?)’ (Kristensen 2015b, 6). In this 
chapter, I use the term ‘American IR scholar’ interchangeably with ‘US-based scholar.’ ‘American IR’ 
or ‘US IR academia’, in this sense, is comprised of scholars who are currently working in American 
universities, regardless of their nationality and educational background. 
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 Although the form that this EAIRT debate is taken in the US is much more broadly 
focused in scope and by no means ‘nationalistic’, there exist certain linkages and 
interactions between the movements in the US and those in East Asia. 
Overall, however, there is little evidence that this debate has any particular impact on 
mainstream American IR.63 With few exceptions, mainstream American scholars are 
largely indifferent to the calls for building alternative theories, whether they originate 
from within (US) or outside of it (East Asia). The research underlying this chapter 
nonetheless reveals that American IR itself is facing an identity problem by 
increasingly shifting away from theoretical parsimony to non-paradigmatic 
approaches and/or analytical eclecticism when dealing with the empirical puzzles 
associated with area and regional studies. Therefore, while mainstream American 
scholars are generally unimpressed with the various claims for East Asian IR theory, 
their shift toward relatively greater eclecticism nonetheless reflects their desire to 
develop theoretical flexibility that best allows them to study global issues and other 
regions (in this case, East Asia) in the context of growing critique of the disjuncture 
between disciplinary and area studies. 
To explore these points, this chapter is organised as follows. It begins with a brief 
review of the conventional wisdom that IR is ‘an American social science.’ This 
serves as a springboard for better appreciating the motivations for change that the 
current EAIRT movement has developed and projected toward the American IR 
community. It will then identify the various critiques of the Western/American-centric 
theories and the alternative visions presented by the ‘dissidents’ in US academia. 
Those claims will be analysed in the context of how they actually shape these 
scholars’ practices. Lastly, this chapter examines the response of American 
mainstream scholars toward these various claims for non-Western/East Asian IR 
theory and to what extent such claims shape or may shape the nature and 
characteristics of American IR. The chapter concludes by arguing that the growing 
interest in studying East Asian politics due to global power shifting to the East and the 
surge of Asian students and immigrant scholars studying in American universities will 
63 ‘Mainstream American IR’ is commonly characterized by its positivist ontology and overwhelmingly 
privileges rational choice approaches (Waever 1998, 689). Most scholars believe that neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism are representatives of American mainstream IR. Nonetheless, constructivism 
(particularly its American branch) is increasingly categorized as part of the mainstream American IR 




                                                          
 gradually sharpen the academic discussions on East Asian international relations in 
the US. This is true despite the insistence of the most conservative mainstream 
accounts within American academia at the moment that such a debate does not exist. 
IR as ‘an American social science’: a matter of growing concern? 
Although the first IR department was established at Aberystwyth University in the 
United Kingdom in 1919, Stanley Hoffman (1977) argued that it was the United States 
that provided the most receptive ground in which the seeds of IR were planted and 
grown into a new field of study. According to Hoffman, the development of 
international relations as a discipline in the United States emerged from the 
convergence of three factors: 1) intellectual predispositions (the explosion of social 
sciences in general in the US after World War II); 2) political circumstances (the 
prominence of American political role in world affairs since 1945); and 3) institutional 
opportunities (the link between the scholarly and policy circles, the role of American 
foundations or ‘kitchen of power’ as well as the free and stimulating social science 
scholarship in the US) (Hoffmann 1977, 43-50).64 Hoffman further identified the three 
factors that have largely shaped the ‘characteristics’ of American intellectual 
predispositions from the outset: 1) a faith in scientific method; 2) a belief that science 
would be useful to society; and 3) the influence of immigrant scholars (Hoffmann 
1977; see also Cochran 2001, 55).65 Although the field has proliferated globally since 
1945, IR was dominated by the United States ‘both in terms of its policy agenda and, 
more importantly, its theoretical orientation’ (Smith 2000, 375). In short, the US has 
dominated the field of knowledge production with the pervasiveness of American 
power and the sheer size, rigor, and diversity of its IR community (Smith 2002, 81; 
Bacon and Newman 2002, 41). That is why Stanley Hoffman called it an ‘American 
social science’ or, alternatively, as Knud Jørgensen observed, ‘IR was launched in the 
image of social science as understood in the US’ (Jørgensen 2004, 331).  
64 On the role of American Foundations (e.g. the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations) on the 
establishment of the IR discipline in the US, see (Parmar 2012; Palmer 1980, 349). 
65 The free ‘politics and sociology of the scholarly community’ in the US provides a stimulating 
environment for the diversity in intellectual thought. The sizable US IR academia (more than 4,000 
scholars spanning across more than 2,000 colleges and universities) ‘makes it largely impossible to 
impose a single intellectual orthodoxy on any field of study’ (Walt 2011). As a ‘melting pot’ for foreign 
immigrants, the US has also attracted ‘the best and brightest’ foreign-born scholars (mostly from 
Europe) who later became prominent thinkers and public intellectuals after their immigration to the US 
(Hoffmann 1977, 47; Palmer 1980, 347-8). These include Hans Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, 




                                                          
 This view of American dominance in IR was further backed up by Kal Holsti (1985) 
in his survey of the state of the ‘dividing discipline’ in eight countries (America, 
Britain, Korea, India, France, Canada and Australia, and Japan). Holsti expands the 
hegemonic structure of IR to a ‘British-American intellectual condominium’ but 
acknowledges that there is ‘a greater reliance solely on Americans to produce the new 
insights, theoretical formulations, paradigms, and data sets of our field’ (Holsti 1985, 
128). More than a decade later, Ole Weaver (1998) also argued that IR is a ‘not so 
much an international discipline’ but rather ‘an American structure’ in that the US 
houses the leading journals and produces most of the field’s research funding (see also 
Smith 2002, 79-80). More recent critical reviews as to whether IR remains an 
American social science (Kahler 1993, 395; Smith 2000; Crawford and Darryl 2001) 
or more thought-provokingly ‘Was it ever an American Social Science?’ (Kahler 
1993, 396; Crawford and Darryl 2001, 17) point to the conclusion that the state of the 
discipline has not much changed more than three decades since Hoffman’s famous 
assertions. Empirically, the latest TRIP Survey Report also finds that 63.67% of US-
based scholars agree or strongly agree that IR is an American-dominated discipline 
while 53.16% think that it is important to counter American dominance in the IR 
discipline (TRIP 2015). 
Although an assertion of American domination in the entire IR discipline may be 
debatable particularly in the contemporary context (see, for example, Turton 2015), it 
is largely acknowledged that the global IR community is dependent on American 
scholars along Gramscian lines in the sub-field of IR theory. As Crawford and Darryl 
(2001, 20) observe, ‘while there is no clear and absolute consensus on the issue of 
whether IR continues to be (or ever was) an American social science’, scholars 
generally acknowledge ‘an overwhelming preponderance of American theoretical 
influences.’ Although there are excellent scholars overseas, Stephen Walt (2011) 
observes that there is a shortage of ‘big thinking’ on global affairs from scholars 
outside the trans-Atlantic axis, including continental Europe. He points to the lack of 
non-Anglo-Saxon scholars and public intellectuals whose writings have managed to 
become the object of global attention and debate. In other words, as Walt vividly puts 
it, ‘there’s no German, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, or Indian equivalent of Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the 
Last Man, or Joseph Nye’s various writings on “soft power”.’ His claims are 
empirically supported by the TRIP survey result on the top ten scholars whose work 
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 has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past twenty years: except for 
Barry Buzan, all the remaining nine most influential scholars in the field are 
Americans.66 
Why, then, is American hegemony in IR scholarship a matter of growing concern for 
not only non-Western but also some Western scholars? Ideally, there would be no 
problem if a theory or an idea is American or Western. Universalism is the ultimate 
end for which all sciences and theories pursue. Yet, as Hoffman (1977, 57) concluded, 
‘because of the American predominance, the discipline has also taken on some 
additional traits which are essentially American, and less in evidence in those other 
countries where the field is now becoming an object of serious study.’ Despite its 
acceptance of diversity of approaches, American IR is predominantly characterized by 
its rationalist ontology, empiricist epistemology, and positivist methodology which 
together ‘define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what 
counts as legitimate scholarship’ (Smith 2002, 72; see also Bacon and Newman 2002, 
39; Tickner and Wæver 2009, 311). A typical example is the dominance of US 
positivist approaches in IR publications (Maliniak et al. 2011, 461). As Steve Smith 
has perceptively observed: 
IR remains an American social science both in terms of the policy agenda that 
U.S. IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory, and in terms of the 
dominant (and often implicit) epistemological and methodological 
assumptions contained in that theory. This latter dominance is far more 
insidious than the former, especially because it is presented in the seemingly 
neutral language of being ‘the social science enterprise’ (Smith 2002, 81). 
The Americanocentric nature of American IR is also reflected in its teaching activities 
where few non-American and virtually no non-Western scholarship whatsoever was 
taught (Waever 1998, 699; Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 306). IR textbooks, written 
by American scholars, have bibliographies only in English and in American IR syllabi 
‘overwhelmingly the references, the suggestions for further reading, and the selected 
bibliographies are the works of American scholars, writing in American journals, or 
for American publishing houses’ (Nossal 2001, 171). For example, a survey on the 
teaching curricula of the ten leading American universities found that US IR programs 
assign an average of 94% of their reading assignments for works developed within the 
intellectual and socio-political context of the US. Among these top IR institutions, 
66 They are (in order) Alexander Wendt, Robert Keohane, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Joseph 




                                                          
 Michigan University is labelled ‘the most US-centric and nationalist IR school 
overall’ by assigning 99% of the readings merely from US-based scholars (Hagmann 
and Biersteker 2014, 303). In a standard ‘Introduction to International Relations’ 
course in the US, reflectivist theories such as ‘dependency, modern-world systems, 
and other Marxian or neo-Marxian perspectives are either ignored or treated 
superficially’ (Robles 1993, 527). In none of the leading American IR programs 
surveyed by Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 305) ‘were students introduced to non-
Western perspectives on, or conceptualizations of, international politics.’ For 
example, with the changing dynamics in world politics, many students now choose 
Asia (particularly China) as a focus of study. However, as Professor Stephanie 
Neuman from Columbia University puts it, it is difficult to expose students to an 
alternative, non-Western view of the world – to see it, for example, from China’s 
perspective – because, with few exceptions, what we read in the US about the Third 
World in general and about China in particular is written from the perspective of the 
US, e.g. the ‘China Threat Theory’ (Interview, October 2013). This has driven her to 
teach a course that introduces Third World’s perspectives on security issues and 
subsequently to edit one of the first volumes that questions the relevance of IRT to 
explaining Third World security (Neuman 1998). As she further explains to this 
author: 
I have been teaching a graduate course, Third World Security Issues, at 
Columbia University for many years.  An issue of confusion that continually 
arises is related to the term ‘sovereignty’.  My students find the concept of 
sovereignty we teach in the West confusing since it has so little relevance 
when applied to weak and poor states. There is a misfit between the term as we 
define it here in the West and its application in the Third World. And this is 
true for many of the central concepts in international relations theory. That’s 
how I came to organize the book, International Relations and the Third World. 
It came directly out of my teaching experience and my frustration with the 
Eurocentric, normative character of most IR theory (Interview, October 2013). 
The problem with this evident parochialism of American IR is that it ‘tends to 
represent world politics in an essentially Americocentric way’ (Nossal 2001, 170). 
This creates ‘barriers to understanding and engaging alternative views on international 
politics’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 307). As a leading US-based theorist has 
recalled to this author: two-thirds of the American Political Science Association (and 
perhaps two-thirds of American IR field) study just American foreign policy and 
international relations perspectives. Mainstream American IR, particularly rational 
theorists, views world politics in an uncomplicated and reductionist way through a 
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 decidedly American lens. ‘They think American power is there forever and it is good 
and America will shape the world… The norms are uncontested, we are right. The 
explanation is unproblematic, we have power and we will win. That is what the 
liberals have thought for the past 150 years’ (Interview, October 2013).  
Urging the development of a more ‘critical pedagogy’ in IR, Hagmann and Biersteker 
(2014, 307) warns that if this kind of parochialism and ethnocentrism in the field 
continues, it may entail risks that ‘students will project paradigmatically restricted, 
culturally closed, gender-biased, and historically situated perspectives onto 
international events, regions, and actors, and simply assume that these perspectives are 
universally applicable and trans-historically valid.’ Calls have thus been raised for 
lessening the American dominance in IR and ultimately striving toward international 
intellectual diversity. This is not an attempt to disregard or displace American theories 
but an endeavour to search for intellectual contributions in other parts of the world for 
the sake of a more representative discipline. As Crawford and Darryl (2001, 18) have 
noted, ‘the point is not that American scholarship has failed to make a positive and 
lasting contribution to IR. The question, rather, is whether room can be found for 
other constructions of the discipline…’ This is because despite the perceived path 
dependence on American theories and concepts in the global IR community, IR ‘is 
quite different in different places’ (Waever 1998, 723). Even in Britain where IR is 
closest to the US, we find the strongest criticism of American domination. Leading 
British theorist Steve Smith (2002, 68), for example, is uncompromising that the US 
study of IR has failed on normative grounds and that by ‘adopting an essentially 
rational-choice account of the relationship between interests and identity’, it ‘runs the 
risk of failing to understand other cultures and identities and thereby become more 
and more a U.S. discipline far removed from the agendas and concerns of other parts 
of the world.’ 
This wider discussion on American hegemony in IR serves as the point of departure 
for exploring the impact of the ongoing EAIRT debate on American IR. If American 
power and European immigrant scholars have been contributing to the dominance of 
the US in the discipline, will the relative decline of American power vis-a-vis ‘the rise 
of the East’, together with the growing number of Asian migrant scholars and students 
in American universities and IR programs, have any impact on the intellectual 
predispositions of American IR? 
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 The ‘dissidents’ and their rationales for theoretical reform 
Although American IR is overwhelmingly characterized by its positivist orientation, 
there are ‘dissenting voices’ increasingly being heard (Robles 1993, 527). According 
to a recent survey on contemporary ‘dissidence’ in American IR, 11.5% American 
scholars identified themselves as Dissidents, 27.9% declared to belong to the Minority 
while 46.2% considered themselves Mainstreamers (Hamati‐Ataya 2011, 366). The 
main criterion for this categorization is their different views on the degree of diversity 
needed in IR. Accordingly, mainstreamers are ‘systematically satisfied with the degree 
of diversity achieved’ which, in their view, reflects ‘a plurality of approaches, 
methodologies, and inquiries that remain in accordance with the central tenets of 
positivism, materialism, and statism.’ Dissidents and Minority scholars, meanwhile, 
are not satisfied with the current degree of diversity in IR and perceive that such 
diversity should entail ‘a stretching of the discipline’s scholarship beyond the limits 
set by mainstream IR scholars’ (Hamati‐Ataya 2011, 388). 
In light of the above definition, the EAIRT-related ‘dissidents’ in US academia are 
those who call for greater diversity of theoretical approaches with nutrition from East 
Asian cases and intellectual sources. They can be categorized into the three following 
positions, led by David Kang, Amitav Acharya, and L.H.M. Ling respectively. The 
first group comprises of East Asia specialists claiming for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to 
existing IR theory. The second group desires to construct a truly representative 
discipline by bridging mainstream IRT and area studies. The third group consists of 
scholars working in the reflectivist tradition of IR theory, mainly undertaking anti-
mainstream scholarship. The common ground is their dissatisfaction with the current 
state of the Western centric nature and American domination of IR and their desire to 
introduce alternative approaches based on non-Western, and for the purpose of this 
study, East Asian understandings of world politics. The extent and nature of their 
dissatisfaction and claims, however, are different. Although there are connections and 
at least some collaboration among and beyond these scholars, their works are 
generally distinct. Given the East Asia focus of this study, the three leading theorists 
and East Asia specialists cited above are selected as the key representatives of these 
approaches, respectively. The reason for them being the exemplars of this study is the 
extent of innovation their works are as compared to their peers. Nonetheless, other 
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 scholars who share the perspectives of these conceptual leaders will be referenced 
where necessary. 
 
Figure 5.1. The EAIRT debate in the US67 
It is important to note at the outset, however, that although sharing the general 
predispositions, these ‘dissenting voices and factions’ are diverse in size and, even if 
put together, they remain a tiny portion relative to the number of mainstream IR 
scholars in the United States. The closer their positions to the mainstream (such as in 
the case of Kang and Acharya whose work have been categorized as ‘constructivist’ 
approaches), the more likely that their views will at least be afforded a hearing by 
mainstreamers. Mainstreamers are, however, less interested in the work of 
postcolonial scholars like Ling and her associates given their different ontological and 
epistemological positions. The emphasis of these approaches is also different: Kang 
and Acharya are trying to enrich and extend Western IRT to the point that it 
eventually incorporates East Asian patterns of international relations. Ling, 
meanwhile, is attempting to build a more distinct theory based on East Asian 
traditions and concepts. Each of these approaches will be discussed in turn. 
67 This figure is made by the researcher based on input data gathered from (Hamati‐Ataya 2011, 366). 
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 ‘Bringing East Asia in’ to IR Theory 
Historically, the study of regions (or area studies) in American political science is 
closely linked to the geopolitical concerns and policy interests of the US. East Asia is 
no exception. Japan’s rise in the international political economy in the 1970s and 
1980s, for example, intensified the impact of ‘revisionist’ theory and interest in the 
US about Northeast Asian regionalism. Japan’s subsequent economic stagnation 
undercut such ‘revisionist’ theories and consequently caused a decline in Japanese 
studies (Rozman 2002, 152-3). East Asia as a whole has nevertheless become a region 
of growing interest since the end of the Cold War. The rapid rise of China and the 
dynamics of East Asian regionalism, in particular, have provided American scholars 
with a playground for theory testing (e.g. Friedberg 1993; Johnston 1995; Berger 
2002; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Through this interaction of IR Theory and 
area studies, East Asia is posing a number of theoretical and empirical puzzles for IR 
scholars, exemplified by the trajectory of China’s rise, the lack of hard balancing 
blocs against China and/or the US, and an ASEAN-led loose and soft regionalism 
(Alagappa 1998; Alagappa 2003; Goh 2008; Johnston 2012). Increasingly, there have 
been visible laments about the disjuncture between existing theories and East Asian 
politics. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the pessimistic predictions of American 
realists about a violent transformation of Asian security order as the result of China’s 
rise sparked counter-arguments from East Asia specialists (Kang 2003a; Acharya 
2003). More recently, some US-based scholars have brought into IR discourses some 
distinctiveness of historical East Asian order, thus expanding the EAIRT debate in the 
US. 
Among US-based East Asia specialists, David Kang, currently at the University of 
Southern California (USC), presents the strongest claims for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to 
IRT. Starting with his disagreements with the pessimistic prediction of East Asian 
Security by American realists, Kang has been a fervent advocate for a new analytical 
framework to explain East Asian politics. His main argument is that theories 
inductively derived from European history often end up ‘getting Asia wrong’ because 
‘Asia has different historical traditions, different geographic and political realities, and 
different cultural traditions’ (Kang 2003a, 84). Asia’s rising importance in today’s 
world system, in his view, ‘gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of 
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 international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce 
increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work’ (Kang 2003a, 58). 
What, then, is so ‘East Asian’ that Kang, and many others, would like to bring into 
IRT? There are at least two dimensions: the peace-prone hierarchical East Asian 
historical system and the lack of religious war in that region’s history.68 Kang 
challenges the traditional ‘US-centric’ approach that views the United States as the 
key ‘stabilizing factor’ in maintaining East Asian order (e.g. Ikenberry 2008; Brooks, 
Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012). Rather, he makes China the centre point of his 
analysis. To understand the absence of hard-balancing bloc against China, Kang 
argues, we need to go back to the historical East Asian order (1300-1900 AD). During 
that time, the region was not characterized by balancing and conflict but hierarchy, 
peace, and stability (Kang 2005, 74; Kang 2010b). Although Western scholars have 
theorized about hierarchy before, such analysis focuses more on the security, 
economic, and social factors (much like hegemonic stability theory) from the vantage 
points of the U.S. authority and legitimacy (Lake 1996, 2009; Dunne 2003). Kang, by 
contrast, offers what is perhaps the most systematic account to date about the 
hierarchical system in pre-modern East Asia. In his view, that system was generated 
by the interplay of ideas and interests. In this hierarchical order, China had both 
cultural and political superiority over its tributary states. East Asian states accepted 
Chinese hegemony and voluntarily subordinated themselves to China which in turn 
fostered regional stability. Put differently, it was ‘an international society based on 
culture’ (Kang 2010a, 593) centring around China’s ‘legitimate authority’ (Kang 
2012).  
Kang further argues that East Asian states prefer a strong China even now because 
whenever China is strong, it would bring regional stability. If China is weak e.g. 
during its ‘century of humiliation’, the region tends to encounter instability. These 
historical patterns help explain why, to Kang, East Asian states are currently 
accommodating rather than balancing China and why the East Asian order is more 
stable and peaceful than realists expected (Kang 2003a; 2003b, 169). Kang attributes 
the paucity of balancing actions by East Asian states against China to two factors: 1) 
interests (East Asian states see the rise of China as bringing more opportunities than 
68 In his work, Kang (2010a) defines East Asia in its narrow concept which includes the Confucians 
states only e.g. contemporary Northeast Asia states (China, Japan, Korea, and Mongolia) and Vietnam. 
The cases of Southeast Asian states, therefore, are less relevant to his analysis. 
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 threats), and 2) identities (the acceptance of China’s benign hierarchical world order 
based on a shared Confucian worldview) (Kang 2007, 4; see also Kelly 2012, 16). The 
policy relevance of this analysis is clear: if East Asian states are not inclined toward 
balancing China, then the US pivot to Asia by mobilizing regional countries to 
‘contain China’, is ‘highly problematic’ (Kang 2005, 76). 
Kang’s more recent work points to the absence of religious wars in pre-modern East 
Asia. During that time, East Asian states like Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and China 
‘rarely experienced anything like the type of religious violence that existed for 
centuries in historical Europe, despite having vibrant religious traditions such as 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and numerous folk religions.’ Addressing this 
anomaly, to Kang, ‘is theoretically important because it challenges a large body of 
scholarly literature that finds a universal causal relationship between religion and war 
that is empirically derived mainly from the experience of only Christianity and Islam’ 
(Kang 2014, 665). This distinct historical pattern of East Asia has become even more 
salient especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 when ‘religion is widely believed to 
be one of the root causes of war, rebellion, and terrorism’ (Kang 2014, 667). Bringing 
this particular aspect of East Asia into IR, therefore, will help address the ‘selection 
bias’ in current literature and promises to enrich ‘theorizing about the relationship 
between religion and war’ (Kang 2014, 665). 
While making a case for avoiding ‘an implicitly Euro-centric approach to Asia’, Kang 
is also aware of the essentialist ‘Orientalism’ that focuses merely on Asian 
differences. Rather, he strongly calls for applying the same Western mode of 
empiricism that based on evidence rather than selection bias in any study on Asian 
international relations (Kang 2003a, 59). What the empirical evidence reveals thus far, 
in Kang’s view, ‘still getting Asia wrong’ a decade after his famous 2003 article first 
appeared (Interview, September 2013). Despite the growing concern about China’s 
‘new assertiveness,’ Kang observes that there is no evidence of either a sharp increase 
in military expenditure or a military alliance against China by East Asian states (Kang 
2013a). Maritime disputes in Asia, albeit intensifying, are still primarily involving 
frigates and vessels posturing rather than directly confronting one another. 
Nonetheless, Kang indicates that he will change his argument if the relevant evidence 
changes its key premises (e.g. if there is a substantial increase in Asian defence 
budgets) (Interview, September 2013).  
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 Despite his systematic conceptualization of East Asian international relations, Kang 
does not aim to build new ‘non-Western’ IR theories. Rather, his goal is ‘to expand 
international relations theory so that scholars can better identify factors that help to 
explain regional and temporal differences in how states think about and achieve 
security and how they conduct their international relations’ (Kang 2003b, 165; on the 
case of North Korea, see Kang 2011). Kang acknowledges current efforts toward 
constructing national school(s) of IR in East Asia as well as Acharya’s and Buzan’s 
argument for non-Western IR Theory in Asia. However, he positions himself within 
this debate in more neutral and agnostic terms: 
I go back and forth about whether there is a need for non-Western theory or 
whether we simply need to realize that the current theories are actually 
European theories. I started out with ‘Getting Asia wrong’ – they all derived 
from European experience and we think it is universal. In fact, the world is 
very old, but most of us believe that the Westphalia world is inevitable, 
obvious, and universal… My basic point was I don’t think that it is universal 
and I say the same thing over and over again. Whether there need to be other 
theories or whether we can widen the current ones is really what I am 
interested in and I don’t know yet… My position in the debate is that there 
clearly is a sociology of the field – things existing independently of the 
theories that make us view the world the way we do… It really helps if you are 
a Korean American or like Amitav Acharya from India, then you really know 
the world does not [from their perspective] look the way Americans think it 
does (Interview, September 2013). 
These views about the particular aspects of East Asian history are also reflected in 
Kang’s teaching of several courses at USC, including Introduction to International 
Relations, Business and Politics of the Korean Peninsula, International Security of 
East Asia, and Introduction to East Asian Studies as well as in his guest lectures 
delivered at other institutions.69 As the Director of USC’s East Asian Studies Center 
and Korean Studies Institute, Kang has also chaired a number of seminars and 
conferences that brought together leading East Asia specialists in the US. His 
argument has attracted both support and criticism from other East Asia specialists, 
creating a ‘mini-debate’ on East Asian IR within American academia. The most 
heated discussion to date was reflected through a conference entitled ‘Was there an 
historical East Asian International System?’ hosted by Kang’s Korean Studies 
Institute at USC in 2013. The conference essays were later organized into a special 
69 See, for example, Kang’s lecture at Cornell University on the theme ‘The Rise of China and the East 
Asian Regional Order’ (Cornell-University 2012).  
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 issue of the Journal of East Asian Studies edited by Kang with a key overarching 
observation: 
Long understudied by mainstream international relations (IR) scholars, the 
East Asian historical experience provides an enormous wealth of patterns and 
findings, which promise to enrich our IR theoretical literature largely derived 
from and knowledgeable about the Western experience. The intellectual 
contributions of this emerging scholarship have the potential to influence some 
of the most central questions in international relations: the nature of the state, 
the formation of state preferences, and the interplay between material and 
ideational factors (Kang 2013b, 181).  
Kang is not alone in his claim for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IR Theory. A number of 
other US-based scholars (many of whom are young immigrant scholars from East 
Asia) are also using East Asian empirical applications for building new analytical 
frameworks, albeit in different ways. Somewhat like Kang’s argument, Kai He has 
posited that all the three major IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) 
that deal with the questions of ‘Does ASEAN matter?’ end up ‘getting ASEAN 
wrong.’ He insists that they fail to specify ASEAN’s actual impact on regional 
security (He 2006, 194). Accordingly, he introduces a new theoretical framework 
called ‘institutional realism’ to explain ASEAN successes and failures. Under this 
framework, 
ASEAN is a realist tool for its member states to realize two levels of balance 
of power. At the intramural level, ASEAN helps its members keep state-to-
state relations balanced and in order, although it does not provide any 
problem-solving mechanism. At the extra-regional level, ASEAN is seen as an 
important institutional balancing tool for ASEAN states to deal with external 
pressures and threats (He 2006, 207; see also He 2008a).  
Kai He’s colleague and partner, Huiyun Feng,70 meanwhile, argues against Iain 
Johnston’s claim that Chinese strategic culture is generally ‘parabellum realist’ 
(Johnston 1995). Employing an operational code construct model, her analysis 
concludes that Chinese strategic culture is generally defensive in nature and that 
Chinese leaders are much more cooperative and accommodationist than what is 
normally perceived to be the case (Feng 2007). As co-authors, He and Feng have 
adopted the innovative step of integrating the neoclassical realist framework in 
70 Both Kai He and Huiyun Feng obtained their doctoral degrees from the University of Arizona. They 
came back to China to work for Chinese think-tanks for a few years before returning to America to 
assume faculty positions at the University of Utah. They left the US for Denmark in 2014 and have 
recently moved to Griffith University in Australia. They are mentioned here because these theoretical 
works were developed while they were working in the US. 
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 political science and prospect theory in psychology to investigate why and how 
leaders make risky and seemingly irrational decisions in international politics, using 
empirical cases from Asian security (He and Feng 2013). Like Kang, they also 
question the lack of hard balancing of East Asian states against China’s rise. Instead, 
they view East Asian security under the alternative lenses of ‘soft-balancing’ and 
‘institutional balancing’ (He and Feng 2008; He 2008b). Nevertheless, as in the case 
of Kang, these US-based specialists only plea for ‘bringing East Asia in’ be it to test, 
falsify, affirm, or broaden existing IRT. They have not, at least not yet, developed 
alternatives that challenge the hegemony of existing IR theory. This makes a 
distinction with the two other approaches to be discussed below. 
Deprovincializing both Western and ‘Asian’ IRT: toward ‘Global IR’ 
Iain Johnston (2012, 54) once categorized David Kang and Amitav Acharya as 
sharing the same agenda of systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IRT. An 
objective analysis of Kang and Acharya’s work, however, reveals that they have 
developed relatively different perspectives in the EAIRT debate. While there are 
certain overlapping interests between these two scholars, Acharya’s approach, in this 
author’s view, is broader in scope and more sophisticated in substance. While Kang 
and other East Asia specialists focus merely on China and East Asia, Acharya often 
embraces Asia as a whole. He has also been the leading advocate of the ‘non-Western 
IR Theory’ project. Understanding his claims and practices, therefore, warrants a 
separate discussion.  
The need for recasting the IR discipline has motivated and underscored Acharya’s 
own scholarship since his entry into the field in the 1980s. Although having been 
educated and working extensively in the West,71 Acharya’s perspective in IR – his 
inclination toward liberal internationalism at first, then constructivism, and now the 
non-Western IRT approach – has been largely shaped by his upbringing in India. 
Immersing himself in a society embedded with Hinduism, Buddhism, and a 
‘Nehruvian worldview’, Acharya has always been sceptical of the realist argument 
that states always identify their interests in terms of power (Acharya 2013b, 6). He 
71 Acharya is an Indian-born scholar. He completed his undergraduate and master degrees in India 
before obtaining his PhD degree from Murdoch University in Australia in 1987. He has prior working 
experience in Canada (York University), US (Harvard University), Singapore (Nanyang Technological 
University), and Britain (Bristol University) before assuming his current position at the American 
University (US) in 2009.  
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 quickly became an advocate of social constructivism when that theory was introduced 
in the 1990s because he saw in it ‘a clear potential to secure greater recognition for the 
agency of non-Western actors’ such as the culture, norms and identity that resonate 
well with Asian thinkers and writers (Acharya 2013b, 11; 2014g, 80). Yet, he 
increasingly felt uncomfortable with mainstream constructivism because of ‘the 
theory’s tendency to privilege the moral cosmopolitanism of Western transnational 
actors in explaining norm diffusion in world politics’ (Acharya 2013b, 12). Although 
acknowledging that some frameworks developed in Western scholarship have been 
more relevant to non-Western contexts such as the balance of threat theory (Stephen 
Walt), subaltern realism (Mohamed Ayoob), neoclassical realism (Victor Cha), and 
other constructivist and post-structural theories; none of them, he laments, ‘give much 
space to the agency of Asian actors: they simply confirm the American-centrism of 
IRT’ (Acharya 2014c, 127-8). This eventually turned him toward the current ‘non-
Western IR Theory’ approach. 
Acharya’s claim for non-Western IRT has four main elements, each of which has 
largely shaped his research and teaching practices over the years. First, he largely 
concurs with other East Asia specialists discussed in the previous section that existing 
Western IR theories, derived mainly from Western history, traditions, and experience, 
fail to fully capture and explain the key trends and puzzles of international relations in 
the non-Western world such as Asia (Acharya 2013b, 251). The claim of universally 
applicable Western theory is, in his view, a ‘false universalism’ (Clifford 2011; 
Acharya 2014c, 129) that is embedded with a dangerous parochialism and 
ethnocentrism (Acharya 2013b, 2). In contrast, he aims to develop an emancipatory 
IRT which should have ‘the recognition of the margin, the representation of the 
object, and the empowerment of the weak’ and ‘to render the discipline truly universal 
by recognizing and incorporating the ideas and the experiences of the non-West’ 
(Acharya 2000a, 17-8). 
This claim has motivated Acharya to study the marginal, local actors in Asia e.g. 
ASEAN. In fact, he has been taking the lead in not only explaining ASEAN intra-
regional cooperation but more importantly how the weaker states of ASEAN have 
shaped the regional order in Asia (Acharya 2000b, 2001; Acharya and Stubbs 2009; 
Acharya 2014f). While Kang and others view Asian order through the lenses of power 
– e.g. either a Sino-centric or US-centric worldview – Acharya focuses on the history 
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 and evolution of Asian regionalism. This is because, as he argues, ‘without 
regionalism, …there might not even be any idea of Asia for us to talk about’ (Acharya 
2010a, 1013). Acharya’s earlier work attempted to introduce an Asian version of 
constructivism – how ideas and norms in world politics are diffused and localized in 
the Asian context with the focus on the agency of local actors in Asian regionalism 
(Acharya 2001, 2010b; Acharya and Stubbs 2009; Acharya 2013b). In his recent 
book, Acharya (2010b) argues that in understanding Asian style regionalism, it is 
necessary to understand the diffusion of ideas and norms in the international system 
from the perspective of local actors. In this light, the reason Asia is not ‘ripe for 
rivalry’ is because ‘Asian multilateral conferences and institutions helped to embed 
the Westphalian norms of independence, reciprocity, equality, and non-interference 
within regional diplomatic and security practice’ (Acharya 2003, 159). His 
explanation of a major historical puzzle of Asian international relations – why 
regional powers failed to create and shape a lasting regional organization to their 
liking and why Asia’s regional institutions have continued to be led by weak states – 
is that ‘in each phase, the region’s principal powers suffered from a legitimacy deficit 
that prevented them from organizing regional cooperation in a sustainable manner, 
despite having the material capabilities to do so’ (Acharya 2014b, 21).  
Second, while his call for ‘non-Western IR Theory’ has aroused growing interest in 
building indigenous theoretical frameworks in Asia, Acharya discounts the prospect of 
an ‘Asian school of IR’. The reason is twofold: 1) Asian diversity creates problems for 
generalizations; and 2) the claim for Asian uniqueness/exceptionalism is quite 
controversial, and thus restricts the global appeal of an emerging ‘Asian school’ 
(Acharya 2014g, 124; 2014c). Regarding the first premise, he asks, ‘how can one 
speak of a coherent set of values that can be uniquely ‘Asian,’ and ignore the 
differences between Confucian, Muslim, and Hindu cultural norms?’ (Acharya 2010a, 
1011). Even within the core East Asian region, there are two distinct systems of the 
Confucian system in North East Asia and the Mandala system in Southeast Asia 
(Acharya 2014c, 124). Building national schools of IR, in his view, is more feasible 
but undesirable because of the alternatively ethnocentric, hegemonic, and parochial 
nature of such academic movements. The construction of a ‘China School’, for 
example, is seen ‘to a large extent an attempt to legitimize the rise of China as a 
fundamentally positive force in international relations’ (Acharya 2011a, 857). Chinese 
exceptionalism, with no difference than its American counterpart, thus ‘carries the risk 
191 
 
 of introducing a new and dangerous parochialism to Asian IR discourse and practice’ 
(Acharya 2014c, 130). It is his scepticism of ‘Asian uniqueness’ that Acharya 
differentiates himself with Kang and the current drive toward constructing indigenous 
theories in Asian IR communities. As he notes, ‘while Western IRT has a tendency to 
universalize, Asian contributions often tend to ride on exceptionalism: how Asia 
differs from other regions’ (Acharya 2014c, 129). The challenge for an Asian 
contribution to IRT, therefore, is how to modify Western-centrism ‘without falling 
into the trap of exceptionalism’ (Acharya 2003, 163). A more useful approach, 
Acharya suggests, ‘would be to generalize from the Asian experience on its own 
terms’ (Acharya 2003, 162).  
Third, instead of supporting ‘Asian exceptionalism’, Acharya argues for ‘Asian 
universalism’ (Acharya 2014g, 81). As he notes, Asia ‘also abounds in historical 
forms of local knowledge with a universal reach. Examples include the ideas of Asian 
thinkers such as Tagore’s critique of nationalism, Nehru’s neutralism and non-
alignment, and Gandhi’s satyagraha’ as well as other local ‘writings that were 
developed either in association with, or in reaction against, Western concepts of 
nationalism, internationalism, and international order’ (Acharya 2014g, 82). Among 
these traditions, Acharya pays great attention to the potential of Buddhism, an age-old 
religion that has pan-Asian appeal, as a rich source for theory building. Drawing on 
Dalai Lama’s comparison on the similarities and compatibilities between Buddhism 
and science, Acharya also makes his own comparison between Buddhism and IR 
theories such as constructivism and post-modernism. The notion of ‘Emptiness’ in 
Buddhist philosophy, in particular, offers a ground of synthesis between Buddhism 
and science, including IR. In the theory of emptiness, nothing is absolute and 
permanent, and everything is interconnected, dynamic, and constantly changing just as 
what the relativity theory generally says. For the Dalai Lama, both quantum physics 
and the idea of emptiness tell us ‘that reality is not what appears to be’. For Acharya, 
Buddhism can be a nutrition to broaden the epistemology of IR as it ‘is not a purely 
ideational doctrine – it rejects the idea of an ‘essential core to . . . our individuality and 
identity that is independent of the physical and mental elements that constitute our 
existence’ (Acharya 2011b, 74).  
Last but not least is Acharya’s argument on the ultimate aim of the non-Western IRT 
and a vision for future theoretical work on Asian IR. On more than one occasion, 
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 Acharya has stated that his goal is not to generate a new grand debate. Rather, his 
intent is ‘to underscore the long-term and ethnocentric neglect of the non-Western 
world in IR theory, the limitations and distortions that this inflicts on our 
understanding of world politics as a whole’. The ultimate objective is to help construct 
‘a more inclusive, truly global IR’ (Acharya 2013b, 1; see also Acharya 2000a, 2; 
2011b). The third pathway which is more possible and desirable as compared to either 
simply using Asia as a testing ground for Western theories or claiming for Asian 
uniqueness/exceptionalism is, in Acharya’s words, the ‘“deprovincialization” of both 
the established Western and a presumptive “Asian” IRT’ (Acharya 2014c, 123). This 
is a process in which ‘existing Western-centric theories are localized to fit Asian 
history and praxis, while local historical and cultural constructs and contemporary 
practices of foreign policy and intraregional relations are universalized and projected 
to a world stage’ (Acharya 2014c, 134). The aim is not to displace, but challenge, 
enrich, and engage with existing theory as well as to offer greater interaction and 
integration between discipline and area studies. The gap between IRT and area 
studies, Acharya suggests, can be bridged by a hybrid such as ‘transnational area 
studies’ and ‘disciplinary regional studies’ which offer ‘much common ground for 
productive interaction and mutual learning’ (Acharya 2014f, 472-83).  
As a demonstration for how such a hybrid might evolve, Acharya has recently 
proposed a new theoretical approach, termed ‘consociational security order’ (CSO), to 
analyse the emerging Asian security order in the context of China’s rise. Drawing 
from different theoretical lenses of defensive realism, institutionalism, and especially 
consociational theory in comparative politics, this model presents an eclectic 
alternative conceptualization on the implications of China’s rise on Asian security 
order beyond the usual explanations offered by theories such as anarchy, hierarchy, 
hegemony, concert, and community. Those theoretical frameworks have identified 
contributing factors to Asian stability/instability but so far have failed to capture the 
complexity of Asian security. The CSO framework, meanwhile, holds that ‘no single 
factor is by itself sufficient to ensure stability’ and that all four conditions – 
interdependence, equilibrium, institutions, and elite restraint – must be present to 
some degree in order to produce Asian order (Acharya 2014e, 162). A key theoretical 
implication of this analysis concerns the relationship between rising powers and 
regional orders. While Western theorists like Mearsheimer presume that rising powers 
(e.g. China) tend to seek regional hegemony and coerce regions, Acharya points to the 
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 opposite possibility: regions, with the conditions of a CSO, can constrain rising 
hegemons.  
Beyond this eclectic work, Acharya’s more ambitious research project is to construct a 
‘theory of multiplex world order.’ His main thesis is that regardless of the fact that the 
US is declining or not, the liberal American-led world order that we have since the 
end of WWII is over. The rising powers, meanwhile, are not united and lack of 
material power (legitimacy, public goods) for global leadership. In this light, what we 
may see instead is the emergence of a ‘mutiplex’ world order which is neither 
multilateral nor unipolar. Unlike the 19th century multilateralism where great powers 
formed alliances and play the game of balance of power, the ‘multiplex’ world order 
comprises of multipolar worlds with more than two or three major powers but their 
interrelationship is complex interdependence. It is like a mutiplex cinema in which a 
variety of shows featuring different plots (ideas), actors, producers and directors (e.g. 
Hollywood thrillers and westerns, Bollywood song and dance, Chinese kungfu, 
European realism, and many other entities) running parallel with each other in 
different theatres. No single movie nor any single director is dominating the attention 
of the audience, and the audience has a choice of what they want to see (Acharya 
2014a). In other words, it is the world characterized by multiple actors (not merely 
great powers or states), complex interdependence, multi-layers of global governance 
today, or a ‘de-centered world.’  
These theoretical claims of Acharya are also translated into his teaching and outreach 
practices. Over the years, Acharya, with his lectures and speeches, has contributed to 
the spreading of theoretical awareness in various non-Western regions (Asia, Africa, 
Latin America), particularly in lesser developing countries in Asia e.g. in India, China, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam, etc.72 This is also partly reflected 
in his present teaching at American University. Acharya’s syllabus for courses like 
‘Introduction to World Politics’, ‘Law and Diplomacy in Regional Organizations 
(ASEAN, Africa, and the Americas)’; and ‘Global Governance’ have assigned 
72 Acharya served as the founding co-President of the Asian Political and International Studies 
Association (APISA) which was established in 2001. As it happens, this author had the opportunity to 
study with Professor Acharya in a course titled ‘Asian Security Order’ in Singapore where many of the 
points discussed in this section were rehearsed. In another occasion, this author was in a master class 
that Acharya delivered to the Vietnamese IR community on the theme ‘IR Theory and Methodology’ in 
August 2011, sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Many of this author’s Vietnamese colleagues have 
been influenced by his non-Western IR approach. 
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 readings on many of his writings as well as some other non-Western approaches.73 He 
also supervised PhD students on his preferred ‘Global IR’ theme such as Jiajie He 
from China working on comparing the divergent normative power between EU and 
ASEAN (He 2016). Acharya has also presented the relevance of his ‘theory of 
multiplex world’ to the study of IR in his lecture titled ‘Political Science and 
International Relations in a Multiplex World’ at the Institute for European Studies of 
the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) on the occasion of the opening of its 
Doctoral Academic Year 2014/15.74 As he noted in that address, ‘one way to make 
international studies more relevant is to encourage universities to broaden the 
curriculum so that it reflects the history, culture, politics, and ideas of the whole 
world, and not just the West…. Whether America is declining or not, the study of 
international relations needs to adapt to the accelerating global diffusion of power’ 
(Acharya 2014d).  
Another impact of this debate on Acharya’s own practices is his graduate shift from 
the relatively controversial term ‘non-Western IRT’ toward a more neutral term 
‘Global IR.’ As the first Asia-born scholar elected to the Presidency of the 
International Studies Association (ISA), Acharya has put forward a theme of his 
interest, titled ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds: a New Agenda for International 
Studies’ for the 2015 ISA Annual Convention. The theme calls for a universal, 
inclusive discipline that takes us beyond its hitherto American and Western 
dominance. At this conference, over 300 panels/roundtables, or nearly a quarter of the 
convention total (1,250 panels/roundtables) were arranged to discuss various aspects 
of ‘Global IR.’ Indeed, as expressed in his six principles or wish-lists for ‘Global IR’, 
Acharya does not aim to rename the discipline but rather to relaunch the field as ‘IR 
2.0’ (Acharya 2013b, 251). The key message to be delivered is: 
International relations has a multiple and global heritage that must be 
acknowledged and promoted. The Global IR must be inclusive in every sense 
and across the traditionally understood but increasingly blurred East-West and 
North-South lines. It needs to be more authentically grounded in world history, 
rather than Western history, and embrace the ideas, institutions, intellectual 
perspectives and practices of non-Western states and societies’ (Acharya 
2013b, 254).  
73 Course syllabi were retrieved from the Website of American University. 
74 The recording of this lecture is available on ULB’s youtube channel (IEE-ULB 2014). 
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 If being taken seriously, this would be a turning point for future development of the 
discipline. One important step in that direction is the publication of a special issue of 
the International Studies Review journal (published on behalf of ISA) that reflects the 
theme of the 2015 ISA Convention – ‘Global IR.’ In fact, in his post as ISA President 
in the year 2014, Acharya had also instructed ISA-sponsored journals to accept 
contributions with good idea from (and if necessary, to provide language assistance 
for) non-Western scholars. He also attended a number of regional and national IR 
conferences in Asia that linked to the ‘Global IR’ theme. For example, in December 
2014, Acharya delivered a keynote speech on ‘Global International Relations’ at a 
seminar on ‘Global IR & Chinese School of IR’ organized by China Foreign Affairs 
University in Beijing. During this trip to China in his capacity as ISA President, 
Acharya also spoke on the compatibility of Global IR & Chinese School of IR at 
Shanghai’s Fudan University. His two main challenges for Chinese IR scholars were: 
(1) how to avoid automatically justifying Chinese government policy as a 
precondition for engaging in IR debate at all; and (2), how to generate global appeal 
for Chinese IR i.e. to offer universal concepts and explanations that apply beyond 
China to world at large. At another conference in Shanghai, Acharya presented his 
consociational security order idea to develop approaches for enhanced security policy 
interaction in Asia (Acharya’s Twitter, 4-8 December 2014). Earlier (in May 2014), 
Acharya attended an international symposium on the future of the IR discipline held in 
the Kinugasa Campus – Ritsumeikan University, Japan. His presentation, entitled 
‘Global IR and Regional Worlds Beyond Sahibs and Munshis: A New Agenda for 
International Studies’ proposed an agenda for a prospective Global IR, which 
transcends the debate between so-called Western and non-Western IR. In his speech, 
Acharya suggested that Global IR is either a mutual learning process between non-
Western and Western IR or an inclusive, an equal, and a constructive dialog between 
them as symbolized by the relations between Sahibs and Munshis in the past 
(Ritsumeikan-News 2014). 
It is important to note that despite his criticism of Western IR theory, Acharya, like 
Kang, remains closely connected to mainstream IR. Kang is not discussing reflectivist 
scholarship at all. Acharya, while noting the many overlapping concerns between his 
perspectives and critical theories and approaches (especially the ‘emancipatory 
claims’ of postcolonialism), admits that he is mostly unfamiliar with reflectivist 
theories and does not discuss their stance in details (Acharya 2013b, 15-6). As he 
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 notes, ‘I don’t call myself a postcolonial scholar but a constructivist because of the 
problem of agency (postcolonial scholars don’t think subaltern can speak), my whole 
life is talking about agency’ (School of International Service 2014). So the next 
movement to be discussed is a separate but related agenda of US-based reflectivist 
scholars, aiming to re-envisioning IR toward a post-Westphalia dynamics.  
Re-envisioning IR with ‘Daoist’ theory of world politics 
As intimated above, reflectivist theories make up a minor component of American IR. 
As Smith points out, they ‘receive little attention in U.S. journals, textbooks or 
syllabi’ (Smith 2002, 81). Leading postcolonial theorists Anna Agathangelou and Lily 
Ling have used a vivid metaphor of a colonial ‘House of IR’ to describe the current 
domination of Westphalian IR at the expense of non-Westphalian IR. In this ‘house’, 
realism and liberalism assume the parental role and other ‘recognized’ family 
members are mostly American theories (no place for non-Western IR theory for sure 
but even the English School is excluded). In that ‘house’, reflectivist theories at best 
serve as the ‘rebel sons’ and ‘fallen daughters’ while postcolonialism is considered 
merely a ‘love child’ that is not even accepted into the household (Agathangelou and 
Ling 2004, 28-34). This is, perhaps, because post-colonialism has been at the forefront 
in calling for decolonizing Westphalian IR (e.g. Nayak and Selbin 2010; Ling 2002; 
Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Ling 2014a). Inspired by Edward Said’s foundational 
text ‘Orientalism’, postcolonial theory has attempted to introduce the ‘non-Western 
Other’ into the IR field by looking at the ‘subalterns’ and ‘marginals’ like women, 
indigenes, etc. (Chowdhry 2007; Ling 2007). They are, therefore, directly and 
indirectly involved in the current debate over non-Western/East Asian IR Theory. 
Among the various postcolonial approaches, that of L.H.M. Ling – a feminist theorist 
at the Milano School of International Affairs, The New School, New York – is 
particularly relevant to the EAIRT debate. Her research agenda focuses on developing 
a post-Western, post-Westphalian understanding of International Relations/World 
Politics. Being a diaspora Chinese (Taiwanese American), her exposure to the 
Asian/Chinese culture, language, and philosophy has facilitated her awareness of 
Asian traditions and submission to Western dominance. This ultimately drives her to 
theorize East Asian international relations from a postcolonial IR perspective (Ling 
1996; Ling, Hwang, and Chen 2009; Ling and Shih 1998). Either by herself or 
collectively with other feminist and postcolonial scholars, Ling has levelled some of 
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 the strongest criticism of mainstream IRT (particularly neorealism). As she argues, 
‘coming from five centuries of Western colonialism and imperialism, abetted by three 
centuries of Eurocentric IR…, neorealist logic produces a series of interlocking 
asymmetries under a single, normative rubric: that is, one culture (‘West’), race 
(‘white’), and gender (‘hypermasculinity’) should supersede all others’ (Ling and 
Pinheiro 2013, 13). From a postcolonial IR perspective, this reveals ‘a predominant 
pattern in IR research and teaching syllabi in terms of methodology 
(rationalist/formal), language (English), geographical location of authors (US), and 
gender (male)’ (Ling 2014b, xxii). 
The product of this combination, in Ling’s view, is that apprehension, fear, and 
distrust overwhelmingly dominate world politics. One example is the ‘China’s Threat 
Theory.’ Western theorists coming from various theoretical traditions such as John 
Mearsheimer and Aaron Friedberg often view China’s rise with suspicion and a cause 
of instability and disorder in Asia. As she further elaborates on this parochial thinking:  
To Westphalian IR, China’s ideology, politics, and culture are so alien the 
country cannot integrate into, not to mention play a leading role in, world 
politics. Instead, China must assimilate: that is, comply with, and preferably 
internalise, the norms, institutions, and practices of the Western, liberal order. 
Only in this way could China become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the 
Westphalian world order (Ling 2013a, 553).  
Yet, Ling asks: does China qualify as a threat as understood in Western terms? What 
if China just entertains a different worldview from Western powers? (Ling 2013a, 
558). Neorealism’s structural logic, in this sense, fails to capture the multiple logics in 
world politics. Postcolonial IR, meanwhile, ‘builds on these explorations of Self and 
Other’ (Ling 2002, 236) and aims for ‘interstitially transforming’ Westphalian 
outlooks in general and (neo)realism in particular (Ling 2002, 231). With that goal in 
mind, Ling has worked with a core group of like-minded scholars (including, among 
others, Carolina M. Pinheiro, Anna M. Agathangelou, and Arlene Tickner) to theorize 
on ‘worldism’ as a supplementary approach to Westphalian IR. Worldism recasts 
IR/world politics into a complex of entwined and entwining social relations with 
multiple, interactive logics (Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Ling 2002), constituting a 
‘world of worlds’ (Ling 2014). Worldism in this light employs ‘hybridities’ (Ling 
2013b, 23). It draws on social constructivism (norms, ideas, agents and structures), 
postcolonial IR (the other subaltern), and dialectical IR (Hegelian dialectics). The 
most important inspiration for worldism is Chinese Daoist dialectics, which Ling 
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 claims to be so far the first non-Western philosophy to be theorized as an alternative 
epistemology of IR and possibly an alternative ontology for IR as well (Interview, 
October 2013). As she has explained the motivations for her pursuit of worldism and 
Daoist theory to this author: 
I draw on Daoist theory as a basis for formulating IR theory. The point is not 
to replace IR theory but to engage with it because the problem with the current 
IR theory is it all focused on the perspectives of the West – the theorizing, 
concepts, experiences, history and it is also from a Western masculinist 
perspective. So my effort is to introduce not just different voices [from outside 
the West] because postmodern scholars have introduced different voices. My 
effort is to theorize another kind of IR to engage with Westphalian IR. I think 
we need to call IR as it is currently understood as ‘Westphalia’ rather than to 
allow Westphalian IR to presume that it represents everything [in IR] 
(Interview, October 2013). 
How much different, then, are worldism and Daoist dialectics from conventionial IR 
theory predicated on Westphalian roots and reasoning? First, Worldism begins with 
five commitments to agency, identity, critical syncretic engagement, and 
accountability as opposed to Wesphalian IR’s five main principles of sovereignty, 
hierarchy, normality, legitimacy, and power (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 42).75 Second, 
Worldism has three characteristics: 1) it ‘does not treat states as ‘units,’’ but ‘values 
the agency of multiple subalterns at multiple sites trying to improve life for the 
majority, not just the minority’; 2) worldism does not define power as ‘a single 
capability’ but as ‘the creative act that emanates from collaboration across differences 
and the trans-subjectivity that arises as a consequence’; and 3) worldism ‘does not see 
politics as a mere balancing of state interest but the building of communities with rich 
legacies of social exchange across imposed borders’ (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 31). 
Together these shape a ‘relational ontology’ for worldism (Agathangelou and Ling 
2009, 8). 
Third, in terms of epistemology, Worldism mainly draws on traditional Chinese 
Daoist philosophy (the yin-yang dialectics, the concept of water, and wuwei (non-
action)) which was developed by ancient Chinese masters Laozi and Zhuangzi (Ling 
2013b, 40). Through yin and yang, Daoist dialectics give us ‘gender as an analytic’ 
with the yin signifying the female principle and the yang the male (Ling 2013b, 15). 
75 This citation is based on a conference paper presented by Prof. Ling at the International conference 
titled ‘International Relations Theory: Views from Beyond the West’ held at the New School, New 
York on 14 October 2013. This conference paper has been turned into a chapter in the new textbook 
edited by Nizar Messari, Arlene Tickner, and L.H.M. Ling (2016). 
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 The world, in this sense, is full of yang, but lacks yin. Unlike conflictual Hegelian 
dialectics, Yin-yang theory 
enables us to develop a method of dialectical discourse – worldist dialogics – 
that builds on the complementarities (yin-within-yang, yang-within-yin)’ and 
results in the acceptance of the opposites or enemies. It allows for complexity 
(‘you are in me and I in you’) without reductions to simplistic dualisms (‘you’ 
vs ‘me,’ ‘us’ vs ‘them’). Equally important, worldist dialogics provides a 
means of creatively and intuitively ‘stepping into the mystery of the unknown’ 
without fear or anxiety, given our mutual embeddedness (Ling and Pinheiro 
2013, 28). 
Such dialectics are relevant to IR in the sense that it can repaint the picture of world 
politics in which Westphalian IR and non-Westphalian approaches or ‘multiple 
worlds’ can co-exist peacefully. In this reconstruction, Westphalia World serves as 
yang to Multiple Worlds’ yin (Ling 2013b, 18). There is no clear-cut distinction 
between the two as, like yin and yang, the East is within the West, and vice versa. For 
example, a research by a Western scholar argues that the Western civilization has its 
root in the East (Hobson 2004). There is also a ‘zone of engagement’ that ‘builds on 
the complementarities that persist, from within and without, despite the contradictions 
that repel the two polarities’ (Ling 2013b, 20). Nonetheless, Daoism does not 
necessarily exclude conflicts. In case there is an imbalance e.g. ‘yin and yang fail to 
match, or each polarity is paired with itself rather than its opposite, then disaster 
necessarily results’ (Ling 2013a, 562).   
Ling applies Daoist theory to analyse US-China relations as it shows ‘how two 
supposedly distinct polarities could bind through complicities and complementarities 
despite their conflicts and contradictions. This process springs from the pockets of co-
implication within each polarity (that is, US-within-China, China-within-US)’ (Ling 
2013a, 549-50). Daoist dialectics, therefore, helps reframe the ‘China threat’ thesis 
into a politics of engagement (Ling 2013a, 563; Ling 2013b, 95). In Ling’s view, 
Daoist dialectics help us see the world differently and help us deal with contradictions 
efficiently. Its emancipatory mission is obvious: to rescue world politics from 
unnecessary conflicts and tragedies (Ling 2013a, 568).  
As can be seen, Ling’s theorizing on Daoist dialectics is also based on the yin-yang 
dialectics like Chinese theorist Qin Yaqing. This is understandable given their 
common exposure to Chinese culture and traditions. Nonetheless, the point of Ling’s 
Wordism or Daoist theory is not to reject or replace Western IRT but to engage with 
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 and supplement to it in order to construct a better body of knowledge. In fact, Ling 
does not support the ideas held by many mainland Chinese scholars who see the 
‘Chinese School of IR’ as a kind of declaration of their ethnic and culture pride. 
Indeed she questions the nature of that project: 
To [assert there is] a ‘Chinese School of IR’ is an oxymoron. It does not make 
sense because what is ‘Chinese’ about IR that it represents!? If it is the same 
old IR but with the Chinese flavour to it then it is the same of Westphalian IR 
– power politics. If it is Chinese then it is not IR. The Daoist theory that I 
presents has inspirations from the Chinese traditions but it is not ‘ethnically 
Chinese’ because there are similar philosophical roots in India and Japan and 
the Daoist theory applies to everybody not just Chinese. And if you use Daoist 
theory for world politics, you will not end up with IR, you end up with 
something else quite differently (Interview, October 2013).  
Similarly, Ling supports the movement to develop indigenous frameworks in East 
Asia if it is implemented in a de-Westphalian manner but warns about a possible 
negative impact if it is conducted otherwise:   
If people are drawing on non-Westphalian concepts and still put it into a 
Westphalian framework in order to demonstrate that ‘we too have theories, and 
so we are just as good as you’, that kind of competitiveness is, in my view, 
stupid. It defeats the purposes [of innovating IR] because you are still 
centralizing the Westphalian order and those who propose the Westphalian 
order. You are not really introducing anything new, it is like saying ‘I have my 
native clothing and isn’t my native clothing just as good as yours? So you can 
wear your shoes and I will wear my native clothing.’ But what’s the point of 
that? That is just another kind of hyper-masculine competitiveness and we 
have had enough of that. The world is weary, I am weary of that kind of 
competition between masculinist identities…76 We don’t need any more of 
that; we need to break from the conventional way of looking at the world, 
relating to the world and being in the world. We need to have a celebration of 
complexities (Interview, October 2013). 
Apart from her theoretical innovations, Ling has also been taking the lead in writing 
alternative textbooks for undergraduate and postgraduate students in the US. The first 
textbook, titled ‘Learning World Politics: People, Power, Perspective, Volume I: 
Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam’ aims to introduce ‘Other worlds’ in IR/world 
politics. She has also authored a book of plays, as an experimental pedagogy for IR, 
titled ‘Play on Worlds: A Performative Pedagogy for International Relations.’77 In the 
past few years, Ling has been teaching a course that totally focuses on ‘Non-Western 
76 Masculinist identities, in Ling’s interpretation, ‘can include women as well, it is not a biological 
definition. It is a social construction. There are plenty of women who compete just like men, who think 
like men, act like men and in fact they put down other women just like men’ (Interview, October 2013). 
77 Information is retrieved from the New School’s website. 
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 approaches to the World.’ Her class begins with a critical review of the contemporary 
debate over the Western-centric nature of IR and the emerging claims for non-Western 
IR Theory. She then discusses the three alternative non-Western approaches of Islam, 
Hinduism, and Confucianism. Ling assigns readings from both Western and Asian 
scholars (e.g. Amitav Acharya, Mohamed Ayoob, Rajiv Malhotra, Yan Xuetong 
etc).78 Most recently, she has worked with Nizar Messari and Arlene Tickner to edit 
another textbook, entitled ‘International Relations Theory: Views Beyond the West’ 
that ‘speaks to the key concepts, categories and issues of world politics from the 
perspectives of those who are based in or originate from the Global South’ (Messari, 
Tickner, and Ling 2016). The ultimate aim, as Ling notes, is ‘to teach IR differently 
and the textbook is just the beginning’ (Interview, November 2013). This could be 
seen as a ‘sea change’, given how parochial IR teaching has been in most US 
universities. 
Living what they preach: what drives changes? 
As designated above, there are at least three types of claims as far as the EAIRT 
debate is concerned in the US and these positions have shaped the practices of 
‘dissident scholars’ or the ‘gatecrashers’ of IR knowledge in the US. As Acharya 
observes, ‘the “gatecrashers” are a diverse lot, but share one thing in common: 
resistance to exclusion and a commitment to emancipation’ (Acharya 2000a, 11). One 
common point of these three approaches is a determination to help construct a better 
body of knowledge rather than a revolutionary agenda such as in the case of the 
‘Chinese IR Theory’ project. The evidence, therefore, points to the conclusion that it 
is a commitment to theory that drives the practices of those scholars working on the 
EAIRT project in the US. Unlike the case of Chinese IR, it is hard to see the impact of 
external ‘intruding’ factors (e.g. funding, nationalism, policy linkages, etc.) on these 
US-based scholars other than that, given their Asian background, they are more 
exposed to the thinking and practices of East Asian countries. In their interviews with 
this author in 2013, these scholars all rejected the role of funding and/or policy 
entrapment in shaping their ‘dissident’ theoretical research agenda, saying it is of little 
interest to the US government and/or funding agencies. In fact, Acharya has written a 
piece warning about the impact of the scholarly engagement and entrapment with the 
78 I thank Professor Lily Ling for providing me this course syllabus for reference. For more details on 
the course’s content, see Appendix. 
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 policy world in the Asian context (Acharya 2011c). In Ling’s case, she has never been 
involved in any consultancy work. Kang, meanwhile, has received a number of 
research grants from the Korean Foundation but that is to support his policy-relevant 
analysis, not theoretical work. Rather, these changing practices reflect the evolution of 
their own thinking over time and their shared commitment toward intellectual 
diversity in IR. As Ling explained her own process of academic evolution to this 
author: 
Postcolonial theory leads me to where I am now because postcolonial theory is 
about critiquing the imperialism that still exists. So it is great as a critique but 
it does not offer an alternative as a theory. I had to go through the passage 
from feminist IR to postcolonial IR to postcolonial feminist IR to my present 
Daoist approach to IR. It is necessary to go through these critiques to pave the 
way because if you don’t understand the critique, then you don’t know what 
should be done (Interview, October 2013). 
Nonetheless, the overarching context that stimulates their work is the geopolitical 
context of theorizing. Arguably, the emergence of East Asian scholarship in the US 
can be attributable to the rise of Asia and the growing academic interests in the region. 
For example, the China debate in the US has clearly exerted implications on IR theory 
and U.S. foreign policy (Hsiung 2008; Christensen 2015; Shambaugh 2012, 2013). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, power shift is the underlying factor driving paradigm change 
in predominant International Relations thinking. In this context, it can be argued that 
the decline of American/Western power and theories versus the rising power and 
cultural assertiveness of China and the East serves as the important background for the 
surge of non-Western/East Asian IR discussions in the US/West. 
Another element that stimulates the debate over EAIRT is the vibrant academic 
freedom in the US which largely tolerates dissenting views. In fact, as a recent study 
on dissidence in American IR has noted, ‘the degree of academic freedom is the most 
influential factor perceived to affect research across the population and should 
therefore be viewed as characteristic of American academia rather than of IR itself’ 
(Hamati‐Ataya 2011, 386). Career incentives based on self-motivation is another 
issue. Interestingly, Acharya’s decision to move from Singapore to the UK and later to 
the US was largely because of the greater intellectual freedom and academic 
opportunities he would enjoy in the latter two venues.79 These structural factors, 
79 Acharya (2011b, 2011c) has, on more than one occasion, criticized the ‘Singapore School’ of Asian 
values and the intellectual atmosphere in Singapore.  
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 together with the growing confidence of the younger generation of immigrant scholars 
in American academia, have culminated in their introduction of bold claims and 
alternative approaches to American IR. Ling further elucidated on this point to this 
author: 
We are now three generations after World War II. I feel that my generation of 
peers to me is different from the former generations of scholars who because 
of world political conditions did not have the kind of structural conditions to 
support their ideas. So I think it is a kind of maturation of a scholarly 
generation which is very well trained in Western IR thinking but also has 
enough cultural self-confidence to draw on their own traditions. And this 
cultural self-confidence, of course, reflects the rise of Asia in the world 
political economy. There is no way you can say that the rise of East Asia and 
now South Asia has nothing to do with the intellectual development. But at the 
same time, it is a reflection of generational change in intellectual development 
(Interview, October 2013). 
This ‘generational change’ and growing academic maturity do not merely imply the 
growing diasporas of Asian scholars who are trained and currently working in 
American universities. It also reflects the growing demand for intellectual diversity 
from within the American/Western IR community. As Hamati‐Ataya (2011, 366) has 
pointed out, all of the scholars who identified themselves as dissidents (accounting for 
11.5% of American IR) are Americans. Leading feminist theorist Ann Tickner, for 
example, acknowledges the fact that IR remains the continuation of US hegemony. 
She nonetheless believes that feminism, less bound by the scientific and disciplinary 
constraints of US social science, has been ‘more international and more 
methodologically pluralistic.’ In this light, Tickner has offered some insightful 
thoughts on how Western critical scholarship might contribute to deconstructing the 
existing body of knowledge with self-reflexibility and incorporation of non-Western 
experiences (Tickner 2011, 617-8). While sympathy for the calls for greater 
intellectual diversity is often found among those American scholars working in non-
mainstream traditions and/or immigrant scholars, one may ask ‘How does mainstream 
American IR – the gatekeepers of established knowledge – respond to such 
challenge?’  
What impact, if any, does the EAIRT debate have on American IR? 
The TRIP surveys, thus far the most extensive study of American scholars’ viewpoints 
on the impact of East Asia on their research and teaching practices, have indicated that 
‘academics recognize the strategic significance of East Asia, but comparatively few 
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 scholars teach about or do research on the region’ (Hundley, Kenzer, and Peterson 
2013, 1). In other words, there is a gap between theory and practice as it applies to 
East Asia. While there has been a recent ‘pivot’ in US policy toward East Asia, there 
is no equivalent within the American IR academic community (Hundley, Kenzer, and 
Peterson 2013).  
This author’s own interviews with leading US theorists also point to the same 
conclusion. Most American scholars – with a notable exception of John Mearsheimer, 
Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Ian Johnston, and Thomas Christensen, among others – 
care less about theory than empirical studies. As a result, despite the growing 
importance of East Asia to the US, there has been virtually little debate about the 
movements toward building indigenous approaches within the region as well as those 
theoretical endeavours by US-based scholars. Even the work of Kang and Acharya has 
not been universally well-received in the US (Interviews with various American 
scholars, October and November 2013). Indeed, some mainstream scholars simply 
dismiss the presence of such a debate in the US. Therefore, while the EAIRT debate 
has clearly shaped the practices of the dissident scholars, it cannot be said that it has 
any particular impact on American mainstream scholars or that it has compelled them 
to change their strong propensity toward theoretical universalism and/or their overall 
disinterest in alternative theory. This response toward EAIRT, however, should be 
placed in the context of the general tendency of American IR: the shift away from 
grand theorizing and theoretical purity toward problem-solving and analytical 
eclecticism. 
The decline of ‘grand theorizing’ and the rise of analytical eclecticism in American 
IR 
To understand mainstream American IR’s response to EAIRT, it is necessary to 
discuss the growing concern about the decline of ‘grand theory’ and the rise of 
‘hypothesis testing’ in US IR that leading theorists John Measheimer, Stephen Walt 
and others have noted (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013; Levine and Barder 2014). There 
are increasing laments about the ‘closing of American minds’ in that scholars are less 
and less concerned about developing new grand theory (asking big questions) or 
rigorously employing theory in their research. This is reflected in the growing number 
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 of non-paradigmatic approaches that the TRIP surveys have disclosed.80 Rather, 
American IR research has been dominated by ‘simply hypothesis testing which 
emphasizes discovering well-verified empirical regularities’ using statistical methods 
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, 427). This ‘triumph of methods over theory’ is 
unhealthy for the development of the IR discipline (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, 
429). Ideally, Mearsheimer and Walt suggest, IR should strike a balance between 
theory construction and hypothesis testing, if not giving greater importance to the 
former.  
How is this relevant to the EAIRT debate? In this author’s view, its relevance is 
manifested in at least two dimensions. First, lesser interest in IRT in general 
subsequently results in disinterest in or even ignorance to alternative theory 
development by non-Western scholars. As a result, mainstream scholars are largely 
indifferent to claims for EAIRT. The implied message is clear: ‘We don’t even care 
about our own theory, why should we care about EAIRT?’ This sentiment is exposed 
in the remark of a noted specialist on Asian i.r.: 
The majority of American scholars, I would argue, including myself, are not 
driven by theory. We don’t really care about theory, we care about empirics 
and about puzzles, and researching and exploring empirical problems. If you 
look at the work of most American experts on Asian international relations, 
that is what they do, they explore problems and theory is tangential at best. It 
is very peripheral to most of the research that is done in the US about 
international relations in Asia… And for US government, theory is 100% 
irrelevant to policy makers… This debate doesn’t have any influence on my 
own thinking and research, frankly (David Shambaugh, Interview, November 
2013). 
Second, the problem not only reflects scholars’ decreasing interest in theory but also 
the narrow focus of existing mainstream theories on a number of topics relevant only 
to American foreign policy. Interestingly, this has served as an excuse for local 
scholars in developing ‘new’ theory. Professor Jack Snyder observes that in the US, 
IR theorizing of the last five to ten years has been going in the direction of being 
theoretically eclectic and problem driven. Scholars have been studying terrorism, civil 
war, foreign-imposed regime change and international intervention, peacekeeping, etc. 
So the research agenda has become more current policy problem-driven and less 
80 The latest TRIP survey result in the US shows that 31.6% of American IR scholars say they do not 
use paradigmatic approach. The two key reasons for their selections are that their approach is not based 
on any paradigm or school of thought (50%) and that their approach is based on more than one 
paradigm or school of thought (40.24%) (TRIP 2015). 
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 oriented toward big macro theoretical debates about the nature of the international 
system. Many of the topics that IR scholarship has been focusing on over the last ten 
years are not so much of interest to China. That might explain Chinese scholars’ 
motivations for developing a ‘Chinese School’ (Interview, October 2013). 
In this context, analytical eclecticism has become an increasingly popular approach in 
the US to study other regions, notably East Asia. For scholars who do care about 
theory when studying East Asia, there is a tendency to employ a hybrid of mainstream 
theories – the so-called ‘analytical eclecticism.’ Peter Katzenstein, for example, has 
been praised by Acharya as ‘the exception among US and Western gurus of 
international relations (IR) in having recognized the importance of Asian regionalism 
(and Asia more generally) as a subject worthy of serious theoretical investigation’ 
(Acharya 2007b, 370). In fact, Katzeinsten is among the pioneers in promoting this 
analytical eclecticism in studying East Asian international relations.81 This is seen as a 
scholarly attempt to bridge the gap between discipline and area studies. According to 
Katzenstein (1997, 6), ‘IR scholars and area specialists both fail to capture regional 
dynamics properly. The former tends to downplay the local or national contexts 
specific to regionalism. In sharp contrast, area specialists pay insufficient attention to 
the broader structural and comparative conditions under which regional developments 
take place.’  
Working at the intersection of IR, comparative politics, and area studies, Katzenstein 
and his collaborators have drawn on a variety of theoretical perspectives from these 
fields to eclectically theorize about Asian economic and security regionalism. Such 
eclectic frameworks ‘serve many good purposes, including avoiding never-ending 
debates about metatheory, providing a common theoretical vocabulary and common 
knowledge, offering common standards for evaluation and a recognizable professional 
identity to scholars, and encouraging progress in one research tradition that finds itself 
in competition with others’ (Katzenstein 2007, 397). In fact, this is a natural reaction 
to the perceived waning American scholarly hegemony as opposed to ‘the rise of 
national and regional centers of academic excellence and the rearticulation of 
indigenous scholarly traditions around the world.’ Accordingly, ‘exploring 
81 In an interview with this author in October 2013, Katzenstein insisted that he was not a constructivist 
and that designating him as a constructivist would be a misreading of his work. Constructivism can 
explain some aspects that realism and liberalism cannot explain but constructivism, to Katzenstein, is 
not theory but merely ‘language.’ He prefers to be linked directly to analytical eclecticism. 
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 intersections between area, regional, and international studies can give students a 
glimpse of theoretical debates at the cutting edge of knowledge, while also teaching 
them languages, facts-in-context, and systematic thinking’ (Katzenstein 2002, 134-6). 
In Katzenstein’s view, moreover, the growing nexus between area studies and IR 
‘must be seen within the context of a change in the demographic composition of 
graduate studies in the U.S’, particularly from an ‘infusion of intellectual energy from 
foreign graduate students and post-docs’ (Katzenstein 2001, 789). In fact, much of his 
thinking about the East have been shaped by his teaching experience e.g. through the 
engagement and interactions with Asian postgraduate students. Interestingly enough, 
Katzenstein has shared with this author that he wrote his book on analytical 
eclecticism for the sake of his undergraduate students (Interview, October 2013). 
Following Katzenstein, other theorists studying East Asia increasingly accept that no 
single theory explains all the dimensions of that region’s IR. For example, a recent 
study on the impact of China’s Rise on IR Theory concludes that ‘a full solution to the 
question of China’s rise will require an “analytic [sic] eclecticism” characterized by 
theoretical pragmatism, broadly formulated questions and complex answers’ (Gilley 
2011, 795-6). More broadly speaking, 
A robust bilateralism and incipient multilateralism in Japanese and Asian-
Pacific security affairs are typically not well explained by the exclusive 
reliance on any single analytical perspective – be it realist, liberal, or 
constructivist. Japan’s and Asia-Pacific’s security policies are not shaped 
solely by power, interest, or identity but by their combination. Adequate 
understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony… Strict 
formulations of realism, liberalism, and constructivism sacrifice explanatory 
power in the interest of analytical purity. Yet in understanding political 
problems, we typically need to weigh the causal importance of different types 
of factors, for example, material and ideal, international and domestic. Eclectic 
theorizing, not the insistence on received paradigms, helps us understand 
inherently complex social and political processes (Katzenstein and Okawara 
2006, 167).  
Analytical eclecticism as a pathway to bridge the gap between theoretical 
universalism and contextual knowledge, therefore, has become a popular framework 
to be employed in most recent publications on East Asian international relations (e.g. 
Katzenstein 2005; Goldstein 2007; Fravel 2010; Shambaugh 2014; Pekkanen, 
Ravenhill, and Foot 2014). The engagement between American theorists (including 
the dissidents) and East Asian anomalies have resulted in the introduction of a number 
of ‘eclectic frameworks’ such as Victor Cha’s ‘neoclassical realism’, T. J. Pempel’s 
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 ‘institutional Darwinism’, Kai He’s ‘institutional realism’, and Acharya’s theory of 
‘consociational security orders’ (Cha 2000; Pempel 2010; He 2008b; Acharya 2013a).  
While eclecticism represents the potential flexibility of IR Theory and the desirability 
to study other regions more extensively, it is often seen as no more than a synthesis 
and an extension of existing (and in most of the case mainstream) theories. As one 
recent work has argued, ‘while China’s rise will certainly contribute to a deepening of 
that theory, it does not support the contention that existing theory is unable to handle 
China’s rise’ (Gilley 2011, 810-1; for similar remark on East Asia more broadly, see 
Johnston 2012, 69). Therefore, a discussion on the response of American mainstream 
IR to the various claims for EAIRT is offered below, analysing the impact of EAIRT 
discourse on the future development of American IR. 
At best agnosticism, at worst indifference: mainstream American IR’s responses to 
EAIRT 
Research conducted for this study has led this author to conclude here that the 
response of American mainstream IR scholars to the various claims for EAIRT is 
mainly threefold: 1) scepticism if not rejection of the possibility and desirability of 
national School(s) of IR in Asia; 2) partial sympathy, within the framework of 
analytical eclecticism, with claims for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IR theory (Kang) or 
‘Global IR’ (Acharya); and 3) indifference to post-colonial IR agenda such as Ling’s 
Daoist approach. Each of these reactions may tell us something about the impact of 
the EAIRT discourses on American IR.  
First, American mainstream scholars do acknowledge that there are some distinctive 
concepts and traditional values that may affect the way Asian nations think about IR 
just as how Western philosophy (e.g. Locke and Hobbes) have shaped the thinking 
and practices of Western countries. Katzeinstein, for example, believes that 
Confucianism is an important feature in the Sinicization of the Asian civilization 
(Katzenstein 2012b) and that Tianxia is a very rich world order concept which will 
really add to what Kant and Morgenthau and other people who deal with world order 
concept (Interview, October 2013; see also Katzenstein 2008b, 2). David Shambaugh 
concurs that the way the Chinese and Indians are thinking about IR today is very 
much rooted in their cultural and traditions, language, historical path, and values. For 
instance, he notes that a number of traditional values associated with Confucianism 
and Legalism such as the role of De (ethics), Mianzi (keeping face), Ba (hegemony), 
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 Datong (Great Harmony) date back hundreds of years ago and that they still play an 
important role in Chinese thinking and writings. As he self-reflects, ‘I told my 
students that there is a Buddhist or Daoist theory. Chinese yin and yang dialectics, for 
example, view things in cyclical change while in the West it is linear change 
(evolutionary change)’ (Interview, November 2013). 
While these remarks may signal at least some recognition by American mainstream 
scholars of the sociology in the IR field as it pertains to East Asia, they nevertheless 
seem to collectively dismiss the idea of a ‘regional’ or ‘national’ school of thought. 
Katzeinstein posits that every region has its distinctive conceptual developments that 
all can learn from, work with, and expand to but to say that drawing on such 
distinctiveness to come up with something dramatically new is, he asserts, highly 
implausible (Interview, October 2013). Another mainstream scholar, meanwhile, 
observes that from an American positivist perspective, the attempt to develop a 
regional School of IR for Asia, ‘is a very foolish project’ and ‘a project which is 
bound to fail because it has inherent limitations, the built-in limitations of 
international relations and social theory in general’ (Interview, October 2013). These 
inherent limitations are most evidently exposed in the case of the ‘Chinese School’, 
dismissed by leading American theorists as merely ‘political slogans’ or ‘propaganda’ 
which may fit very nicely during the earlier period of the ‘China’s peaceful rise’ but 
which have become increasingly harder to sell at the moment (Interviews with 
American scholars, October and November 2013). Note this observation by one 
American constructivist who says he takes culture seriously: 
I am worried when I hear about the Chinese IR theory. I am reminded of 
arguments by Carl Schmitt back in the 1930s whose writings about the 
German international relations have become an excuse to reject everybody 
else’s. It may become an excuse for Chinese professors. They may take this 
cultural element which is supposed to be unique – one that says something 
positive about themselves e.g. ‘peaceful rise’ (Interview, October 2013). 
In fact, as Chris Brown has pointed out, the universalist intellectual predispositions of 
American IR is ‘committed to denying the privileging of any particular national 
viewpoint – indeed to denying the very idea that a national viewpoint could have any 
intellectual validity’ (Brown 2001, 216). Such rejection is also applied to the 
possibility and desirability of a pan-regional framework. Katzenstein, for example, 
holds that he needs theory, not ‘Asian’ theory (Interview, October 2013). Similarly, 
Victoria Hui posits that ‘it is a good idea to develop genuinely universal theories by 
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 incorporating non-Western experiences. But this is not to say that we need a separate 
regional theory’ (Interview, October 2013). Jack Snyder meanwhile strongly 
dismisses the ideas of ‘Asian School(s) of IR’ or ‘Asian values’ discourses:  
Singaporean diplomats wrote about ‘Asian values’; Aryeh Neier, the founder 
of Human Rights Watch, replied that they were ‘unacceptable values.’ You 
can call them ‘Asian’ but they are not any more acceptable for Asians than for 
anyone else. So from the universalists’ point of view, if an idea doesn’t meet a 
universalist standard, it is not good enough (Interview, October 2013) 
Yet, the strongest critique in this regard is presented by David Shambaugh, perhaps 
one of the greatest skeptics of EAIRT: 
Asians seem to take Asian IR more seriously than non-Asians take Asian IR. 
Frankly, I don’t think there is a big debate. In the West, there is no debate, it is 
a non-issue. Most Westerners dismiss Asian attempts to create an alternative 
school of IR because they aren’t very theoretically sophisticated and they are 
not achieved universally. They are all very sui generis, or unique. Despite the 
strong desire for Chinese School of IR, so far Chinese scholars have not 
produced any kind of theory that is appealing and attractive to people outside 
China. That is a litmus test for any school of IR. It has to have universalistic 
appeal…. There is not a distinctive American school of IR. We have 
developed several schools of thought but we don’t call it an ‘American 
School.’ So I am quite sceptical at best and I dismiss the idea that there is such 
thing as an Asian School of IR, much less a Chinese School, Japanese School, 
Korean School, or anything else so far… Asian IR has not gained appeal. It 
hasn’t defined itself (Interview, November 2013). 
Second, there seems to be more sympathy with Kang and Acharya’s constructivist 
arguments, partly because that approach is still regarded as fitting within the 
framework of mainstream theories. David Shambaugh, who has earlier rejected the 
desirability of a specific Asian School(s) of IR thought, nevertheless notes that 
‘constructivism definitely has a basis original in Southeast Asia, to the extent that any 
kind of Asian School of IR is constructivism. Although constructivism also originated 
in the West, South East Asian scholars and governments have given it many 
substances’ (Interview, November 2013). In fact, constructivism is attractive to East 
Asian scholars because it rejects the sort of universalizing projects that associated with 
more traditional forms of rationalist IR Theory. Acharya’s theorizing on norm 
localization, in particular, has been quite well received by mainstream scholars as a 
rich and interesting research agenda because it taps into a larger debate in IR about the 
vernacularisation or localization of general international norms of democracy, 
sovereignty, human rights etc. Similarly, works that compare both the commonalities 
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 and differences between European and Asian history and practices of international 
relations have been generally welcomed. In fact, scholars in the mainstream seem to 
increasingly acknowledge the potential of using East Asian cases to enrich existing IR 
theory (see, for example Wohlforth et al. 2007; Katzenstein 2008b, 17-8; Johnston 
2012; Womack 2014; Kim 2014, 50). 
Mainstream American theorists are less enthusiastic about Kang and others’ argument 
for ‘getting Asia wrong.’ To those mainstream American scholars whom this author 
has a chance to interview, Kang’s theorizing on a Sino-centric hierarchical order 
reveals both the promise and pitfalls of ‘East Asian’ scholarship. On the one hand, 
Kang tries to take the region seriously which, in their view, is good. On the other 
hand, he endeavours to provide a new analytical framework on Chinese terms that 
does not distinguish the relationship between the Chinese reading of history and 
current Chinese policy interests which, according to mainstream American scholars, 
lead to ‘a flawed analysis’ (Interviews, October and November 2013). Chinese 
leaders, in David Shambaugh’s opinion, are no different. ‘They are hard-headed 
practitioners of realpolitik and realism’ (Shambaugh 1997, 18). Similarly, Jack Snyder 
argues from the US vantage point: 
It seems pretty clear that they [East Asian states] are ready to balance with the 
US against China in order to maintain their sovereignty. So I think that Kang 
has an argument that was sort of plausible when he first wrote it and it starts to 
look less and less plausible with every year that goes by (Interview, October 
2013).  
The ‘getting Asia wrong’ thesis is also opposed by other immigrant East Asia 
specialists who use East Asian cases as a means for proving the universality of 
Western IRT. Victoria Hui and Yuankang Wang, former students of leading American 
IR theorists Jack Snyder and John Mearsheimer respectively, disagree with David 
Kang and Huiyun Feng that China’s behaviour/strategic culture is pacifist and 
‘Confucianism-based.’82 Hui has been developing a dynamic theory to explain how 
Asia and Europe are both similar and different with regard to their interstate systems 
and state formation. Her comparative analysis explains why seemingly similar war-
prone ancient China (the Warring States period of 656 to 221 BC) and early modern 
Europe (1495 to 1815) ended with different types of state formation: ‘a coercive 
82 Another example of American supervisor-Chinese student team working on Asian power balancing 
issues is Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu. They co-author an article titled ‘After Unipolarity - 
China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline’ (Schweller and Pu 2011). 
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 universal empire’ – the Qin dynasty – in ancient China but a ‘checks and balances’ 
system in early modern Europe (Hui 2005, 7). In both cases – which are more than 
two thousand years apart –  Hui finds the existence and operation of an Asian balance 
of power system intact, although the logic of balancing is Western-centric in its 
origins (Hui 2005, 226). Her explanations to the question of why the Napoleonic wars 
ultimately failed but Qin Shihuang successfully unified China may be striking to the 
advocates of a benign and different China (like Kang). The Qin dynasty could achieve 
universal domination by pursuing ‘the most comprehensive self-strengthening reforms 
and the most ruthless strategies and tactics’ i.e. divide-and-conquest strategies toward 
neighbouring countries and harsh suppression of its own people (Hui 2005, 35). In 
comparison, European leaders, although practicing balancing and counterbalancing, 
‘rarely pursued ancient-Chinese-style stratagems and brutality against fellow 
Europeans’ (Hui 2004, 201). This outstanding work won the 2006 Jervis-Schroeder 
Award from the American Political Science Association for the best book on 
international history and politics. It has also been praised by Acharya as an exemplar 
of ‘East Asian’ IR scholarship that travels beyond China or East Asia (Acharya 2014g, 
82).  
Apart from publishing in English, Hui has also extensively published in leading 
Chinese venues. As Hui has shared with this author, ‘scholars with truly bi-/multi-
cultural backgrounds are better equipped to integrate East Asian experiences’ 
(Interview, October 2013). Hui nonetheless warns against both Eurocentricism and 
Sino-centrism in theorizing, calling for Chinese scholars to exhibit a greater awareness 
of history. She has also raised concerns about Yan Xuetong’s ‘Ancient Chinese 
thought, modern Chinese power’ volume as employing an ‘unhistorical and even anti-
historical’ view of ancient Chinese history, and thus risks ‘building castle on the sand’ 
(Hui 2012b, 2012a). More broadly speaking, Hui holds that the various attempts to 
construct national Schools of IR in East Asia ‘would indeed be like building regional 
trading blocs.’ Nevertheless, she notes that ‘they do help to enrich the debates’ 
(Interview, October 2013). 
Yuan-kang Wang, meanwhile, is even bolder in defending the relevance of realist 
theory in explaining Chinese behaviour and the ancient East Asian order during the 
medieval era of the tenth–twelfth centuries as well as the rise of China in the modern 
day international system (Wang 2011c, 2013d). Wang completely disagrees with the 
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 ‘benign China’ thesis. He instead agrees with Iain Johnston (1995) that Chinese 
behaviour has been generally realist-oriented but disagrees that such realist strategic 
thinking is embedded in China’s culture. Rather, his explanation is simple – it is 
power and power asymmetry that matter. Analysing historical East Asian system 
during Chinese Song dynasty (960 – 1279) and Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644), Wang 
concludes that ‘like their European counterparts, great powers in East Asia have 
historically attempted to dominate the region and maximize their share of power over 
potential rivals.’ In such an anarchical system, ‘Imperial China placed a high premium 
on the utility of force and looked for opportunities to maximize China's relative 
power. China adopted a more offensive posture as its power grew and shifted to a 
more defensive one as its power declined’ (Wang 2004c, 174-5). Viewed in this 
longitudinal historical context, Wang, like his mentor John Measheimer, predicts an 
‘unpeaceful’ re-emergence of China (Wang 2006b; see also Mearsheimer 2006).  
Overall, Kang and Acharya’s discourses about the promise of using East Asia (or Asia 
more broadly) as a foundation either to enrich IR theory or to construct new theory 
have been somewhat accepted by Western IR mainstreamers but with serious 
qualifications. As Katzenstein has noted, in a world of American theorizing, the kind 
of ‘value-laden’ claims that Kang and Acharya are making is very hard for 
[American] people to understand (Interview, October 2013). Furthermore, these 
‘dissident’ scholars’ theoretical approaches may not be seen as distinctive to 
mainstream American IR as what has been claimed. In fact, Kang and Acharya’s work 
are not perceived as so significant with the mainstreamers given that US IR is actually 
more interested in asking empirical questions, and especially if Kang and Acharya are 
not perceived by them as engaging in original theory building at all. Kang’s work can 
be categorized into the constructivist account but only adds the ‘East Asian flavour’ 
into it. Acharya’s research agenda on norm localization and Global IR, from the 
standpoint of mainstream American scholars, is interesting and more challenging but 
not so much theoretically distinct (saying local actors need agency does not a theory 
make). While noting that the negligence of East Asia region in IR theory may come at 
the expense for trans-Atlantic IR, Iain Johnston (2012) strictly requires that ‘for 
theoretical contributions to IR focusing on East Asian to succeed, they would need to 
resolve major controversies, lead to breakthroughs, and drive theory development.’ 
Acharya has responded to this point, saying that Johnston ‘sets a bar too high’ 
(Acharya 2014g, 83). 
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 Lastly, mainstream scholars are largely unimpressed with alternative research agendas 
presented by post-colonial theory. Analytical eclecticism, thus far mainstream 
American IR’s most comprehensive response to non-Western scholarship, mostly 
focuses on how a synthesis and dialogues can be attained and sustained between 
mainstream theories, including the various branches of realism, neorealism, and 
constructivism. There have been rare cases where an eclectic framework is drawn 
between mainstream and reflectivist theories. The delegitimation of post-colonial IR is 
exposed in a remark by one leading American scholar who claims that the 
generalization of world politics that postcolonialism offers is very weak. In his words, 
‘when you tell me you are doing post-colonialism, I think I understand what you are 
saying but you need to tell me a whole lot more’ (Interview, October 2013). Ling 
herself admits that she has had a hard time trying to get recognition from the ‘big 
names’ in American IRT.  
In the West, there are many stereotypes about Asian women, both good and 
bad. They [mainstream men in mainstream IR] seem to generally not like what 
I have to say. They treat me as a kind of ‘oddity’. When I was younger, I 
wanted to be accepted by the big guys but now I get to the point when I don’t 
care anymore. Instead, I get fulfilment from the work itself as well as from a 
network of friends, colleagues, and students. So I have my own community 
(Interview, October 2013). 
Albeit such remark is not much of a rationale for failure to engage and refute critics, 
here, we clearly see the divergence between the growing self-reflexivity in ‘East 
Asian’ scholarship and American mainstream IR’s lack of self-criticism given the 
latter’s hegemonic status. John Mearsheimer, for example, disagrees with the critique 
placed by Acharya and many others that IR is ‘too American-centric and needs to 
broaden its horizons’ because there are ‘legitimate and defensible reasons’ for the 
American dominance in IR which is, in his view, a ‘benign hegemony’ (Mearsheimer 
2016, 147). In fact, this gap in perception is due to the fact that for scholars 
advocating EAIRT, it is necessary to ‘catch up’ and establish a disciplinary profile 
whilst American mainstream scholars, given their current dominance within the 
discipline, do not need to do. This view is reflected in the below remarks  by one of 
the most moderate voices in the US mainstream  IR community concerning East Asian 
IR: 
At the conceptual level, we can learn [from East Asian distinctive ideas and 
concepts] but from the generic approach and theory level, I haven’t seen it. So 
I say I never say ‘no’, but I say the burden to prove that there is an East Asian 
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 IR is on those who say it exists. I am not the one who will be looking. If you 
come up with something, I would love to read it but I think the burden to prove 
it is on you, not on me. That makes me sound more conservative intellectually 
than many of my East Asian colleagues would like me to be but it is not. I am 
agnostic, I think it is possible but you got to show me. I don’t have to show it 
or the West doesn’t have to show it (Interview, October 2013). 
While there is a wide gap in the actual practices of the EAIRT proponents and its 
greatest sceptics – which include most of those working in mainstream American IR – 
it would be premature and indeed misleading to conclude that such divergence is 
permanent or cannot be bridged. Rather, the difference between the shift to 
eclecticism in the US and the drive toward theoretical purity and innovation in East 
Asia reaffirms the sociology of the field – there exists a relationship between identity 
and approach to the discipline. Equally, analytical eclecticism does reflect promising 
evidence of the US academy’s desire to study global issues and develop theoretical 
flexibility that best allows it to study other regions amid the ongoing power shift. In 
this light, the increasing popularity of analytical eclecticism should be seen as a 
reaction, in a passive form, of American IR toward the critique about the disjuncture 
between American/Western IR theories and the practices of international relations in 
‘non-Western’ regions, including East Asia. Furthermore, as one recent work 
observes, the rise of China/East Asia and foreign policy practices in the region 
‘contributes to the creation of IR theory and the conduct of foreign policy analysis in a 
peculiar way – not necessarily by writing IR theory but by refocusing IR theorisation 
on the civilizational process’ (Shih and Yin 2013b, 61). The trilogy on civilizations 
and processes edited by Peter Katzenstein is very relevant in this context (Katzenstein 
2009, 2012a, 2012b). The central arguments that Katzenstein puts forward in these 
books is that civilizations (be it an ‘American imperium’ or ‘Sinicization’) are plural 
and pluralist. By refocusing IR Theory to the civilizational unit, he helps shape an 
overarching theme in IR scholarship that there is indeed no difference between East 
and West.  
Similarly, there have been signs that some mainstream American scholars are willing 
to update their assigned reading list for East Asia-related courses. In his teaching of 
the ‘China’s Foreign Policy’ course at Cornell University, Allen Carlson has 
increasingly included a sampling of writings by PRC-based scholars on the syllabus to 
provide alternative perspectives beyond the US-centric approaches. The feedback he 
has received from his students is encouraging: ‘students, many of whom are quite 
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 interested in learning more about the ‘Chinese’ perspective on various issues, 
inevitably find such assignments to be very engaging and thought provoking’ (Carlson 
2012, 430). Similarly, Stephanie Neuman’s syllabus for her Third World Security 
Issues course at Columbia University does not merely rely on the work of American 
scholars. As more scholars from non-Western countries begin to write in English and 
contribute to the international relations literature, she includes their work in her class 
syllabus. In that way, Neuman hopes her students will gain a more balanced view of 
security issues in the Third World (Interview, October 2013).83 Others have also 
suggested IR scholars in the West to draw more abundantly from area studies 
expertise in general and East Asian experience of international relations in particular 
for theory building and theory testing (Moore 2004, 393; Johnston 2012; Pekkanen, 
Ravenhill, and Foot 2014, 4). In a rare case that may reflect concern about American 
parochialism becoming obsolete, an American constructivist scholar offers some 
thought-provoking remarks about the possibility of the new ‘East Asian’ theory and its 
linkages with Western scholarship: 
I am all for an East Asian IR Theory and I think it is good. I am looking for 
learning about it and taking part in that debate. I think it is wonderful to have 
scholars from many different places in the world who try to address this kind 
of question. But I also want to warn against the danger about how this kind of 
theory can become very disruptive and misleading. With the West, it is the 
same thing. For example, Edward Said talks in his famous book ‘Orientalism’ 
how ideas about modernization – ideas about what modernity and civilizations 
meant - became an excuse for Western imperialism. This is to some extent 
unavoidable but I hope that scholars including scholars in East Asia need to 
think about it through and learn from the mistakes in the West and avoid them 
(Interview, October 2013). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the dynamics of the EAIRT debate in US academia. What 
it finds is that there are relative richness and diversity of claims and reactions to 
EAIRT. While evidence shows that this debate has shaped the practices of ‘dissident 
scholars’ quite clearly, it can hardly be said that the same degree is exerted on 
American mainstream IR scholars. Significantly enough, the findings here point to the 
presence of the sociology of knowledge as far as the EAIRT debate is concerned. In 
other words, there seems to be an inherent linkage between identity and perspective in 
83 Her course syllabus assigns readings from scholars such as Mohamed Ayoob, Amitav Acharya, and 
other non-Western writings on the Third World. I thank Professor Neuman for providing me her course 
syllabus for reference. 
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 IR. For the dissident scholars, their practices are mainly inherited from their previous 
accumulations. In the US, the diversity of thought, the strong mainstream agendas, 
and the independent thinking of foreign-born scholars explains why most of the 
‘dissident’ agendas are ‘personal.’ Given this particular characteristic of American IR, 
the drive toward theoretical innovation based on East Asian cases in the US has 
adopted a different understanding of ‘new-ness’ than the form it takes in East Asia. In 
fact, it is a struggle between new theories and old theories on new issues, or put 
differently, between empirical differences only versus emerging theoretical 
differences rather than a ‘revolutionary’ approach such as that represented by the 
Chinese School.  
For mainstream American scholars, a general disinterest in EAIRT is actually in itself 
an identity concern embedded in their wilful rejection of a critique that would 
undercut their intellectual hegemony. Mainstream American IR’s reactions to EAIRT 
are largely conditioned by the intellectual hegemony of the US in the field and the 
traits of American IR – their dominant positivist tradition. Against this background, 
the most nuanced reaction toward EAIRT among American IR is found among critical 
and constructivist scholars while rational theorists simply reject such academic 
movements. Yet, contrary to the most conservative accounts among American IR 
which insists that such a debate does not exist and that it is a non-issue for the West, 
the rising popularity of analytical eclecticism nevertheless reflects the desirability of 
American academia to develop synthesis and flexibility in studying the complexities 
of world politics in general and the East Asian region in particular. In this sense, 
analytical eclecticism is actually an initiative by which mainstream IR adherents seek 
to diffuse critique of ‘Western theories’ and to narrow the gap between the 
universalism of American theories and regional empirical anomalies. In short, it is just 
a defensive move or, put differently, it just marks the beginning of a shift away from 
their ‘business as usual’ logic. 
Given the continued domination of American scholarship and the incipient stage of 
the alternative approaches, it would be naïve to think that the global discipline or 
American IR will change its nature overnight. The growth in quantity and the 
maturation in quality of foreign students and scholars currently studying and thriving 
in American IR, however, suggest that this debate will be more likely to permeate in 
American IR in the time to come. The rise of two dissident scholars, Amitav Acharya 
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 and Lily Ling, to Presidency and Program Chair, respectively, of ISA 2015 
Convention and their ability to set the agenda for the world’s largest association on 
international studies on such controversial theme as ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds’ 
signal a looming generational change worldwide that may, in turn, introduce a new 
stage for the IR discipline to accept more diversity and for American IR itself to 




If IR is to overcome Western dominance, then it must offer concepts and 
theories that are derived from other societies and cultures… Global IR, after 
all, does not seek to displace but subsume existing IR and enrich it with the 
infusion of ideas and practices from the non-Western world…(Acharya 2016, 
6). 
The geopolitical and cultural rise of East Asia has triggered a debate on how IR theory 
should respond to this structural change. On the one hand, we see a critical self-
reflection within Western scholarship about the ‘end of IR theory’ – the decline of 
grand theorizing and great debates, a call for acceptance of theoretical diversity, and 
the emergence of analytical eclecticism to answer key empirical questions in 
international relations. On the other hand, a growing array of IR scholars is calling for 
bringing an ‘Eastern’ agency into IR Theory. There are many claims for and counter-
claims against the so-called ‘non-Western IR Theory’ emanating from East Asia. 
While it remains to be seen whether this academic movement will have a decisive 
impact on the development of the IR field, the growing intensity of this debate has 
yielded an important opportunity to explore an understudied practical aspect of theory 
building in IR – the practices of knowledge-in-the-making.  
To what extent do theoretical controversies in IR shape the practices of academics 
involved in those debates? That is the key puzzle that has driven the research 
underlying this study. Although there exists a well-developed literature that lays out a 
variety of arguments about the theory-practice relationship, particularly the linkages 
between the discipline, theory, and the political reality, the existing body of literature 
has not extensively examined how theory impacts on the practices of theorists 
themselves. It is strange that a discipline as concerned with theory as it is and one 
dominated by theoretical debates has not paid adequate attention to the possible 
linkages between theory and the practices of those who produce it. The central enquiry 
of this thesis, therefore, has been to develop an account of whether the various 
theoretical claims presented in the debate over East Asian IR Theory have ‘roots’ in 
the actual academic conduct or instead they are being conducted above and beyond 
the quotidian practices of academic life. Either of these outcomes provides a platform 
to interrogate the integrity of the claims for/against East Asian IRT, rather than merely 
privileging the pyrotechnics that it may have generated. It is posted here that the 
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 EAIRT debate can serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of the theory-
practice relationship; indeed, that is how theory and theoretical debates in IR actually 
shape the practices of academics.  
One way to understand the complexity of theory-practice interaction is to foster 
reflexive deliberations on academics’ own practices as the analytical focus. Decoding 
the connection between the various claims about EAIRT and the scholarly practices of 
academics involved in that debate has been undertaken here. Three dimensions along 
such lines are at the heart of this study: why knowledge claims occur the way they do; 
how theorists validate and implement these claims in their daily life; and what actually 
drives those claims and practices. It has been argued in this study that these three 
issues are interrelated and that a full investigation into these questions requires us to 
turn to the sociology of science framework. Among other things, the sociology of 
science claims that theorizing is itself a practical activity that is directly and indirectly 
shaped by the interactions between the individual academic and his/her wider socio-
political and institutional environment. In the course of establishing knowledge claims 
and practices, various structural and agential factors (including power shifts, socio-
political concerns, academic structure, and scholars’ theoretical identities) often 
intrude in and shape relevant theorists’ responses to an academic issue such as the 
EAIRT debate. In other words, there is clearly a sociology of knowledge construction 
– things that exist beyond the theory that shape the way theorists view the world, and 
consequently, their knowledge claims and daily practices. 
Empirical findings 
The empirical findings of this study vindicate the key claim postulated by the 
sociology of science: theorists assemble their environment with the claims they make 
in theoretical debate. That is to say, there have been some actual changes in the 
research, teaching, and other outreach activities adopted by scholars involved in the 
EAIRT to match the claims they make in that debate. Nonetheless, the degree and 
form of changes vary across cases due to the uneven impact of social factors on the 
practices of claims. In the case of the EAIRT debate, those social factors can be 
classified into two main categories: structural consideration and agential choice. 
Understanding the various responses toward EAIRT requires appreciating the role of 
both structure and agency in shaping scholars’ behaviours vis-à-vis the EAIRT debate. 
In their covariation, structure creates preponderance toward shaping outcome but 
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 ultimately it is the agency that decides whether and if yes, how, to respond to the call 
for EAIRT. 
In chapter 3 this study has found that it is in China where the impact of structural 
factors (e.g. power shift, geopolitical concerns, social practices, and institutional 
settings) on academic practices is most evident. Accordingly, more than two-thirds of 
the Chinese IR community have agreed on the need to construct a ‘Chinese style’ 
theory. At least three directions toward establishing Chinese IR knowledge were 
identified, namely 1) the Chinese School of IR, 2) the Tsinghua approach to IR, and 3) 
the Chinese theory of foreign affairs led by the Beida camp. The ‘universalist’ 
scholars, constituting a minority within the Chinese IR community, meanwhile seek 
further integration with Western scholarship and thus see no need to construct a 
Chinese IR theory. A common trend can thus be discerned insofar that in establishing 
the various kinds of knowledge claims in China, external factors do intrude in and 
undermine Chinese scholars’ commitment toward universally applicable theories. 
Accordingly, the key approaches toward theoretical innovation in China have been 
shaped by very different causes. The most radical accounts of Chinese IRT are largely 
driven by their ethnic identity, cultural exceptionalism, and national interests. The 
‘universalist’ scholars, meanwhile, have retained their agency role in strictly 
observing universalism of knowledge amid the strong impact of China-related factors. 
Serving as a bridge between the nationalist Chinese scholarship and the scientific 
camp are those pro-Chinese IRT Western-trained scholars who, as the result of their 
socialization into the Chinese contexts, advocate a hybridization of Western and 
Chinese learning. Intertwined with the overarching ideological and political 
environment in China, these structural and agential factors have pulled the Chinese 
IRT debate in the direction of attaining a general consensus on the need to construct 
indigenous IR theory. Yet they differ on what pathways must be followed to achieve 
that end. This explains why theorizing in China has taken various and, at times, 
seemingly contradictory forms. 
Japan presents a different picture of indigenous theory development in East Asia. That 
East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge construction has 
become evident. While the form that this interest is taken in China is quite 
homogeneous and nationalistic, the situation in Japan is much more diverse and 
complicated. In Chapter 4, the researcher finds that despite growing interests in 
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 knowledge production in Japan, there have been few claims for and actual theorizing 
on a ‘Japanese brand-name’ in IR Theory like the ‘Chinese School.’ The EAIRT 
debate does hold an interest among a small portion of theoretically oriented Japanese 
IR scholars whilst the majority of Japan’s IR academia remains focused on areas 
studies and diplomatic history. Such development has its roots in the structural 
restraints embedded in that country’s unresolved identity as a de-facto polity situated 
between ‘East and West’ and the heritage of its war-time history. As a result of these 
legacies and the long-time path dependence on Western knowledge, what would occur 
for a Japanese contribution to IR theory, at best, is either historical explorations of 
past Japanese IR or theoretical engagement with the broader non/post-Western IR 
agenda. Furthermore, given the tradition of peaceful coexistence among diverse IR 
traditions in Japan, there various theoretical movements will most likely follow their 
own trajectory without integration and synthesis. This will position Japanese IR (just 
like Japan’s overall foreign policy at the moment) at a crossroads. Theoretical 
development in Japan, therefore, should be treated as a case of ‘eclecticism’ in the 
sense that it is neither a ‘neo-colonial entity’ of Western IR nor an alternative 
challenger like Chinese IR. 
A study on the impact of the EAIRT debate in the US, meanwhile, finds that this 
debate holds an interest within a small number of US-based (in most of the cases, 
foreign-born) East Asia specialists and American scholars working in the 
constructivist and reflectivist traditions of IR Theory. This debate has shaped the 
practices of these scholars quite clearly as seen through their trailblazing endeavours 
in terms of research, teaching, and networking activities which aims to introduce more 
in-depth non-Western perspectives (such as those of Asia) to their American/Western 
audience. Collectively, these efforts are intended to re-orient global scholarship 
toward a less Western/American-centric nature and with theoretical inputs from the 
Asian traditions. Although the form that this EAIRT debate is taken in the US is much 
more broadly focused in scope and by no means ‘nationalistic’, there exist certain 
linkages and interactions between the movements in the US and those in East Asia.  
Yet there is little evidence that this debate has any particular impact on the 
mainstreamers and American IR overall. With few exceptions, mainstream American 
scholars, given their lingering hegemony in the field, are largely indifferent to the 
calls for building alternative theories be they from within (US) or without (East Asia). 
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 This study nonetheless concludes that American IR itself is facing an identity problem 
by increasingly shifting away from theoretical parsimony to non-paradigmatic 
approaches and/or analytical eclecticism when dealing with the empirical puzzles 
associated with area and regional studies. Equally, the growing popularity of 
analytical eclecticism reflects the US academy’s desire to study global issues and 
develop theoretical flexibility that best allows it to study non-Western/East Asian 
issues. In this light, while mainstream American scholars are generally unimpressed 
with the various claims for East Asian IR theory and analytical eclecticism should be 
seen as a reaction, in a passive form, by predominant American IR factions toward the 
growing critique of the disjuncture between disciplinary and area studies and the 
challenge posed by the emerging ‘East Asian’ scholarship.  
Taken together, these empirical findings show that the EAIRT debate has exerted 
different impacts on the practices of scholars involved in that debate. For EAIRT 
proponents or the ‘gatecrashers’, the EAIRT debate has shaped their practices quite 
clearly as seen in various academic endeavours toward theorizing on non-
Western/East Asian perspectives. For EAIRT critics or the ‘gatekeepers’, however, 
the EAIRT debate may not have any significant impact on their practices. Here, we 
clearly see the divergence between the growing self-reflexivity in ‘East Asian’ 
scholarship and American mainstream IR’s lack of self-criticism given their 
hegemonic status. This is quite understandable because the pressure of theoretical 
innovation is often shouldered on those who want to make the change whilst, for those 
who already enjoy the status quo, it is largely ‘business as usual.’ In fact, this gap in 
perception is due to the degree to which for East Asian states/scholars, IR Theory 
offers a way to ‘catch up’ and establish a disciplinary profile which the US – given its 
current dominance of the discipline – does not need to do.  
The difference between the rise of analytical eclecticism in the US and the drive 
toward theoretical purity and innovation in East Asia also reaffirms the sociology of 
the field – there exists a relationship between identity and approach to the discipline. 
The various extents to which this debate has exerted its influence on scholars’ 
practices confirm the sociology of science logic: while theorizing is presumably 
driven by scholars’ scientific objectivity, ‘external’ factors such as the social, 
institutional, and psychological contexts (which are different in different places) may 
intrude in the process of establishing knowledge and undermine scholars’ commitment 
224 
 
 to universally applicable theory. In this light, the EAIRT claims and practices take 
different shapes in different places because they have been socially constructed to 
various extents by diverse structural and agential factors. The extent to which the 
EAIRT debate can shape academic practices depends on two things: scholars’ agency 
and the level of exposure they have to the wider institutional and socio-political 
settings in which they operate. In this interplay of structure and agency in determining 
an outcome, the former serves as the intervening variable while the latter plays the 
decisive role in shaping an actual outcome. The uneven influence of these structural 
and agential factors on EAIRT scholarship explains why in China we see the 
dominant narratives of the Chinese style IR theory; why Japanese IR adopts diversity 
of approaches without debate and synthesis; and why in the US it occurs in the form 
of decentralising but also enriching American mainstream scholarship in order to 
build a better body of IR knowledge.  
On the interplay of structural and agential factors in determining outcomes 
The central argument of this thesis is that the interaction of structural and agential 
factors shapes the changing practices scholars have adopted in response to their claims 
in the EAIRT debate. This is in line with a key constructivist observation which 
highlights the importance of both the agents and the structure in shaping actors’ 
behaviour (Adler 1997). Existing literature regarding the EAIRT tends to 
overemphasize the importance of the structure (e.g. power shifts) over the agents and 
thus only focuses on one specific level of analysis. Such a narrowly focused approach 
‘limits the need and ability to contemplate the various factors that concurrently shape 
actors’ behavior’ (Lupovici 2013, 239). This study, derived from its three-layered 
analytical framework and empirical findings, insists that understanding how EAIRT 
debate shapes the practices of scholars requires appreciating both the importance of 
structural and agential factors. In agential terms, the drive toward EAIRT can be 
explained first and foremost by personal motivations of individual academics 
themselves (training background, psychological aspects, ideological and political 
beliefs, fame, career incentives, etc.). Structurally, EAIRT claims and practices are 
directly and indirectly shaped by the wider national, institutional, and socio-political 
setting such as funding, traditions of academic discipline, geopolitical concerns, and 
national interests of the country with which they are associated. Cross-cutting among 
these layers are the generational change and academic maturation of those EAIRT 
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 scholars and an evolving nascent power shift to the East. In what follows, these factors 
are categorized into the ‘necessary’ versus ‘sufficient’ conditions to better explain the 
interactions among various factors in play relative to determining the degree and form 
of changes we have witnessed concerning the EAIRT debate. 
The necessary conditions for changes: a new batch of scholars plus a geopolitical 
context 
First and perhaps most importantly, it can be seen that the current drive toward 
constructing non-Western IR Theory in Asia or East Asian IR Theory can only be 
made possible with the rise of distinguished scholars who are, on the one hand, well-
trained in Western knowledge and, on the other hand, have developed a greater sense 
of confidence in developing their own thinking based on their profound local 
knowledge. Clearly, generational change is the first necessary pre-condition for a new 
wave of theoretical innovation, as has happened in the past and is happening now with 
the non-Western/East Asian IRT. In the US/West, this generational change is found in 
the surge and maturation of immigrant scholars (and Asian graduate students) in 
American/Western universities who have helped to introduce more theoretical and 
empirical insights into the existing Western paradigms. In East Asia, returning 
Western-trained scholars have contributed to enhancing theoretical rigor in various 
East Asian IR communities. As a result of the encounter between these scholars’ 
previous training and the local knowledge, there have been growing endeavors aiming 
at not only introducing and critically engaging with Western IRT but also constructing 
new analytical framework based on the local experience and traditions. In fact, the 
EAIRT debate can be said to be a ‘maturity mechanism’ that scholars in East Asia are 
currently going through, and scholars in other places e.g. the US have experienced. In 
the US, however, universalism is the end point; it is not the particularly Western 
output of that maturity mechanism. In East Asia or Asia more broadly, ongoing 
generational change will be conducive to making IR ‘a more level playing field.’ If 
the current trend continues, we can expect greater innovation and progress in research 
in, and the teaching of, IR in Asia (Moon and Kim 2002, 65). 
It should be noted, however, that as happened with the emergence of new theories in 
the past, it is not simply new people coming into the discipline that drives the changes 
that we have witnessed concerning the EAIRT debate. It is something more 
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 complicated: new people plus a context that is particularly welcoming of innovation. 
Realism and constructivism, for example, only really came into being because of the 
emergence of a new batch of scholars and the political context – the end of WWII and 
the end of Cold War respectively. Similarly, the context for the ongoing surge of 
literature on Asian IR is partly a result of a distinct material and ideational power shift 
to the East – the decline of American/Western power and the geopolitical and cultural 
rise of East Asia or Asia more broadly. With such logic, we can imagine that an 
unambiguously dominant US would not display the same level of stasis or a clearly 
declining China would not be so keen on new approaches. 
While a shift in geopolitical fortune necessarily changes something in theorising, what 
has been affirmed in this study is that this has not exerted the same impact on 
individual theorists and more broadly on the three national IR academies under this 
study. Rather, it points to differences in response. China, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
provides the clearest evidence where power shift has created such a large consensus 
among its IR academia to construct a Chinese style IR theory to support the ‘peaceful 
rise’ of China. Japanese counterparts, meanwhile, usually draw a line between 
geopolitics and knowledge production. As has been noted in Chapter 4, the 
development of ‘Japanese’ IR is conditioned by the historical burden of Japan’s failed 
pan-Asianism in the past, the country’s relative decline at present as well as its 
ambiguous identity as the country situating between the Western and Asian 
civilizations. Moreover, Japan also offers an interesting case of the impact of power 
politics. Yoshihide Soeya (Interview, December 2013), for example, argues that as the 
result of China’s rapid rise and Chinese aspiration for a China-centered world, the 
tendency for Japan to side with the established liberal international order has become 
stronger. Finally, as Chapter 5 that discusses the case of the US has shown, power 
shift only has an impact on the practices of a small number of US-based ‘dissident 
scholars’ whilst the majority of American IR, who still enjoys the hegemony in both 
the real world and the IR discipline, is largely indifferent to the EAIRT claims and 
practices.  
Interestingly, however, not only many scholars in the US but also some in Japan and 
even China have not changed their practices despite the intensification of power shifts. 
Instead, it seems to be something that creates a propensity or a tendency. The reason 
for these different responses to power shift across various national contexts, as have 
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 been argued in this study, is largely threefold: first, changes in knowledge production 
power is often slower to be realized than changes in material power; second, power 
shift to the East is by itself a tendency rather than a given fact; and third, even if 
power shift is evident enough such as in the case of China, scholars do have an agency 
in deciding what to practice corresponding to their own identities and beliefs. The US 
dominance in the real world, for example, started as early as in the late 19th century 
but IR only became an ‘American social science’ in the wake of WWII. Furthermore, 
it is important to note that China now has only shown sign of a rising great power. It 
has not become the dominant power yet nor is its great power status guaranteed. 
Broadly speaking, the same logic can be applied to East Asia – the ‘Asian century’ is 
a future prospect rather than current reality. That explains why some scholars are 
responding to power shift in the case of EAIRT but some do not.  
Moreover, this process of knowledge transfer is not inevitable. It would be naïve to 
believe that the rise of China and East Asia will automatically bring about new and 
increasingly predominant IR theory. Regional scholars are well aware of this fact. The 
first ISA Asia-Pacific Conference (held in Hong Kong in late June 2016), for 
example, states in its call for proposals that the political and economic rise of ‘Asian 
superpowers’, such as China, Japan and the East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies has not 
been able to re-shape IR theory and practice. Although attributing the proliferation of 
national Schools of IR in Asia to the rise of China and the East, local scholars 
acknowledges that these academic endeavours have done a little in challenging 
Western dominance in the field and ‘have left the traditional ontology of IR intact’ 
(ISA 2016). 
In short, as has been well argued by the sociology of science, power shift does have an 
impact on knowledge production; nonetheless, such an impact is an indirect one as 
theorizing is first and foremost an outcome of a scholar’s arduous thinking process. 
Therefore, generational change and power shift are the necessary conditions for 
theoretical innovation such as in the case of EAIRT whilst, as will be elaborated 
below, institutional support and agential choice are the sufficient conditions for such 
changes. 
The sufficient conditions for changes: institutional support and scholar’s agency 
While external factors such as generational change and power shift do matter in 
stimulating EAIRT discourses, theorizing is more directly shaped by the factors closer 
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 to the academic scene, namely the institutional settings and agency role played by 
scholars. As theorizing is a scholarly activity that involves independent thinking and 
self-motivation, academics do have an agency role in deciding what they want to do. 
What the author has found in this study is that the EAIRT proponents do in fact 
display their resolve in theoretical innovation and have produced some initial 
outcomes such as Qin Yaqing’s theory on relationalism, Ling’s Daoist theory of world 
politics, or the emerging ‘post-Western IR’ agenda developed by some Japan-based 
scholars. Nonetheless, these academic movements remain at their early stage and will 
thus require much more effort and time in order to produce notable research outcomes. 
This trend is not unique to the case of EAIRT scholars but has become a general 
practice in the field of IR theorizing. Reportedly, it took Kenneth Waltz 15 years to 
write his Theory of International Politics volume (Jervis 2011, 40) and even much 
longer to develop the thinking that found its way into that seminal work. Arguably, 
therefore, EAIRT will take time to develop in credible ways. The drive toward EAIRT 
with its earliest serious scholarly development dates back to only less than a decade 
ago. Therefore expectations about remarkable research outcomes or the novelty of 
EAIRT should not be overstated at this stage. Even Chinese scholars whose desire for 
a Chinese style theory is strongest are well-aware of this fact. ‘Theoretical innovation 
does not happen overnight’, they reflect (Mao 2013). It is like ‘building a mansion 
which needs a solid basis and cannot be built on sand’ (Ren Xiao, Interview, August 
2013).  
Moreover, theorizing is difficult and time-consuming work that requires not only the 
personal creativity of scholars but also a stimulating working environment. Across the 
three empirical chapters, we can see evidences of how the material and spiritual 
support as well as career incentives presented by those institutions in which the 
theorists are working have contributed to shaping the changing practices of scholars. 
Particularly in East Asia, universities in those countries and territories like China, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapore have poured large investments 
into the construction of new research platforms and personnel recruitment with the 
aim to build IR institutions with global standards. As a result, there have been stricter 
requirements developed for scholars in their academic performance and publication. 
Such competitive environments are encouraging young scholars to engage in more 
serious original research. In China and Japan, for example, this has fostered some 
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 institutionally based IR perspectives such as the Tsinghua approach and Beida camp 
in China or the new ‘Kyoto School’ in Japan. 
Another important finding regarding the agential role of scholars in shaping the 
theory-academic practices relationship is that theoretical claims shape the epistemic 
practices of scholars more clearly than their non-epistemic practices. As the empirical 
chapters of this study have shown, the EAIRT debate shapes the research practices 
(e.g. theoretical discussion, publishing, organization of and attendance at conferences, 
and the searches for funds and allies) of scholars more clearly than their teaching and 
other social practices (networking, policy consultancy, public presentation, etc.). This 
is because research constitutes the most important and frequent practice of the 
intellectual life. In this context, strengthening one’s own theoretical work and 
engaging in debates with those entertaining rival perspectives and positions should be 
seen as a core practical response to the claim for EAIRT. Teaching is another 
important epistemic practice. This study has found that there have been a few, albeit 
important changes in the teaching agenda of pro-EAIRT scholars to match the claims 
they put forward in theoretical debate. Whilst IR theory syllabi in East Asian 
universities look not much different from those taught in the West, courses or sections 
of course that discuss the Chinese IR School, post-Western IR, and non-Western IR 
have been increasingly taught in Chinese, Japanese, and even American universities 
(see Appendix). These new pedagogies may be used as a tool for ‘thought experiment’ 
– projecting new approaches and seeing the reactions from students and other 
scholars. This kind of mutual learning process seems to be lacking in Asian textbooks 
but has been pioneered elsewhere (e.g. Messari, Tickner, and Ling 2016). 
Nonetheless, the impact of theoretical claims on the teaching practice of EAIRT 
scholars is not as strong as that on their research practice partly because not all 
scholars are teaching the same EAIRT-related courses. Some of the academics 
assessed in this study have retired and no longer teach (e.g. Takashi Inoguchi, Ni 
Shixiong). For others who do the teaching, it is not always that they teach the courses 
of IR Theory or East Asian international relations where they can teach what they 
preach in the EAIRT debate. At some institutions such as Peking University, the IR 
Theory course is co-taught by four or five lecturers. Given these diverse institutional 
and personal backgrounds, it is difficult to generalize the impact of EAIRT on 
individual academic teaching practices.  
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 Last but not least, there is also evidence that scholars adopt changes in their social 
activities beyond the academic domain. The extent to which theory can shape 
theorists’ outreach activities depends on how far they are willing to move from their 
natural ‘Ivory Tower’ e.g. engagement in policy consultancy, media/public 
presentation, seeking funding, and networking. Along these lines, it is important to 
note the networking practices among scholars who yearn for change. Proponents of 
non-/post Western IR have played an important role in helping to expand the existing 
structure of IR which is currently centred on the leading Western-based academic 
journals – the so-called ‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ in the field. Either through 
international bodies such as the ISA, regional platforms, or connections with leading 
publishing houses, these scholars have actually attempted to play the gatekeeping role 
themselves. There have been efforts to construct regional publishing platforms such as 
the Japan-based  International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, the Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, and South Korea-based Asian Perspective, etc. to provide an 
outlet for theoretical-oriented research by Western and local scholars with an interest 
in Asian international relations. Additional evidence is the organization of the first 
ISA Asia-Pacific Conference in Hong Kong in 2016 which aims to ‘investigate the 
ways in which IR (as both practice and theory) is being transformed in the Asia-
Pacific’ beyond Western IR theory (ISA 2016). Yet perhaps the clearest examples in 
this sense is the introduction of a new book series titled ‘Global Dialogues: 
Developing Non-Eurocentric IR and IPE’ (series editor: John Hobson and L.H.M. 
Ling). Published by Rowman & Littlefield, this series ‘adopts a dialogical perspective 
on global politics which focuses on the interactions and reciprocities between West 
and non-West, across Global North and Global South’ (Littlefield). This series also 
seeks to register how ‘Eastern’ agency, in tandem with counterparts in the West, has 
made world politics and the world political economy into what it is. According to the 
Rowman & Littlefield’s website, the Editorial Review Board of this series includes 
some of the most vocal participants in the non-Western IRT/EAIRT debate, namely 
Amitav Acharya (US), Pinar Bilgin (Turkey), Ching-Chang Chen and Josuke Ikeda 
(Japan), Alan Chong (Singapore), Shogo Suzuki and Yongjin Zhang (UK).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that there are indeed serious efforts to 
encourage intellectual creativity and to mobilize institutional and social resources to 
make way for theoretical innovation e.g. criticizing existing frameworks, seeking 
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 allies and funding, establishing ‘social organizations’ such as new IR journals, 
conference panels, and book series that talk about EAIRT. What are the constraints 
and/or implications of this movement on the development of East Asian IR studies 
and the IR field more broadly? 
From periphery to semi-periphery? East Asian IR between power shift and 
paradigm shift 
Given all the aforementioned necessary and sufficient conditions for change, what can 
we expect about the evolution of East Asian IR? This thesis has found that although 
there are discernible changes at the national level, scholarly dialogues about a pan-
regional approach remain modest. Even the possibility and desirability of a ‘national’ 
IR theory, such as the Chinese School of IR, is debatable. The constraint for the 
emergence of a regional level theory is largely threefold. 
First and foremost is the ‘preoccupation with national agendas’ and the wide range of 
diverse interests among East Asian IR communities which makes it ‘much less 
cohesive and monolithic academically than Western Europe and North America’ as 
Takashi Inoguchi has pointed out: 
One of the unifying forces of IR scholarship in East Asia is the medium of the 
English language, yet of course this is a primary vehicle for the inculcation of 
ideas that have originated elsewhere in the world, especially North America 
and Europe. In other respects – religion, ideology, culture – and of course a 
recent troubled history there has largely obstructed the development of an East 
Asian consciousness, and this has pervaded into the academic realm. Where 
alternative Asian visions have been suggested – such as Confucianism or 
‘Asian values’ – they have not formed into coherent or persuasive IR concepts 
and certainly not contending paradigms (Inoguchi 2012, 15).84 
Second and more importantly, although there is a proliferation of various national 
schools of IR in the region, East Asian IR communities remain largely dependent on 
Western knowledge in both their methods for constructing new theories as well as in 
their teaching about IR. It can be seen that there are two ways for building ‘East 
Asian’ IRT. The first is distinctly indigenous theorizing about the world – such as 
‘Asian values’ or Confucianism and the second is using Western IR theoretical 
frameworks as a springboard for incorporating the Eastern agency and/or ideas. In 
both senses, ‘East Asia remains underdeveloped’ (Bacon and Newman 2002, 22) for 
84 As analyzed in Chapter 5, this is a view to which the IR mainstream scholars such as Peter 
Katzenstein and David Shambaugh readily concur. 
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 two reasons: the continuous lack of very original approaches, concepts and ideas with 
wider applicability and the path dependence on Western knowledge (including the 
translation and consumption of leading Western IR textbooks). As one Japanese 
scholar has observed, a major reason for this comes from people’s attitude to 
knowledge: ‘to see it as something pre-packaged and simply consumed’ (Josuke 
Ikeda, Interview 2014). Therefore, ‘even if a “Chinese School of IR” drawing heavily 
on distinctly Chinese traditions eventually emerges it will have been mediated via 
theory as practiced in the English-speaking, mostly US-dominated Western world of 
IR’ (Hellmann 2010, 8-9). Looking at more encompassing theoretical approaches that 
may have transnational appeal, few of them are really all that innovative e.g. Lily 
Ling’s Daoist theory of world politics or the emerging post-Western turn in Japan. 
Much of EAIRT scholarship, however, remains a structured re-discovery of past 
theoretical and conceptual innovations. That is actually precisely how theorising in the 
West is meant to work – theoretical innovations in IR over the last decades have been 
attributable to exactly this process. As two local Asian scholars have noted, ‘needless 
to say, the appeal to something Western in order to begin the construction of one’s 
self-knowledge produces a sense of inferiority’ (Shih and Huang 2011, 15).  
In this light, despite the surging interests in becoming knowledge producers, few East 
Asian IR communities can be counted to the semi-periphery of the second tier in the 
existing hierarchy of the discipline. Even Japan and China with their sizable IR 
communities and conscious institutional efforts at increasing their visibility globally – 
recently by establishing the peer-reviewed English language journals such as IRAP, 
AJCP, CJIP – are not having much of an impact globally nor have scholars in either 
China or Japan succeeded in establishing a distinct national profile (Inoguchi 2007, 
2009). In the more distant future, only China, with its continued geopolitical rise and a 
very distinct and old tradition of its own, has the promise to rise to a semi-periphery 
theoretical status or, put differently, to compete with Western IR academia in 
constructing new knowledge about the world (Hellmann 2010, 11).  
Last but not least, there is a lack of dialogue among East Asian IR communities and 
beyond. Most of the EAIRT discourses to date are narrowly focused and the 
transnational appeal of such ‘scholarship’ remains in question. For non-Western/East 
Asian IR to have more regional and even global appeal, it needs to eschew 
exceptionalism and broaden the scope of its applicability beyond the country or region 
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 from which it is derived. In other words, such attempts to develop alternative 
approaches to understanding the world need to ‘travel beyond their nations and 
regions’ (Acharya 2016, 14). In so doing, the most important task for East Asian IR 
community is to have more frequent and productive dialogues with each other so that 
they can learn from each other’s mistakes and to foster a more common approach 
toward IR theorizing. At the moment, there have been some positive developments 
along this line such as the engagement between mainland Chinese scholars and 
diaspora in Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, and Western-based scholars (such as 
L.H.M. Ling, Yongjin Zhang, Feng Zhang, etc.) in providing theoretical input for the 
presumed ‘Chinese School of IR’ or the various regional conferences organized by 
Japan and India-based scholars on the development of post-Western IR agenda. This 
may give some hope for the future development of East Asian IR. 
Moreover, the development of non-Western IRT in East Asia could serve as a major 
precedent, spilling over to a degree to which similar theoretical innovation might 
occur in other regions. In fact, such a development process may usher in an initial 
stage of reformulation of IR itself. Yet a cautionary note here is that such 
reformulation does not mean the dismissal or displacement of Western IR theories. 
Existing Western expertise will be certainly an essential element on which different 
people residing and working in different regions may rely to build their knowledge. 
However, any such process should not stop merely at regionalisation of IR because 
our world is, in fact, becoming both more ‘localised’ and ‘globalised’ (Josuke Ikeda, 
Interview, February 2014). Accordingly, any regionally particularistic view will need 
to accompany the holistic view of the world. In this light, the construction of the 
perceived ‘Global IR’ with an East Asian component in it may indeed help IR build a 
better and more flexible body of knowledge and lead to a more truly representative 
discipline.  
Implications and avenues for future studies 
This thesis represents an inaugural study for investigating the effect of the EAIRT 
debate on the practices of scholars involved in that debate. Its key contribution is 
twofold: to extend our knowledge on an understudied aspect of the theory-practice 
relationship – the practices of theoretical claims and to enrich the sociology of the 
discipline by investigating the applied or professional practices of scholars in bringing 
their claims into life. This study has shown that scholars are generally living what they 
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 preach in theoretical debates as manifested in numerous evidences of change adopted 
by scholars under study. In the process of actualizing their theoretical claims, scholars 
do have an agency in deciding what they want to practice but there are various 
pathways in which structural factors such as the geopolitical, social, and institutional 
ones may intrude or influence in the course of establishing practices and even 
knowledge itself. This conclusion indicates that, despite such laments about the 
theory-practice gap and the perceived irrelevance of IR knowledge, theory and 
practice are intrinsically inter-related.  
A limitation of this study, however, is that it only examines the one-way relationship 
between theory and practice – how theory shapes the practices of scholars but not the 
other way around or what particular linear relationship may exist between the two. 
Therefore, future research should be undertaken to explore whether and if so, how, 
academic practices can shape theory in turn. This kind of research would unveil a 
more complete dynamic explaining the linkages between theoretical claims and 
academic practices and the theory-practice interrelationship.  
Given that this thesis has adopted the ‘most likely case’ approach, it has mainly 
focused on those IR communities where claims for EAIRT are strongest and where 
there are clearest signs of changing practices toward EAIRT – in this case the 
Northeast Asian IR academia and US-based scholars. Further research, therefore, 
should be conducted to determine the impact of the EAIRT debate on the lesser 
developed national IR academia in East Asia, such as those in Southeast Asia. 
Although this study does contemplate the picture of theory development in East Asia 
as a whole, its scope has been restricted by time and resources in examining the 
situation in Southeast Asian IR academia more rigorously. Yet there are also budding 
interests in indigenous theorizing in that part of the world, with the cases of 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia all being potential cases-in-point. Such an 
investigation would certainly be useful in determining the effectiveness of power shift 
and social factors on the practice of IR in small and medium states in Asia. 
Heightened reflexivity on how IR knowledge is produced and practiced in different 
parts of the world can be helpful for making IR a better and truly representative body 
of knowledge.  
The aforementioned limitations, however, do not devalue the contribution of this 
thesis. An investigation on how theory shapes academic practices in the EAIRT 
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 context is the foundational step on which future studies can draw to produce new 
knowledge about the linkages between theory and disciplinary practices as well as the 
sociology of IR more broadly. Importantly, this study establishes validity for the 
assertion that, contrary to the growing concern about the ‘end of IR theory’, there are 
reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the state of the field: IR remains a theory-
driven and theory-oriented discipline. As far as the EAIRT debate is concerned, we 
continue to witness rivalry among different perspectives and approaches. This is 
healthy for theory development in particular and for the IR field as a whole because 
‘rivalry implies debate and debate implies progress’ (Schouten 2008, 6). Although it is 
still too early to conclude whether or not this non-Western/East Asian IRT or the 
broader ‘Global IR’ agenda will form another ‘grand debate’ in IR, it has clearly 
revealed the logic of ‘law of small numbers’ and ‘structural competition’ among rival 
theorists and theories which has characterized the cause of theoretical innovation since 
the very first days when science came into being. As many scholars have rightly 
noted, what makes IR a distinctive discipline is the vibrancy of its theories and 
theoretical debates. Put differently, ‘International Relations may find resilience 
because it has become theory-led, theory-literate and theory-concerned’ (Dunne, 
Hansen, and Wight 2013, 405). Ultimately, theoretical innovation at all level, be it 
grand theory, middle range theories or even embryonic if untested perspectives, will 
help ensure that IR remains a relevant and distinctively exciting discipline. For that 






 Appendix 1:  
List of interviewees85 
Country/
Territory 
Name Affiliation Form of 
interview 















Fudan University Oral 12 August 2013 
Ren Xiao 
 
Fudan University Oral 13 August 2013 
Tang Shiping 
 
Fudan University Oral 
 
13 August 2013 
Wang Yiwei 
 
Renmin University Oral 27 August 2013 
Zhu Feng Peking University 
(2013), moved to 
Nanjing University 
in 2014 
Oral 2 September 2013 
Song Xinning 
 
Renmin University Oral 
 





Oral 3 September 2013 
Zhang Xiaoming Peking University Oral 4 September 2013 
 
Xu Jin  
 
CASS Oral 5 September 2013 
Wang Yizhou 
 
Peking University Oral 6 September 2013 
Shi Yinhong Renmin University Oral 7 September 2013 
 
Taiwan Chih-yu Shih  National Taiwan 
University 












Takashi Inoguchi University of 
Niigata Prefecture 
Oral 13 December 
2013 
Yoshihide Soeya Faculty of Law 
Keio University 
 
Oral 25 December 
2013 
Kazuya Yamamoto Waseda University Returned 
questionnaire 
2 February 2014 
Josuke Ikeda Osaka University Returned 
questionnaire 
5 February 2014 
Kosuke Shimizu Ryukoku 
University 
Oral 8 February 2014 
85 Interviewees were given the choice of indicating their preference for identification: full disclosure or 
confidentiality (anonymous). In the case where an oral interview could not be arranged, a written 
questionnaire was sent to the interviewees via email for them to answer and return to this author. 
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  Giorgio Shani International 
Christian 
University 
Oral 22 February 2014 




25 March 2014 
Yoshiro Sato Ritsumeikan 
Unversity 






moved to Ryukoku 
University 











David Kang University of 
Southern California 






Oral 14 October 2013 
Jack Snyder Columbia 
University 
Oral 16 October 2013 
L.H.M. Ling 
 
The New School, 
New York 
Oral 17 October 2013 
Peter Katzenstein 
 








19 October 2013 
Thomas Berger Boston University Oral 21 October 2013 
David Shambaugh George Washington 
University 



















 Appendix 2: 
Collection of course syllabi on non-Western/East Asian IRT 
1. The Rise of China and Change in World Politics  
- Course convenor: Xu Xin 
- Institution: Peking University. 
(Course syllabus was retrieved from the official website of Peking University). 
2. Culture and Politics in Japan: From Kyoto School to Miyazaki Anime 
- Course convenor: Kosuke Shimizu 
- Institution: Ryukoku University. 
(Course syllabus was provided by Prof. Kosuke Shimizu and included here 
with his approval). 
3. Non-Western Approaches to the World 
- Course convenor: L.H.M. Ling 
- Institution: The New School, New York. 
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 Course syllabus 2:  









 Course syllabus 3: 










Office: Rm 604, 72 Fifth Ave. 
Office Hours:  Thursdays 2:00-4:00pm or by appointment 
Email: LingL@newschool.edu  




This course stems from a lack. That is, scholars and practitioners of International 
Relations (IR) increasingly recognize the need to take into account world politics as a 
whole, rather than presume it fits neatly into the Westphalian inter-state system that 
Europe invented. But they often lack the knowledge on how to do so. And this lack 
involves all in IR, regardless of where one may come from geo-culturally. The 
discipline of IR, in other words, limits our ability to know of, by, and about our world-
of-worlds. It reflects and sustains the hegemony of “the West,” now led by the US 
national security state. 
This course aims to amend this lack. We do so with modesty since we can only cover 
a portion of the world in bits and pieces, fits and starts. But I hope these small 
beginnings will lead to larger insights, giving the student a sense of what’s out there in 
terms of people, power, and perspectives. 
Here, we will examine three world traditions: Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism. 
Please note: this course will not approximate a comparative religion/philosophy 
course. We will not study these world traditions in isolation from one another or our 
contemporary lives. Rather, we will look at how these pre-Westphalian traditions 
interface not only with one another but also our daily lives and the politics that arise 
from them. 
We will cover each tradition from three angles: (1) the philosophy, (2) how it is lived, 
and (3) how it reflects and/or influences contemporary politics. Given the vastness and 
richness of the subjects available, our focus is necessarily limited. Students may want 
to pursue other lines of inquiry in their term papers. 
We conclude this course with a query: is there a post-Westphalian IR in the making? 
And if so, what does it imply for world politics? 
 
REQUIREMENTS 
Class Participation (5%). Students are expected to participate in class discussions. 
Full attendance is presumed. The instructor is obliged to report to the Dean’s office 
any student missing more than 3 classes. 
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 In-Class Summary (10%). Each student must summarize in class within 15 minutes 
one assigned reading. Visual aids or a copy of the summary distributed to cohorts, 
either in hardcopy or by email, is required. The summary should answer the following 
questions: 
1.   what problem/issue is the author addressing? 
2.   what evidence does the author present to substantiate his or her argument? 
3.   is the author persuasive? 
Four Response Papers (15% each, 60% total). Students must write four response 
papers on a reading of their choice. The response paper cannot be on the same reading 
as the student’s in-class presentation. Please spread these response papers over the 
course of the semester rather than hand them in all at once at the end of the semester. 
The purpose of the response paper is for the instructor to check and improve the 
student’s writing skills. It is in the student’s interest to receive feedback on this as 
soon as possible. These response papers must be typed, double-spaced, in size 12 font, 
and no longer than 2 pages. The response paper is due on the day we discuss the 
assigned reading and can be submitted electronically. 
Term Paper or Artistic Project (25%). The term paper gives the student a chance to 
examine a topic in greater depth. The student will focus on a particular question/issue 
and conduct research to answer it. Consultation with the instructor, either in person or 
by email, is required. Outside sources should be used but drawing on the Internet 
alone is not permitted. Students must consult journal articles and books, as well. The 
term paper should be 15-20 pages, no more no less. It should be double-spaced, with 
proper citation format,1 and in size 12 font. The term paper/artistic project is due on 
Friday 11 December 2015. 
NOTE ON PLAGIARISM 
Plagiarism refers to any appropriation of words or ideas without due attribution. Any 
words copied directly from another source must be placed within quotation marks. 
After a direct quote, this form of acknowledgement is required: (author’s last name, 
year of publication: page number of quote) in the text followed by a full citation in the 
Bibliography. Referencing an idea requires citing only the (author’s last name, year of 
publication) in the text followed by a full citation in the Bibliography. A student 
failing to take these precautions could be found guilty of plagiarism and expelled from 
the program.2 
READINGS 
I will email all readings – unless otherwise indicated with an URL. Please print your 
name and email address on the sign-up sheet. If you missed the sign-up sheet, please 
email me. 
______________ 
1 I suggest you use the Reference Citations listed for the International Studies Quarterly.  See 
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478/homepage/ForAuthors.html). 




 You will need to purchase the following book (available on amazon.com): 
Priya Joshi, Bollywood’s India: A Public Fantasy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015) (http://www.amazon.com/Bollywoods-India-Fantasy-Priya- 
Joshi/dp/0231169612/ref=sr_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1439215662&sr=16&key
words=bollywood) 
The University Learning Center 
The University Learning Center provides individual tutoring sessions in writing, ESL, 
math and economics. Sessions are interactive, with tutor and student participating 
equally. Appointments can be scheduled via Starfishor stop by for a walk-in session, 
available every hour from 10:00am to 7:00pm. The ULC is located on the 6th floor of 
66 West 12th Street. For more information, please visit the Center’s website: 
http://www.newschool.edu/learning-center/.  
COURSE OUTLINE 
Session 1 (9/2):  Introduction: International Relations (IR) – Neither 
International Nor Relational 
Introduction of the course and the state of IR as a discipline of study for world 
politics. L.H.M. Ling, “The Red Dust of World Politics: Paradigms of Self and Other 
Compared between The Quiet American and Dream of the Red Chamber” 
(powerpoint presentation). 
Session 2 (9/9): How to De-Colonize IR? 
Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New 
Agenda for International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014): 647-659. 
International Studies Review (2015), special issue: Forum on “Global IR, Regional 
Worlds”: 
•   John Mearsheimer, “Benign Hegemony.” 
•   Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?” 
•   Peter J. Katzenstein, “Diversity and Empathy.” 
•   Navnita Chadha Behera, “Knowledge Production.” 
•   Barry Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?” 
•   J. Ann Tickner, “Knowledge is Power: Challenging IR’s Eurocentric 
Narrative.” 
•   Peter Vale, “Inclusion and Exclusion.” 
•   Shiping Tang, “Practical Concerns and Power Considerations.” 
•   Shirin M. Rai, “One Everyday Step at a Time.” 







 I. ISLAM 
Session 3 (9/16): Islam & IR 
Maurits Berger, “Religion and Islam in Contemporary International Relations,” 
Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations April 2010 
(http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100400_cdsp_book_mberger.pdf) 
Nassef  Manabilang Adiong, “Accommodating Islam into IR: the Case on Nation-
State,” in Nassef  Manabilang Adiong (ed.), International Relations and Islam: 
Diverse Perspectives, pp. 139-144 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2013).  
[9/23: NO CLASS, YOM KIPPUR] 
Session 4 (9/30): Political Islam [Guest Lecturer: Massimo Ramaioli, PhD 
Candidate, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs, Syracuse University] 
Hamid Enayat, “Introduction: The Relevance of the Past,” in Modern Islamic Political 
Thought (London: IB Tauris, 1982). 
Imam Khomeini, “Foreword” and “Introduction,” in Islam and Revolution – Writings 
and Declarations, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (London: Routledge, 
1985). 
Bassam Tibi, “Why Islamism is not Islam,” in Islamism and Islam (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
Yahya Sadowski, “Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Question?” Annual Review of 
Political Science (9) 2006: 215-240. 
Session 5 (10/7): War & Peace in Islam 
S.M. Farid Mirbagheri, War and Peace in Islam: A Critique of Islamic/ist Political 
Discourses (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 
•   Introduction: “Framework of Analysis and Setting the Questions,” pp. 1-13. 
•   “The Concepts of War and Peace and their Comparative Positions in an 
Islamic 
Context,” pp. 81-114. 
•   “The Question of Jihad,” pp. 115-138. 




Session 6 (Saturday 10/10 from 2-4pm, Klein Conference Room (A 510) at 66 W 12th 
Street): What is Hinduism? 
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 John Stratton Hawley, “Naming Hinduism,” The Wilson Quarterly 37 (4) 1991: 387-
401. Gurcharan Das, The Difficulty of Being Good: On the Subtle Art of Dharma 
(New Delhi: Allan Lane, 2009): 
•   “The Central Story of the Mahabharata,” p. xvi 
•   “Arjuna’s Despair,” pp. 88-116  
•   “Krishna’s Guile,” pp. 183-212 
•   “Mahabharata’s Dharma,” pp. 256-275. 
 
James A. Hijiya, “The Gita of J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 144 (2) June 2000: 123-167. 
[10/14: NO CLASS, INSTRUCTOR WILL BE IN BUENOS AIRES! 
MEANWHILE, INSTRUCTOR WILL PROVIDE SEVERAL BOLLYWOOD 
FILMS FOR YOU TO VIEW DURING THIS WEEK.] 
Session 7 (10/21): Bollywood’s India 
Priya Joshi, Bollywood’s India: A Public Fantasy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015) [whole book]. 
Nissim Mannathukkaren, “Subalterns, Cricket and the ‘Nation’: The Silences of 
‘Lagaan’,” Economic and Political Weekly 8 December 2001: 4580-4588. 
Patrick Colm Hogan, “So What’s the Deal with All the Singing?” Understanding 
Indian Movies: Culture, Cognition and Cinematic Imagination (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2008). 
Session 8 (10/28): Theorizing Politics in the Subcontinent 
Jimmy Casas Klausen, “Economies of Violence: The Bhagavadgītā and the Fostering 
ofLife in Gandhi’s and Ghose’s Anticolonial Theories,” American Political Science 
Review 108 (1) February 2014: 182-195. 
R. Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra: A Pendulum Theory of History,” Southeast 
Asian Studies 17 (1) 2010: 1-6. 
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M. Grey, “Encountering the Mandala: the Mental and Political Architectures of 
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P.U. Manggala, “The Mandala Culture of Anarchy: the Pre-Colonial Southeast Asian 
International Society,” Journal of ASEAN Studies 1 (1) 2013: 1-13. 
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 III. CONFUCIANISM 
Session 10 (11/11): Social Relations & Social Order 
Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, “The Tributary System as International Society in 
Theory and Practice,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5 (1) 2012: 3-36. 
Wang Gungwu, Renewal: The Chinese State and the New Global History (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2013): 
•   “Another Kind of Nation,” pp. 29-54. 
•   “Sovereign Relationships Are Not Absolute,” pp. 55-80. 
•   “Modernity, the State and Civilization,” pp. 103-130. 
 
[SPECIAL SESSION 11 (11/17): TEA CEREMONY, TBA] 
Session 12 (11/18): Confucianism as a Living Tradition 
Jay Goulding, “‘Three Teachings Are One’: The Ethical Intertwinings of Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Daoism,” in Xinyan Jiang (ed.), The Examined Life: Chinese 
Perspectives, pp. 249-278 (Binghamton: SUNY Press, Global Academic Publishing, 
2002). 
Tianbiao Zhu, “Compressed Development, Flexible Practices, and Multiple Traditions 
in China’s Rise,” in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Sinicization and the Rise of China: 
Civilizational Processes beyond East and West, pp. 99-119 (London: Routledge, 
2012). 
Caroline S. Hau, “Becoming ‘Chinese’ in Southeast Asia,” in Peter J. Katzenstein 
(ed.), Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond East and 
West, pp.175-206 (London: Routledge, 2012). 
Session 13 (Tuesday 11/24 but on Wednesday schedule): Confucianism in 
Politics, Past & Present 
Takeshi Shiraishi, “The Rise of China and its Implications for East Asia,” in Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.), Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond 
East and West, pp. 120-150 (London: Routledge, 2012).  
“Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream,” Economist 4 May 2013 
(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-
should- serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping). 
Ching-Chang Chen, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: An Ethos of 
Appropriateness and China’s ‘Loss’ of Ryukyu,” in Pinar Bilgin and L.H.M. Ling 
(eds), Decolonizing ‘Asia’? Unlearning Colonial/Imperial Power Relations (London: 
Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming). 
[11/25: NO CLASS, THANKSGIVING BREAK] Session 14 (12/2): What Next? 
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